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Part One of this study is a historical narrative that addresses the political, economic, and 
technological factors associated with the building of the first railroads in North Carolina, and their 
relationship to the railroad in Virginia. Both the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road and the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road were completed in 1840. The latter did not run to Raleigh, as was the original intention 
when it was incorporated in 1833, but rather it terminated near the Weldon Toll Bridge on the Roanoke 
River where it connected to the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road. The Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road, 
incorporated in 1835, connected to the Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road, a branch line of the Petersburg 
Rail Road, by its own bridge over the Roanoke approximately twelve miles west of Weldon. The two North 
Carolina railroads lacked the benefit of a connection that would bring them into a network. This part of the 
study concludes with the assessment that trade competition between the commercial centers of Norfolk and 
Petersburg adversely influenced early railroad development in North Carolina. 
Part Two of this study presents two spatial hypotheses. The first advances the position that early 
railroad development in North Carolina would mirror railroad development in southern Virginia to form an 
alignment of commercial centers north-to-south rather than east-to-west within physiographic regions. The 
second hypothesis suggests that the early railroads in North Carolina could have intersected north-to-south  
and east-to-west to form a productive network across physiographic regions. Of the many railroads 
proposed in North Carolina during the 1830s, the Waynesborough and Raleigh route seems the most likely 
component of an alternative network that would support the second hypothesis, if its practicality can be 
demonstrated by a plausible model. The empirical model prepared for this study replicates the conventions 
of a period railroad survey utilizing modern geographic tools and resources. The analysis of the resulting 
estimate supports the proposition that this railroad could have been built at that time had the interests in 
Raleigh and Wilmington agreed to one railroad to the Roanoke. The viability of other options suggests the 
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 Dr. Maureen Basedow, an archaeology professor at the University of North 
Carolina at Wilmington, initiated my research on the early railroads of North Carolina by 
suggesting that I map the surviving structures of the site of the railroad complex at 
Wilmington and provide the general dates of their construction. This was a particularly 
attractive assignment for the reason that my father, Edmund E. Burke, had frequently 
taken me to the facility as a child during the twilight years of its operation; and as an 
undergraduate in the 1970s, I had frequented the site before most of its structures had 
been demolished.  
After completing this assignment, I had a strong desire to continue the research. 
Under the guidance of Dr. W. Frank Ainsley of the Earth Sciences department at UNC-
Wilmington, I began preparing a survey of the existing railroad-related structures and 
architecture along the 161½ miles of the route of the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad. 
Dr. Ainsley has maintained an unflagging interest in my research since that time, and I 
am honored the he chose to serve as the outside member of my dissertation committee.  
Upon entering the Historic Preservation program at the University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro in 2002, Dr. Jo Ramsay Leimenstoll encouraged me to continue 
my research by exploring the relationship between railroad development in Eastern North 
Carolina and the diffusion of stylistic innovations in domestic architecture within the rail 
corridor. This research served as a foundation for preparing several chapters and 
appendices presented here. 
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In 2004, I was granted the privilege of being accepted into the Ph.D. Program in 
the Department of Geography at UNC-Greensboro, where I encountered a faculty that led 
me to expand the scope of my research to embrace the many spatial aspects of the topic. 
 I begin by thanking my committee. Dr. Elizabeth Nelson devoted a considerable 
portion of her time to reviewing the maps in my dissertation, and offering her editorial 
skills to its final preparation. Dr. Zhi-Jun Liu introduced me to the area of GIS 
programming, and rekindled my interest in mathematics. Dr. Phillip Royall encouraged 
me to expand my inquiry into the realm of physical geography, a direction that had a 
profound influence upon the changing of my original research design. Dr. Jeffery Patton 
served as chairman of my dissertation, and I greatly appreciate the many enlightening 
four-hour meetings he set aside to discuss the many drafts of my work, and provide sound 
advice from the preparation of my research design to the completion of the dissertation. 
Other member of the faculty not connected with my dissertation offered useful input, 
including Dr. Gordon Bennett, Dr. Selima Sultana, and Dr. Keith Debbage. I am grateful 
to the department for securing an assistantship and tuition wavier in 2007. 
Many individuals and institutions have aided my research over the years. I would 
like to express my thanks to Donna Kelly in the Historical Publications Section of the 
Division of Historical Resources in the Office of Archives and History in Raleigh that 
facilitated permission to use maps from North Carolina in Maps by W.P. Cumming. 
Beverly Tetterton and Joseph Sheppard of the New Hanover County Library provided 
copies of useful maps, and most of stockholder reports of the Wilmington & Weldon Rail 
Road Company referenced in this study. Sadie Hood and the staff of the Wilmington 
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Railroad Museum gave me unlimited access to their archives and collection of artifacts. 
Through their assistance, I gained insight into the early railroad technology and the day-
to-day operation of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road.  I appreciate the assistance of 
Habte M. Teclemariam, Senior Reference Librarian of the Geography and Map Division 
of The Library of Congress in locating Hamilton Fulton’s Plan of Croatan and Roanoke 
Sounds, a copy of which is included herein. I also acknowledge the assistance of Traci 
Thompson of the Braswell Library, Elaine Sandberg of the South Carolina State Library, 
Molley French of the Charleston County Public Library, Rhonda Koenig of the Wayne 
County Public Library, the staff of the North Carolina State Archives, the staff and 
volunteers at the North Carolina Transport Museum at Spencer, and the staff of the 
Richmond Public Library.  
F. Donald Hickman applied his skills to the grueling task of proofing multiple 
drafts of this work, along with offering valuable editorial criticism, encouragement, and 
sound advice in dealing with the less pleasant moments of this endeavor. I appreciate his 
tireless work, often proofing different versions of the same chapter many times over. 
Cynthia A. Johnson assisted me with field study, and several of her photographs appear 
as figures in the present volume. I am appreciative of the generosity of Gregg Turner for 
sending a copy of his book A short History of Florida Railroads, to Bob Cooke of the 
Civil War Roundtable for sharing copies of his articles on the history of the Wilmington 
& Weldon Railroad during the Civil War, and to Dr. Doug Rader, who shared his 
research on the deeds of the Slocomb Plantation in Dudley, North Carolina. My 
conversations with George Savage of Tarboro enhanced my understanding of the 
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transportation and economy of rural Edgecombe County during the late 19th and early 
20th century.  Trillian Hosticka offered her skills in proofing early drafts of two chapters 
of this work.           
I feel fortunate to have had the benefit of support from my friends and family 
including John E. Best, Mary Hall-Brown, Edmund Burke, Patrick Burke, Robert Burke, 
Ernesto Ferreri, Victor Galloway, Donald Hickman, Almira Johnson, Cynthia A. 
Johnson, Clyde Rollins Sr., Clyde Rollins, Jr., the late Elizabeth Rollins, Dr. Michael 






 Throughout the preparation of this work, the author considered several different 
approaches to organizing its content. Ordinarily, empirical studies in geography follow 
the traditional form of introduction of the hypotheses, a review of the literature, a 
description of the research methodology, analysis of the acquired data, discussion, and 
conclusions. However, the research topic of this study is obscure, being concerned with 
complex, unfamiliar details of the distant past, and lacking any substantial body of 
current research. To overburden the reader with purely historical research while at the 
same time introducing theoretical research associated with the analytical methods seems 
counterproductive. To present a complete part dedicated to the history of the early 
railroads of North Carolina with detailed attention to the early railroad technology, 
survey and construction methods, finance, and planning becomes a matter of necessity. In 
addition, this part should illumine the related history of the internal improvement 
movement in the state as well as the political environment in which it emerged. Extrinsic 
factors, such as Jacksonian economic policy, British investment practices and iron 
manufacturing, and the evolution of the American civil engineering tradition are relevant 
to railroad development in North Carolina. To introduce hypotheses after the reader 
acquire an overview of the subject in the historical narrative is appropriate. 
 The second part of this work follows the accepted form for empirical research in 
geography. It uses data gleaned from early railroad surveys undertaken by civil engineers, 
treatises on railroad technology, annual reports of several period railroad companies, and 
statistics compiled by the State of North Carolina and the United States Census. In 
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addition, modern geological and topographical geodatasets are used for GIS applications 
employed throughout the part. The research problem is simple, and the hypotheses draw 
upon the historical research presented in the first part. Many proposed railroad projects 
were under consideration in North Carolina during the 1830s. Some of these were 
impractical, and these can be disregarded in the analysis based upon information present 
in the historical narrative. One or more of these plans cannot be dismissed. They present 
the possibility that the early railroads of North Carolina could have been shaped into an 
alternative network. If there is a strong economic or technical factor that influences the 
model of these possible routes or the alternative network adversely, it is likely the early 
railroads constructed in North Carolina represent the best available option under 
particular conditions, regardless of their redundancy. However, if a more efficient 
alternative network was possible, the planners of the early railroads were in error. 
 Modeling an alternative railroad, or network of railroads, is a form of 
counterfactual analysis. This approach, usually finding applications in sociology and 
history, is particularly well suited for certain geographic problems. Geographic modeling 
is often directed towards “what if” propositions related to an actual landscape with 
measureable properties. It is easier to place hypothetical objects on a landscape, past or 
present, and to produce a plausible model of their cost and economic impact than to 
defend an alternative outcome for historical events based upon the addition or removal of 
certain causal factors. The methodology employed by the author to produce 
counterfactual models in the second part of this work involves an examination of the 
topography of the landscape on the probable route of a proposed railroad, and rendering 
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its profile as code sequences that correspond with the railroad construction conventions 
employed by civil engineers during the 1830s. By comparing the calculations from the 
extant railroad for excavation, embankment, trestlework, and grades appropriate for the 
available locomotive technology, it is possible to do so for the counterfactual model for 
estimating its cost. The analysis is aided by the fact that some of the railroads were 
constructed at a later time, and one of particular interest was under the direction of the 
same civil engineer responsible for some of the early railroads. Foreseeing the likelihood 
that at least one model would have feasible, the analysis should continue with a 
comparison using more conventional statistical methods. The existing data on the change 
in land values, agricultural output, and population within the corridors of the early 
railroads, the counties through which the counterfactual railroads would have passed, and 
the actual railroads that took the routes of the models at a later time should yield a 
plausible estimate of the earning potential of the counterfactual model. 
 The final part of this work includes a set of appendices that address certain topics 
in depth that could not be included in the historical narrative, but rather supplement its 
reading. Many of these appendices are separate studies unto themselves on specific 
topics. These are followed by the bibliography. 
 The continuous pagination throughout these parts reflects the author’s desire that 
the work should be viewed a whole, regardless of length, rather than an empirical study 
rooted in purely geographic concepts sutured to historical narrative. Together the parts 
comprise a single work in the field of historical geography, and cannot as standalone 
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works fully answer the host of questions surrounding the origins of the early railroads in 
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What conditions influenced the evolution of North Carolina’s antebellum rail 
network? In several aspects of planning, including route selection, the earliest railroads in 
the state appear to deviate from the more frequently observed models of railroad 
development.  
D.W. Meinig, in his examination of two different railroad networks, one in the 
Columbia Basin of the United States and the other in south Australia, observed that the 
designers of both intended to connect farming districts with the coast. One was built and 
operated by a private corporation, and the other was a state supported railroad. The first 
railroad had been an improvement upon an existing transportation system that connected 
steamboat landings on the Columbia River with grain producing areas in the interior 
(Meinig, 1962, 395-396). North Carolina’s first railroads included a railroad in the 
Piedmont that terminated at the Roanoke River, and a railroad that traversed the Coastal 
Plain from the port of Wilmington to the town of Weldon on the Roanoke.  
The first was a private corporation, and the second was a corporation chartered 
under a public act, with the state holding two-fifths of the capital stock. Both connected 
to Virginia railroads, and their termini were located at the ends of the Roanoke Canal. 
Their Virginia counterparts had built their railroads to the river first, but not to transport 
produce from the interior to river landings. It was entirely the reverse. These railroads 
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intercepted produce transported on the Roanoke before and after it passed through the 
canal. Early railroad promoters in North Carolina also proposed plans that would involve 
connecting inland water routes to commercial towns by rail to intercept produce 
transported by river to out-of-state markets.  
James Iredell, Jr., governor of North Carolina from 1827 through 1828, 
recommended building an experimental railroad from Fayetteville to Campbellton, a 
distance of approximately two miles. John Owen, his successor, suggested that such a 
railroad should extend to the Yadkin or Great Pee Dee (Owen, 1828, 11). The idea of 
connecting the Great Pee Dee to the Cape Fear appeared as early as 1820. Steamboat 
transport from Cheraw, South Carolina, on the Great Pee Dee sufficed for the time. 
However, some in Cheraw envisioned that a railroad from there to Wilmington would be 
practical with steam locomotives at a future date. The promoters of this plan revived it in 
1833 when they anticipated that a railroad would extend from Virginia to the South 
Carolina line (The People’s Press and Wilmington Advertiser, December 4, 1833, 
October 15, 1834).  
Some early proposals aimed to achieve the same ends by using railroads as a 
substitution for canals to facilitate west-to-east river transportation patterns. During his 
tenure as engineer for the State of North Carolina, Hamilton Fulton proposed the 
construction of “timber railways” as a cost saving method of connecting Raleigh to the 
Neuse River along Crabtree Creek with another railway paralleling Walnut Creek (North 
Carolina, 1821, 30-33). The competition between regional markets and state markets was 
the prevailing influence behind these plans.  
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The state contemplated railroad construction as an alternative to roads and canals 
that would direct produce to internal commercial towns. Regional commercial towns, 
even across state lines, wanted to construct railroads to attract produce away from 
established river routes. In both cases, these plans aimed to supplant established routes 
rather than improve them. River transport was a source of input to the railroads, whereas 
the early railroads of the Columbia Basin delivered agricultural output to the steamboats 
of the Columbia River. 
 Taaffe, et al. (1963) described the typical sequence of transportation network 
development in underdeveloped countries. Using observations from Ghana and Nigeria, 
these researchers identified a pattern of lines of transportation emerging from coastal 
ports and penetrating the interior. Feeder lines, interconnections, and “high priority” 
corridors evolved from these interior connections. The initial motives for establishing 
these connections were administrative, defence, or gaining access to agricultural or 
mineral resources.  
One of the early North Carolina railroad proposals did fit this port to interior 
model. Joseph Caldwell, the first president of the University of North Carolina, proposed 
a plan for a Central Rail Road spanning the state from Beaufort to the mountains in The 
Numbers of Carlton in 1828. Caldwell, a mathematician, provided a route for this railroad 
than can be determined indirectly from a table of places in the state and their distance 
from the line. The work also included useful statistics on the cost of transportation of 
crops to market by the prevailing means (Caldwell, 1828, 21-23, 41-47).  For the time, 
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the plan was both visionary and impractical. However, the idea of the Central Rail Road 
took hold of the public mind, particularly in the piedmont.  
On August 1, 1828, two hundred people attended a meeting held at William 
Albright’s home in Chatham County to listen to Dr. Caldwell. The address and 
resolutions of that meeting were published (Mebane and Heartt, 1828). By the early 
1830s, this plan was at the core of the state’s policy on projected internal improvements. 
The North Carolina Railroad, completed from Charlotte to Goldsboro in 1856, and the 
Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad, completed from Goldsboro to Beaufort in 1858, 
represents the late realization of the policy. The Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road, a plan to 
connect the port of Wilmington to Morganton via Fayetteville, was another railroad 
proposal of the port-to-interior model. However, the project languished during the 
antebellum period and was final constructed toward the end of the century. The evolution 
of the early rail network of North Carolina did not follow the model suggested by Taaffe 
and colleagues (Taaffe, 1963). The organization of transportation under a central 
authority to achieve such a state system was not established. The railroad routes ran from 
the port of Wilmington and at Raleigh, the state capital, terminating to north through their 
respective physiographic regions without connecting.   
Did the early promoters of railroads fully understand the nature and expense of 
rail transportation? In the 1830s, every railroad was an experiment in so much as each 
was testing a new technology under unique economic and geographic conditions (Ruffin, 
1836, 766-767). That the early promoters of railroads, particularly those supporting 
extensive projects, fully understood the limitations or the unique nature of railroads is 
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doubtful. The American press touted the advantages of railroads over canals in the early 
1820s. This was remarkable, as locomotives were still in the experimental stage and had 
not yet proven their reliability.  
The pioneer in the field of locomotive design, English engineer George 
Stephenson, would produce a suitable design by the late 1820s, build a first full-scale 
locomotive in 1825, and perfect it in 1827. An actual steam railroad opened between the 
port of Liverpool and the manufacturing town of Manchester in 1829 (The American 
Farmer, October 15, 1824, March 4, 1825; Niles’ Weekly Register, March 26, 1825; 
Stearns, 1998, 31).  
The excitement of the press of the mid-1820s was conjectural. The few successful 
experiments with locomotives prompted the logical conclusion that putting down lengths 
of track was easier than excavating canals. Joseph Caldwell, the author of the Central 
Rail Road plan, suggested that the rails would accommodate horse drawn wagons and 
any person providing his own vehicle could use the railroad by paying a toll. There would 
be sidetracks for passing traffic every third of a mile (Brown, 1928, 15-16). While the 
idea of making railroads suitable for both locomotives and horses was common in this 
period, Caldwell’s suggestion that anyone with the properly fitted wagon could use the 
tracks at will implies that he was thinking of the railroad as a type of turnpike. Others, 
such as the promoters of the Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road, assumed that constructing 
large-scale railroads was merely a matter of economy of scale. Private investors in 
different communities through which the rails would pass could share the cost of 
construction and operation. They would enjoy the profits, both in dividends and increased 
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commerce. However, the task of constructing and managing railroads required an 
organization of labor and capital that was qualitatively different from any economic 
activity that preceded it.  
Did the primitive railroad technology limit the selection of routes, and retard the 
development of the network? The developers of later railroads enjoyed the benefits of 
knowing these limitations prior to planning a connection or network. The civil engineers 
employed by the railroads to conduct surveys and recommend construction methods were 
refining their craft on the job. The prevailing methods of construction had inherent 
weaknesses that created long-term financial liability for the companies. The abundance of 
wood and the scarcity of domestic iron suggested using strap iron wooden rails for the 
initial construction of the way, but the longer these rails remained in use, the higher cost 
of maintenance caused profits to decrease. An east-to-west railroad like the Central Rail 
Road, the key element of early state policy, appears incompatible with 1830s technology.  
How did the nationwide financial downturn of the late 1830s and early 1840s 
derange the early plans for a rail system, and what was the long-term impact on its future 
development? The completion of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road and the Raleigh 
& Gaston Rail Road coincides with the destabilization of the financial base of the United 
States economy that began with the Panic of 1837. The economy remained depressed 
through the mid-1840s, and recovery in the Southern states lagged behind other sections 
of the Union. Work had commenced during a period of prosperity, and both railroads 
strived to achieve north-to-south connection through the state. The Raleigh & Gaston 
Rail Road would form a link between the Petersburg Rail Road and the projected Raleigh 
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& Columbia Rail Road. Efforts to capitalize on the latter failed, and the Raleigh & 
Gaston’s finances began to deteriorate before it was completed, with diminishing profits 
forcing it into foreclosure. The plan for an interior corridor through Raleigh failed to 
materialize during the antebellum period. The North Carolina Railroad displaced the 
interior corridor to the west. The Wilmington & Raleigh survived the financial downturn, 
and through its steamboat service to Charleston established the north-to-south corridor. 
However, it struggled with debt, and the company deferred construction of a branch line 
connecting to the interior and south. Without branch lines, it did not serve the interest of 
the interior regions, or improve its profits with a through rail to the south. 
What were the strengths and weakness of the North Carolina’s policy on internal 
improvements? One of the key functions of government is to build and maintain a 
transportation infrastructure that serves the most remote reaches of its domain so that all 
its citizens have the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of communication and commerce. 
In theory, all regions within a state should be equally represented in the process of the 
planning a transportation network, with their particular needs and resources considered 
only in the context of the whole. The citizenry must come to an equitable arrangement on 
the distribution of the tax burden that will finance it. If a state fails to develop a 
comprehensive policy for transportation, or lacks the political will to abide by one, the 
transitory demands of the market will assume the deciding role in public work. The 
resulting network, in the form of permanently established routes, will preserve sectional 
differences within a state even though the former economic interests in these sections are 
no longer relevant.          
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The history of the internal improvements in antebellum North Carolina is 
inseparable from the political character of the state as it developed after the Revolution. 
Richard Hartshorne observed that in most state areas physical or cultural barriers, to a 
degree, separate regions; regions have varying relationships with outside states; and 
regions differ from each other in population, economy, and political attitudes 
(Hartshorne, 1950, 105). Four distinct physiographic regions, the outer coastal plain or 
tidewater, the inner coastal plain, the Piedmont, and the mountains divide North Carolina. 
The Cape Fear Region, the Eastern Region, the Piedmont Region, and the Mountain 
Region comprise the current cultural and economic divisions of the state. A delegate to 
the 1835 North Carolina Constitutional Convention described the state’s divisions as an 
obstacle to internal improvements. 
 
It is a lamentable fact, that there exists a mutual jealousy all over out State, not 
only between East and West, but between the Cape Fear, the Neuse, the Roanoke, 
&c. And the consequence is, whenever any improvement is proposed in one 
section, an opposition arises in another, and a resort must be had to that odious 
system, known by the name log-rolling, to carry any point. 
 
– (North Carolina, 1836, 124) – 
 
 
Logrolling – the exchange of political favors to achieve a regional goal – is not a 
device that has faded from politics. However, the “mutual jealousy” described by the 
delegate is defined by the major river basins and physiographic regions. The organization 
of pre-railroad antebellum political factions appears to have oriented around river 
transportation routes in the east, and land transportation routes in the west. The lack of 
equal representation in the legislature was a defect in the North Carolina State 
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Constitution of 1776; it became apparent only as the western part of the state was 
gradually settled, and each section began to agitate for internal improvements. The 
ambitious plan proposed by Archibald Murphey in the 1810s and the state plan proposed 
by the Internal Improvement Conventions of 1833 required a unified legislature to move 
forward. The ratification of the North Carolina State Constitution of 1835 resolved some 
of the inequities of the early constitution, but it took more than a decade before North 
Carolina acted on a state plan. 
Finally, the State of North Carolina as a political whole fashioned its internal 
improvement policy from the beginning around preventing commerce from being carried 
out of state to Virginia and South Carolina. However, the diverse sections of North 
Carolina had trading relationships with different commercial centers of in these states, 
and these connections tended to interfere with policy-making. Further complicating the 



















THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 
 
 The economic Railroad development in the United States took it first great strides 
in the antebellum South. The Baltimore & Ohio and the Charleston & Hamburg railroads 
pioneered large-scale railroad construction in the late 1820s. Compelled by the region’s 
extensive geography, the early southern railroads exceeded their northeastern 
counterparts in length. Many historians have advanced the conclusion that the southern 
railroads failed to evolve into a coherent network because of undercapitalization, poor 
planning, nonstandard construction techniques and gauges, and the lack of rail 
connections between cities and the rest of the country. James A. Ward, author of 
Railroads and the Character of America, 1820-1887, found that many of these 
assumptions about the inferiority of southern railroads emanate from a narrow scope of 
research, much of it concerning the network’s wartime inadequacies. Using Albert 
Fishlow’s regional-capital-investment series for railroads and Henry V. Poor’s 
compilation of yearly railway mileage, Ward found that southern railroads met or 
exceeded the national average capitalization per mile between 1837 and 1842. The lack 
of standardization of gauge was a problem throughout the Union, not limited to the 
southern railroads. Additionally, he noted the primary function of these railroads was to 
provide transportation to the nearest market, not to supply the needs of bordering states. 
Ward attributes the decline in the gross capitalization per mile in the South after 1842, 
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thus the rate of railroad development, to the region’s slow recovery from the nationwide 
depression that followed the Panic of 1837. The scarcity of technical expertise brought 
about by service of West Point-trained civil engineers in the Mexican War and 
construction of the foreign money markets following the outbreak of the Crimean War 
prevented many southern railroads from upgrading the 1830s technology of their initial 
construction (Ward, 1973).  
 The impact of the economic downturn of the late 1830s influenced the 
developments of North Carolina’s antebellum rail network. Advocates of internal 
improvements had devised a state plan for a network consisting of intersecting north-to-
south and east-to-west corridors in 1833. The state granted charters to a number of 
promising railroad projects that year. By the beginning of 1840, the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road and the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road were nearing completion. When 
the North Carolina General Assembly met in their 1848-49 session, the state did not 
actually have a rail network, merely two fragments of a state system of internal 
improvements that evolved contrary to earlier plans. At this point, both railroads were on 
the verge of becoming inoperable. The tracks of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road and the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, originally constructed with perishable strap-iron 
wooden rails, needed reconstruction with durable heavy iron (Graham, 1848, 3-8). The 
Raleigh & Gaston was then, for all purposes, a state-owned railroad. After defaulting on 
interest payments for state endorsed bonds, North Carolina instituted foreclosure 
proceedings against the company in 1845, and took possession of the railroad the 
following year. Throughout its existence as a private company, its net profits proved 
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insufficient to service its debt and balance expenditures. The State of North Carolina had 
also endorsed the bonds of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, and it was the railroad’s 
largest shareholder. The company, though deeply in debt, was profitable and its future 
prospects appeared encouraging. The company had yet to declare dividends. Regardless 
of the productiveness of these investments the state was obliged, for the sake of the 
public good, to facilitate the rebuilding of these railroads and lend its support to the long 
awaited east-to-west trunk line that would bring the existing railroads into a state network 
(Brown, 1928, 33-39, 53-58). Disruptive external economic forces contributed to the 
conditions of the railroads in 1848. This was compounded by earlier planning decisions 
made by the individual railroad companies and the inability of the state to adopt a 
comprehensive system of internal improvements that left the railroads open to the ill 
effects of the depression.  
 
The Causes of the Financial Disruption 
Andrew Jackson’s opposition to the re-chartering of Second Bank of the United 
States was a key element in the origin of the financial crisis. Several significant 
individuals had played key roles in the formation of the bank, the financiers, John Jacob 
Astor, David Parish, Stephen Girard, Jacob Barker, and two politicians, Alexander James 
Dallas and John C. Calhoun. The charter of the first Bank of the United States expired in 
1811. Within a year, foreign investors withdraw seven million dollars from the nation’s 
economy. The War of 1812 demonstrated to lawmakers that the United States lacked the 
military or financial resources for national defense. By 1814, Dallas was attempting to 
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garner support in Washington for a National Bank – among these, Nathaniel Macon – 
arguing that not only was such an institution necessary, but concerns about its 
constitutionality were unfounded. Dallas was seeking a bank to serve the government’s 
interest in wartime. Nothing became of this, or the efforts aimed at creating a 
commercially oriented national bank. In March of 1816, Congress considered the Dallas-
Calhoun Bill. During the debates, it met with opposition from the likes of the Federalist 
Daniel Webster, and the Democratic-Republican John Randolph. Supporters included 
Henry Clay. The bill passed the House by a narrow margin, and the Senate by a wide 
margin. James Madison signed the bill into law on 10 April 1816 (Walters, 1945, 115-
130).  
The Bank of the United States functioned opposite of the Federal Reserve Banks 
that exist today. The private banks were indebted to this central bank rather than acting as 
its creditors. It exercised its control of banks by restricting the capital available for 
lending so that their notes would not depreciate. It was unpopular with state and private 
banks because it restricted their lending power. Hard currency Democrats favored the 
stabilizing influence of precious metals over paper currency, and a limit on credit to curb 
market volatility. The pro-bank Democrats favored a system that would support business, 
growth, and speculation. Both factions historically opposed a national bank. Thomas 
Jefferson had tolerated the First Bank of the United States because it functioned well and 
there was not enough resistance to it within his party. Jackson was motivated by a hard 
currency ideology and pressure from private banks. Biddle’s attempt to renew the bank’s 
charter in advance of its expiration was impulsive and ill-timed (Hammond, 1947). 
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Jackson, in his state of the union message to Congress in 1829, began his attack 
on the second Bank of the United States after becoming aware of an effort by the bank’s 
supporters to have its charter renewed in advance of its expiration in 1836. Nicolas 
Biddle, the bank’s president, sought Jackson’s support for the re-charter bill as Congress 
considered it in 1832. Jackson did not want the government to be a stockholder in the 
bank, yet he wanted directors appointed by the President of the United States serving on 
the board of the bank in Philadelphia and its branches. He also believed the bank was 
engaging in real estate speculation, so he wanted limits set on the time the bank could 
hold the property it had obtain through defaulted loans; and also wanted the bank to pay 
state taxes on its branch properties at the same rate used for taxing similar property 
owned by state banks. Biddle agreed to the proposed amendments to the charter. The 
bank’s opponents, however, delayed action on passing the bill through Congress. Allies 
of the administration in the Senate proposed amendments to the bill that required the 
bank to surrender its privileges of being the only nationally chartered bank. Foreigners 
were ineligible to hold stock in the bank, and the bank accepted bank notes as payment of 
debt from individuals under the same rules applicable to state chartered banks. The 
branch properties were subject to state taxes. These amendments failed, and the bill 
passed through Congress. On 10 July 1832, the president returned it to Congress with his 
veto message. The bank’s failure to negotiate a compromise was both impolitic and 
shortsighted (Perkins, 1987, 532-538).  
In late 1833, Biddle to cause a contraction of the earning assets and demand 
liabilities of the bank in response to Jackson’s decision to remove federal deposits from 
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the second Bank of the United States to state banks. The Deposit Act of 1836 dispersed 
all but five million dollars of the federal surplus to the states. Biddle’s motives appear 
intended to force the return of deposits or obtaining a new charter. Meerman’s analysis of 
financial statistics of the period indicates that the impact of the contraction was not 
crippling because specie was entering the country due to falling imports and increasing 
exports. The recession that followed the contraction was likely the product of market 
uncertainty (Meerman, 1963, 378-388). The timeline of events began with the ratification 
of the Deposit Act on 23 June 23, 1836. Supplemental Transfers commenced on 1 August 
1, 1836. Specie Circular went into effect on August 15, 1836, and the first and second 
distributions of the federal surplus occurred on January 1, 1837 and April 1, 1837. New 
York banks suspended specie payment on May 10, 1837. Shortly thereafter, the Bank of 
England rejected commercial bills of discount from Anglo-American mercantile houses 
(Rousseau, 459, 484).  
George Macesich advances the hypothesis that the primary source of the 
monetary disturbance in the United States between 1834 and 1845 was external, though 
he does note the influence of internal events. His examination provides an explanation of 
the nineteenth century international specie standard. Counties had to fix and maintain 
specie value, imports and exports of specie had to move freely, specie movement 
influenced domestic money supply, and there had to be a reasonable level of price 
flexibility. Macesich, using statistical methods, determined that the collapse of the 
banking system was an adjustment in the larger international economic structure that was 
dependent of the maintenance of the specie standard, not the influence of Jacksonian 
17 
 
monetary policy alone. The British had invested heavily in the United States during the 
1830s. A number of external events in Europe, such as crop failure in England in 1838 
and a decline in the demand for British textiles, placed strains on the Bank of England, 
prompting the bank to borrow gold from France. The liberality of the London money 
market was constrained (Macesich, 1960).  
After the Second Bank of the United States failed to secure it charter in 1836, the 
bank obtained a charter under the State of Pennsylvania. The bank, still the nation’s 
largest corporation, assumed a policy of extending credit to internal improvement 
projects and financing cotton, the United States’ leading export. These investments 
comprised one-third of the bank’s earning assets. The economy of the South was at a 
standstill. During the summer of 1839, Biddle embarked on a campaign to gain 
dominance of the banks of New York and Boston. The Bank of the United States 
withdrew large amounts in specie from these banks, and shipped large quantities of gold 
to England. The specie, obtained on London and Paris drafts, then sent to Europe to pay 
the draft at a loss, created a loss. The bank’s agent in London, Samuel Jaudon, secured 
capital from the Paris Rothchilds with drafts, and attempted to obtain a loan from the 
Bank of England. He eventually accepted loans from private individuals backed with 
American securities. In spite all efforts, the Bank of the United States was falling victim 
to the maturing postnotes it had sold to bring down its competitors. Unable to meet its 
obligations, the bank was suspended and subsequently declined to ruin in 1841. Wall 
Street remained intact, recognized abroad as a center of legitimate banking (Hammond, 
1947).   
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Richard H. Timberlake would address the question of the central bank in the early 
1960s after the publication of Bray Hammond’s critical work Banks and Politics in 
America. He presented a thesis quite different from Hammond on the demise of early 
central banking. This is, central banking policy was incompatible with the specie 
standard. Society resented a central bank in the United States. The development of banks 
chartered by Congress occurred for fiscal purposes, and “the central banking idea 
developed residually as an ‘external economy’ to the public character of these 
institutions.” There was not a safe ground for these institutions to exist. The Treasury was 
the appropriate repository of public funds, and the authority over currency. Their 
functions could not assume control over hard currency. The commercial banking 
activities of a central bank appeared to tend towards a monopoly. President Tyler, a 
Whig, vetoed a bill that would create a central bank like the Bank of the United States in 
the early 1840s. The Democratic position was that the centralized monetary policy was 
the responsibility of the Treasury. The bank was never revived (Timberlake, 1961).           
The impact of Jacksonian monetary policy on North Carolina came with the 
distribution of the federal surplus. The General Assembly enacted An Act to Aid the 
Internal Improvements of the State that directed the surplus revenue towards the purchase 
of stock in the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road and several other projects (North 
Carolina, 1837, 349-352). North Carolina was slow to obtain a Jacksonian “pet bank” 
after the distributions of federal deposits from the Bank of the United States in 1833. In 
1835, Romulus M. Saunders, a Democrat, successfully persuaded the administration to 
direct deposits to the Bank of North Carolina (Gatell, 1964, 54). Jacksonian monetary 
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policy had the double impact of providing the State of North Carolina with the 
unexpected capital to finance internal improvements, but the individual shareholders of 
the companies – mostly merchants and planters – experienced the resulting deleterious 
effects of the Panic of 1837 and the depression that followed. James Owen, president of 
the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, describes the burden of shareholders in his 1840 
report to North Carolina Board of Internal Improvement a few months after the railroad 
was completed. In the years before the crisis, many of the shareholders had subscribed 
liberally to the stock of the company. During the downturn, the directors of the company 
chose to exercise forbearance with the distressed shareholders that were unable to pay the 
scheduled installment on the shares rather than press for payment (Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road Company, 1840, 7). Owens’s perspective is that of the eastern counties, and 
the planter-merchant class that enjoyed the benefits of external trade. It is unlikely that 
the yeoman farmer of the interior felt the impact of the downturn severely, if at all.  
Historian Bill Cecil-Fronsman noted in Common Whites: Class and Culture in 
Antebellum North Carolina that two economies existed in the state, a modernized market 
based economy and a subsistence economy. Morton Rothstein suggested the concept of a 
dual economy for the antebellum South in 1967. Few historians thought it appropriate to 
consider the plantation economy “modernized,” yet most agree that the practice of semi-
subsistence agriculture in the South represented an independent economic sector. In 
North Carolina, the underdeveloped transportation network of the state deprived many 
farmers of any alternatives other than growing for local consumption. It would be 
pointless to grow more than could be consumed, and transporting elsewhere would have 
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been costly. Economic realities shaped their culture (Cecil-Fronsman, 1992, 97-109). The 
currency of yeoman farmer and his immediate community was produce. The source of 
wealth was on his land, and supremely tangible. Andrew Jackson emerged from this 
background, and had little sympathy for concentrations of capital in Philadelphia, Wall 
Street, or London. The economic crisis of Jacksonian Era was a defining moment in the 
economic history of the United States for those who had access to external markets. 
Therefore, external variables determined the economic reality upon which their culture 
was organized.  
The development of the antebellum railroad network in North Carolina is, above 
all, one event in the historical geography of capitalism. The steam locomotive was a 
technological tool for reorganizing spatial and temporal function of landscape to 
maximize capital. The accumulation of profit drove an outward search for a larger market 
(Saunders, 1995, 9-12). There were traditionalists, such as North Carolina’s elder 
statesman Nathaniel Macon, which advocated a different set of principles on which to 
organize the spatial functions of the state so it might maintain its independence from the 
influence and instabilities of outside markets. Their influence had prevailed in state 
government from the end of the Revolution, and their unswerving resistance to 
centralization shaped the internal improvement movement in North Carolina. They feared 
the emergence of a plutocracy that would overthrow the accomplishments of the 
Revolution and link the fate of the state to foreign interest. Internal improvements was 
the domain of individual and private corporations, not the state, and accepting the aid of 
the federal government for improvements would oblige the state to support its policies. 
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This political philosophy is Antifederalism and its core concepts were incorporated in 
Jeffersonian Democracy and the State’s Rights Ideology that define the character of the 













































THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
Many of the railroads of North Carolina and Virginia mentioned here were built 
under the direction of Major Walter Gwynn, a West Point trained civil engineer. His 
career in North Carolina and the neighboring states would continue through the 
antebellum period, and include a number of hydrological projects, bridge designs, and 
railroad surveys. The American school of civil engineering was still in its formative years 
when the railroad movement began. The science and craft of this new technology was 
European, and the emerging tradition of civil engineering in the United States was the 
agency of its transfer and refinement. The American school possessed both the 
advantages and defects of the English and French schools of thought that influenced its 
development.  
West Point trained engineers formed the foundation of civil engineering in the 
United States; and while the states were reluctant to seek government aid in financing 
public works, they were more than willing to employ army engineers. The passage of the 
General Survey Act of 1824 and the creation of the Board of Engineers for Internal 
Improvements provided turnpike, canal and railroad companies with army engineers. 
Through projects such as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Charleston and 
Hamburg Railroad surveys, engineers such as Major William G. McNeill and Lieutenant 
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George W. Whistler refined the craft of the railroad survey. Throughout the 1830s, Army 
engineers offered technical support that aided the construction of 1,879 miles of track. 
The War Department and Congress began the practice of loaning Army engineers to 
these private companies in the mid-1830s. The Topographical Bureau understood that the 
railroads were of military as well as commercial significance and served the national 
good. If the army withheld its engineering expertise, these worthy projects would suffer. 
After the repeal of the General Survey Act in 1838, many of the West Point trained- 
engineers who participated in these surveys would later become presidents, chief 
engineers, or engineering staff for railroads and canal companies (Hill, 1951, 235-242, 
244-245).   
The threat of slave insurrections and hostile incursions by Native Americans 
prompted the War Department to consider the military potential of this new technology; 
railroad companies, eager to receive technical aid, were quick to call attention to the 
logistical value of their particular railroads. The companies gave army engineers in the 
service of railroads considerable independence. They located routes to avoid steep 
grades, “deep cuttings and heavy embankments, and long viaducts.” Army engineers , 
unfortunately, often recommended different track gauges advocated in various textbooks, 
and acquiesced to advocating the use of less durable wooden rails – at least for initial 
construction – because wood was cheap and abundant. Walter Gwynn, in his capacity as 
chief engineer for the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road advocated wooden rail 
construction. The government and military did not actively pursue a standard of 
construction to avoid the perception of federal interference (Angevine, 2001, 292-318). 
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The training of army engineers at West Point followed the French scientific 
school more so than the tradition of British technical artisanship. Colonel Claudius 
Crozet, a graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique and a professor at West Point, emphasized 
the practical application of mathematics in the curriculum during the early 1800s. The 
French had made considerable advances in the science of hydraulics. The cadets needed 
to conceptualize a project in detail and prepare plans before they could build. Crozet 
introduced Sganzin’s Program d’un Course de Construction, a textbook on transportation 
surveying, to his classes in 1816, “the first textbook in America to discuss reservoirs and 
advocate locks and dams in natural channels.” Captain Dennis Hart Mahan, a West point 
graduate and professor of mathematics (1824), continued his study of engineering in 
France in 1826, and returned to the academy as the best-educated engineer in America. 
His tenure at West Point continued until his death in 1871. However, the influence of the 
French school left the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with a focus on large-scale 
federally sponsored navigation projects, and thus out of the political and economical 
mainstream (Shallat, 1990, 22-24, 28-32, 49-50). 
The field of civil engineering attracted some outside of the military. Charles S. 
Storrow, a graduate of Harvard, continued his education in France at the Ecole des Ponts 
et Chaussees during the early 1830s. During 1831, Storrow visited Britain to examine 
that country’s engineering achievements. There he prepared drawings of the roadbed of 
the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. These proved their worth shortly after his return 
to Boston. The Boston and Lowell Railroad hired him as assistant engineer. In 1835, he 
published his Treatise on hydraulic engineering. It was a landmark work in the history of 
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American engineering, and one of the earliest written in English to build on the 
theoretical advances made in the field by the French. Storrow’s work was quickly taken 
up by Dennis Hart Mahan and became the standard introductory text in hydraulics at 
West Point, and was cited by Mahan in his own works (Ford, 1993, 271-276, 281, 288-
292).  
The Ecole Polytechnique graduated engineers that were also concerned with types 
of engines. Nicholas Leonard Sadi Carnot’s Reflections on the Motive Power of Heat 
(1824) was an obscure work cited by the influential French engineer Benoit Pierre Emile 
Clapeyron, and eventually attracted the attention of William Thomson, Lord Kelvin. 
Though Carnot did not live to explore thermodynamics beyond the Reflections, his latter 
notes suggest a revision of his concepts in a similar direction as those expressed by James 
Prescott Joule on the conservation of energy (Kerker, 1957, 143-149). Francois Marie 
Guyonneau, le Comte de Pambour, another graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique, 
published Traite des Locomotives (1835) and Theorie de la Machine a Vapeur (1844). 
These works employed a high degree of mathematical facility, and remained standard 
texts for decades (Kerker, 1960, 267-268). De Pambour’s equations are cited extensively 
in the Report from The Secretary of War in compliance With a resolution of the Senate of 
24th January, 1838, with a report of the survey of the Charleston and Cincinnati railroad 
(United States, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, 1838, 157: 27-32). 
The transfer of British engineering knowledge to the United States appears to be 
more direct. Benjamin Henry Latrobe, a British professional engineer became the 
engineer for the Philadelphia Waterworks and he was also the architect of the Capitol;  
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considered the father of [professional] architecture and civil engineering in the United 
States, his American career spanned the years 1796 until his death in 1820 (Buchanan, 
1986, 506). Hamilton Fulton, civil engineer for North Carolina, consulted Latrobe on the 
possibility of uniting at least two of the great rivers of North Carolina (North Carolina, 
1819, 22, 32). The British firm of Robert Stephenson and Company at Newcastle-upon-
Tyne supplied some of the early locomotives used on the American railroads (Buchanan, 
511). The Wilmington & Raleigh owned two Stephenson locomotives (Wilmington 
Advertiser, 10 November 1837). American engineers added some useful modification to 
this English equipment, and eventually developed locomotives more appropriate to the 
topography of the American landscape and the cheap methods of rail construction (Cal. 
Scientific Press, 1880, 35).  
Horatio Allen, an engineer for the Delaware & Hudson Canal Company, later the 
chief engineer of the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road, studied railroad technology first 
hand while on an iron purchasing mission to England at the behest of the Delaware & 
Hudson in 1828. Allen was an early advocate of steam power over animal traction. In 
England, he made the acquaintance of George Stephenson who accompanied him on an 
examination of the Liverpool & Manchester Railway, and observed iron rails on wood 
spaced four feet eight inches apart on the Stockton & Darlington Railway. He placed 
orders for the Delaware & Hudson Canal Company for three locomotives from Foster, 
Rastrick & Co. of Stourbridge, and an order for one locomotive from Stephenson. The 
Foster, Rastrick locomotive “The Stourbridge Lion” proved to be too heavy for the track 
of the Delaware & Hudson when it was tested. This was a slight setback. Allen accepted 
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the appointment of chief engineer for the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road in 1828. 
Confident in the future of steam locomotives, he advised the company to build their 
railroad for steam locomotives from the start. His plan for construction was timber rails 
top with iron held in place by spikes. At least eight early English locomotives were used 
on this railroad (Carlson, 1960, 144-146-147). 
George Stephenson had used a track gauge of four feet and eight inches on the 
Stockton and Darlington railroad in 1825. The short railroad was adapted to use as an 
existing tramway used for carrying coal wagons. Stephenson placed iron on the timbers at 
the gauge used by the colliery that employed him. He later used the same gauge on the 
Liverpool and Manchester Railway. He and his son Robert built locomotives for this 
gauge unless a company ordered otherwise. The British engineer Isambard Kingdom 
Brunel experimented with the seven feet gauge. He believed the larger gauge would 
allow the locomotive and car to travel with greater stability and high speeds. The British 
government commissioned trials between the different gauges where the broad gauge 
track proved to be superior. However, the officials from the Board of Trade 
recommended the four feet eight and a half gauge since it was already in wide use 
(Siddall, 1969, 32-33). American engineers planning the Baltimore & Ohio visited 
Stephenson’s Liverpool & Manchester Railway in 1829. Stephenson had expanded the 
gauge by one half inch to allow more room between the rail and the wheel flange. The 
American engineers came away from the experience with the conviction that the 
Liverpool & Manchester was the model for their railroad in all aspects, including track 
gauge. They altered their original plans for using four feet six inch gauge to standard 
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gauge. Other visiting engineers from the United States tended towards round measure 
measurements such as four feet nine inches and four feet ten inches. The five feet gauge 
was widely accepted by American engineers, and its use by the Charleston & Hamburg 
Rail Road prompted the planners of other southern railroads to adopt the gauge. Other 
American engineers, impressed by stability of the ride of the seven feet gauge of the 
British Great Western Railway recommended broad gauges to their companies. The six 
feet gauge was used by the New York and Erie Railroad. Before 1850, the railroads of the 
United States and Canada would use a large range of different rail gauges (Puffert, 2000, 
934-944). 
Methods of rail construction were as varied as the selection of rail gauge. Walter 
Gwynn, chief engineer for the Portsmouth & Raleigh Rail Road and the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road, recommended strap iron wooden rail construction. This consisted of 
iron bar, two-inch wide by one-half inch thick, spiked to heart pine rails resting on oak 
sills. The sills were notched to receive the rails and oak wedges held the rails in place 
(Gwynn, 1833, 5). The Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road used four different methods of 
construction, two types of sleeper construction, pile construction, and truss construction. 
The first sleep construction was the least expensive and suitable for solid ground. Six by 
ten inch wooden rails were set in ten by twelve inch sleepers spaced six and a half feet 
apart. The ground was excavated or filled as needed. With the second sleeper plan, the 
rails are placed three inches into caps, secured with wedges, held in place with a two-inch 
spike, and the sill is bedded lengthwise nearly to its depth in the ground. The size of the 
rail is the same. The sills are nine feet long, and the sills are placed three feet from the 
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center of the road under the rails. The sills are nine by nine inches. The rail is held in 
place by the cap, and the cap is set in the sill. The third construction method used piles. 
These piles were pine logs (?) ten to fifteen inches long driven into the ground by a pile 
driving machine. The company furnished these machines to the contractors working on 
the road. They had a special spade attachment, much like a posthole digger, that 
excavated a hole three and a half feet deep. The piles were placed in the hole, and 
hammered into the soil with a 600-1,000 pound hammer falling along guides. The 
machine stood fifteen feet high, and was mounted on wooden rollers. The piles were 
driven to depths not less than four feet in the ground. They were driven six feet apart 
transversely, and six and a half feet apart longitudinally. When in place, they were cut to 
level, and capped with nine feet six by nines. The truss method was used for very high 
elevations of the track. A foundation of piles had to be placed first. Then an arrangement 
of four eight by ten inch timbers were built into the form of an inverted “W,” and capped 
with a ten by twelve. The bottom sills were twelve by twelve inches. The cost of this type 
of construction ranged from $6,000 to $10,000 per mile (Ruffin, 1833). Strap iron 
wooden rail construction was significantly different than the latter method employed 
using heavy iron rails.  
George W. Whistler, a West Point trained engineer and pioneer in railroad 
surveying and construction in the United States, was employed by the Czar of Russia as a 
consultant on the St. Petersburg and Moscow Railroad in the early 1840s. In a letter to 
Count Kleinmichel in September of 1842, Whistler summed up the arguments for and 
against the use of wide gauges. The advantages included greater stability, a reduction of 
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frication, and the potential for greater speeds. The disadvantages included the increased 
length of axles and their consequent weight, and the cost of material on the road 
associated with the greater width. Significantly, he recommends the use of heavy iron 
rails of sixty pounds per yard supported every three feet. The chair, a cast iron fitting 
between the base of the rail and supporting wood or stone, were commonly used at each 
bearing point on European railroads of the day, but only on the ends where rails joint on 
American railroads. Whistler recommended, based on his own experiences, that the use 
of the H-rail provided greater stability and economy than the more common T-rail 
(Vanderblue and Whistler, 1939).  
The differing selection of gauge, construction methods, and equipment used by 
the early American railroads is attributable to the diffusion of British technology through 
the agency of West Point-trained civil engineers. The passage of the General Survey Act 
of 1824 filled the need for professional engineers for canal and railroad projects by 
lending Army engineers. The American school of civil engineering was influenced by the 
scientific French school; however its emphasis on hydrologic problems rather than the 
new railroad technology led many to seek their knowledge though the few treatises on the 
subject or through visits to England. The American railroad evolved with built-in 
disadvantages, particularly different rail gauges and perishable wooden construction, that 










THE RAILROAD SURVEYS 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, this work explored the origin of the American school of 
civil engineering, the role of United States Topographical Bureau engineers in early 
railroad development, and some techniques used in railroad surveys. This chapter will 
examine a number of surveys from the 1830s in detail to determine what construction 
techniques they recommended for particular terrains. 
United States Civil Engineer DeWitt Clinton conducted a survey for a railroad 
from the Portage Summit of the Ohio Canal to the Hudson River in the early 1830s. He 
submitted his report to Lt. Colonel John J. Abert of the Topographical Bureau on 26 
January 1832, and the report was transmitted to Congress on 29 February 1832.  
 
 
I should, however, propose that it should be double track, and that locomotive 
engines should be used entirely on it, to supercede [supersede] the necessity of the 
horse path. The rails should also be elevated on suitable blocks, some inches 
above the ground, to admit of their being freed, in the easiest manner, from the 
snow and sleets which would lodge on them during winter. The great error of the 
roads in operation, or building, in this county, is, having the rails nearly on the 
level of the horse path. I would also propose, in deep cuts, that the roads should 
have an [a] uniform declivity, to admit of the water which may collect to be 
drained in the easiest manner; and, on heavy embankments, that the road should 
be constructed of wood, and that suitable turn outs should be made from one track 
to the other. 
 





The horse path also appears in Walter Gwynn’s survey for the Portsmouth & Roanoke 
Rail Road. The centers of the sills (crossties) were to be cut for the construction of the 
path. Though it was a single-track railroad, the drainage ditches were positioned with the 
idea of allowing space for double-track. When the section of that railroad had been 
completed between Portsmouth and Suffolk, a large drainage ditch was dug through the 
Dismal Swamp alongside the path of the track and the excavated material was used to 
build up the track bed. It was topped with a layer of approximately a foot of sand. 
Seventeen miles of track were completed by the time Gwynn made his report. He makes 
mention of Claudius Crozet’s estimate of $90,563 for this section of the line, but it had 
been completed for $75,000 (Gwynn, 1833, 5-6). The method described by Gwynn for 
the section of track between Portsmouth and Suffolk involved placing the sills at least 
half-way into the ground to accommodate the horse path. This would allow the bottom of 
the rail to touch the ground, the method that Clinton advised against. The sills on the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road originally were buried one-quarter in dirt to which the 
company reported in 1850 that they lasted from five to six years. Sills later completely 
covered with dirt lasted only three years (Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, 
1850, 11). The method described – excavation and embankment – is common practice for 
railroad construction. The excavations cut into the slope of the land. 
 
The graduated surface of the road-bed in excavations, will vary from 13 to 16 feet 
in width, the slopes being 45º. The graded surface on embankments will present a 
uniform width of 12½ feet, with slopes of 33½º or 1½ base to 1 perpendicular. 
 





During the course of locating the route of a railroad, stakes are placed at intervals 
along a centerline. The 100-feet stakes, starting from the beginning of the road, are called 
full stations, and all others are plus stations. For example, a stake set at 5280 feet (a mile) 
is number “52 + 80.” A profile of the slope of the land is obtained by level-rod readings 
at each stake and intervening points where the slope of the land changes. This practice is 
called profile leveling (Davis, Foote, and Kelly, 1966, 213-215). In the report of the 1837 
survey of the Western & Atlantic Railroad in Georgia, Lt. Colonel S. H. Long includes a 
profile map of the route. The base measurement is the level of the Oostanaula River 
(United States, 1837a, Document A). The route of the railroad began at the 
Chattahoochee River south of Marietta, Georgia, crossed the Etowah River, and followed 
the valley of the Chickamauga River to the Tennessee line. Major James D, Graham 
conducted a survey for a railroad from Pensacola, Florida to Columbus, Georgia in 1836 
that also followed the river course.  
 
The profile of the route will present inclinations nowhere greater than ten or 
fifteen feet rise or fall per mile, except to avoid the circuit of the valley of the 
Chattahoochee just before it receives the Oochee. In order to gain the valley of the 
latter stream by a shorter route, the trace of the road will be rendered more 
straight, but it may be necessary to admit one or two short inclinations not 
exceeding thirty feet per mile. 
 
– (United States, 1836, 6) – 
  
   
 The terrain on the Pensacola to Columbus route follows the alluvial basin of the 
Escambia River from Pensacola to its confluence with the Conecuh in southeastern 
Alabama. The route parallels the Conecuh to its head and turns east towards Columbus. 
The river network is oriented north to south. This 210-mile railroad became another 
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victim to the Panic of 1837. Work on the project ceased. Graham estimated that the 
railroad would cost about $6,800 per mile. The director of the company recommended 
strap iron wooden rail construction (Turner, 2003, 18-19). 
 The Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road employed a different method of 
construction. This was described in the Farmers’ Register as partially resting on the 
ground, but elevated five to six feet above the ground for most of its length. The 135-mile 
railroad ascended 510 feet to its highest point before descending into the Savannah River 
valley. The grade at this point was steep, and two 25 horsepower stationary engines were 
employed to help trains up an inclined plane. The first of four methods used on this 
railroad – Sleeper plan No. 1 - was used on clay or gravel soil using fill, excavation, and 
ditching. The sills were covered with soil. The cost of the track alone cost the company 
$1450 per mile. There were over five miles of track on the railroad put down with this 
method. Another arrangement – Sleeper plan No. 2 – consisted of sills oriented in the 
direction of the rails, buried in the soil, with a cap connecting the rail to the sill. This was 
the method employed on the inclined plane. There were 18 miles of this type of track, and 
each mile cost between $1800 and $2200 per mile. The other methods used on this 
railroad are Pile construction and Truss construction. Piles less than 7 feet in height did 
not require additional bracing, while some at 15 feet were braced from the on both sides. 
Piles from 7 feet to 10 feet had a single brace, and those above 10 feet had cross braces. 
Pile construction cost between $1,900 and $3,000 per mile, with the average being 
$2,300. Truss construction, as explained earlier in this work, used in work over 12 feet, 
required a pile foundation, and assumed an upside down “W” form. The Charleston and 
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Hamburg line contained 5 miles of truss construction averaging between $6,000 and 
$10,000 per mile. (Ruffin, 1833, 261-262).  
 The 10 miles between Main Street in Suffolk and Station 290 on the Portsmouth 
& Roanoke Rail Road contains six truss bridges totaling $600, and four stone drains 
totaling $1,000. Station 290 to station 525 on the west bank of the Blackwater River (near 
the present-day town of Franklin, VA) contained 20 truss bridges at $1,500, but the 
bridge across the river had stone abutments and piers at a total of $9,500. Gwynn 
includes a truss bridge at $120 over Buckhorn Run, a bridge over the Meherrin River at 
$14,500, and several more truss bridges and stone drains totaling $1,600 (Gwynn, 1833, 
8-9). The overall cost per mile for embankments and excavations varied for the nine 
divisions of the railroad between Suffolk and the Roanoke. Excavation costs dropped in 
the 5.43 miles leading to the Nottoway River and approximately four miles before the 
Meherrin River. The most costly embankment occurred 5.29 miles after the crossing of 
the Meherrin, followed by a sharp reduction of costs over the 4.46 miles before the 
Summit at Station 1406, 12.35 miles from the Roanoke River (Figure 1). The profile of 
the route from the Meherrin River at the Virginia-North Carolina line to Station 1288 
(5.29 miles) shows an elevation gain of 84.23 feet; however, the climb distance is 2.63 
miles. The track runs along the west bank of Cypress Creek until it crosses it south of 
Margarettsville, North Carolina. A sharp ascent begins on the south bank of the creek 
(Figure 2). The greatest cost for embankment apparently was incurred in smoothing this 





Figure 1. The cost per mile for excavation and embankments derived from the 
construction estimates prepared by Walter Gwynn for the Portsmouth & 
Roanoke Rail Road.  
 Data Source: Gwynn, Walter. (1833). Report of Walter Gwynn, Esq. Engineer, 
to The President and Directors of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road 






Figure 2. The route of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road entered North Carolina after 
crossing the Meherrin River. It followed the west bank of Cypress Creek until 
the bend past Margarettsville. It immediately begins an ascent to the “summit” 
at 144 feet. 
Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, North Carolina-1/9 












The survey for the Winchester and Potomac Railroad was conducted in 1832, and 
presented to the Twenty-fifth US Congress in 1838. It contains maps, tables, and 
associated technical documents that illustrate the science behind the early surveys. Lieut. 
Colonel Long’s formula, (b-c/2a + b + c) × m/n = h/l, is used for the height per length of 
the plane, or grade. The weight of the cars being pulled by the train is a, b is greater net 
tonnage and c is the lesser tonnage in both directions, and m/n is the opposing force of 
friction as compared to level. The weight of the engine and tender is represented by E, 
and added to the weight of the cars and tonnage in both directions (2E + 2a + b + c). It is 
a measure of power necessary to maintain equilibrium against gravity on an incline. 
James Adamson’s formula, W = E (a – sin i ) / ( ∫ / n) + sin i, determines the appropriate 
weight for an incline. Here, E is again the weight of the engine, a is the weight necessary 
for friction with the track to allow motion (Ea is traction at level), ∫ / n is the resistance of 
friction at level, and i is the angle of incline. The engine used in some of the examples 
given in the text is 4.5 tons capable of pulling a 50-ton load at 10 to 15 miles per hour at 
level. The weight of a tender, with fuel and water, is 3 tons. Using these formulas, the 
text includes a brief table of maximum tonnage on several grades on the line of survey. 
The estimate planned for strap iron wooden rail construction and a horse path with 
sleepers placed 4 feet apart and 6’ by 6’ rails (United States, 1838e, 30-34).  
 The essence of these calculations becomes clear when contemplated in a form that 
is more familiar. The parallel and downhill component of weight is usually expressed as 
ma = W sin α, where the weight is multiplied by the sine of the angle of the incline. The 
resultant R of reactions (normal) of the plane on the body is the weight multiplied by the 
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cosine of the same angle, R = W cos α. If the carload is at rest, the force acting against the 
weight of the car from the rails will cancel the normal component of its weight; it is in a 
state of equilibrium. The sum of vertical forces equals zero, the sum of the horizontal 
forces equals zero, and sum the moments of those force at any point on the plane is zero 
in statics (∑ H = 0, ∑ V = 0, ∑ M = 0), all derived from Isaac Newton’s Third Law. 
[However, it is possible for an entire structure to be in motion and still be in a state of 
equilibrium when the individual parts of the structure do not move with respect to each 
other.] Other forces apply to bodies in motions, and figure into the equations for statics 
where necessary (Cabannes, 1968, 92-93; McCormac, 1967, 11-12). In a frictionless 
model, the sine of the angle of incline equals the force required to pull an object up the 
incline divided by the mass of object times gravity (9.8 m/s2), sin α = F vertical  / mg. 
Friction must be added to the parallel (downward component) of the weight on ascent and 
subtracted on descent. 
 Walter Gwynn recommends the use of a 5-ton locomotive on the Portsmouth & 
Roanoke Rail Road since the grade along the whole extent of the line would not exceed 
20 feet per mile. He notes that the performance of this engine at that grade equals a 6-ton 
engine at 30 feet per mile grade (Gwynn, 1833, 6). The 1838 report by engineers 
Wilmington Gibbs McNeill and W.G. Williams on the survey for the Louisville, 
Cincinnati & Charleston Rail Road is one of the most exhaustive reports of the early 
railroad era, and contains a wealth of information of grades, locomotives, construction, 
and topography. Drawing from the research of De Pambour, these engineers explored the 
cylinder, wheel diameter, length of stroke in connection, pressure per square inch in 
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connection with type of engines required for steep grades. For example, a locomotive of 
twelve tons, under 70 lbs of pressure per square inch, traveling 10 miles per hour on a 
grade of 60 feet per miles would have a cylinder diameter of 1.6 feet, a wheel diameter of 
4.5 feet, and a stroke length of 1.33 feet.  In the pages of calculation presented in the text, 
there is the formula ((T + E)/ h) 2,240, where T’ is the load, E is the weight of the engine 
in tons,  h is the incline of the plane in the ratio 1 to h, and the friction of the load is 2,240 
pounds, (T’ × F). Using this formula to calculate for the power of tractions with engine 
on a grade of 60 feet per mile and traveling 10 miles per hour, the loads per engine would 
be 78.4 tons (United States, 1838, 28-30).  
 Insomuch as these documents provide fascinating insights into the science of 
early railroad technology, the locomotives described therein – 5 tons, 6 tons, 12 tons – 
were still primitive machines. Grades had to be moderate to accommodate these engines, 
increase their efficiency, and load capacity. The various construction methods including 
excavating, embankment, piles and trestlework, smoothed out ascents and descents. As 
evident by some of the surveys for railroad in mountainous terrain, the need for heavier 
engines made it necessary to space sills more closely. Where possible, the engineers 
located the routes along the courses of rivers. Walter Gwynn’s survey for the Wilmington 
& Halifax (Wilmington & Raleigh) passes through the alluvial plane of the Cape Fear 
River basin for much of its extent. The directors of the company selected the “Western 
Route” that proceeds west of the Northeast Cape as far as Faison. Gwynn noted that, 
outside of bridging a few minor streams, a few excavations of no more than ten feet, and 
embankments of two or three feet, the railroad could be built in nearly a straight line over 
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level ground (Ruffin, 1836, 348).  An examination of the terrain along the route of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road between Wilmington and Faison on the Coastal Plain 
of North Carolina verifies Gwynn’s observations. In most places the modern rails rest on 
a modest layer of ballast, and it is likely the original railroad rests on a layer of sand like 
its counterpart, the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road (Figure 3). The first great obstacle 
that the railroad had to cross was the Northeast Cape Fear River. As mentioned earlier, 
this required a 360-foot lattice truss bridge with stone piers. However, the levels of the 
banks of this section of the river are not steep (Figure 4). The Northeast Cape Fear makes 
a bend westward approximate 6 miles east of this position as it makes its way to the 
confluence with the Northwest Cape Fear. On its way northward to Faison, the railroad 
follows the high ground on the west side on the Northeast Cape Fear – to use the analogy 
“cutting with the grain.” Outside of crossing the difficult Burgaw Swamp, Rockfish 
Creek, Stewart Creek, and other minor streams, the line of the railroad is straight (Figure 
5). The site of the most extensive section of trestlework south of Faison was at Bear 
Swamp. It was mentioned in the 1856 stockholders report as the highest trestlework on 
the entire line. The longest section of trestlework was through Goshen Swamp 
(Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, 1856, 6). It is now a high embankment (Figure 6). At 
Faison, the line of the railroad takes an arc into Goshen Swamp (Figure 7). There is still 
an impressive wooden trestle crossing the stream running through Goshen Swamp. Piles 
were driven into the soil of the streambed, the outer piles set at an angle, a cap on the 





Figure 3. This photograph, taken on the north side of Smith Creek in New Hanover 
County, NC, illustrates the level character of the alluvial land of the Lower 
Cape Fear. The modern railroad track is set in a modest layer of ballast. 






Figure 4. The NE Cape Fear River, approximately 10 Miles from Wilmington, is the first 
significant obstacle on the route of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The 
modern railroad bridge in this photograph shows how close the levels of the 





Figure 5. The terrain at Bowdens, 4.3 miles from Faison and approximately 60 miles 
from Wilmington, remains level. This view shows the track looking south. It 
follows a straight patch from north of Rocky Point to Faison. Photograph by 




Figure 6. The most extensive embankment on the Wilmington to Faison section of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road is at Bear Swamp, a short distance from 
Faison. It was originally trestlework, and was filled in during the renewal of the 





Figure 7. Goshen Swamp, located north of Faison, is an extensive pocosin. The longest 
section of trestlework of the original railroad was built through this area. The 
railroad began filling in the trestlework in this section after 1856. Photograph by 






Figure 8. Modern trestlework is used on the railroad at Goshen Swamp. The method is 
still practiced in railroad construction, and this example resembles the 
description of the high trestles on the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road in many 
aspects. Photograph by James C. Burke 
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 The landscape changes as the route of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
continues to the Neuse River. Walter Gwynn notes this fact in the report of his survey. 
 
Here the first undulation in the plane of the road worthy of notice occurs, a 
descent and immediately an ascent of 30 feet to the mile is unavoidable, and some 
comparatively deep cutting, and heavy embankments are encountered. 
Immediately on ascending the valley Goshen, the route reaches a dry, level, open 
woods through which it passes over Brooks’ Branch … After making a slight 
undulation in crossing Brooks’ Branch, which is a very inconsiderable stream, it 
arrives at the same level, on which it continues to the head of Yellow Marsh; 
along the margin of which, it descends to the valley of the Neuse River, 
encountering in its descent, some heavy cuttings, which consist, however, entirely 
of sand. 
 
– (Ruffin, 1836, 348) – 
 
 
This work discusses Brooks’ Branch (or Brooks Swamp) in the context of the stagecoach 
line of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The piles and trestlework at Brooks’ 
Branch are those mentioned in Frances Kemble’s Journal of a Residence on a Georgian 
Plantation. During her trip south from Philadelphia, Mrs. Kemble traveled on the yet to 
be completed Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The ravines in her text are in Brooks’ 
Swamp (Appendix E). The high embankments at Brooks Swamp, traversing a distance of 
approximately 1.3 miles, south of Dudley, North Carolina (Figure 9). The head of the 
Northeast Cape Fear commences on the east side of Mt. Olive, and the Goshen Swamp 
drains into the river. Therefore, a large part of the route of the Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road follows the course of the Northeast Cape Fear to its headwaters. Between 
Dudley and Brogden, the excavation is extensive as Gwynn’s report indicates (Figure 





Figure 9. The car in this photograph provides a sense of scale for the embankments at 
Brooks Swamp, south of Dudley in Wayne County. The original piles and 
trestlework are mention in Journal of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation by 






Figure 10. This photograph, taken at Brogden looking south toward Dudley, shows how 
the track following the undulations of the terrain. There are several deep cuts 
in this section. Photograph by James C. Burke 
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 The route of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road from the turn at Faison to 
Weldon follows a different pattern. It crosses two major rivers, the Neuse and the Tar, 
and a number of small streams such as Nahunta Swamp, Black Creek, and Contentnea 
Creek. The route of the railroad runs perpendicular to the prevailing stream flow. A 
railroad that runs parallel to the prevailing stream utilizes the advantage of the level 
ground of the river floodplains and basin divides. It does not matter if the river is flowing 
north to south or west to east. This is apparent from the survey of the Pensacola to 
Columbia, the Western and Atlantic route, and the Winchester and Potomac route. The 
railroad has to cross minor tributaries that drain from hillside hollows or higher planes of 
the river divide. When a route starts running perpendicular to the prevailing stream flow, 
it might cross from one river basin to another. The relics of prior stream action, hills and 
declivities, must be cut and filled to make a smooth grade. In the case of the Wilmington 
& Raleigh Rail Road, it passed over terrain worked by the ancient wave action – scarps 
and terraces. It passed through Wilson, Edgecombe, and Halifax counties, the route 
passes through area of the Coastal Plain Province that contains Precambrian and 
Paleozoic granitic rock covered by a thin layer of Coastal Plain sediments (Daniels, 
Gamble, Wheeler, and Holzhey, 1972; Councill, 1954, 7, 10-12, 15). 
 The route of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road, built through the Northeast 
Piedmont, encountered bands of Precambrian and Paleozoic granitic rock, lower 
Paleozoic slates, flows, and pyroclastics (Councill, 7, 15). Charles F.M. Garnett, chief 
engineer for the company [also the chief engineer of the Western & Atlantic during the 
early 1840s], mentioned that the presence of rock along the route caused the price of 
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excavations and embankments to be costly. In addition, the railroad had to construct five 
bridges, of which the one over the Tar River was the highest. These bridges, totaling 
3,240 feet, cost the company $155,000 (Ruffin, 1839, 388).  
There are distinct differences between railroad construction on the Coastal Plain 
and the Piedmont. The task of bridging rivers and streams is different because of the 
stream cross-section through rock and residual soil and that of sand and alluvial clay.  
In codifying the information about terrain for use in route analysis there are 
several factors to consider. The first is the location of the route parallel or perpendicular 
to the prevailing direction of the drainage network regardless of geological province. 
Second, the location of route on the Coastal Plain differs for that of the Piedmont and 
Mountain terrain in bridging, trestlework, excavation, and embankment because of 
stream hydrology and soil. Third, crossing major rivers is costly wherever they are 
located. Coastal rivers will spread out over a floodplain and tend to be shallow, but a 
bridge there will have a longer span than one crossing at some point upriver. Piedmont 
rivers will have higher banks and require tall piers. Finally, by early antebellum 
standards, the weight of a locomotive and the tonnage it is able to haul is proportional to 
the steepness of the grades along the line; heavier loads require closer spacing of sills.             
Could a railroad be built in the early years that could pass between the Coastal 
Plain and the Piedmont, or the Piedmont and Mountains? Walter Gwynn, serving at the 
chief engineer of the North Carolina Rail Road in 1851, recommended that the route of 
the railroad should commence at Waynesborough, then pass four miles north of 
Smithfield and continue to Raleigh. From there it would continue its arc through the 
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piedmont to Charlotte (North Carolina Rail Road Company, 1851, 4-6). The 
Waynesborough to Raleigh section of the road fulfilled the intentions of those that first 
proposed a railroad between Wilmington and Raleigh in 1833. On the Map of North 
Carolina of 1882 prepared by state geologist W.C. Kerr and civil engineer William Cain, 
the Raleigh & Augusta Air Line Railroad extends from Raleigh to the town of Hamlet in 
Richmond County, not far from Rockingham and on a line to Cheraw. There, it forms a 
junction with the Carolina Central Railroad on its westerly route to Charlotte. In many 
respects, it follows the projected route of the Raleigh & Columbia Rail Road. To the 
north, the Raleigh & Gaston extends from Gaston to Weldon with the Greensville branch 
of the Petersburg Rail Road removed. The Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley Railroad, 
however, extends from Fayetteville past Greensboro into Stokes County rather than to the 
Narrows of the Yadkin as originally proposed (Cumming, 1966, Plate XIV). Not only 
does this prove that many of the early plans were viable when the technology improved 
and the capital was available, many in fact followed their projected route. The 
Waynesborough to Raleigh segment of the North Carolina Railroad is particularly 
significant because Walter Gwynn directed the survey. While it is difficult to prove he 
would have recommended the exact route to the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road had 
the company built its Raleigh branch line from Waynesborough, it is unlikely his 
sensibilities would have strayed from finding the most efficient and economical route. 
The deviation of the Raleigh & Augusta and the Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley routes 
appears motivated by the development of the Chatham coalfields and the domestic iron 
production (Appendix H). Both railroads intersected at the town of Sanford. The fact 
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remains that since these railroads existed, they have left an impression on the physical 
landscape that provides reference for models of the proposed railroads of the 1830s that 
follow their routes.  
With iron rails, closely spaced crossties, and heavy 4-4-0 locomotives, all the 
routes mentioned were possible in the late antebellum and later. Taking a closer look at 
these routes and looking for the steep grades, deep excavations, and extensive bridging 
can contribute to determining the technical demands of these routes if they were built 
during the 1830s.   




























BRITISH IRON ON AMERICAN RAILROADS 
 
 
The first great railroads in America were built with British iron. Wood was 
readily available, but there was no reliable source of domestic railroad iron. The United 
States Government offered remission of duties on imported iron to railroad companies   
to encourage construction. As the original rails started to fail after about ten years of use, 
the railroads returned to the foreign market for new heavy iron rails rather than buy from 
domestic manufacturers, even though the quality of domestic iron had improved and was 
produced in quantity. American ironmasters began petitioning Congress for a resumption 
of duties on imported iron, but the railroads mounted stiff resistance. The integration of 
the manufacturing organizations and financial institutions of Europe, and particularly 
those of England, continued to recommend their iron to the American railroads 
throughout the antebellum period. 
In May of 1849, Dr. Armand J. DeRosset, Jr. left on the steamer America, sailing 
from New York to Liverpool to negotiate the purchase of new iron for the relaying of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. By the end of July, it appears that he had succeeded. 
The Wilmington Journal announced that he had made a contract for 9000 tons of heavy 
T-iron, enough to relay 120 miles of the line. The terms of this contract were not 
disclosed at the time, but they were considered equitable.  The arrival of the first load of 
273 tons of T-iron from Cardiff, Wales arrived at Wilmington, North Carolina in October 
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on the brig Albemarle (Wilmington Journal, 25 May 1849; 27 July 1849; 12 October 
1849). The Company desperately needed to replace their deteriorating strap iron wooden 
rails put down in the late 1830s. Years earlier, the Petersburg Rail Road Company, 
completed in 1833, had to replace their perishable wooden rails. In May of 1843, the 
Petersburg Rail Road had relaid all but two miles of their road with heavy T-iron, as well 
as nearly completing their bridge over the Roanoke at Weldon. Three thousand tons of 
iron had to be put down before a specified date or the company would have to pay 
$75,000 in duties (Wilmington Chronicle, 24 May 1843; Ruffin, 1843, 165-166). 
A Bill for the Relief of the Petersburg Railroad Company, presented by the 
Committee on Finance in the United State Senate on 17 January 1843, required that the 
company provide proof that they had put down all the iron by 1 December 1844. The bill 
was a continuation of duty free privileges granted on 13 August 1842, and expired 3 
March 1843. The iron had to arrive before that date. There were one thousand tons put 
down in 1842; and an additional two thousand tons had arrived at City Point in February 
of 1843, and then sent by wagon to the depot to be sent down the road for installation. 
This was done without an interruption of service (United States, 1843; Ruffin, 1843). The 
particular circumstances of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road and the Petersburg Rail 
Road represent the general state of early railroads built with strap iron wooden 
construction: the rails lasted for about ten years. 
The United States at the dawn of the railroad era was an agricultural nation that 
had no means of manufacturing iron in the quantities necessary for building railroads; its 
engineering tradition was in its infancy, and the lack of regional investment capital 
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inhibited most large scale internal improvement projects. By contrast, Britain, the 
preeminent industrial nation-state of the early nineteen century, had developed mass 
production techniques for the manufacturing of iron; its engineering tradition had 
established the first standards for locomotive design and railroad hardware. The banking 
houses of London dominated international finance, and had a reputation for providing 
investment capital to foreign ventures, both directly and through intermediaries. The first 
railroad companies in America had little choice but to purchase their iron and equipment 
from British manufactures, and to seek part of the necessary investment capital in 
European bonds. As early as 1828, the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road Company had 
prepared a memorial to congress for a remission of duties on imported iron; the memorial 
was referred to the Committee on Finance (United States, 1828, 994-996). The 
remissions of duties on foreign iron for railroads soon became a matter of policy.  
The use of foreign iron on American railroads started to become a contentious 
issue during the 1840s as the domestic equivalent became more available and of 
comparable quality. The Memorial of a Number of Ironmasters at Lexington, Virginia, in 
relation to An increase of duty of imported iron, 14 March 1842, stated that the iron 
interests of Virginia cannot sustain themselves without increased duties on English iron 
(United States, 1842, 5). It would seem that the Petersburg Rail Road Company could 
have saved time and expense had they patronized Virginia’s burgeoning iron industry, 
but they chose to remain with foreign manufactures. The Virginia ironmasters failed to 
persuade Congress to alter policy. Ten years later, the Legislature of New Jersey 
castigated the general government for its failure to enact a national policy to support 
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domestic manufacturing of iron while noting that “the principle governments of Europe 
lavish the most generous encouragement on the production of the mines and various 
manufactures of iron” (United States, 1852, 1). The “generous encouragement” appears 
to have been reserved for the railroads. 
The “Statement of the amount of duties on railroad iron refunded, annually, from 
the year 1831 to 1841” reported by the Treasury Department in 1842 amounted to a total 
of $4,800,183.84 for the entire period. Beginning with $6,847.90 refunded to the 
Baltimore and Ohio in 1831, the amount jumped to $336,709.19 in 1832 as seven 
railroads came under construction. The United States government cancelled the bonds for 
duties when the particular shipment of imported iron was laid down. The amount for 
1833 had dropped to $202,210.70; however, another railroad (Boston) was added in 
1834, and the amount climbed to $421,010.34, and continued to rise in 1835 to 
$529,529.79. The amount for 1836 was $234,194.74; it was $407,517.05 in 1837, 
$910,011.66 in 1838, and $672,376.86 in 1839. The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
received a refund of $38,455.65 during this year. It was the only refund of duties for that 
railroad listed. The amount for 1840 was $688,510.97, and for part of 1841, the amount 
was $391,264.64. Tables for iron imported under the tariffs of 1842 and 1846 for years 
1843 through 1838, including articles, quantities, values, and duties, are found in the 
Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury dated 16 January 1849. It is apparent that there 
was a pressing need for iron products of all kinds. However, the need for imported 
railroad iron was so pervasive during the early days of railroad construction that the 
citizens of Pennsylvania were petitioning Congress for a reduction in duty on this product 
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in 1835 (United States, 1842a, 4-5; 1849, 1-16; 1835, 1-2). It would take more than 
petitions and memorials to make domestic iron competitive: the transportation 
infrastructure had to exist first.  
Congress passed an act on 14 July 1832 to refund duties on railroad iron 
providing that that it was installed permanently; however, some clarity was needed on 
railroad hardware. The Baltimore & Susquehanna Rail Road Company ordered 320,000 
iron fastenings for their track known as dog-tooth clamps and was erroneously charged 
the duty as if they were ordinary hardware. The company petitioned Congress in 1837 for 
remission of duties on such items (United States, 1837, 1-2). Other situations were more 
serious, and reflected the general derangement of the American economy during the late 
1830s and early 1840s. The State of Michigan had a different problem with their railroad 
iron. The last of its imported iron arrived in New York on 10 May 1839 and 23 May 
1839, and was intended for immediate use, but that state had negotiated its loans with the 
United States Bank in Philadelphia and the Morris Canal and Banking Company. These 
banks failed, and because that state no longer had the funds to continue the project, the 
railroad put down the iron in1842. The state missed the deadline for remission of duties 
on the iron. The United States brought a suit against James H. Whitney, bondsman for the 
State of Michigan, and he was ordered to pay $8,428.19 in damages and $50 for the cost 
of court. The State of Michigan, in 1844, sought relief from this judgment citing the 
failure of the banks as the cause of the delay, not the negligence of the state (United 
States, 1844, 1-2).  
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The predicament in which the State of Michigan found itself in the late 1830s was 
not an isolated event. The early American railroads relied on bonds rather than stock for 
raising capital because distant investors favored the secure profits they offered. Some 
companies went directly to London to obtain sterling bonds, and others utilized the 
agency of large northern banks such as Nicholas Biddle’s Bank of the United States in 
Philadelphia. This practice continued through the antebellum period.  Sterling bonds 
helped finance the Petersburg Rail Road, the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road, and the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The Bank of the United States failed in 1840. Other 
financers, such as the Boston firm of Henshaw and Ward helped reorganize the failed 
Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road as the Seaboard & Roanoke Rail Road utilizing New 
England Capital in the late 1840s. During the 1850s, Wall Street, with the backing of 
European banks, emerged as the center for railroad securities (Chandler, 1954, 248-249, 
251n, 253, 257, 262-263). The Deposit Act of 1836, the product of Jacksonian monetary 
policy, entailed the shift of hard currency, known as specie, from the nation’s economic 
center to state banks in order to accomplish the distribution of the federal surplus. Its 
dispersal disrupted commercial intercourse, and eroded investor confidence at home and 
abroad. The Panic of 1837, and the subsequent depression that followed, undermined the 
stability of the American financial market (Rousseau, 2002, 459, 484-486). As a result, 
the advance of domestic industry was set back; the railroad companies and their 




The Letter and Memorial of Isaac K. Lippincott, On the manufacture of iron and 
the operation of the present tariff laws of 31 December 1841 noted that under the existing 
conditions brought about by the closing of furnaces in New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and in all the seaboard states, reduced duties had brought British iron into 
direct competition with domestic iron. Lippincott recommended the building of a 
National Foundry as first presented in a report to the House of Representatives on 12 
January 1839.  He was especially supportive of the idea of locating such a facility in 
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania where there were 102 iron foundries within fifty miles of 
the town of Lancaster. In the same year, the citizens of Danville, Pennsylvania had 
prepared a memorial advocating their region as the site of the National Foundry based 
upon their proximity to the necessary materials of iron smelting, transportation 
connections, and their safe removal from the threat of invasion. William Cost Johnson’s 
report from the Select Committee on the National Foundry of 23 February 1843 titled 
National Foundry is an extensive and fascinating document on this subject that is worthy 
of further examination; however, the purpose of the foundry is clearly stated within the 
opening pages. Not only was there a need for a National Foundry for the production of 
munitions and ordinance; such an institution would establish national standards for iron 
manufacturing through “scientific study and practical experiment” (United States, 1841, 
1-5; 1841a, 1-3; 1843a, 1). 
The proposed revision of the Tariff of 1846 by the Taylor administration brought 
forth the all too familiar economic complaints of the era, the propping up of northern 
industry on the backs of the south and the west. For the State of North Carolina 
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specifically, two hundred and sixty miles of railroad needed to be re-laid or built; and 
tariff duties would make the task unnecessarily expensive. The Wilmington Journal 
expressed these views a month after Dr. DeRossett’s departure. The writer was referring 
to the cost of iron for relaying the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road.  
 
Now, taking 50 tons as an average per mile, (an exceedingly low estimate,) we 
have 32,500 tons of iron as the total amount necessary.  This can be procured, we 
suppose at $45 per ton, $1,462,500 in all.  Under such a tariff as the iron men 
want, it would cost $60, a total of $1,950,000, or a difference of nearly half a 
million of dollars, out of which North Carolina would be protected for the benefit 
of Pennsylvania.  These calculations are made somewhat hastily and without 
pretending to accuracy in the details, yet we feel certain that the relative 
proportion of prices will be found pretty much as we have placed them. 
 
– (Wilmington Journal, 22 June 1849) – 
 
 
The newspaper later reported that a comparison of the English iron with American 
railroad iron manufactured at Danville, Pennsylvania – both used on the Harrisburg & 
Lancaster Rail Road – found that the American product was tougher; yet it cost about 
five dollars a ton more than the Wilmington railroad was paying for their British iron. 
However, it later cited articles in the Washington Republic and New Haven Register that 
were more critical of the cost and strength of American made iron: still, the main 
complaint was that the American product cost more (ibid, 21 September 1849, 5 October 
1849). 
The debate over imported railroad iron would continue into the 1850s. Thomas 
Clingman of North Carolina, during his career in the House of Representatives, spoke at 
length on the floor on the subject of duties on imported railroad iron noting that the 
railroads of North Carolina were in essence public works in which the farmer asks how 
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much he can afford for such improvements and then he purchases shares. Citing the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road’s seventy cents to the dollar share value, he does not 
consider North Carolina’s railroad stock the type of investment for the capitalist seeking 
large and immediate returns. The railroads enable the farmer to get his produce to market, 
and yield their dividends in the form of public good, not profits. To these statements, he 
elicited the concurrence of his fellow Representative from North Carolina, William S. 
Ashe, later president of the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad (United States, 1852a, 1056). 
Among the Resolutions of the North Carolina Legislature presented to the Thirty-second 
Congress was a resolution calling for the abolition of duties on railroad iron (United 
States, 1853, 1-2). The following year, a convention was held in Richmond for the 
purpose of persuading Congress to approve a refund of all the duties collected on 
imported railroad iron between 1851 and 1854 because the duties had been imposed 
differently for various railroads depending on the rates in force at the time of 
construction. The amount of the duties totaled $10,072,977.60 on $33,576,592 worth in 
iron. The Memorial of the convention explains these inequities. 
 
While some States made their railroads when iron was admitted duty free, or 
when the price of iron was so low was to compensate, in some measure, for the 
oppressive duty, other States were so misfortunate as to construct their most 
important works when the duty, added to the high price of iron, rendered it an 
intolerable burden. If it be just and equitable to encourage railroads by continuing 
this exemption from duty for a longer period, it is equally so to refund the duties 
paid by those companies which have borne the pressure of the high duty and the 
high price combined. 
 




 Part of the success of the British product had been the introduction of the hot-air 
blast in their iron manufacturing. This process forces a reaction between carbon 
monoxide and iron ore that yields molten iron and carbon dioxide. Lippincott mentioned 
this method and another discovery whereby anthracite coal could be used in smelting iron 
when he referred to cheaply made iron from England, Scotland, and Wales. The British 
had been in the iron business for a long time, and it perfected the production of it in 
quantity. They had also pioneered railroad technology, and could produce all the 
specialized hardware that their clients required. Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North 
Carolina, all rich in the raw materials for iron making, would need decades of 
organization before their iron manufactories would be ready to mass-produce iron rail. 
 The British could also offer another service that was not readily available in the 
United States of the 1840s, credit. Dr. DeRosset not only went to England to purchase 
iron; he also negotiated a mortgage on the company to pay for the iron. The 1850 
stockholder’s report records “Mortgage Bonds payable in London and due in 1869, this 
amounted issued for Iron purchased bearing 6 per cent interest … [$] 355,555.56.” The 
company still had its debt of $222,666.67 in English bonds due in 1858. There were also 
bonds due to the United States for duties on the iron for the amount of $39,424.13 
payable in annual installments over the course of four years (Wilmington & Raleigh Rail 
Road Company, 1850, 8-9). The raising of money to pay freight and duties on iron was a 
key issue at the 1849 meeting of the stockholders. The Wilmington Journal reported the 
proceedings of this meeting. The company was apparently in such want of cash that it had 
to appeal to the stockholders to endorse bonds for the transportation of their new iron 
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(Wilmington Journal 10 November 1849). The amount of the company’s early debt to the 
English banks for its initial construction made it likely that they would return to finance 
its reconstruction; and likewise, the English financiers would sooner lend more for 
improvements rather than risk their investment. 
 British iron and European capital would remain an essential element of the 
American railroad economic culture until the Civil War forced a reorganization of 
production, labor, transportation, and capital to achieve military objectives. There is a 
difference between the transfer of technology and the creation of an industry. The market 
for British locomotives in the United States existed briefly. American craftsmen wasted 
little time in adapting British locomotive technology to the nation’s diverse landscapes 
and the special needs of its various companies. Even the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail 
Road had its own foundry for manufacturing replacement parts, and managed to construct 
a few of its own locomotives. By contrast, American iron was manufactured by the same 
class of craftsmen, working autonomously in close proximity to the raw materials, but 
often removed from the existing transportation network. While they were able to produce 
iron of the same quality as their foreign counterparts, they lacked the command of capital 
to produce it cheaply and in quantity. The British had more than a century’s experience in 
industrial capitalism: raw materials, manufacturers, labor, transportation, consumers, 
investors, financial institutions, insurers, and government worked in concert to supply an 
international market. Only during the Post-war period, when the demand for railroad iron 









THE CANAL ERA 
 
 
  The debates surrounding the Bonus Bill of 1817 records the exhaustive effort on 
the part of Congressmen John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay to seek the application of 
federal funds for road and canal improvements. Albert Gallatin had proposed a national 
system of roads and canals in his Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Subject 
of Roads and Canals in 1808.  Calhoun and Clay had hoped see this plan put into action. 
As the bill made its way through Congress, it was weakened by amendments that 
compromised its design – shifting control of such projects away from the federal 
government, and distributing funds to the states according to population. President James 
Madison vetoed the bill. 
The Bonus Bill threatened the balance that was the heart of Madison’s 
constitution. Nothing prevented lawmakers from using the funds it would 
establish to cultivate majorities and to dominate Congress contrary to public 
interest. Proportional spending protected nothing and even fostered something-
for-everyone distributions … Presidents and experts would be powerless to 
impose order and fairness on networks of trade. The strong would crush the weak, 
and while states plundered the federal treasury, politicians would erect nationwide 
factions on the backs of public works. 
 
– (Larson, 1987, 383) – 
The future of a national system of internal improvements was curtailed, and the 
responsibility fell upon the states to take up their own programs of public works. The 
federal government, with the exception of projects on national interest, was relegated to 
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the role of providing technical support. Funding for such projects in the states was 
seriously hampered by a long-standing resistance to federal involvement in such projects. 
Antifederalist opposition to ratification of the United States Constitution was the origin of 
these sentiments. After ratification, the prevailing commitment to the ideals of 
Jeffersonian Democracy preserved the fear of central authority. 
The obvious strength of the Federalist argument was its emphasis on national 
defense. The generation of the American Revolution would have been all too aware that 
their military conflict with the British could have easily had a different outcome; and the 
revolution’s accomplishments could be undone in some future conflict. The European 
powers had been, and in all likelihood, would continue to be engaged in “territorial 
disputes, and commercial rivalries.” Inevitably, the European powers would exploit the 
vulnerability of the states; or the European powers could draw individual states into 
alliances that would threaten their confederation (Ferling, 2003, 304-306). Having an 
organized national military was not in dispute. It had proved its worth during the 
revolution. However, the Antifederalists saw the military as only being necessary during 
wartime; a permanent military force carried with it the potential of nurturing a dictator 
that would overturn the rule of the people, and use the military to enforce his rule on the 
states. Additionally, the Articles of Confederation forbid Congress from maintaining such 
a military; and the forces it could assemble in peacetime were limited to the function of 
internal defense (Main, 1961, 143-149, 160). When James Madison submitted a proposal 
to Congress to include a Bill of Rights in 1789 as amendments, many of the opponents of 
the Constitution were mollified (Cavanagh, 1989, 9-17). The Federalists carried the day 
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during the early years of the republic. However, there were many, such as John Randolph 
of Virginia and Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, that continued the opposition to the 
Federalist agenda by aligning themselves with Thomas Jefferson and his allies. By 1796, 
James Madison had resigned from Congress to take a seat in the Virginia legislature for 
the sole purpose of garnering support for Jefferson. Nathaniel Macon recruited Joseph 
Gales, a young newspaper editor that had fled England, to set up a newspaper, the 
Register, in Raleigh to counter the capital’s Federalist newspaper (Dodd, 1908, 156-159). 
Jefferson considered the entrenched Federalist in government positions a type of 
aristocracy. He set about removing a number during his term as president between 1801 
and 1805 (Prince, 1970).  
 The Antifederalist representatives to the First Congress not only maintained a 
discussion about issues that they asserted remained unresolved by the ratification of the 
Constitution; they were also suspicious of Alexander Hamilton’s fiscal policies. Many 
felt that under the new Constitution, the financial elite had the opportunity to subvert the 
government and create an aristocracy of wealth (Aldrich and Grant, 1993, 296, 299-301). 
The previous discussion on the Second Bank of the United States illustrates the 
apprehension that Jackson and his supporters entertained over the public/private nature of 
that institution. The states, with their reluctance to accept aid for internal improvements, 
assumed considerable debts. As a result, sectional interests often entangled public 
funding for internal improvements. In Virginia, corporations were set up to receive both 
the investment of private shareholders and the state.  
64 
 
By 1838, Virginia had amassed $6,662,180 in debt for its support of canals, 
railroads, turnpikes, and miscellaneous improvements whereas the State of North 
Carolina was debt free. Virginia had created a fund for internal improvement and a board 
to administer it – the Board of Public Works – in 1816. The board could authorize the 
subscription on the part of the commonwealth to two-fifths of stock of companies 
engaged in improvement projects while private investors subscribed to three-fifths of the 
stock. The investors had to pay for at least one-fifth of the stock subscriptions. The state 
deemed this method appropriate for small- scale projects; but great works, such as 
navigation improvements to the James River by the James River Company, were beyond 
the means of private capital. The commonwealth bought up interests in the company and 
contracted its officials to carry through the work. By 1823, the management of the 
company was transferred to state officials. This pattern continued with other large-scale 
canal and turnpike projects, and the railroad companies received aid in the form of state 
funded stock subscriptions. Virginia borrowed funds on the credit of the state. By 1837, 
Virginia had incurred debts of $1,324,500 for the James River Company and $780,000 
for the James River & Kanawha Company. The state debts for the several railroads 
projects included $250,000 to the Portsmouth & Roanoke Railroad Company, $206,800 
to the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company, and $80,000 to the 
Petersburg Railroad Company. The Winchester & Potomac Railroad Company received 
$120,000 in aid from the state. The remaining companies the state aided received 
amounts below $64,200 (Morton, 1917, 343, 349, 356-359, 361-362, 366). The first 
significant public works project in Virginia, the Dismal Swamp Canal, would affect the 
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economy of North Carolina and influence the development of the state’s first plans for a 
system of internal improvements. It would also spark the trade competition between the 
commercial centers of southern Virginia.  
The Dismal Swamp Canal connected the Elizabeth River at Portsmouth, Virginia 
to the Pasquotank River in Camden County, North Carolina. The canal, completed in 
1805 and subsequently improved to handle more traffic, diverted the commerce from 
northeastern North Carolina to Norfolk. The federal government required the increase in 
depth to facilitate the passage of larger craft from the North Carolina sounds, but it also 
allowed craft passing through the Roanoke Canal to travel to Portsmouth and Norfolk. 
This required change in the Dismal Swamp Canal by the federal government had a 
twofold impact. Opposition to federal funding by central Virginia thwarted the 
subscription to the company stock. There would be several lotteries held to aid the canal. 
Notices for the Virginia State Lottery (Fifth Class-For the benefit of the Dismal Swamp 
Canal Co.) appeared in North Carolina newspapers. Congress eventually subscribed to 
shares in the company stock (Raleigh Register, 12 January 1827, 10 April 1827). The 
new depth of the canal made it possible to ship produce from the upper Roanoke Valley 
via the Roanoke Canal to Portsmouth and Norfolk. In short, it contributed to a trade 
imbalance between Petersburg and the Hampton Roads region (Stewart, 1973). 
 Judge Archibald Murphey, a visionary North Carolina state senator, labored to 
create the state’s first policy on internal improvements. In 1815, he chaired a committee 
on inland navigation. The Report of the Committee on Inland Navigation concluded that 
river improvements would lead to the growth of commercial towns on the state’s major 
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rivers. His report to the legislature of the following year notes that trade from the 
Roanoke was entering the Norfolk market via Albemarle Sound, thus drawing off 
potential revenue (Conner, 1930, 31; North Carolina, 1815, 7; 1818, 18). The Memoir 
was a comprehensive plan of improvements that would transform the state’s rivers into a 
transportation network. It recommended a system of canals to bypass the falls on the 
major rivers and proposed a connection between at least two of them (Murphey, 1819, 
17-19). The state made a step forward towards this goal when it hired its first professional 
civil engineer. 
Hamilton Fulton arrived in North Carolina to begin his employment as the state 
civil engineer in 1819. Fulton examined the work of the Roanoke Navigation Company at 
the Great Falls, and noticed problems with it; and in the course of developing plans for 
similar works, consulted civil engineer Benjamin H. Latrobe on problems concerning the 
physical geography of North Carolina. He also observed Franklin, Granville, Warren, and 
Halifax counties in North Carolina sent tobacco and wheat by wagon to the Virginia 
markets, likely destined for the Petersburg market (North Carolina, 1819, 5, 8, 21-32, 42-
44, 49). The Annual Report of the Board of Public Improvements for 1820 included 
examinations of the progress of the Clubfoot and Harlowe Creek Canal, the Fayetteville 
Canal, a joint report on the Roanoke Canal by the state engineer for Virginia, Thomas 
Moore, and Hamilton Fulton, and Mr. Fulton’s report on the practicality of reopening 
Roanoke Inlet. There are also reports concerning other projects on coastal navigation, the 
Cape Fear, the Broad, the Yadkin and the Catawba rivers (North Carolina, 1820, 1-37). 
The Annual Report of the Board of Public Improvements for 1821 includes a report by the 
67 
 
United States’ engineers on the practicality of reopening Roanoke Inlet, and Mr. Fulton’s 
reports on the progress of the Roanoke Canal – including his plans for the aqueduct over 
Chockoyotte Creek. He also mentions the possible useful application of a timber railroad 
in connection with improvements on the Neuse River. His report on the Clubfoot and 
Harlowe Canal indicates that the design for a lock constructed for that canal was 
defective. This document also contains a report from Denison Olmsted, professor of 
chemistry and mineralogy at the University of North Carolina, on the mineral resources 
of the state. While much of Mr. Fulton’s report is fascinating, the 1821 Annual Report is 
significant because it defines the objects of a system for internal improvements in North 
Carolina: to provide all the citizens of the state with a way of getting the “productions of 
their industry” to market; and to “fix that market within our own limits.” The means of 
paying for this system involved the state taking out a loan of $500,000 at an annual rate 
not exceeding six per cent; and the Treasurer would issue certificates of stock. The state 
would subscribe to $225,000 in shares of the canal and navigation companies (North 
Carolina, 1821, 13-29, 38-41, 62-67, xix-xxiii). Murphey’s plan for internal 
improvements received the attention of the national press for its comprehensive approach 
and scope (North American Review, 1821). Very little came of these plans; however, the 
fact it established a dialogue on internal improvement policy is significant.   
 Hamilton Fulton’s plan to reopen Roanoke Inlet is particularly interesting. The 
port towns of Albemarle Sound had enjoyed accessed to the Atlantic via Roanoke Inlet 
during colonial times, however the inlet closed in the mid-1790s. Reopening the inlet 
became an important element of North Carolina’s internal improvement policy during the 
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antebellum period. Several plans recommended by engineers for the state and the United 
States Topographical Bureau received consideration, but the project never advanced to 
far beyond the planning stage (Appendix A). The great disappointment of public works 
undertaken in North Carolina during the nineteenth century was the Clubfoot and 
Harlowe Creek Canal. The project, conceived before the Revolution and finally 
completed in 1827, never proved very useful. Its purpose was to facilitate navigation 
between the Neuse River and Beaufort harbor. The canal had consumed tens of thousands 
of dollars of public funds over many decades; yet, when opened the tolls were merely a 
fraction of the investment required to build it and revenue continued to diminish year 
after year. The anticipated traffic on the canal never materialized, and the canal fell into 
disrepair.  The state was unable to sell the canal until 1872 (Watson, 2002, 81-85).  
The first attempt at a state system of internal improvements was underfunded and 
mismanaged. Its defects included the lack of engineering expertise to oversee the various 
projects, the absence of a sufficient labor force, and a waste of funds (Owen, 1829, 4; 
Brown, 1928, 12-13). Some of the more profound defects were intrinsic and would have 
an impact on the development of railroads.  There was a widely held belief that private 
corporations could carry through internal improvement projects more effectively; and the 
power bloc of the eastern counties opposed plans that they perceived as possible suggest 
taxation for improvements, which would benefit the west at their expense. North 
Carolina’s veteran politician and unshakeable Antifederalist, Nathaniel Macon, was 
opposed to soliciting aid from the general government for internal improvements. He also 
believed that the state had little commercial potential, and tax revenues would be better 
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applied to education (Price, 2001, 209-210; Turner, 1971, 69; Jeffery, 1978, 114; Price, 
2004, 297, 290-291; Dodd, 1908, 388-390).  When all factors are considered, it appears 
that Archibald Murphey’s plan for a state system was beneficial insomuch as it focused 
attention towards the need for transportation policy in North Carolina, and identified the 
causes of the degradation of its economy. The Roanoke Canal, constructed by the 
Roanoke Navigation Company and jointly supported by North Carolina and Virginia, was 
the principal work completed out during this period; as it came into operation, its 
existence would exert attraction for the early railroads built in both states. 
The Roanoke River crosses the political boundary between North Carolina and 
Virginia. Through its tributaries, the Staunton and Dan, its basin extends deep into the 
interior of both states. The river courses south through the coastal plan North Carolina, 
and empties into Albemarle Sound. In 1663, the Lord Proprietors set the boundary 
between Virginia and Carolina at 36 degrees north. In 1728, it was surveyed to thirty 
miles east of the Blue Ridge and has remained since (Merrens, 1964, 19-31). The earlier 
line would have placed most of the basin within Virginia. For the early railroads, the river 
served as a de facto economic boundary. The Petersburg Company completed their 
railroad to the north side of the Roanoke in 1833, and the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail 
Road followed in 1837. The latter used the toll bridge to carry their trains to Weldon on 
the south side of the river. Each railroad was an extension of a commercial center in 
Virginia, and both were competing for the agricultural output of the entire basin. The 




The Roanoke Canal was thirty feet wide at the bottom with slopes of one and a 
half feet to one foot, and three feet deep. The total length at the water’s surface was 
thirty-nine feet and a towpath that was ten feet wide (North Carolina, 1821, 22-23). The 
Clubfoot & Harlowe Creek Canal was four feet deep and fourteen feet wide at its bottom.  
The slopes were one and half feet to one foot, and the total width at the surface of the 
water was twenty-six feet. The towpath was eight feet wide (North Carolina, 1820, 2). 
The Roanoke Canal extended approximately eight miles, of which a little more than 
seven miles remain. The stone culverts, massive aqueduct, and locks remain. The upper 
sections of the canal are dry (Figure 11). The Clubfoot & Harlowe Creek Canal also 
remains, but water still flows in it (Figure 12). Though slightly larger when completed 
and now silted to half its original depth, it is apparent to the observer that small shallow-
draft bateau navigated these canals.   
The Roanoke Navigation Company continued its improvements of the Dan and 
Staunton rivers after the Roanoke Canal was in operation (North Carolina, 1829). By 
1831, the Virginia & North Carolina Transportation Company was operating eight boats 
of sixty tons burthen between Norfolk and Weldon. The trip took between eight and 
thirteen days. The monthly average loads on these boats included 400 hogsheads of 
tobacco, 1200 barrels of flour, and 800 bales of cotton. The company put two steamboats 
in service on the lower river for towing boats to Norfolk. The steamboats carried their 






Figure 11. The remains of the upper locks of the Roanoke Canal are located at Roanoke 
Canal Museum in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina. The narrow width of the 
locks was designed for bateau, a shallow-draft boat of about eight feet in 







Figure 12. The Clubfoot & Harlowe Creek Canal is located in Craven and Carteret 
counties and can be accessed from NC 101. It connects the Neuse River with 
the Newport River. Its promoters hope to improve commerce by creating a 
channel between New Bern and Beaufort. Photograph by James C. Burke 
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In the same year, the State of North Carolina received the sum of $875 as dividends on its 
500 shares of stock in the Roanoke Navigation Company (Coon, 1908, 539).  
 In 1821, the Board of Public Improvements of North Carolina proposed a plan for 
borrowing $500,000 on the credit of the state to help pay for transportation 
improvements. The board recommended that the state invest nearly half of this amount in 
the stock of the Roanoke Navigation Company, the Yadkin Navigation Company, the 
Cape Fear Navigation Company, the Tar Navigation Company, The Neuse Navigation 
Company, the Catawba Navigation Company, and the Clubfoot & Harlowe Creek Canal 
Company. The remainder was committed to a number of coastal navigation projects and 
road projects in the western part of the state. The citizens of the state were adverse to 
paying for improvements with high taxes, so the board recommended that the treasurer of 
the state issue certificates on the debt payable bearing six percent interest annually. The 
board also notes that some projects, such as improving access to the port of Beaufort, had 
commercial advantages over other projects. They were of the opinion that the jealousy 
between commercial towns interfered with developing a general plan of internal 
improvements. Each town supported the projects that would direct commerce to their 
neighborhood (North Carolina, 1821, xx-xxviii). The state could not accomplish Judge 
Murphey’s plan for internal improvements. The Roanoke Navigation Company proved a 
successful investment, but it benefited Norfolk more than the other commercial towns in 
North Carolina and Virginia. As South Carolina and Virginia pored capital into public 




 The lack of a national plan for internal improvements placed the full burden of 
financing state projects on citizens that resisted taxation for improvements that would 
benefit another region of the state. The jealousy between towns and regions in North 
Carolina cannot be understated. This is the central theme of early railroad development in 
North Carolina. Different sections of the state, with their respective commercial towns, 
would align their interests with commercial centers in Virginia. Weldon, at the lower end 
of the Roanoke Canal, became the focus early railroad construction. At the time when 
Petersburg was contemplating a railroad to the Roanoke, the Roanoke Navigation 
Company anticipated the transport of 4,800 hogsheads of tobacco, 14,400 barrels of flour, 
and 9600 bales of cotton on the Roanoke River annually. They estimated that the actual 
annual agricultural output of the Roanoke Valley included 15,000 hogsheads of tobacco 

















EARLY PLANS FOR RAILROADS IN NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 The early period of railroad development in North Carolina has received only 
passing attention from historians, and the few existing scholarly works on the subject are 
dated.  It is appropriate to review the earliest railroads that were proposed and/or 
incorporated in North Carolina before 1835. The failure of these plans demonstrated to 
early promoters and legislators that there was insufficient private investment capital 
across the different regions of the state to support the building of large-scale railroads. On 
closer examination, it is apparent that the early railroad surveys were flawed, and the cost 
estimates were inaccurate. Further, the early promoters clearly did not have a full 
understanding of the nature of railroads. They conceived their plans under the notion that 
railroads would function much like canals and public roads. By 1833, delegates from 
across the state met in Raleigh for two internal improvements conventions to formulate a 
comprehensive plan for submission to the North Carolina General Assembly for state 
support. Two years later, agitation for internal improvements would figure significantly 
in the debates of the North Carolina State Constitutional Convention. The events of this 
period provide a foundation for determining the significance of the state’s policy for 
railroad development throughout the antebellum period. 
 Joseph Caldwell, the first president of the University of North Carolina, proposed 
a Central Rail Road spanning the state from Beaufort to the mountains in The Numbers of 
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Carlton in 1828. Caldwell, a mathematician, provides a route for this road that can be 
determined indirectly from a table of places in the state and their distance from the line 
(Figure 13). In addition, the work includes useful statistics on the cost of transportation of 
crops to market by the prevailing means (Caldwell, 1828, 21-23, 41-47). For the time, the 
plan was both visionary and impractical. However, the idea of a Central Rail Road took 
hold of the public mind, particularly in the piedmont. On 1 August 1828, a meeting was 
held at the home of William Albright in Chatham County to consider the need for a 
Central Rail Road. Two hundred people attended the meeting, and listened to an address 
by Dr. Caldwell. The address and resolutions of that meeting were thereafter published 
(Mebane and Heartt, 1828, 1-8). By the early 1830s, the plan was at the core of the state’s 
policy on projected Internal Improvements. In theory, the projected railroad would be 
accessible to many farmers of the interior (Appendix B).  
James Iredell, Jr., governor of North Carolina from 1827 through 1828, 
recommended building an experimental railroad from Fayetteville to Campbellton - a 
distance of approximately two miles; this plan was supported by his successor John 
Owen. Owen went further by recommending that the Cape Fear River should be 
connected to the Yadkin in North Carolina or to the Great Pee Dee in South Carolina by a 
turnpike or railroad (Owen, 1829, 11). In January of 1830, a steam locomotive 
demonstration was set up at the Court House in Fayetteville for citizens to take a ride on 
a circular track. The General Assembly of North Carolina passed An Act to incorporate a 










Figure 13. This is the Central Rail Road as Joseph Caldwell described it in his 1828 The 
Numbers of Carlton. The locations illustrated on the line of the route appear in 
a table provided in the text (Appendix B). The route is mapped on the present 
counties for reference. It is unclear how it would extend to the Tennessee line 
as latter promoters suggested. By 1831, the Central Rail Road plan was a 
route from Salisbury to Beaufort. The Central Rail Road concept matured into 
the North Carolina Railroad in 1849. The route extended north through 
Greensboro and Hillsboro then to Raleigh.   
Data Sources: Caldwell, Joseph. (1828). Numbers of Carlton. New York: G. 
Long; Cumming, W.P. (1966). North Carolina in Maps. Raleigh: State 
Department of Archives and History, Plate XI; US Census Bureau. (2000). 
Census 2000 TIGER/Line ® Files [machine-readable data files]. MAPdata 








This "experimental railroad" was to be built from Fayetteville to Campbellton on the 
Cape Fear River. The two-mile steam railroad was to be capitalized at $20,000 with a 
single share costing $100. Though the distance of this railroad seems insignificant, the 
use of a steam locomotive is its remarkable feature. To put this into perspective, the 
Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road, the only commercial railroad in the United State using 
steam power exclusively at that time, was only in operation over five miles of its length. 
The estimated cost of Fayetteville's railroad was estimated to be $16,000 for 2 miles of 
railroad at $8000, an engine at the river costing $4000, a locomotive engine costing 
$3000, and other fixtures costing $1000. When the books were opened to subscribers in 
March of 1831, the citizens of Fayetteville subscribed liberally to the stock of the 
company. At the close of the books, $52,300 of subscriptions had been taken. This was 
$32,000 in excess of what was required to capitalize the company, and all but $1000 was 
subscribed to by citizens of Fayetteville. However, work would not commence on this 
project for another three years (Carolina Observer, 13 January 1830, 6 January 1831, 13 
January 1831, 3 March 1831, 17 March 1831; People’s Press and Wilmington Advertiser, 
21 May 1834). 
About noon on Sunday 29 May 1831, the citizens of Fayetteville emerged from 
church to find their town in flames. The fire that had started at the kitchen of James Kyle 
on the Market Square quickly consumed much of the town, including businesses, public 
buildings, hotels, churches, and the Academy. A detailed account of the terrific property 
losses can be found in the Carolina Observer that was published the same day. In short 
order, another instance of fire transformed Fayetteville’s loss into a political opportunity. 
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The North Carolina Capitol building caught fire less than a month later, on Tuesday 21 
June 1831. John M Mason, John Bell and William Adams, workers employed to apply 
zinc to the building’s roof, were blamed for accidentally causing the conflagration that 
reduced the structure to the point that its walls fell in. Governor David L. Swain would 
give a firsthand account of the fire in the 1860s (Carolina Observer, 29 May 1831, 28 
June 1831; Swain, 1867, 9, 37).  
The destruction of the State House in Raleigh roused slumbering ambitions in 
Fayetteville and the Cape Fear region. Fayetteville had, following the Revolution, 
anticipated being the seat of government for the state; and had commenced the building 
of a graceful designed brick State House in 1787, only to be disappointed when the 
General Assembly chose to locate the capital in Wake County the following year 
(Cavanaugh, 1989, 4). It is perhaps a cruel irony that Fayetteville could no longer offer 
the use of this facility to the homeless legislature following the burning of the capital 
building, for the State House in Fayetteville had been one of the structures destroyed in 
that town’s great fire. However, the ensuing debate concerning the relocation of the 
capital to Fayetteville would have far-reaching consequences: it exposed the need to 
resolve by convention problems with the state’s constitution; it magnified the political 
frictions between the State’s regions; and it prompted further discourse on internal 
improvements. The Cape Fear political faction, with its economic interests in the 
southwest, would do anything – even force a constitutional convention – to remove the 
political center of gravity to its domain (Schauinger, 1949, 135-137). The Piedmont and 
port towns of the extreme East, though very different from each other, couldn’t possibly 
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benefit from having the state’s capital so closely located to the favorable port of 
Wilmington. At the same time, two plans for east-west railroads were evolving that 
mirrored the geopolitical divisions. 
 Railroad legislation and the debate over relocating the Capitol also brought back 
to the Legislature one of the state’s greatest minds – Judge William Gaston. In May of 
1831 at New Bern, he had expressed his support for a railroad from Beaufort to New 
Bern and thence to Raleigh to be known as the North Carolina Central Rail Road to be 
built with the aid of the state (ibid, 131-133). At about the same time, J.S. Smith, P.H. 
Winston, and Walker Anderson of Orange County were drafting a memorial to the 
legislature concerning a variant of the Central Rail Road that would extend from 
Beaufort to Salisbury with the potential for connecting spurs to the Cape Fear and the 
Roanoke (Schauinger 131-133; North Carolina, 1831).  
 On the day that the particulars of the burning of the capitol building appeared in 
the Carolina Observer, another article in the same issue suggested that the building of a 
railroad from Fayetteville to the interior of the state would aid the town’s recovery. The 
plan received the immediate support of Charles Fisher, Speaker of the North Carolina 
House of Commons. However, his open support of a competing plan for the Central Rail 
Road from Salisbury to Beaufort led the Carolina Observer to remark that he had 
abandoned Fayetteville’s plan, his "first love." However, another prominent supporter, 
John Pearson, introduced a resolution at a meeting at Salisbury for the preparation of a 
memorial to the legislature to commission a survey of a route from Fayetteville to the 
Yadkin River above the Narrows. In December, a resolution was introduced in the North 
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Carolina Senate to incorporate a Cape Fear to Yadkin railroad, owned by individual 
stockholders, to connect Haywood, at the confluence of the Cape Fear and the Haw in 
Chatham County, to Louisburg in Franklin County where it could connect with the 
Petersburg Rail Road. Senator Williams introduced a resolution to inquire into a 
Haywood to Louisburg to Halifax route. At the same time, a committee in Wilmington 
was preparing another memorial for the upcoming meeting of the General Assembly for 
proposing a railroad that would run from Wilmington, to Fayetteville, to the Yadkin and 
thence to Morganton (Figure 14). On 19 December 1831, this memorial was presented to 
the General Assembly; and several days later in the session, Judge Gaston introduced a 
bill for surveying the route of the Cape Fear and Yadkin Rail Road from the ocean to the 
mountains at the state’s expense. The bill passed, and the railroad moved towards a 
beginning. The Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road was incorporated during the 1831-32 
Session of the General Assembly and the capital stock of the company was to be 
$2,000,000. The state paid the cost of the survey. The books were open for subscription 
on 8 May 1832. A notice in the Wilmington newspaper, The People's Press, a year later 
marks the demise of this plan to connect the mountains with the coast. The subscribers 
were informed that their money would be returned (Carolina Observer, 28 June 1831, 24 
August 1831, 7 December 1831, 14 December 1831, 21 December 1831, 21 December 
1831, 23 December 1831, 4 January 1832; Brown, 1928, 17; The People’s Press and 











Figure 14. The 1832 route of the Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road extended from 
Wilmington to Morganton. North Carolina State Senate member Williams 
introduced a resolution to connect the Cape Fear and Yadkin to the Petersburg 
Rail Road from Haywood via Louisburg. This branch line would have passed 
through Raleigh. The Petersburg Rail Road, completed in 1833, ended at 
Blakeley on the Roanoke close to Weldon’s Orchard (Weldon). 
Data Sources: The Carolina Observer; The People’s Press and Wilmington 
Advertiser; Cumming, W.P. (1966). North Carolina in Maps. Raleigh: State 
Department of Archives and History, Plate XI; US Census Bureau. (2000). 
Census 2000 TIGER/Line ® Files [machine-readable data files]. MAPdata 









Some blamed the engineer employed by the state to survey the route. The claim 
was that the engineer ignored the council of locals who said a route could be devised that 
would avoid the physical obstacles that might be encountered by terminating the road at 
Flat Swamp Creek where it joins the Yadkin, on the Davidson and Rowan county line. 
Wilmingtonians tended to blame the citizens of Fayetteville, citing local rivalries for the 
cause of the failure. Others suggested that the original plan to connect Wilmington to the 
mountains would have been the preferred route, but the commissioners of Fayetteville 
caused the route from Fayetteville to the mountains to be surveyed first without allowing 
Wilmingtonians to have a say in the matter. The editor of the Carolina Observer refuted 
accusations that the citizens of Fayetteville did not fully support the project. Though he 
implied that the impetus for obtaining the charter started with Wilmington, he clearly 
stated that the citizens of Fayetteville had subscribed liberally; however, the western 
counties received blame for not subscribing (The People’s Press and Wilmington 
Advertiser, 8 May 1833, 13 May 1833, 22 May 1833, 29 May 1833).  
An examination of articles from the Raleigh newspaper provides further insight 
into the failure of the Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road. The 7 May 1833 issue of the 
weekly Raleigh Register reported that Dr. William P. Hort was prepared to return money 
to the investors, and adds that the western counties "failed to subscribe a cent towards 
affecting the proposed object." The failure of the proposed Central Railroad effort is 
mentioned in the same article. Nearly a week later, The Raleigh Register included an 
excerpt from a letter by James Wyche, the Superintendent of Internal Improvements for 
North Carolina, and a citation from engineer Mr. Rawle's estimate of the cost of one mile 
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of track (single and double). Francis William Rawle, a civil engineer from Pennsylvania, 
had been hired to survey both the Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley route and the Central 
Rail Road route. Mr. Wyche stated that the estimate was based on building a permanent 
way that was designed for double track on well-made embankments executed by 
experienced contractors and varying types of labor. Mr. Rawle's figures place cost per 
mile for single track at $2, 278.64, and $4,557.28 for double track (Appendix C). In the 
same issue, the Raleigh Register cites the editor of the Carolina Observer's statements 
that a railroad could be built to the Narrows of the Yadkin, but the conditions set forth by 
the charter would require too much capital, and that amendments to the charter would be 
addressed at the next session of the General Assembly. The commissioners at Fayetteville 
persisted in making it known that they had not abandoned the project. The most obvious 
problem for the project was the company's failure to secure the necessary funds. Alan D. 
Watson, in his book Wilmington, North Carolina to 1861, notes that even though 
subscriptions amounting to more than $100,000 in stock had been secured in the Cape 
Fear region (two-thirds of it by Wilmingtonians), the conditions of the company's charter 
required $300,000 in subscriptions to secure their charter. The disappointment that 
resulted from the failure of the Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road Company to meet the 
$300,000 in subscriptions required by its charter led the citizens of Wilmington to 
consider a plan to build a railroad between Wilmington & Raleigh (Raleigh Register, 7 
May 1833; North Carolina, 1833a, 100; 1833b, 141; Raleigh Register, 14 May 1833, 11 




Forty-eight of North Carolina’s then sixty-four counties were represented at the 
internal improvements convention held in Raleigh on 25 November 1833. Early in the 
convention, a committee under the chairmanship of Duncan Cameron was formed 
consisting of one member of each of the state’s Congressional districts. The primary 
objective of the committee was to determine what plans embraced the interests of the 
state’s different regions, and recommend a plan of internal improvements to the General 
Assembly for state patronage. First, they defined five sections of the state having 
different needs for addressing their respective markets. Of the many plans that the 
committee considered, they excluded those that were only of local benefit, and those 
beyond the resources of the state. The general plan of the committee recommended a rail 
from Edenton to the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road, or a canal to the Dismal Swamp 
Canal for the northern counties and those below Halifax. The remainder of their general 
plan recommends any combinations of roads, railroads, river routes and canals to serve 
the other regions of the state. They noted that the route should establish the standards, by 
which a particular project can be judged, not the mode that is employed.  
 
They propose further a communication, by rail road, river, or canal, or any two of 
them, or all united, from some point on the seaboard of the State, to the Tennessee 
line; and another communication of the same kind from some point on the 
Roanoke river, running southwardly, to the South Carolina line. These two latter 
works, it is believed, will fully answer the purposes of the other remaining 
portions of the State; while the whole combined will, it is hoped, meet the wants 
of the State at large, and all, and every part, readily fall in with, and form a part 
of, any internal communication which it may be hereafter thought necessary to 
form between the eastern, western, northern and southern portions of the Union. 
 




The committee further recommended that any company incorporated in the state for 
improving transportation should be allowed to intersect with, or cross, any other project 
completed or planned by another such company. The companies could, when three-fifths 
of their capital stock was subscribed to, request the General Assembly consider a 
subscription by the state to the remaining two-fifths of the shares. The Memorial 
continues with an estimate for a general plan that involves building thirty-five miles of 
railroad, at a cost of $280,000, for the northern counties, one hundred and fifty miles of a 
north-to-south railroad costing $1,200,000, an east-to-west railroad costing $2,920,000, 
and a ship channel from New Bern to Beaufort that would cost $600,000 (Figure 15). The 
estimate for the railroads is $8000 per mile. The total cost of this plan is given at 
$5,000,000 and the committee recommended that this amount could be borrowed in 
Europe for a rate or four or five per cent. The financial resources of the state are listed as 
$1,067,000 in actual property, and $706,000 in uncertain items. The actual property 
includes $500,000 in bank stock, and shares in the Roanoke Navigation Company, the 
Cape Fear Navigations Company, the Pungo and Plymouth Road, and the Buncombe 
Turnpike; loans to the Clubfoot and Harlowe Canal Company, the Tennessee Turnpike 
Company, and the Swannanoa Turnpike Company. Included in the state’s assets are land 
bonds amounting to $440,000. The state’s claim for military expenditures during the War 
of 1812, and the proportion of western lands are the uncertain items. The annual interest 
on the actual property at four per cent is given as $42,680, and other regular sources of 














Figure 15. The Memorial of the Internal Improvements convention held in November of 
1833 recommended to the General Assembly two railroads that would cross 
the state. The north-to-south railroad would span 150 miles and the east-to-
west railroad would extend 365 miles to the mountains. In this map, the east-
to-west route begins at Beaufort and ends to the French Broad River near 
present-day Marshall. The point on the South Carolina Line is place north on a 
line to Cheraw, South Carolina. A continuation of this line would extend to 
Columbia, South Carolina. The dark line extending to Weldon represents a 
connection with the Virginia railroads. The length of the route is 
approximately 164 miles. The gray line represents an extension from Raleigh 
to Old Gaston (Wilkins Ferry) where the railroad would connect to Petersburg 
Rail Road via the Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road. The latter was 
incorporated in North Carolina after the Memorial was prepared. The distance 
of the entire route is approximately 158 miles. 
Data Sources: North Carolina.(1833). Memorial of the Convention upon the 
Subject of Internal Improvements held in Raleigh, November 1833, to the 







The North Carolina Legislature responded to the Memorial of the Convention 
upon the Subject of Internal Improvements by assembling the Joint Select Committee on 
Internal Improvements to prepare a report. While the committee concurred with the 
memorialists on the necessity of a general program of internal improvements, they did 
not recommend any immediate action. They recommended that further surveys and 
estimates should be made before the state should commit to a plan (North Carolina 
Legislature, 1833d). Their position was understandable, considering both the multitude of 
projects being considered and the dismal performance of past programs of internal 
improvements. The 1833 Report of the Board of Internal Improvements identifies the 
cause of past failure as too many projects undertaken at one time. The survey of the 
Central Rail Road and the Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road cost the state $7022.46, and 
both railroads had failed to raise the capital required by their charter. The board 
considered two important objectives as part of a general plan: there must be a good outlet 
to the ocean and a railroad should be connected to that outlet. A railroad from the 
Roanoke to South Carolina is also considered important, with a connection between 
Raleigh and Wilmington (North Carolina, 1833e). The Report of the Committee on 
Internal Improvements expands on the report of the board, recommended changes to its 
membership with one member acting as superintendent of public works, and pointed out 
that the citizens of North Carolina were quick to realize the potential of the steam 
locomotive; they support the convention’s proposal for a policy of two-fifths investment 
on the part of the state (North Carolina, 1833f). In addition, the committee recommended 
that the state should employ a topographical engineer, perhaps from the topographical 
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bureau of the United States government, to make estimates and surveys of the proposed 
routes (Coon, 1908, 641). 
During the 1833-34 Session of the General Assembly, an act to incorporate the 
Halifax and Weldon Rail Road Company passed, and an act to incorporate the Halifax 
Rail Road Bridge Company passed. Other acts and acts to amend acts concerning 
railroads were presented to the General Assembly that session. These included the 
Lumber River and Cape Fear Canal and Rail Road Company, the Greensville & Roanoke 
Rail Road Company, the Roanoke & Raleigh Rail Road Company, the Roanoke & 
Yadkin Rail Road Company, the Fayetteville & Campbellton Rail Road Company. In the 
same session of the General Assembly, the representatives from New Hanover County 
voted against an appropriation for railroad surveys against the wishes of their 
constituents. There was a bill presented to amend the charter of the Petersburg Rail Road 
so that they could continue from the Roanoke to Raleigh (North Carolina, 1834a, 70, 73, 
75, 81, 97, 99, 105; Raleigh Register, 24 December 1833, 25 March 1834, 17 November 
1833). 
Some of the most interesting amendments presented during that session pertain to 
the charter for the Weldon Toll Bridge. During the 1832-33 session of the General 
Assembly, an act to incorporate the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road Company, passed 
by the Virginia Legislature on 8 March 1832, was read. Mr. Mathews, the same senator 
that introduced the Halifax & Weldon Rail Road bill in 1833, moved that the words “at 
any point on the Roanoke below Weldon” be changed to the words “opposite Weldon.” 
The bill was then sent on to the House of Commons for their approval. On the bills return 
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to the senate, the words “opposite” and “or below” had not been agreed upon. The 
Weldon Toll Bridge was incorporated during the same session. A year later, the company 
presented amendments to their charter. A motion was presented to amend the bill by 
adding to the third section a paragraph that would set the annual tolls at fifteen per cent of 
the cost of the bridge and its railroad until the project had paid for itself. Thereafter, the 
tolls would be regulated by the legislature. The president and directors of the company 
were required to submit an annual report. This amendment was rejected. The fifth section 
of the bill was amended with a paragraph that made the company and its agents liable for 
the loss of service due to disrepair of the bridge and railroad, and prescribed a penalty for 
overcharging or undercharging the toll. This change was accepted, and the bill was sent 
on to the House (North Carolina, 1833a, 111, 129, 131; 1834a, 114-115). It is clear from 
this bill that the Weldon Toll Bridge Company originally had control of the bridge and 
the railroad track that crossed it. Of the many railroads incorporated during the 1833-34 
session of the General Assembly, the most significant included the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road, the North Carolina Centre & Seaport, the Roanoke & Raleigh, and the 
Greensville & Roanoke (Brown, 1928, 27). The Halifax & Weldon Rail Road and the 
Weldon Toll Bridge are significant because they constituted a crossing of the Roanoke. 
The projected network of railroad at the end of 1833 connected the ports of Beaufort and 
Wilmington to Raleigh and the Roanoke. The Fayetteville to the Yadkin River route was 

















Figure 16. The network of proposed railroad incorporated at the end of 1833 included the 
Roanoke & Raleigh connecting the capital to Weldon or Halifax, the Halifax 
& Weldon, the Wilmington & Raleigh connecting through Waynesborough, 
the North Carolina Centre & Seaport connecting Beaufort to Raleigh or the 
Wilmington & Raleigh, and the revived Cape Fear to Yadkin River route. The 
Greensville & Roanoke was an extension of the Petersburg Rail Road that 
terminated on the north side of the Roanoke River west of Weldon. 
Data Source: Brown, C.K. (1928). A State Movement in Railroad 





















THE ORIGIN OF WILMINGTON & RALEIGH RAIL ROAD 
 
  
The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road began with a proposal to construct a 
turnpike between the port and the capital immediately after the Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail 
Road failed to meet the subscription required by its charter. Some citizens of Wilmington 
presented the idea in the Raleigh Register in advance of the Internal Improvements 
Convention of 4 July 1833. The editor of the paper printed the suggestion that an 
extension from Raleigh’s Experimental Rail Road to Wilmington and New Bern would 
be a better plan than a turnpike. By the close of the Convention, the promoters of the 
scheme met in Waynesborough, the projected junction of the branch lines from New Bern 
and Wilmington, to arrange a drive from subscriptions to the railroad. By year’s end, the 
North Carolina General Assembly chartered the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
Company. The route was set between Wilmington and Raleigh. During 1834, controversy 
erupted between the company and interest in Raleigh and the Petersburg Rail Road when 
the railroad’s directors attempted to change the termination of route from Raleigh to 
Halifax. However, the General Assembly of North Carolina ratified the amendment to the 
charter in 1835. In its new incarnation, the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road was an 
experiment in multimodal transportation. During its construction, it operated a stagecoach 
line forming a connection between its northern and southern divisions. It fleet of 
steamboats provided regular service between Wilmington and Charleston.  
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This period in the history of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road has received 
little attention from scholars. Unfortunately, it is difficult to understand the relationship 
between this railroad and the Virginia railroads without understanding the origins of the 
conflict between Wilmington and Raleigh over the route change. Much of the material 
necessary to prepare a cohesive narrative of these events comes from primary sources.  
   The first railroad built into North Carolina territory was the Petersburg Rail 
Road. The Experimental Rail-road Company was incorporated during the 1832-33 
Session of the General Assembly; in addition to carrying stone from the quarry for use in 
building the new State House, the company’s charter set the price for hauling stone for 
any future public building (North Carolina, 1833a, 29). It was the first railroad in the state 
built by North Carolinians. Governor David Swain later reported that one of Raleigh’s 
most respected and enlightened women originally suggested it, Mrs. Sarah Polk (Swain, 
1867, 34-37). During the Internal Improvement Convention held in Raleigh during 
November of 1833, Edmund Ruffin’s monthly publication the Farmers’ Register 
published an article entitled “Memoranda and Scraps from a Traveler’s Note Book” that 
provides an outsider’s perspective to the proceedings. During his stay in Raleigh, the 
writer had an opportunity to examine the Experimental Rail Road.  
 
A rail-way of 1¼ miles was made from the quarry to the statehouse, solely to 
bring the stone, and has yielded profitable dividends to the proprietors, and at the 
same time enabled the transportation of the stone to be effected at one-third of the 
expense (as I heard,) that it would have otherwise cost. This facility also induces a 
much larger use of granite for new houses which are erecting on Fayette[ville] 
street, and will ultimately cause the town of Raleigh to show more beauty than 
many others of thrice its wealth and population … of the 2200 yards of the whole 
road, 1304 required either excavation or embankment, the greatest depth being 
apparently four feet, and the greatest height eight, judging by my eye. The length 
94 
 
of the places excavated and embanked, was counted by sills. The total cost of the 
rail-way, 2200 yards, including every material, and every source of expense, 
amounted to only $2,700, or $2,160 the mile. It is true that the sills are not of as 
large, nor of as good timber, as a work intended for permanent use would require, 
and that the iron strips are not more than one-sixth of an inch in thickness. But if 
the timber and iron had been such as were used on the Petersburg and Roanoke 
rail-way, it would have scarcely have made this cost $3,000 the mile; and yet this 
work, from the far greater unevenness of surface, must be more costly for its 
extent, than would be a rail-way from Roanoke, by Fayetteville, to South 
Carolina, exclusive of the viaducts over rivers. 
 
– (Ruffin, 1834, 467) – 
 
 
  Following the disappointment of the failure of the Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road 
project, the citizens of Wilmington proposed a plan to the citizens of Raleigh to connect 
their cities by means of a turnpike via Clinton (People’s Press and Wilmington 
Advertiser, 29 May 1833). In their response, the Raleigh Register advanced an idea that 
some had suggested (the article does not mention who they were) of extending the 
Experimental Rail Road in Raleigh to the town of South Washington on the Northeast 
Cape Fear. In the same article, a plan submitted was by individuals in New Bern for a 
railroad connecting Raleigh to some point on the Neuse that could support navigation.  
 
The proposition from Wilmington, is to connect Raleigh with that town by means 
of a Turnpike, on a simple and cheap plan. This plan, we fear, though preferable 
on the score of cheapness would not answer the purpose intended, to say nothing 
of the constant repairs required on a road so constructed. The main idea of 
connecting the two places is however, so obviously important, that it must not be 
lost sight of. A plan [which] we have heard mentioned, and with general 
approbation is this: By a bona fide Rail Road. From the termination of our 
Experimental Rail-Road, to connect this City with South-Washington, in New 
Hanover county, making that place the head of Navigation. We understand from a 
most respectable source, that the distance between Raleigh and that point is only 
75 miles in a direct line, and that from thence, boats, drawing three or four feet of 
water, can at any season of the year ascend and descend the river. Such are the 
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great advantages of location and convenience of timber, on this route, that it is 
believed a Road could be constructed for about $2,000 per mile. 
 
– (Raleigh Register, 11 June 1833) – 
 
 
Prior to the Internal Improvements Convention held in Raleigh on 4 July 1833, 
the delegates from Wilmington, New Hanover County and the surrounding area 
assembled at a public meeting at the courthouse in Wilmington. Their committee 
instructed them to cooperate with the citizens of Raleigh and others in the construction of 
a railroad between Raleigh and Wilmington; and to protest plans that would carry 
resources out of the state (The People’s Press and Wilmington Advertiser, 26 June 1833; 
Raleigh Register, 25 June 1833). At the July Internal Improvements Convention, the 
survey and estimates from the Cape Fear were referred to the general committee, and a 
number of railroad projects were discussed. These included a railroad from the Roanoke 
running west, a railroad from the Cape Fear running west, a railroad from Raleigh to the 
Roanoke, and a railroad from Raleigh to Fayetteville. John D. Jones of Wilmington 
introduced a proposal for a railroad from Wilmington to Raleigh. Jones was a lawyer by 
trade, but was also an agriculturalist, a member of the House of Commons, and president 
of the Bank of the Cape Fear and is associated with a deed of land to the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road on the northern outskirts of Wilmington (Brown, 1928, 31; Sprunt, 
1916, 249-250; New Hanover County, 1840, 210). Judge William Gaston presented a 
resolution to build a railroad from Raleigh to Waynesboro. Gaston, a statesman of great 
reputation both in the state and nationally, had come out of retirement after the State 
House fire for the sole purpose of preserving the Capital at Raleigh and championing the 
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plan for the Central Rail Road. In the Legislature, he was active in supporting railroad 
projects, and he introduced the resolution to build the railroad from Raleigh to 
Waynesborough with branch lines to Wilmington and/or New Bern. From this point, the 
railroad could be extended to New Bern or Wilmington. On the same day that the minutes 
of the convention were printed in the Raleigh Register, an appeal commenced to build a 
railroad from Raleigh to Waynesboro. 
 
Rail-Road to Waynesborough - It has been determined to make a vigorous and 
united effort to raise subscriptions to effect the construction of a Rail Road from 
this City to some point on the Neuse River, at or very near Waynesborough, to be 
continued from thence to Newbern, or to Wilmington, or to both places. We have 
been requested to publish the annexed form of a caption, to be used in securing a 
pledge of subscription to the stock of a Company to be incorporated for this 
purpose: "The Subscribers bind and oblige themselves severally, to take the 
number of Shares attached to their names, in a Company to be formed and 
incorporated for the erection of a Rail Road from Raleigh to or near to 
Waynesborough. The said Shares at the prices of 100 Dollars each, and the 
Subscribers respectfully ask the General Assembly to grant a charter of 
Incorporation, and they hereby submit to have themselves charged by enactments 
in said charter with the amount of Stock herein subscribed. 
 
– (Raleigh Register, 16 July 1833) – 
 
 
The notice concluded with a statement for committees who wanted to open a subscription 
to continue the railroad to New Bern or Wilmington.  
When the books were opened at Waynesborough, $25,000 in stock was 
subscribed to immediately by an unnamed gentleman from Wilmington. In August, a 
meeting was held at Roles' Store in the northern part of Wake County. Col. Allen Rogers 
was appointed chairman, and Joseph Fowler served as secretary. Governor Swain and 
William H. Haywood addressed the assembly. The purpose of this meeting was to 
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determine the amount of subscriptions that could be expected from the area. Wilmington 
had at this point subscribed to $100,000 in stock, and the promoters hoped Wake County 
would subscribe to enough stock to carry the proposed railroad from Raleigh to some 
point on the Neuse. The resolutions adopted at this meeting included instructions to be 
given to the representatives from Wake County to the next General Assembly, urging the 
representatives to support a system of internal improvements and seek state funds to aid 
in their realization. During September, an additional eight subscribers from Pittsboro 
subscribed to $15,000 in stock, and the railroad was first referred to as the "Raleigh & 
Wilmington Rail Road" (Figure 17). When the General Assembly met in 1833, "The 
engrossed bill from the House of Commons, to incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail-road Company” was read the first time and passed on 23 December 1833 (Richmond 
Enquirer, 16 August 1833; Raleigh Register, 30 July 1833, 13 August 1833, 3 September 
1833, 17 September 1833, 31 December 1833, 7 January 1834).  
 During the year of 1834, the Wilmington Committee would have a long running 
battle of words over statements presented in the Address of the Internal Improvement 
Central Committee. Gavin Hogg, one of the original commissioners at Raleigh listed in 
the charter of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, authored it. At the heart of this 
dispute was with the proposal set forth in the statements in the Address that the first 














Figure 17. This map of eastern North Carolina illustrates the evolution of the Wilmington 
& Raleigh Rail Road concept through the year 1833. It began with a proposal 
from citizens in Wilmington to the citizens of Raleigh to build a turnpike 
between Wilmington and Raleigh via Clinton. The editor of the Raleigh 
Register suggested extending the Experimental Rail Road in Raleigh to the 
head of navigation on the Northeast Cape Fear at South Washington. During 
the Internal Improvements Convention held in Raleigh in early July, the 
promoters of the scheme began an effort to secure subscription for a railroad 
between Raleigh and Waynesborough with branch lines to Wilmington and/or 
New Bern. The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road was chartered at the 1833-
34 session of the North Carolina General Assembly. The Halifax & Weldon 
Rail Road, later to merge with the Wilmington & Raleigh, was chartered the 
same year. 
Data Sources: The People’s Press and Wilmington Advertiser, 26 June 1833; 
Raleigh Register, 25 June 1833, 16 July 1833, 30 July 1833, 13 August 1833, 
3 September 1833, 17 September 1833, 31 December 1833, 7 January 1834; 







We object to the proposition to construct the first rail road, from the southern 
boundary to form a connection with those from Petersburg and Norfolk.  Such a 
road would be intersected by every road, river and canal conveying produce from 
the interior; and this produce would consequently go to Petersburg or Norfolk.  
The current of trade, thus firmly established could never be diverted, and the 
interior of the State would become tributary to Virginia, and the whole sea-board 
abandoned to utter ruin.  Under such circumstances, what rational hope could the 
people of the sea-board entertain from constructing a road to intersect the great 
transverse route, what would the citizens in the interior care about such a route to 
our own seaboard, possessing already one of primary importance to Norfolk!  If 
the object to the Committee be to divert the trade of North Carolina from South 
Carolina and Virginia, the first rail road constructed should be from the interior of 
the State to Beaufort, or some other port in North Carolina.  No connection should 
be formed with those of Norfolk and Petersburg, until the current of trade is 
firmly established in its proper channel.  This being accomplished, the people in 
this quarter would not wish to interfere, to retard the general plan of internal 
transportation, that our Legislature or the citizens of the State may think proper to 
adopt. 
 
– (People’s Press and Wilmington Advertiser, 14 May 1834) – 
 
 
Gavin Hogg responded to the New Hanover committee in July. He accused the town 
leaders of having a leaning towards commerce, not agriculture; they inclined to condemn 
any plan that did not bring the resources of the state into their commercial sphere. The 
Wilmington committee responded with a rebuttal stating that the entire trade of the 
seaboard would be ruined by building a railroad from Fayetteville, or the South Carolina 
line, to meet the Virginia railroads at the Roanoke. Interests in Halifax were also critical 
of the Central Committee’s Address: the adoption of the plan would carry commerce out 
of the state to Virginia and South Carolina (Raleigh Register, 15 July 1834, 12 August 
1834, 16 September 1834). 
The Report of the Board of Internal Improvements of North Carolina, transmitted 
by the Governor to the General Assembly, December 10th, 1834 stated that of all the 
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railroad companies incorporated during the last session of the General Assembly, only a 
part of the Cape Fear and Yadkin Rail Road from Fayetteville to Campbellton was under 
way. The board was of the opinion “that no general system of improvement can be 
effected in North Carolina by incorporated companies,” and that each of the companies 
needed one principal engineer with assistants. A resolution was introduced to the General 
Assembly whereby two-fifths of the stock of any chartered railroad in the State should be 
supported by the State. During the same session, Edward B. Dudley, representing New 
Hanover County, attempted to introduce a bill in the House of Commons to amend the 
charter of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. Samuel Smallwood, the representative 
of Beaufort County, motioned that the bill be laid on the table until 3 November 1835 
during the next session of the General Assembly. The motion passed seventy-one to thirty 
(North Carolina, 1834b, 3-4; People’s Press and Wilmington Advertiser, 17 December 
1834; Raleigh Register, 13 January 1835). 
The major railroads that were chartered in 1833 include the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road, the Roanoke & Raleigh Rail Road, the Greensville & Roanoke Rail 
Road, and the Halifax & Weldon Rail Road. Of these, the Roanoke & Raleigh, a plan to 
connect Raleigh with Halifax or Weldon, failed to progress beyond its incorporation. The 
change of route of the Wilmington & Raleigh has been suggested by Brown to be a 
practical decision based upon the commercial potential afforded by connecting to the 
Virginia railroads, and noting Sprunt, mentioned that Raleigh may have been indifferent 
to the project (Brown, 27, 31-32). Sprunt, however, also mentions that at the time the 
railroad was chartered in 1833, that the company had not considered the advantages of 
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building to the Roanoke (Sprunt, 150). An exchange of letters that were printed in the 
Wilmington Chronicle in 1840 between writers “Petersburg” and “Roanoke” yields a clue 
to the nature of the outside forces that were acting upon railroad planning in North 
Carolina. Writer “Roanoke” clearly states that both the Petersburg Rail Road and Raleigh 
were displeased by the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road’s change of route. 
 
He says, first, “that when the Wilmington Rail Road was first commenced, the 
Petersburg Company was of course very anxious to see it carried to Raleigh – but 
when they found the Company intended to run it to the Roanoke, they were 
equally as anxious to have a good connexion with it there.” He does not say, but I 
shall say it for him, that as soon as it was mentioned that the Wilmington Road 
would not go to Raleigh, but would go to the Roanoke River, his Company made 
the most imperious threats of opposition, which threats were energetically carried 
out, by the united influence of Petersburg and Raleigh, and even the lobbies of the 
Legislature Halls of North Carolina were besieged by this Petersburg Company, 
urging the defeat of the Wilmington Road – and I call on “Petersburg” if he 
denies this, to show forth the correspondence which then took place between 
Messrs. Osborne and Dudley, Presidents of these respective Companies, upon this 
very subject. Nor was this opposition of short duration, but continued 
unrelentingly, until it was seen the Wilmington Company would succeed in 
despite of their efforts … and then was expressed this great anxiety to connect 
with the Wilmington Company at the Roanoke. This was a wonderful exhibition 
of good feeling towards the Wilmington Road, truly, and worthy of all 
consideration by your community. And here we want it to be borne in mind, that 
during all this conflict, the much abused Portsmouth Company was lending its 
feeble aid to the Wilmington Company, and has never ceased to continue this 
friendly feeling, because it is its interest to do so. 
 
– (Wilmington Chronicle, 11 November 1840) – 
 
       
The promoters of railroads in North Carolina had fallen under the influence of 
two opposing factions. The interests in Raleigh had aligned themselves with the 
Petersburg Rail Road. The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, through its change of route 
to Halifax, would open the entire market of eastern North Carolina to the Portsmouth & 
102 
 
Roanoke Rail Road, as well as creating the opportunity for a through ticket to the south. 
When the Petersburg Rail Road sought to establish a connection to the Roanoke by way 
of the Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road in 1833, the continuation of service through 
Raleigh and Wilmington would have given the Petersburg market the advantage. The 
Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road could only realize its potential if railroads extended 
from its terminus on the Roanoke at (Old) Gaston to Raleigh, then Fayetteville, and 
eventually to Columbia, South Carolina. This arrangement would constitute an interior 
through route that could compete with the coastal through route. 
As early as August of 1833, the residents of the Cape Fear had voiced concerns 
about the Petersburg Rail Road’s plans to extend their railroad south to Fayetteville, and 
hoped the delegates to the Internal Improvements Convention would support plans that 
encouraged commerce within the state. By year’s end, the Petersburg Rail Road 
Company had moved to have their charter amended to extend the railroad from the 
Roanoke to Raleigh. Bills to incorporate the Halifax & Weldon Rail Road Company, the 
Weldon Toll Bridge Company, and the Halifax Rail Road Bridge Company were 
presented to the North Carolina General Assembly in 1833. These separate private 
corporations in total were intended to be used by the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road 
(The People’s Press, 6 March 1833; Raleigh Register, 13 August 1833, 17 November 
1833, 24 December 1833; Wilmington & W.R. Co. v. Alsbrook, Sheriff, 1892, 279, 164). 
This was a very practical type of arrangement. The Halifax & Weldon Company did not 
have to acquire locomotives and rolling stock. The company would construct what 
amounted to an extension of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road while remaining an 
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independent entity. Walter Gwynn, acting as chief engineer for the Portsmouth & 
Roanoke Rail Road, reported in his 1833 survey for that company that an extension of the 
railroad past the Roanoke by “enterprizing citizens of North Carolina” was favorable 
(Gwynn, 1833, 10). The New York Farmer, reprinting an article from the Farmers’ 
Register published on 1 December 1836, explains why the Petersburg Rail Road, in 
essence, created the Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road. Not long after reaching Blakeley, 
the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road was projected to terminate four miles upriver at 
Weldon. Petersburg responded by planning a railroad that would extend from Hicksford 
(Emporia) to Wilkes’ Ferry (Gaston). The bridge over the Roanoke at that point was to be 
built by the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road (New York Farmer, 29 May 1837). 
The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road managed to overcome opposition to the 
changes in its charter by the time the General Assembly met in late 1835. There are 
several notable compromises in the plan, some of which would be rendered moot by 
subsequent developments. In early December, the company came to agreement with 
interests in New Bern that the route pass as close as possible to Waynesborough, the head 
of navigation of the Neuse. Branch lines were projected to be built to Raleigh and New 
Bern after the completion of the main line; and the project would proceed without any 
provisions for the state to take stock in the company (Raleigh Register, 6 December 1835, 
29 December 1835). Building the railroad through Waynesborough was logical. It had 
been part of the original plan, and it was not too far removed west from a direct line from 
Wilmington to Halifax. The state would later become the railroad’s largest shareholder, 
and its branches to Raleigh and New Bern would not be built by the company. The 
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THE ORIGIN OF THE RALEIGH & GASTON RAIL ROAD 
 
 
During the 1834-35 Session of the North Carolina General Assembly, legislators 
considered a bill to amend the charter of the Raleigh & Roanoke Rail Road and a bill to 
construct a railroad from Gaston, at the termination of the Greensville & Roanoke Rail 
Road, to Raleigh – the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road. The bill to incorporate the Raleigh 
& Gaston excited interest because it had not been before any committee. The 
incorporators had observed that the legislature had been liberal about granting charters to 
railroads if they were not seeking state aid; thus, the railroad was chartered as a private 
undertaking (Raleigh Register, 3 December 1835, 15 December 1835; Brown, 45).  
Three months after the company was incorporated, an article from a writer 
identified as “Petersburg,” reprinted from the Petersburg Intelligencer, appeared in the 
Farmer’s Register.  
 
We have been going on very quietly with the subscription to the Raleigh and 
Gaston Rail Road Company – little has been said and much done. But so much 
may be said in favor of the scheme that I think it would be proper to publish in 
your paper some of the reasons on which the friends of the work rely to 
recommend it to the public. 
 
– (Ruffin, 1836a, 652) – 
 
 
There was a strong connection between the officers of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail 
Road and Petersburg interests. Charles F. Osborne, president of the Petersburg Rail Road, 
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was a business associate in cotton and textile manufacturing in Petersburg with investor 
Samuel Mordecai, an officer in the Petersburg Rail Road Company. George W. 
Mordecai, the half-brother of Samuel, was the first president of the Raleigh & Gaston 
Rail Road. Osborne also served on the board of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road, and his 
name appears conspicuously in the company’s second annual report (Wyatt, 1937, 21-22, 
25n; Ruffin, 1838, 740, 742). The Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road, the Raleigh & 
Gaston Rail Road, and the proposed Raleigh & Columbia were to serve as a de facto 
extension of the Petersburg’s market influence. The 1836 “Proceedings of the Petersburg 
Rail Road Company” printed in the Farmers’ Register states this goal outright. The 
company projected an extension of their market to the Yadkin. 
 
On the south within the short space of a year, we have grafted on our road the 
Greensville and Roanoke Rail Road; and proposals will soon be submitted for a 
bridge across the Roanoke at Gaston, connecting that improvement with the 
Raleigh and Gaston Rail Road – and satisfactory assurances are given us that 
before the present year rolls away, the connexion will be complete, and part of the 
road on the other side of the Roanoke so far made, that it may be used for travel 
and transportation … at no distant day a connexion with the Yadkin country, 
(perhaps the finest in the south,) either at Raleigh or at Oxford, we are insured a 
continued and increased value to our investment: nor is it too much to anticipate, 
that the period is almost at hand when from the profit on travel alone, we shall 
declare such dividends to our stockholders, as will amply satisfy them, and 
consequently have it in our power to reduce the rates of transportation of produce, 
to the mere expense of its receipt and delivery. 
 
– (Ruffin, 1836, 762) – 
 
 
The assumed destiny of Virginia’s railroads was perceived before these railroads were 
built. An article in the Richmond Enquirer published not long after the Fayetteville Rail 
Road was incorporated suggests that Petersburg would eventually extend their railroad to 
107 
 
Fayetteville, and Norfolk would build a railroad to Raleigh via Halifax (Richmond 
Enquirer, 13 March 1831).  
 The Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road had commenced work with several built-in 
handicaps: it was a private corporation owned by individual stockholders; work on the 
railroad had to begin at the Roanoke River, not Raleigh; and the company had to build a 
bridge over the Roanoke. The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road was incorporated under a 
public act, had benefited from having merged with the Halifax & Weldon Rail Road, and 
had received the two-fifths investment on the part of the state. The latter was only 
possible because of the distribution of the federal surplus to the states, an element of 
Jacksonian monetary policy. The same policy would trigger the Panic of 1837, and the 
subsequent depression. This subject was touched on briefly in the discussion of railroad 
iron. Its impact on the Raleigh & Gaston was crippling, setting it on a path to insolvency.  
In the months before the Panic of 1837, the Raleigh Register celebrated a 
burgeoning new era of internal improvements beginning with Governor Edward B. 
Dudley’s inaugural speech, and William Graham’s speech on the application of public 
moneys for railroads and canals. Work on the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road had 
commenced, though by February there were reports of an outbreak of smallpox along the 
line. The first meeting of the Raleigh & Columbia Rail Road had taken place, and the 
first annual meeting of the company was scheduled for that month. The Raleigh and 
Gaston was constructing their bridge over the Roanoke: three piers and one abutment of 
the bridge at Gaston had been constructed, and iron for the rails had been ordered from 
Maury, Latham and Company of Liverpool and A & G Ralston of Philadelphia (Raleigh 
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Register, 3 January 1837, 17 January 1837, 7 February 1837, 41 February 1837, 28 
February 1837).  
On 2 May 1837, eight days before the onset of the Panic, the Raleigh Register 
reported that the Warren County Superior Court was considering the constitutionality of 
the condemnation of land for use by the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road. It was unclear that 
the charter of the company provided for it. The company had 1200 laborers employed on 
the line by late July, and the five stone piers – 160 feet apart – and the abutments of the 
bridge at Gaston were finished. The total length of the bridge was 1000 feet. The sixth 
installment on the stock of the Raleigh & Gaston was announced in September, and 
installments came due in the next month. As the year was drawing to a close, the Weldon 
Toll Bridge was nearly finished and several cars were taken across by horses; the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road had finished work on the bridge across the Northeast 
Cape Fear ten miles from Wilmington (Raleigh Register, 2 May 1837, 31 July 1837, 4 
September 1837, 23 October 1837, 30 October 1837; Wilmington Advertiser, 10 
November 1837).  
The second annual meeting of the stockholders of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail 
Road was held on 22 January 1838 at the state bank in Raleigh. The railroad clearly was 
experiencing some problems, even though the tone of the text appears to be optimistic. 
Thirty-eight miles of the road had been graded, a shipment of iron had been received, and 
they expected forty-eight miles of the railroad to be in operation by June. Sills could not 
been laid on the roadbed due to the frost. The company had expended considerable time 
and capital building their bridge over the Roanoke. However, it had yet to be completed. 
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Deliveries of timber had been delayed by low water levels on the Roanoke. The company 
admitted it did not have the capital to finish the project, and offered its remaining shares 
for subscription as well as contemplated pursuing a loan in England (Ruffin, 1838, 740, 
742). George Mordecai failed in his attempt to secure money in Europe; however, he 
managed to purchase 800 tons of iron at a low rate. The North Carolina General 
Assembly in their 1838-39 Session passed “An Act for the relief of the Raleigh and 
Gaston Rail Road Company” wherein the state endorsed the bonds of the company to the 
amount of $500,000, and required the railroad to mortgage their property to secure the 
state from any loss. The General Assembly would later foreclose on the mortgage when 
the company became insolvent (The American Farmer, 1839, 78; Brown, 53-54; North 
Carolina, 1845, 96-102).  
In an obvious way, the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road needed to be connected south 
or east. The projected Raleigh & Columbia Rail Road failed to meet the subscriptions to 
its stock required by its charter. By the time of their annual meeting in 1839, the company 
reported that there were five bridges on the route of the railroad and their total cost was 
estimated to be $155,000. The cost of the railroad, including the bridges, was $14,378 per 
mile. The report mentioned that travelers were deterred by the difficult stage ride from 
Columbia and Augusta to Raleigh, but they still anticipated the eventual benefits of a 




















Figure 18. This map illustrates the routes of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road and the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. By its charter, the projected Raleigh & 
Columbia Rail Road could extend from the Raleigh & Gaston to any point on 
the South Carolina line within thirty miles of Rockingham (5). The gray 
dotted lines indicate possible routes ending fifteen miles apart of the state line. 
The number point are the towns where that towns where subscription were 
taken, Pittsboro (1), Carthage (2), Fayetteville (3), Wadesboro (4). The second 
line west of Fayetteville is the shortest. However, line passing through 
Rockingham is in a direct line to Columbia, South Carolina. 
Data Source: North Carolina. (1837). Laws of the State of North Carolina 
Passed by the General Assembly at the Session of 1836-37. Raleigh: Thomas 









 They dismissed the merits of an inland rail connection between Wilmington and 
Charleston that would replace that company’s steamship line (Ruffin, 1838, 740, 742; 
1839, 388). It is significant that the officers of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road were 
perpetually enamored with their connections to Petersburg, and never abandoned the 
dream of pushing their railroad south to Columbia. This connection was an element of 
their plans despite the proposed building of any railroad link between Wilmington and 
Raleigh.  It was, in essence, the official position presented in Gavin Hogg’s Address of 
the Internal Improvement Central Committee. Had the Raleigh & Columbia Rail Road 
been constructed, it would have diverted north-to-south traffic away from the coast.  
The Raleigh & Gaston had anticipated carrying the “Great Mail,” through its 
connection with the Greensville and Roanoke at Gaston, rather than via the junction of 
the several railroads at Weldon. Others were of the opinion, such as early promoter Judge 
Duncan Cameron, that the Weldon junction would “command the transportation of the 
mails.” The company suffered the loss of a significant source of income when the 
contract was awarded to the Wilmington & Raleigh (Brown, 46, 55). Cameron’s 
reasoning was fatally flawed. If there were a first law of transporting the mails, major 
junctions on operating networks would be favored over dead-ends on projected networks. 
Connecting the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road to Weldon was inevitable, and is evidenced 
by the fact the Post Office Department had determined that its First Class – the “Great 
Atlantic line” from Boston to New Orleans – should connect south via Charleston. Once 
set, it would be developed from Charleston southward to New Orleans via Augusta and 
Covington, Georgia by rail and Mobile to New Orleans by steamboat. The Wilmington to 
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Charleston steamboat connection, albeit the weakest link, was the most direct. The 
Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road and the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road were Second 
Class routes. The difference in the contract was significant. The Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road received $75,000 annually to carry the mails from Weldon to Charleston seven 
times a week. The Petersburg Rail Road received $15,200 annually to carry the mails to 
Weldon seven times a week. The Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road received $2,000 
annually to carry the mails to Gaston six times a week, and the Raleigh & Gaston Rail 
Road received $8,000 annually to carry the mails to Raleigh six times a week. The 
Norfolk to Weldon route and the Charleston to Savannah steamboat route were Second 
Class routes (United States, 1845, 105: 1-7). 
The Weldon to Charleston route had a somewhat controversial beginning. The 
Memorial of Many Inhabitants of the City of Charleston Praying that the Southern Mail 
be carried by way of Halifax and Wilmington dated 27 November 1837 and signed by 
David Alexander, president of the Charleston Chamber of Commerce was submitted to 
Congress and was referred to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads on 14 
February 1838. The memorial notes that the State of North Carolina had subscribed to 
two-fifths of the stock of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, sixty miles of the railroad 
would be completed by 1 May 1838, and in the interim, four horse coaches would run the 
line. Two steamboats would complete the connection from Wilmington to Charleston. 
The memorialists present a timetable that shows that the change of route would result in a 
saving of time over the Halifax to Columbia route, via Fayetteville, Cheraw, and 
Camden. This memorial did not merely suggest the creation of a new route. It 
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recommended the changing of the “Southern Great Mail” route – that is, all the mail 
dispatched south. This memorial was protested by the citizens of Cheraw in their Petition 
of the Citizens of Cheraw. They challenged Charleston’s estimates of the times on the 
existing route, noting that the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road would be completed by the 
following summer and the Raleigh & Columbia Rail Road had recently been incorporated 
by the North Carolina Legislature. Additionally, an application was made to the South 
Carolina Legislature for the incorporation of a railroad to run from the South Carolina 
line to Columbia. The Petition of the Citizens of Camden noted that the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road route to Charleston was at the extreme east of both North Carolina and 
South Carolina. The Wilmington to Charleston steamboat connection excluded an 
extensive area of commercial towns, coastal and interior, from direct distribution of 
mails. The interior route was geographically situated to distribute the mails east and west. 
The Memorial of John Bryce and 212 Others, Inhabitants of Columbia, S.C., and 
Vicinity, Remonstrating against the removal of the great Southern mail route argued in 
favor of the superior efficiency of the interior route when the projected Raleigh & Gaston 
and Raleigh & Columbia would be completed. On 7 July 1838, Congress ratified An Act 
to establish certain post routes and to discontinue others. This piece of legislation is 
significant in two aspects. “Section Two” of the acts makes all railroads in the United 
States, in existence or thereafter to be built, post routes, and “Section One” establishes a 
route from Weldon to Charleston via Halifax, Enfield, Waynesborough, South 
Washington, and Wilmington. The route changes mentioned in the act in “Section Three” 
114 
 
were to go into effect on 1 July 1839 or sooner (United States, 1838, 1838a, 1838b, 
1838c). 
The awarding of the Southern Great Mail contract to the Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road illustrates the fact that there were two great rail networks developing to the 
north and south that were independent of the influence of Petersburg and Norfolk. The 
decision on the part of the Petersburg Rail Road to build to Blakely had determined the 
subsequent development of the network to the south of the Roanoke. The building of the 
Greensville & Roanoke was a wasted move, for there was one direction to take after 
reaching the Roanoke, which was to cross it. The building of the Portsmouth & Roanoke 
Rail Road, and the subsequent bridging of the Roanoke at Weldon, established a new 
objective, Halifax. Had the original Roanoke & Raleigh Rail Road scheme proceeded, 
Raleigh would have connected to Weldon or Halifax (Brown, 27). To the north, the 
railroads being built from New York, to Philadelphia, and to Fredericksburg were 
trending south. The early construction of the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road 
established a westward trending rail network below the Santee River. These networks, 
even if one only considers the transport of Great Mail, needed to be linked. The early 
construction of the Petersburg Rail Road established a southward trending rail network to 
intersect the South Carolina railroads. The Petersburg Rail Road became aware of this 
when the 1838 changes brought about a change in the designation of the express mail 
route. 
The Memorial of The Petersburg Railroad Company, praying the payment of a 
sum of money withheld from them, under their contract for the transportation of the mail 
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dated 27 December 1838, and signed by Charles F. Osborne, expresses the company’s 
bewilderment of a loss of $8,000 from their contract for changes brought about in 1838. 
The changes, issued to the company by S.R. Hobbie of the Contract Office of the Post 
Office Department, placed the beginning of the express mail route going south at Gaston 
and the end of express mail service north of Petersburg. In a letter to the company, 
included in a report to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads of the Senate 
dated 23 January 1839, Postmaster General Kendall explained to the company that 
Petersburg was the last distributing post office going south and the first going north. The 
express mail began at Gaston and extended south. The Post Office Department had also 
given contracts to the railroads operating from Richmond to Philadelphia, thus there was 
no longer a need to provide express service – being that all the mail from the Roanoke to 
New York City traveled by rail. The mail separated from the total dispatch at Gaston as 
express mail, even if it arrived there from New York in a separate express pouch, was not 
express mail until it left Gaston south. The express mail arriving at Gaston from the 
south, was part of the great mail traveling north on the Petersburg Rail Road (United 
States, 1838d, 1839). This is more than an interesting piece of historical trivia. The fact 
that the express dispatch had been changed from Blakely to Gaston  - the Petersburg Rail 
Road had to wait for its scheduled arrival at Gaston – indicates that the Great Mail was 
dispatched on the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The express dispatch was not 
needed at this junction with the Petersburg Rail Road; and the discontinuation of the 
express service north of Gaston indicates that the railroads north of Petersburg had 
formed a continuous network. The merger of the Weldon & Halifax and the Wilmington 
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& Raleigh, and the early operation of this road with its mix of rail, stage, and steamboat 
connections, ensured that it would receive the contract for the Southern Great Mail – the 
validation that the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road was the only trunk line passing 
through North Carolina.   
The “Report of Walter Gwynn, Esq., Engineer, to the President and Directors of 
the Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road Company,” prepared in 1836, justified the route 
to Halifax in the conclusion to his survey. 
 
Routes passing through the interior, with a view to divert travel, must be regarded 
as experiments, running counter to all experience, and of very doubtful success. 
And I lay it down as an incontrovertible fact, that those works which will prove 
most profitable, and conducive to the great and varied interests of the country, 
may be classified under two heads. Those which connect the commercial cities, 
and those which lead from commercial towns by the most direct routes to the 
interior and western portions of our country … All the improvements which are 
contemplated from the sea-board to the western part of your state, must cross the 
line of your railway; and to whatever point destined, will find it to their interest, 
to some extent, to pursue it, in order to make of the most favorable location. 
Under this aspect, your rail road presents itself to the state in a peculiarly 
interesting point of view. It traverses it nearly through its entire length from north 
to south, and forms the basis upon which the internal improvement scheme of the 
Raleigh Convention may be most economically carried out. 
 
– (Ruffin, 1836, 348) – 
 
 
Gwynn noted three additional significant features of the route that recommended its 
acceptance. The railroad, through its connections with the Portsmouth & Roanoke and 
Petersburg railroads to the north and connection to Charleston by steamboat to the south, 
made the railroad a work of national importance. The railroad could serve a strategic 
function for the concentration of troops and munitions for the defense of the seaboard. 
The scope of the project placed it “beyond the reach of competition” (Ruffin, 1836, 348). 
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 Contrary to the opinions of the critics of the Wilmington to Halifax route, the 
citizens of Wilmington could not do better by running their railroad to Raleigh. It does 
not matter that Raleigh interests did or did not support the Wilmington to Raleigh route, 
or the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road officials threatened commercial interests in 
Petersburg – and their Raleigh business partners – by upsetting their plans to create a 
monopoly on the agricultural output of North Carolina’s piedmont. The benefits of 
maintaining competition between the Virginia railroads for market share at their junction 
near Weldon, in addition to opening up the Charleston market to the same, was obviously 
better for the citizens of the east than supporting the Petersburg monopoly. If Gwynn’s 
assessment of the viability of routes were correct, the Central Rail Road, not the Raleigh 
& Gaston, would have served the best interests of the City of Raleigh and piedmont 
agriculturalists. By 1839, the incorporators of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road had joined 
with some who had served the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road to form the Weldon Rail 
Road Company to connect the Raleigh & Gaston to the Portsmouth & Roanoke at 
Weldon (Clark, 1877, 28). During the 1840s, the Petersburg Rail Road built its own 
bridge over the Roanoke at Blakeley; and by the end of the Civil War, the Raleigh & 
Gaston opted to use their connection to Weldon rather than rebuild their bridge at Gaston 
that was destroyed during the war. The Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road, with its 














THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1835 
 
 
 The cause of internal improvements in North Carolina and the movement to 
amend the original state constitution are intimately connected. Thirty-five counties 
existed, and twenty-nine of these were in the eastern region in 1776. The old constitution 
allowed each county one senator and two representatives in the legislature. Seven 
borough towns sent one member to the House of Commons, representing the commercial 
interests of the state. As the population of the state grew, large counties in the central and 
western parts of the state were created. The smaller counties of the east retained control 
over the legislature, however. By 1821, representatives of the western counties 
introduced resolutions to amend the constitution, which the eastern majority rejected.  
After the State House fire in 1831, the controversy over relocation of the capital to 
Fayetteville set in motion a successful movement to amend the constitution (Conner, 
1908, 3-8). 
 The North Carolina State Constitution of 1776 reflected the practical condition of 
wartime, and represented a compromise between radical and conservative elements of the 
revolutionary government. It was workable, through undemocratic, favoring the eastern 
planter and individualistic backcountry farmer. The radicals favored a break with the 
British traditions of government; the conservatives wanted to keep parts of it that would 
limit suffrage and give independence to the judiciary. The conservatives were in the 
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minority, but they managed to influence the writing of the first constitution, which was 
ratified on 17 December 1776. The nature of North Carolina politics remained similarly 
arrayed after the Revolution. The conservatives argued for a tolerant policy toward 
former Loyalists, and the radicals opposed clemency on any level. The radicals’ interests 
led them to promote a local, centered form of government, and they were averse to 
central authority and the restriction on the issuing of paper currency. These political 
divisions were not formal parties. However, during the debates over the ratification of 
Federal Constitution, the radical emerged as Antifederalists (Gilpatrick, 1931, 20-36).        
 Throughout the 1820s, the need for internal improvements was the greatest source 
of discord between the eastern and western counties. Sectional differences had hampered 
the realization of Archibald Murphey’s plan for a state system. Easterners were inclined 
to relegate the execution of navigational improvements to private companies rather than 
accept state aid for the projects that would primarily serve their interest. This was 
motivated by the fear that state aid in the east would lead to state aid in other regions of 
the state, and the wealthy east would be taxed to pay for improvements in the west. The 
west, however, gradually was organizing into a political block with the persistence to 
attain greater representation. The State House fire in 1831 set in motion the alignment of 
interests in the Cape Fear counties and West. Westerners were not concerned about the 
location of the capital, but the friends of the movement to locate the capital to 
Fayetteville offered to support their efforts to amend the constitution. During the 1831-32 
Session of the General Assembly, the alliance managed to defeat a bill to appropriate 
funds to rebuild the State House. However, the Cape Fear region was not supportive of 
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the convention bill introduced by the West and it was defeated. The reformers managed 
to arrange an unofficial poll on the subject of a constitutional convention in 1833 that 
almost succeeded in convincing the General Assembly to pass a convention bill, but it 
was again defeated. The alliance between the east and western counties solidified after 
the 1833-34 Session of the General Assembly. Several railroads were incorporated during 
this session, but the conservatives blocked any recommendations for aid, including 
funding for surveys. This was particularly frustrating to eastern commercial interests 
(Jeffrey, 1989, 52-60). 
 The Internal Improvements Conventions of July and November, the Memorial of 
the convention, and growing enthusiasm for railroads in the public mind did not sway the 
General Assembly in 1833-34. By mid-1834, the improvement minded Whig Party was 
gaining ground in North Carolina. The Committee of Correspondence in Wilmington, the 
bane of Gavin Hogg, was a strong Whig presence in the Cape Fear. They railed against 
the Virginia-South Carolina interior railroad proposed in the Memorial. Edward B. 
Dudley belonged to the committee. He would become the first president of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road and the first popularly elected governor of North 
Carolina. The question of amending the constitution and the prosperity of the port fused 
in the Whig leaning of Wilmington. Governor David L. Swain pressed the subject of a 
constitutional convention in his message to the General Assembly in 1834. The bill 
passed during the 1834-35 Session (Konkle, 1922, 144-148).  
 On the evening that the General Assembly rejected the bill for a constitutional 
convention during the 1833-34 Session, representatives of the counties favoring the 
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convention met on 11 January 1834 to plan their next course of action. The 
representatives resolved to form an Executive Committee to prepare and publish essays 
on amending the constitution of the state. In addition, they planned to publish the bill 
rejected that day, and to establish committees in the individual counties to distribute the 
publications and collect contributions to offset costs (North Carolina, 1834c, 3-4). 
Through the spring and summer of 1834, the supporters of amending the state 
constitution began distributing pamphlets and holding rallies. The campaign extended 
into the eastern counties (Jeffrey, 1989, 62). The fund of a state system of internal 
improvements is discussed in the Proceeding of a Meeting of Members of the Legislature, 
held in Raleigh, January 11, 1834; with an Address to the People of North-Carolina, on 
the Subject of Amending the Constitution of the State. 
 
This subject presents a forcible appeal to such among you as desire to see the 
State embark upon a scheme of Internal Improvements. – Were a loan taken by 
the State, sufficient to commence operations such a work, the funds must be under 
the control of a Government whose necessary expenses exceed the ordinary 
revenue of $15,000 per year, and who does not know, that the system would be a 
“scapegoat,” to the sin of all other expenditures, and become odious? Would the 
people at large be taught to discriminate when it is notorious that few among you 
possess or have sought after any knowledge of our finances for many years? 
Depend upon it, you will never command money for the expenditure, or 
enterprize to pursue a system of great public works, if you are to rely upon an 
increase of taxes equal to the present deficiency of revenue for governmental 
purposes, added to enlarged demand on it for the interest of a State debt. 
 
– (North Carolina, 1834c, 15) – 
 
 
Simply stated, the expense of government had increased as new counties were added, yet 
many of these counties were not contributing enough in taxes to maintain their 
administration. While a program of internal improvements was necessary for the 
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prosperity of the state, the increasing costs of government would continue to consume tax 
revenues and reduce available funds in the treasury to finance those improvements. A 
state program such as the one suggested in the Memorial of the Internal Improvements 
Convention, set aside by the General Assembly of 1833-34, required that the state secure 
loans totaling five million dollars in portions of one million annually.  
 The General Assembly approved the bill for the constitutional convention on 5 
January 1835, and the convention convened on 4 June 1835. The delegates to the 
convention were freeholders of at least one hundred acres from each county. The most 
notable of these included Governor Swain, Judge William Gaston, and Charles Fisher. 
Nathaniel Macon, chosen president of the convention, would perform the last great 
service of his career (Konkle, 1922, 150-152). Macon, at seventy-eight years old, had 
spent much of his life in Congress and had known the framers of the first North Carolina 
State Constitution. While his selection as president did not hold special political 
significance, he was the undisputed authority on the 1776 constitution. Macon, Gaston, 
and Swain dominated the proceeding of the convention (Lefler and Newsome, 1973, 353-
354).  
 The debates of the convention reflect the conflict between two visions of North 
Carolina. Nathaniel Macon clearly supported the cause of education, an issue that was 
linked to the internal improvement movement. However, he did not believe that North 
Carolina was a commercial state, and its lack of a good port along with the “sickly” 
environment of the southeast section placed it in a poor position to compete with other 
states. Promoting public education would make the citizens of North Carolina virtuous, if 
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not great. Nathaniel Macon took a difference approach in some remarks about the 
degraded condition of the state, noting that North Carolinians were independent and “in 
general more happy,” even though they lacked the more conspicuous trapping of 
prosperity (North Carolina, 1836, 43, 92). Macon did not want to see the constitution 
rewritten; he merely wanted amendments appropriate to meet the changed conditions and 
to satisfy the western section of the state. He wanted to see suffrage based on mature 
judgment rather than property, public education support by taxation, annual legislatures, 
the recording of individual votes – viva voce – in legislature, religious liberty, county 
integrity, and the election of state officers and judges to specific terms. He was not 
concerned with commercial fads or internal improvements (Dodd, 1903, 387-389). To a 
degree, the convention achieved many of these objects. However, Macon was 
disappointed that the convention approved biannual sessions. 
 In the course of the debates, James Wellborn, a delegate from Wilkes County, 
stated that the disparity between the representation of the east and west had been 
responsible for the failure of a system of internal improvements, including both the 
Central Rail Road and the plan to connect the Cape Fear and Yadkin. Mr. Wilson, of 
Perquimans, questioned the motives of the west in seeking equal representation. He 
believed that Mr. Wellborn’s statements exposed the desire of the western counties to 
have railroad and canals to give them an outlet to the ocean. However, the opening of 
new territory to the south and west would continue to encourage outmigration from the 
state, and the soils of the western counties of North Carolina was exhausted. A railroad to 
the west could not reverse conditions. Jesse Speight, of Greene County, remarked that a 
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railroad from the seaboard to the mountains was impossible. The state did not have the 
capital for such a project, and the profits from transporting produce would not sustain it. 
Railroads made their money from passenger service. Nevertheless, if the citizens of the 
east were to be taxed for railroads, they should have a say in how the money was 
distributed. Mr. Speight stated that a mutual jealousy existed in the state between east and 
west, and between all the river basins. The only possible way to get the cooperation of the 
representatives of the opposing sections of the state was to extend political favors. He 
hoped he could bring before the legislature a plan to build a railroad from Beaufort to 
New Bern and a railroad from Fayetteville to the west. He thought these projects were 
practical (North Carolina, 1836, 86-87, 98-99, 123-125).  
 The subjects of internal improvement and education intersect the debates on 
borough representation, the number of representatives in the House of Commons, and 
other administrative considerations. The convention embraced other proposed 
amendments such as the removal of religious qualifications of office holding. This 
provision of the 1776 constitution remained untested, and perhaps ignored. The new 
amendment changed the qualifications, but excluded non-Christians. The new 
constitution also abrogated the right of “Free Persons of Color” to vote. However, those 
constitutional changes that altered the nature of representation indirectly influenced the 
cause of internal improvements. Under the new constitution, the composition of the 
House of Commons consisted of 90 to 120 members, based on population numbers. This 
gave the western counties fair representation according to size. The east retained an 
advantage because three-fifths of its large slave population county was included in county 
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population – the federal number. The Senate, apportioned to the tax value districts, gave 
the eastern counties additional advantages (Hamilton, 1916, 13-15). 
 The convention adjourned on 11 July 1835 and the constitution was put to popular 
vote several months later. The citizens ratified the North Carolina State Constitution of 
1835 by a majority of 5165 votes. The vote was divided along sectional lines with most 
easterners voting for rejection (North Carolina, 1836, 400, 425). Contrary to the long 
accepted view, the movement to amend the convention involved bipartisan cooperation 
between the Democrats and the Whigs. The popular election of the governor, as Judge 
Gaston noted, would stimulate party politics within the electorate. The citizen would lend 
their support to the party that served the interests of the whole state (Jeffrey, 1989, 64-
65). Edward B. Dudley, North Carolina’s first popularly elected governor, would be 
elected in 1836. The citizens of the state continued to elect Whig governors until 1850. 
Charles Manly, the last Whig governor, left office in January of 1851. The politics of the 
improvement minded Whig party would shape the railroad movement in North Carolina 
during its first period of construction. 
 Edward B. Dudley was a harmonizing force in North Carolina politics. He 
focused on practical issues rather than partisan concerns, and entertained a liberal 
viewpoint. Having served in Congress from 1829 to 1831, he refused to run for another 
term. In 1830, he had published a circular that opposed the Cherokee removal that 
irritated some in the western most section of the state. However, when he ran for 
governor during 1836, his platform was unambiguous. His views on internal 
improvements made him an attractive candidate in the western counties in spite of being 
126 
 
an easterner. He possessed a congenial personality, great wealth, and tendency to follow 
his principals doggedly (Hamilton, 1916, 36; Jeffrey, 1989, 75).  
 Governor Dudley, with the aid of his colleague William Graham, labored to 
reorganize the finances of the state during the 1836-37 Session of the General Assembly. 
The central achievement of this session was the two-fifths investment on the part of the 
state for several railroad projects, including the Cape Fear & Western Rail Road from 
Fayetteville to the Yadkin River, the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, and the North 
Carolina Central Rail Road from Beaufort to Fayetteville (Konkle, 1922, 176). The new 
statute channeled the distribution of the federal surplus into the stock of the railroad 
companies and the dividends from the stocks would be applied to the fund for public 
education called the Literary Fund (North Carolina, 1837b, 346-352). 
 Without the constitutional reforms put in place during the North Carolina State 
Constitutional Convention of 1835, it is unlikely that railroad development would have 
progressed during the late 1830s. The failure of earlier railroad schemes and the inability 
of the General Assembly to adopt a state plan for internal improvements are strongly 
associated with the undemocratic nature of North Carolina politics under the North 
Carolina Constitution of 1776. The amendments to the constitution allowed for the 
development of political parties along the national model, the election of the governor by 
popular vote rather than by the legislature, and diminished the sectional nature of North 











THE BUILDING OF A RAILROAD 
 
 
The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road was completed in March of 1840. At one 
hundred sixty-one and a half miles long, it was the longest railroad in the world, and it 
operated another one hundred fifty miles of steamboat service. During its construction, 
the company had operated a stagecoach line to bridge the gap in the rails between 
northern and southern sections, and its steamboats maintained regular service to 
Charleston. The railroad had actually been in service since mid-1837, providing a through 
ticket – “tri-weekly line of communication between Charleston and Weldon” 
(Wilmington Advertiser, 5 May 1837). It was a multimodal trunk linking north to south 
through relatively underdeveloped territory. By the early 1850s, the Wilmington & 
Manchester Railroad would replace the steamboat connection to Charleston through its 
junction with the South Carolina Railroad. There would not be another railroad route 
passing north to south through North Carolina until the Piedmont Railroad, between 
Danville and Greensboro, was built during the Civil War. The unprecedented length of 
the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, and the interstate concepts behind its design, 
establish the significance of this railroad in the history of transportation planning. It was 
not merely a railroad for accumulation of agricultural produce for a regional commercial 
center, or a railroad connecting a port with the interior, or a railroad connecting 
commercial towns; it formed the original north/south trunk through North Carolina that 
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would endure, with some changes, into the 20th century. It was the product of state and 
private capital, and was the only railroad of the several recommended for state investment 
in the mid-1830s that would proceed. While there were abundant surveys for vast 
railroads such as the Charleston & Cincinnati Rail Road, and there were many companies 
chartered to build stupendous railroads, the building of this railroad had actually 
proceeded to completion. Hitherto, the early history of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail 
Road, both from a technical and economic perspective, has gone unexamined. For the 
success of this route to be fully appreciated, it is necessary to assemble from primary 
sources the details of its planning, construction, and equipment. 
Walter Gwynn was one of nine West Point graduates on the team of topographical 
assistants selected by the principal engineers to undertake the survey of the Baltimore & 
Ohio Rail Road in 1828. During this survey, the engineers marked a 66-foot wide path 
with stakes. Stations, or places where instrument reading were taken, were numbered in 
sequence. Benchmarks were marked in red, and places that needed to be cut or filled 
were marked. The engineers and assistants required a team of men to set up instruments, 
clear undergrowth, set stakes, prepare meals, and drive the wagon. The survey party 
usually included fifteen men (Dilts, 1993, 63-65). Gwynn would work on the survey for 
the Petersburg Rail Road, and later become the chief engineer for the Portsmouth & 
Roanoke Rail Road (Raleigh Register, 2 October 1833). The exact date he became 
associated with the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road is uncertain. However, he was 
surveying the route for it in 1836. By April 1836, he had found three sites for crossing the 
Northeast Cape Fear River on the outskirts of Wilmington, and the company expected the 
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survey to be done in time to lay a cornerstone for the Fourth of July (Wilmington 
Advertiser, 22 April 1836, 27 May 1836). The issues of The Wilmington Advertiser 
between July 1836 and March 1837 are missing, but other North Carolina newspapers 
contain articles that fill the gap. It appears that the survey took longer than anticipated.  
 
Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road. – We are gratified to learn, that the Engineers 
of this road, have completed a survey of one entire line, running between the N. 
E. River and Long Creek, through Waynesboro to Halifax; and a part of another 
line from Goshen down on the west side of Long Creek. They are now engaged 
on a line, on the east side of the N. E. river by Rockfort, on the Neuse, through 
Tarborough. 
 
– (Raleigh Register, 5 July 1836) – 
 
 
Walter Gwynn’s report on the survey for the Wilmington & Halifax Railway (an early 
unofficial name of the Wilmington & Raleigh) appears in the October issue of Farmers’ 
Register, a monthly journal published by Edmund Ruffin. 
 Gwynn proposed an eastern and a western route that would begin in the town of 
Wilmington and junction with the Halifax and Weldon Rail Road. The western route 
commences in the southeast of Wilmington at a place known as “Dry Pond” on the 
southern boundary of Wilmington. The line crosses Market Street, continuing to the site 
of “Love Grove,” once a plantation, and crossing Smith Creek (Appendix D). The 
railroad continues to the site of the old bridge over the Northeast Cape Fear River. The 
route crosses Rockfish Creek and Stewart Creek to Bear Swamp in a direct line of forty-
five miles. The railroad turns toward Waynesborough at Goshen Swamp, crosses Brooks 
Branch and Yellow Marsh, and enters near the town near to the site of the bridge that 
carries the stage road between Halifax and Fayetteville over the Neuse River. The route 
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continues on to Enfield and Halifax. With the exception of the location of the starting 
point in Wilmington, the Western Route appears to be the selected route. Walter Gwynn 
includes a variant to the Western Route beginning at the “timber pens” presumably that 
that existed at Point Peter opposite Wilmington on the Cape Fear River, and proceeds 
across the “dividing ground” (Eagle Island) at the confluence of the northeast and 
northwest tributaries of the Cape Fear. It continues between Long Creek and Moore’s 
Creek, between Moore’s Creek and Rockfish Creek, to the head of Bear Swamp. This 
route would follow the course of the old 1890s route of the Cape Fear & Yadkin Railroad 
from Wilmington that parallels present-day US 421 to Montague, then follows a direct 
course to Bowdens (Figure 19). The Eastern Route differs significantly in that it crosses 
the Neuse River at Rockford Bridge (N 35.23348; W 77.82112) east of Goldsboro, then 
crosses Contentnea Creek at Edwards Bridge (N 35.41320; W 77.49667) at present-day 
Schuffleton on the Green/Pitt county line. It would then continue to Tarboro, and then 
pass through the divide between Deep Creek and Conoconnara Creek, and turn west to 
enter Halifax below Quankey Creek. The section of the later Seaboard Coastline Railroad 
between Scotland Neck to Halifax follows the general path suggested by Gwynn for the 
northern end of his eastern route. An abandoned section of railroad leading from Scotland 
Neck to Tarboro via the town of Speed appears to be a favorable continuation of the route 
south. However, Gwynn’s estimate of 162 miles and 1504 feet of rails does not fit into 
this model. Starting at “Dry Pond” in Wilmington and proceeding in a direct line to 
Rockford Bridge, then directly to Edwards Bridge, to Tarboro, to Halifax, and then to 









Figure 19. This map of modern eastern North Carolina illustrates Walter Gwynn’s 
Western Route of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The names of the 
places given are current and some are for reference purposes. The solid line 
represents the accepted variant of the Western Route. The distance is 161.5 
miles. Walter Gwynn gives this distance in his survey. The railroad crosses 
Rockfish Creek and continues to Bear Swamp. The dotted line indicates the 
alternate route from Wilmington to Bear Swamp. The abandoned track of the 
1890’s Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley Railroad avoids the swamps of the Cape 
Fear Lowland by passing on the high ground between Moore’s Creek and 
Long Creek as Gwynn described in his 1836 survey. The Cape Fear & Yadkin 
Valley Railroad turned northwest at Montague. This location is the first point 
offering the opportunity for a direct route to Bear Swamp over moderate 
ground.     














Figure 20. This map of modern eastern North Carolina illustrates Walter Gwynn’s 
Eastern Route of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The names of the 
places given are current and some are for reference purposes. The solid line 
illustrates the accepted route of the railroad. The broken line represents the 
Eastern Route. The total distance is 162.5 miles from Wilmington to Weldon. 
This distance matches Gwynn’s calculations, and the map given here includes 
those places mentioned in the report.  
 Data Source: Ruffin, E. (1836). The Farmers’ Register. 348-351. 






The company selected the Western Route. It began on the north side of 
Wilmington at the river rather than at “Dry Pond,” and it continued to Faison, where it 
arced towards Goldsboro (Waynesborough), and continued to Rocky Mount, Halifax, and 
Weldon. The total length of the route was 161.5 miles. The selection of this route is 
confirmed in the “Proceedings of the Second Annual Meeting of the Stockholders of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company after construction was well underway.”   
In laying before you an account of their transactions since the last annual meeting, 
the President and Directors have the satisfaction to state, that after the most 
thorough examination of this country through which the road is to pass, its 
location has been decided and fixed—passing ¾ of a mile east of 
Waynesborough, crossing the Tar River—through Enfield and Halifax to Weldon; 
making the total distance between Wilmington and Weldon 161 miles. Having 
carefully examined the several routes surveyed and reported to them, they concur 
entirely in the opinion, that the above is the most eligible; and their expectation of 
its speedy completion, at the original estimate, (as will appear by a 
communication from their Engineer) are now fully confirmed. 
 
– (Wilmington Advertiser, 18 May 1838) – 
 Governor Dudley commenced the work on the railroad by turning the first spade 
of earth on 25 October 1836 (Brown, 1928, 33). In November, the Raleigh Register 
carries an article concerning the stockholder meeting held November 7. Work was to 
begin at the Halifax division. 
From a Report made to the meeting, it appears that about 30 miles of the Road 
have been located, and 25 put under contract. The contracts, so far, have fallen 
within the estimates of the Engineer. Six hundred tons of Iron, spikes &c., two 
Locomotives, and Wheels and Axles for 50 Cars, have been ordered from 
England deliverable in March next. 
 




 The plan involved eventually having two crews working at both ends of the road. 
The Wilmington crew would put down rail to Faison’s Depot and turn north to join with 
the Halifax crew working toward Enfield. This was determined at the meeting of the 
stockholders on March 14 and 15 of that year. The first mention of the letting of contracts 
on the road appeared in the Carolina Observer (Fayetteville) in late January of 1837. At 
that time, the eighty-eight miles of the route from Wilmington to Waynesborough 
(Goldsboro) had been located, and the company had awarded contracts for fifty-two 
miles of grading. Contractors had cut a large portion of the timber for the superstructure.  
The officers of the company were happy to report to their stockholders by February that 
the stockholders of the Halifax & Weldon Rail Road Company agreed to merge their 
stock with Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company. The contractor responsible for 
putting down rails began work in April (Carolina Observer, 26 January 1837, 9 March 
1837; Wilmington Advertiser, 17 April 1837). 
 Contractors, with an average force of 900 laborers, were at work grading the road 
in early 1837. In addition to the extent of work reported in February, contractors were 
grading the twelve miles from Halifax to Enfield. The company issued contracts for rail 
and sills to landowners along 100 miles of the route. By November, fifty-tree miles of 
grading were completed, contractors were grading another forty-three miles, they had put 
down twenty-three and a half miles of rails, and thirty miles of rails were in progress. 
Two Stephenson locomotives had arrived and were being used to carry construction 
materials. Work on the bridge over the Northeast Cape Fear River, ten miles from 
Wilmington, was underway.  The bridge was 360 feet long with three spans resting on 
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two stone abutments and two stone piers. The water at this location was thirty-six feet 
deep. The shops and fixtures at Wilmington were under construction. The company’s 
stagecoaches took two and half days to travel from Halifax to the company docks in 
Wilmington (Wilmington Advertiser, 5 May 1837, 10 November 1837; Appendix E).  
In November of 1837, the train was in operation between Halifax and Weldon. 
This was the first regular train running over a significant distance in North Carolina. The 
locomotive and cars were in use every day except Sunday and Tuesday to convey 
passengers as far as the track was open in late December at Wilmington. Twenty miles of 
track were open on the southern division of the road as far as Armstrong’s farm two 
months later. The daily schedule of departure from Wilmington was pushed back from 11 
AM to 9:30 AM (Raleigh Register, 5 December 1837; Konkle, 1922, 182; Wilmington 
Advertiser, 12 January 1838, 2 March). In April, the Wilmington Advertiser reprinted an 
article from the Raleigh Register on the progress of the road: 
 
We learn that by the first of May, at farthest, this road will be completed in 
Teachy’s, 3 miles above Rockfish, or 42 miles from Wilmington. One month 
thereafter, 7 miles more; on the first of July, 5 more; and by the middle of August, 
5 more. This will make 59 miles, and reaches the cross roads from Duplin Old 
Courthouse, and thence to Limestone. It is expected that 20 miles, from Weldon 
to Enfield, will be opened by the first of June. 
 
– (Raleigh Register, 6 April 1838) – 
 
The Wilmington Advertiser reported on 4 May 1838 “A most dreaded part of the road, the 
Burgaw Swamp, thirty miles from Wilmington is finished, and the cars will traverse it 
probably tomorrow.” In the same article, it is stated, “A good deal of produce has already 
been brought to this market by way of the railroad, such as Turpentine, Tar, Bacon, Corn 
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&c.” The schedule for departure from Wilmington Depot was pushed back another hour 
to 8:30 AM by mid-May. In October of 1838, the northern end of the line was in 
operation as far south as Enfield, and the southern end had extended service to Faison. 
The company’s stagecoaches serviced the 90 miles between Faison Depot and Enfield. 
Twelve miles of track between Faison and Martin’s farm (in the neighborhood of the 
present-day town of Dudley) was completed by mid-December, and the first train was 
sent over this stretch of track on 20 December 1838 (Wilmington Advertiser, 4 May 1838, 
18 May 1838, 19 October 1838, 21 December 1838). 
 The remaining nine miles of track to Waynesborough lacked only the iron for 
completion. Shipped from New York and Philadelphia, it arrived in early 1839.  On the 
occasion of Washington’s Birthday in Waynesborough on 22 February 1839, the town 
was witness to the arrival of the first train as well as the first steamboat to navigate the 
Neuse River to that point. The vessel was the E.D. McNair. The union of river and rail 
transport at Waynesborough was significant in that the steamboat provided a connection 
to New Bern that served until a railroad was built between the towns. The train brought 
dignitaries from Wilmington, including the Wilmington Volunteers and their band 
(Wilmington Advertiser, 21 December 1838, 11 January 1839, 11 February 1839, 8 
March 1839).  
 At the third annual meeting of the stockholders held at Waynesborough on the 
sixth and seventh of May that year, the company reported that 103 miles of the line were 
open. The company had ten locomotives in services, and four eight-wheeled passenger 
cars. Each had a capacity of fifty passengers each. Two sections of the line totaling about 
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eighteen miles were expected to be open by July. This left fifty-eight miles of track to be 
completed. Iron for the railroad was being shipped to Wilmington and Portsmouth. By 
August, twenty-one miles in two sections was completed, thus reducing the distance 
between the two divisions to thirty-seven miles. The trains travelled ninety-three miles on 
the southern division, and thirty-one miles on the northern division. At this time, the 
stagecoaches ran forty-two miles, but this was reduced to thirty miles when twelve miles 
of track was opened in October (Wilmington Advertiser, 10 May 1839, 17 May 1839, 24 
May 1839, 23 August 1839, 4 October 1839). 
 The opening of the line into the interior of the state improved commerce in both 
directions. By September, The Wilmington Advertiser quoted a report in The Wilmington 
Chronicle that twenty-three freight cars of “merchandise of various kind” had left the 
port for the rural markets along the line. Similarly, the opening of the last sections of the 
road brought the first load of bacon ever from Green County, a product previously 
shipped to New Bern. At this time, the stage route had been reduced to thirty miles. 
On October 11, The Wilmington Advertiser announced that the ship Oberlin had arrived 
in New York with a shipment of 575 tons of iron from England for the railroad, and the 
same issue reported that a Norris locomotive had been purchased and was expected to be 
in place at the northern end of the road by early November (Appendix F). On 4 
November 1839, the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road held its Fourth Annual Meeting 
(though the Third Annual Meeting had been held in May) in Wilmington. A total of 130 
miles of the railroad was in use at that time (Wilmington Advertiser, 27 September 1839, 
4 October 1839, 11 October 1839, 15 November 1839). 
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 In early January of 1840, the Wilmington Advertiser published an article that 
provides details of the progress of the railroad up to that time. Trains ran daily over a 
125½ miles of track from Wilmington to Tar River, and 29½ miles of track from Weldon 
to Battle’s Depot – a total of 155 miles. This left only 6 miles to be completed. In 
addition to these facts, the Wilmington Advertiser includes detail on curves and grades: 
 
Only 21 1-2 miles 650 feet of this road are curved, leaving the unparalleled 
amount of 139 1-2 miles of straight road, in a total length of 161 miles. One of 
these straight lines is 47 miles long; others are 3 – 4 – 6 – 7 – 8 – and 15 miles in 
length. The shortest radius of curvature used is 5730 feet and most of the radii arc 
12 – 20 and 30,000 feet, - the radius of one curve is 68,240 feet in length – which 
curve is considered equal to a straight line – The steepest grade on the road is 30 
feet per mile – these occur only in approaching the few streams that cross the line 
– the grades generally are level or near approximations to level grades.  
 
– (Wilmington Advertiser, 3 January 1840) – 
 
 
 The remaining 30 miles would not be completed until March of 1840. Sprunt 
gives 7 March 1840 as the day on which the last spike was driven. Burton Alva Konkle 
states in his biography of John Motley Morehead that the exact time the last spike was 
driven that day was at 12 PM, and the first train from Wilmington arrived at Weldon at 9 
PM. A celebration was held at Wilmington Depot on 15 April 1840. The Wilmington 
Volunteers provided music for the occasion, and food was provided for a crowd of 550. 
The Wilmington Weekly Chronicle gave a detailed account of the festivities (Sprunt, 
1918, 150; Konkle, 1922, 200n; Wilmington Chronicle, 15 April 1840). The following 














Figure 21. This map illustrates the timeline of construction for the Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road. Each point represents a section of track that was opened for use 
based upon available documentation. Construction commenced at both the 
southern and northern divisions in 1837. 
Data Sources: Wilmington Advertiser, 5 May 1837, 10 November 1837; 
Raleigh Register, 5 December 1837; Wilmington Advertiser, 12 January 1838, 
2 March 1838, 6 April 1838, 4 May 1838, 18 May 1838, 19 October 1838, 21 
December 1838, 11 January 1839, 11 February 1839, 8 March 1839, 17 May 
1839, 24 May 1839, 23 August 1839, 4 October 1839, 11 October 1839, 15 







The following statement of expenses was prepared by James S. Green, treasurer 
of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road for their annual report to the Board of Internal 
Improvement in 1840. The figures , current to 1 May 1840, included:  
 
Survey and location of road, $18,879.27, Land damages, $16,262.60, Excavation 
and Embankment, $346,330.83, Rails, Sills and Knees,$244,330.83, Bridges and 
Truss work, $166,961.16, Iron, Spikes & Splicing plates, $257,145.38, 
Superstructure, $127,712.92, Depots, Turn Outs & Water, Stations on the Line, 
$22,166.17, Machine Shop & Ware Houses and Wharf at Wilmington$56,691.51, 
Shop, &c. at Weldon, $2,911.06, Engines, coaches and cars, $170,815.21, 
Mathematical instruments, $794.61, Engineering expenses, $58,867.25, Printing, 
and Advertising for Instalments on Stock &c., $1,198.50, Office Expenses, (Rent, 
Fuel, Stationary &c.) $1,584.16, Salaries to Officers and Clerks, $18,795.84, 
Interest on Loans &c., $27,191.01, Discount on English loan, $36,912.91, 
Contingent Expenses, (Postages, Commissions, Agents, &c.) $8,930.63, Halifax 
& Weldon Rail Road, $54,622.14.”  
 
 
The cost of the railroad had been $1,638,812.57 and the cost of the four steamboats and 
their fixtures had been $270,942.97; thus, the total cost amounted to $1,909,755.54 


















THE STEAMBOAT LINE 
 
 
The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road operated its steamship line between 
Wilmington and Charleston from 1837 until rendered unnecessary by the completion of 
the Wilmington & Manchester Rail Road in 1854. The company owned six ships during 
this period: the Boston, North Carolina, Governor Dudley, C. Vanderbilt, Wilmington, 
and Gladiator, all of which were side-paddle passenger vessels. The steamboat line was, 
in essence, an extension of the railroad into South Carolina that exploited a pre-
established water route, and the railroad was able to provide this service almost 
immediately. While the steamboat line never carried the volume of the freight of railroad, 
it did provide passengers with the most convenient access to the south.   
 At the 1 May 1837 meeting of the stockholders, President James Owen reported 
that a steamboat had been purchased since their last meeting in February of that year, and 
it had arrived in advanced of the company’s stagecoaches.  
 
Contracts have been entered into for another steamboat, under the supervision of 
one of the most skilful and scientific builders of our country, and she will be 
ready in the month of October, at which time we anticipate that 50 miles of the 
Rail Road will be completed, and furnished with coaches and cars for the 
transportation of passengers and produce. 
 





 The first steamship between Wilmington and Charleston in May was the 248-ton 
Boston. It was constructed in the shipyards of New York, New York in 1836, and its first 
homeport had been in Albany, New York (Vinson et al., 2006). References to this vessel 
appear in Annual Report submitted by president pro tem Alexander Anderson to the 
Board of Internal Improvement in 1838, along with the financial report prepared by 
company treasurer James S. Green. The company had paid $58,233.70 for the Boston, 
which was traded to the shipbuilding firm of Watchman & Bratt in partial payment for 
the new steamship Wilmington (North Carolina, 1838a; Wilmington Advertiser 14 June 
1839; 23 August 1839; 27 September 1839).  
 During December of 1837, the 370-ton North Carolina, also built in the New 
York shipyards, was the second steamship to be put into service (Vinson et al, 2006). 
This ship had a brief and troublesome beginning with a return to New York for 
maintenance in 1838 (Wilmington Advertiser, 19 October 1838). In May of 1839, she 
collided with company steamship C. Vanderbilt off the South Carolina coast near 
Georgetown, and both ships were force to return to Charleston. An account of the 
collision appeared in the Wilmington Advertiser. 
 
The non-arrival of the Steamer Vanderbilt up to yesterday morning from 
Charleston, (due on Sunday morning) and the North Carolina being also due 
yesterday morning, without making their appearance caused an intense anxiety in 
our community.  At about 10 o’clock A.M. yesterday, the Steamer Southerner, 
Capt Chase, arrived from Charleston bringing the unpleasant intelligence that the 
Vanderbilt and North Carolina came in contact with each other on Saturday night 
about 11 o’clock, off Georgetown light—the former on her way to this port, the 
latter hence to Charleston.  The Vanderbilt struck the North Carolina, on her 
starboard beam, near the forward gangway, cutting her down to the copper line, 
and otherwise damaging her to a considerable extent.  The injury received by the 
Vanderbilt was slight, and will be repaired in a few days.  Both boats made 
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directly for Charleston, where they arrived at 6 o’clock on Sunday morning.  We 
have heard various accounts of this unfortunate occurrence, and of causes which 
led to it, but forbear at present any notice of them, as we are assured that the most 
prompt measures are now taken by the Company’s Directors, to investigate the 
affair thoroughly, and that such action will be had, as will strongly guard against 
any thing of the kind in the future.  
 
– (Wilmington Advertiser, 10 May 1839) – 
 
The captains of both ships were suspended pending an investigation by the 
company (ibid). As a result, Captain Davis of the North Carolina was relieved of his 
command. The North Carolina was expended to be ready for serve again by the first of 
June (ibid, 17 May 1839). A year later, on 25 July 1840, the company steamship 
Governor Dudley collided with the North Carolina as the two ships were passing. This 
time, the North Carolina was lost. The Governor Dudley was the third steamship of the 
company to be put into service. Frances Anne Kemble included details in her Journal of a 
voyage from Wilmington to Charleston on the Governor Dudley. Mrs. Kemble and her 
family set out to the railroad company’s docks to board the ship in the afternoon of 24 
December 1838. They had only arrived in Wilmington at five o’clock in the morning that 
same day. Mrs. Kemble, a perennial critic by nature with an almost pathological 
obsession with neatness, had been subjected to a two-day ordeal on the yet to be 
completed Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. She had been deprived of rest, jostled about 
on the stagecoach, exposed to the cold wind, and been offered strange, interrupted meals 
in dirty environments – all in the company of equally miserable strangers. Her experience 
on the Governor Dudley appears to be a relatively pleasant change, though she cannot 




The afternoon was beautiful, golden, mild, and bright – the boat we were in 
extremely comfortable and clean, and the captain especially courteous. The whole 
furniture of the vessel was remarkably tasteful, as well as convenient – not 
forgetting the fawn-colored and blue curtains to the berths. But what a deplorable 
mistake it is – be-draperying up these narrow nests, so as to impede the meager 
mouthfuls of air which their dimensions alone necessarily limit one to. These 
crimson and yellow, or even fawn-colored and blue silk suffocators, are a poor 
compensation for free ventilation; and I always look at these elaborate 
adornments of sea beds as ingenious and elegant incentives to seasickness … The 
captain’s wife and ourselves were the only passengers; and, after a most delightful 
walk on deck in the afternoon, and comfortable tea, we retired for the night, and 
did not wake till we bumped on the Charleston bar on the morning of Christmas 
Day [Tuesday, December 25, 1838]. 
 
– (Kemble, 1863 [1984], 35-36) – 
 
 A more jovial writer T.A.R. composed a story for the March/April 1843 issue of 
Orion, a Monthly Magazine of Literature and Art entitled “Locomotion: Or, Lights and 
Shades of Travel” that describes his travel in the company of a friend on the Wilmington 
& Raleigh Rail Road trains, stagecoaches, and steamboats during 1838. The writer notes 
that “yellow Jack,” meaning Yellow Fever, in the South had caused a “derangement and 
uncertainty in public conveyances to those latitudes.” His observations on the coach ride 
and the eating arrangement along the route confirm Mrs. Kemble’s experiences 
(Appendix E). T.A.R. notes that it was five in the morning when his company arrived in 
Wilmington. The steamboat Governor Dudley was scheduled to dock at eight, but T.A.R. 
reported that the steamship had been late for the last three of its tri-weekly trips. After 
waiting, the writer and his company chartered another steamboat, Cotton Plant, to take 
them as far as Smithville (now Southport), there to meet the Governor Dudley with 
instructions from the “Wilmington agency” to exchange passengers – the Cotton Pant 
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returning to Wilmington and the Governor Dudley returning to Charleston. The Cotton 
Plant was prepared at one in the afternoon, and was ready to cast off at two. There were 
at least thirty-four passengers, seven of whom had been waiting for the boat to Charleston 
for more than a week. The passengers were required to pay for the trip to Smithville, but 
were reimbursed by the captain of the Governor Dudley (T.A.R., 1843, 342-352). 
 The C. Vanderbilt began her service on the railroad’s Wilmington to Charleston 
Packet in December of 1838. Built new in 1837 for Daniel Drew and owned by Cornelius 
Vanderbilt, it weighed 346 tons and its first homeport had been New York, New York 
(Vinson et al, 2006). Upon adding the C. Vanderbilt to their fleet and a contract from the 
Post Office Department, the company began daily trips to Charleston. Outside the 
collision with the North Carolina, the ship appears to have required only a new boiler. 
The new boiler was constructed for the ship in the company shops at Wilmington 
(Wilmington Advertise, 4 January 1839; Wilmington Chronicle, 23 November 1842).  
 The editor of the New Orleans Commercial Bulletin expressed his satisfaction 
with the Vanderbilt when he opted, in 1849, to proceed north via the steamship line and 
railroads from Charleston rather than a steamer bound for New York. 
 
I wrote you a hasty letter from Charleston, yesterday, and immediately after 
closing it, made up my mind to come by the mail route instead of by the New 
York steamer, for as the weather continued blustering and threatening, I preferred 
the risk of twelve hours sea sickness to a delay of three days, and accordingly I 
was soon on board the Wilmington mail boat, the Vanderbilt, Capt. Marshall.—It 
has been very much the custom to decry this line of boats as inferior and unsafe, 
but I think without sufficient cause.  We have recently been accustomed to the 
splendid modern Ocean steamers of 1,000, 1,500 and 2000 tons, fitted up with 
great style and luxury, that we look with contempt upon the small, snug and 
comfortable boats of a few years back, when they were considered all that was 
necessary or desirable; and I must confess, when I drove down, and saw only the 
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wheelhouses and the chimneys of the Vanderbilt visible above the wharf,  I felt a 
little disappointed, and cast another look upwards towards the unquite sky and 
lowering  clouds, but when I got on board, found every thing so snug and 
comfortable, even though rather on the small scale, comparatively, that I felt no 
regret in having selected that route.  The night proved very rough, with 
considerable sea, but the wind was favorable, and the boat made such rapid 
progress, that we had to go under very low steam, so as not to reach the bar before 
daylight, when the buoys could be distinguished.  Notwithstanding all the 
complaints of the boats of this line, there has been none in the United States 
which have run with more success; for they seldom lose a mail, and only in 
weather when almost any boat would do so, as they are allowed but very little 
margin to schedule time, and I have no recollection of any serious accident having 
happened to any of them in many years.  The accommodations on board, are very 
good, as is also the fare.  They have an upper saloon or cabin on deck, where the 
meals are given, with windows all round as in a railroad car, which makes it both 
light and airy.  These boats are owned by the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad 
Company, and they are a constant drain upon them, as the expense of keeping 
them up is far from being covered by their earnings; on the contrary, they draw 
heavily on the profits of the road.  This of itself is a fair reason why largest and 
more expensive ones are not put on the line, besides as regards size, the water on 
the bar of the river to Wilmington, would not admit boats of heavy draft. 
 
– (Wilmington Journal, 31 August 1849) – 
 
 The Wilmington was built in 1839 in Baltimore and put into service in September 
of the same year. The builder was Langley B. Cully, and its captain was Charles Ivey. It 
was one hundred seventy-two feet long by twenty-four feet wide, with a cargo hold ten 
feet deep, and was equipped with a 135-horsepower Watchman & Bratt engine. It had a 
dining hall forty feet long by twelve feet wide with eleven windows on each side, and 
was decorated with faux porcelain pilasters between the windows, cornice work, and 
gilding. The saloon woodwork was of crotch mahogany and curly maple (Vinson et al, 
2006). The woodwork was executed by T. Morris & Son, and was perceived to be an 
example of fine craftsmanship, “We understand that $10,000 or $15,000 more have been 
expended upon the Baltimore boat than the builders are to receive by the contract” 
147 
 
(Wilmington Advertiser, 14 June 1839). A more detailed account of the vessel’s 
specifications appears in the Wilmington Advertiser in late September. The editor derived 
some of his material from Lyford’s Price Current, a weekly commercial published in 
Baltimore.   
 
Upon the delivery of the Wilmington by Watchman & Bratt, the building 
contractors, to the agents of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company; it 
was ascertained before leaving the Chesapeake, that she was too slow for the 
purpose of carrying the Great Southern mail, for which she was designed.  She 
was consequently returned to these contractors for the purpose of making the 
necessary alterations.  Watchman & Bratt having satisfactorily ascertained that 
she could not generate steam as fast as she could consume it, the furnace draught 
was increased by adding 12 feet to the length of her smoke stack, which partially 
remedied the defect.  She then left Baltimore for Wilmington, and arrived here on 
the 20th.  On the 21st she made her first to Charleston and on the 24th her second.  
The return passage of the latter, was performed in 16 hours—and the distance 
from Smithville to Wilmington—28 miles—in two hours by our editorial 
chronometer--___ favourable … The Wilmington is a new boat, just finished, and 
left our waters for the first time on Thursday last for Wilmington, N.C. in charge 
of Capt. Ivey.  She is owned by the Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road Company, 
for whom she was built by contract with, and under the supervision of Messrs. 
Watchman & Bratt, distinguished Machinists and Engine Builders of Baltimore.  
Mr. Langley B. Cully was the Shipwright; and ‘competent judges who have 
examined, have pronounced the workmanship faithfully executed; the materials 
not to be surpassed in quality; and her model is certainly beautiful.—Her length is 
172 feet, breath of beam 24 feet, and depth of hold 30 feet, and her 
admeasurements about four hundred tons.  Her bucket wheels are of iron, which is 
a new feature in building in this country; her Engine , one of Watchman & Bratt’s 
best, 135 horses power, and she has one of Raub’s patent double self-acting safety 
valves, the first which has ever been introduced to operate successfully, on board 
of any boats on our waters.—The accommodations are ample for 100 passengers, 
having that number of berths by each of which depends a life preserver. 
 
– (Wilmington Advertiser, 27 September 1839) – 
 
 
The article includes comments from the captain, Charles Ivey. He stated that the ships 
guards are eighteen inches higher above the waterline than other boats. In addition, the 
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wheel buckets are made of iron, and the boiler burnt one cord of wood per hour 
(Wilmington Advertiser, 27 September 1839).  
 The Gladiator was the last vessel added to the railroad’s steamship line. Built in 
New York in 1841, it became operational on the Wilmington to Charleston Packet in the 
same year. Its gross tonnage was 379 tons (Vinson et al, 2006). The sparse record that has 
survived appears to indicate that the Gladiator performed admirably. In 1849, the United 
States Government chartered the steamship to transport troops from Smithville to Palatka, 
Florida. The officers of the company, under the command of Captain A. Elzey, prepared 
a card that expressed their gratitutde to the captain and crew of the ship. 
 
The undersigned, passengers on the steamer Gladiator, one of the Wilmington and 
Charleston Line of Steamboats, recently chartered to transport Company E, 2nd 
Regiment of Artillery, fro, Fort Johnson, N. C., to Pilatka, Florida, take pleasure 
in testifying to her merits as a fine sea boat, where no effort is spared to contribute 
to the comfort of the passengers. We also avail ourselves of this opportunity to 
tender our grateful acknowledgements to her gentlemanly commander, Capt. 
Isaac B. Smith, and to the officers and crew generally, for the highly creditable 
manner in which the trip was performed, and the uniform kindness and attention 
shown us during the passage. 
 
– (Wilmington Journal, 5 October 1849) – 
 
 The steamboats were scheduled to arrive in Charleston at ten o’clock in the 
morning. It appears from the 1849 annual report that with four vessels operating up to the 
termination of the packet in February of 1854, the company employed crews for three – 
three captains, three first mates, three second mates, four first engineers, four second 
engineers, eight firemen, six wheelmen, nine deckhands, three stewards, three 
stewardesses, six waiters, three cooks, six knife boys and scullions, and an additional 
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three deckhands that were slaves. The report of James T. Miller, the agent for the 
company’s steamboat line, included in the 1850 annual report of the company a listing of  
three captains: Smith commands the Gladiator, Bates the Governor Dudley, and Sterrett 
the Wilmington. The Governor Dudley, from the description provided in the report, 
appears to have encountered hurricane conditions in August of that year, but still 
performed well. The C. Vanderbilt was out of order awaiting the delivery of a new boiler. 
The following year, at the next annual meeting, the company reported that the Vanderbilt 
has been completely “rebuilt from her keel up,” including machinery, to the point being 
“a new boat in all but her name.” An examination of the earlier 1847 annual report 
indicates that the Gladiator had undergone repairs during the year and was in need of 
having the copper lining of the hull replaced. The other three ships had been modified to 
remove a design flaw; the guards were removed to make them more navigable in bad 
weather (Wilmington Journal, 19 November 1847, 9 November 1849, 19 November 
1849; Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, 1850, 7; Wilmington Herald, 5 
November 1851; Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road Company, 1855, 15-16).  
 The end of the Wilmington to Charleston packet came with the competition of the 
Wilmington & Manchester Rail Road in 1854. The line had created a prolonged regular 
commercial intercourse between the ports. It was a de facto extension of the Wilmington 
& Raleigh Rail Road, but it also a temporary device whose demise was the intended 
outcome of a planned advancement of rails southward. 
 
This morning, for, we suppose, nearly about the last time, we heard the ringing of 
the steamboat bell on her arrival here from Charleston, and saw her sweep along 
the river front of town.  Hereafter, we presume, all intercourse between this place 
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and the Queen City must be carried on by way of the Wilmington and 
Manchester, and the South Carolina Rail Roads. A piece of open sea navigation 
like that between this place and Charleston, must always occasion a break and 
comparative uncertainty in the operation of lines composed of Rail Road travel, 
so that we must have looked for grumbling so long as it existed,  --no matter how 
prompt and faithful the service performed by the boats; and no boats have done 
better service, or with less loss of life or property than those belonging to the 
Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road Company.  Still with all the grumbling we had 
come to regard them as old friends.  Their commanders, too we have always 
found exceedingly clever gentlemen, and if one did puke a little in rough weather, 
it was all for the good of his or her wholesome.  
 
– (Wilmington Journal, 3 February 1854) – 
 
 During the following year, S.L. Fremont, engineer and superintendent of the 
company, reported at the 1855 annual meeting that “way travel,” that is, from one place 
on the line to another place rather than “through travel,” had increased since that steam 
packet had been discontinued (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road, 1855, 15). This is in 
part due to the reduction of the Wilmington to Weldon ticket from “through” to “way” 
fare (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road Company, 1855, 7).  
 The opening of the southeastern North Carolina and northeastern Southern 
Carolina by the Wilmington & Manchester Rail Road, and the connection between the 
North Carolina Rail Road and the Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road at Goldsboro, 
established a network with a multitude of passenger and freight destinations on the 
existing line. For example, the long anticipated rail connection between Raleigh and 
Wilmington was available, and counties of Brunswick and Columbus to the south of 
Wilmington acquired access to and from the port by rail. The steamboat packet could 
fulfill only so much within the limits of time and its connections. The accommodations 
the steamboats offered through passengers stand in stark contrast with the aggravations 
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associated with stagecoach and railroad travel. The intent of the Wilmington to 
Charleston packet was not recreational. It was a necessary extension of the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road to the intended length. When the rails were down, the railroad could 
unburden itself of its steamboats and its obsolete corporate name. In the delivery of the 
Great Mail, the steamboat connection from Wilmington to Charleston was problematic. It 
accounted for a significant number of incidents of failure of the mails on the New York to 
New Orleans Great Mail route, and by 1845 the Wilmington to Charleston steamboat 
connection was the section of the route responsible for many failures and irregularities of 
the mails. The major cause of these delays was the weather. The Mobile to New Orleans 
steamboat connection also experienced similar difficulties (United States, 1839a, 2-4; 
1840, 2, 6; 1845a, 2, 9-15). In the late 1840s, the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
anticipated a rail connection to South Carolina. 
 
We now confidently look forward to the time, when the Steam Boat line can be 
dispensed with, as there is every probability that the Wilmington and Manchester 
Road will be constructed.  The completion of this Road would doubtless be of 
incalculable benefit to our Road, and every Stockholder is therefore deeply 
interested, in contributing to so desirable a result. The completion of the 
Wilmington and Manchester Rail Road, coupled with the renewal of our Road 
with heavy Iron, (while there would be a large diminution of expenses on our 
line) would secure an increase in speed of 24 hours, between the North and South, 
a large increase of our business, and safety and certainty, in the transmission of 
passengers, mail and freight. 
 
– (North Carolina, 1848, 7(C): 30) – 
 
 
The docks of the steamboat packet of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road in Charleston 
were located at the foot of Laurens Street south of the shipyards (Bridgens and Allen, 









THE TRADE WAR 
 
 
The trade war between Petersburg and Norfolk was the offshoot of several 
internal improvement projects. Peter C. Stewart traces the origins of the economic 
competition to the opening of the Dismal Swamp Canal in his article Railroads and 
Urban Rivalries in Antebellum Eastern Virginia. The climax of the struggle came when 
Petersburg gained control over a portion of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road’s track 
in North Carolina, and shut the railroad down.  
 
Towards the end of the War of 1812 Norfolk merchants and North Carolina 
farmers happily witnessed the completion of the Dismal Swamp Canal, which 
permitted lighters and other small craft to bring the Old North State’s lumber and 
agricultural products to the Elizabeth River. Narrow and shallow, the canal posed 
no threat to Petersburg, recently rebuilt after a disastrous fire and entering an era 
of significant growth as a textile and tobacco-processing center. Unfortunately for 
the relations between the two towns, the businessmen of Norfolk, noting that they 
controlled only a small fraction of the total commerce of their own state, tried to 
secure the tobacco and grain produced in considerable volume in the Roanoke 
Valley. 
 
– (Stewart, 1973, 4) – 
 
Norfolk was able to exercise its early ambitions through investment in the Roanoke 
Navigation Company and continued support for increasing the depth and width of the 
Dismal Swamp Canal. The Roanoke Navigation Company, chartered in 1807 for keeping 
the Roanoke River clear of obstructions, did not commence a comprehensive program of 
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improvements until North Carolina and Virginia re-organized the company under the 
aegis of both states in 1815. The Dismal Swamp Canal Company, incorporated in both 
North Carolina and Virginia in 1790, began work on the canal in 1793 and completed it 
in 1814. The canal improvements were completed in 1828. During the years 1828-29, the 
improvements to the Dismal Swamp Canal, coupled with the completion of the locks of 
the Roanoke Canal, allowed produce from the upper Roanoke Valley to bypass the Great 
Falls and continue to the Dismal Swamp Canal by way of Albemarle Sound. Prior to 
these improvements, boats would unload produce at the Great Falls, where it would be 
transported to Petersburg by wagon. Petersburg responded to the redirection of its share 
of incoming produce to the Norfolk markets by incorporating the Petersburg Rail Road in 
1830. The purpose of this railroad was to intercept the produce passing through the 
Roanoke Canal near its outlet at Blakeley, North Carolina. Since the railroad was partly 
built in North Carolina, the company had to be incorporated in both states (Henderson, 
1941, 107). Its railroad was completed in 1833. 
 Stewart’s article provides an account of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road’s 
control over the bridge spanning the Roanoke River, the attempt by the Petersburg Rail 
Road to drive the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road Company out of business with 
reduced fares. Also, the advantages of the through ticket from Baltimore via the 
Baltimore and Norfolk Steam Packet Company and the clandestine acquisition of the debt 
of the North Carolina section of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road’s track by a 
Petersburg politician named Francis Rives in 1843. Rives attempted to take up the track, 
but was thwarted by Walter Gwynn and the Sheriff of Northampton County. Rives was 
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brought to trial in North Carolina, but could not be convicted. The Supreme Court of 
North Carolina determined that Rives had the right to control the section of track he had 
acquired. Rives shut down the track (the Petersburg Rail Road was paying him $2,500 
quarterly to keep the line closed), and caused the railroad to fail. However, North 
Carolina would not grant Rives a charter to the track he controlled. Eventually, a new 
company was formed in Norfolk called the Seaboard & Roanoke Rail Road. The railroad 
was rebuilt, and service to the Roanoke resumed (Stewart, 1973, 9-14).There are several 
important aspects of the narrative that are missing in Stewart’s article. For instance, the 
closing of Roanoke Inlet in the late 1700s left the Albemarle region of North Carolina 
without an outlet to the ocean, thus enhancing the success of the Dismal Swamp Canal. 
Also, the efforts of Petersburg and Norfolk to extend their railroads south of the Roanoke 
excited sectional rivalries in North Carolina, and upset the state’s plans for an east to west 
railroad; and the State of North Carolina enacted legislation to counter the aggressiveness 
of the Petersburg interests, and assisted in the restoration of the Norfolk connection.  
 The maritime commerce of the Albemarle Sound region of North Carolina 
expanded during the closing decades of the Colonial Era as more land in the vast 
Roanoke River Basin was put under cultivation. The closing of Roanoke Inlet in the late 
1790s curtailed the development of a major port in the state’s northeast. Beaufort Harbor 
and the port of Wilmington were located too far to the south to be beneficial. The Dismal 
Swamp Canal, completed in 1805 (improved during the 1810s), attracted the produce 
entering Albemarle to the Norfolk market. As mentioned earlier, the State of North 
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Carolina commissioned plans for reopening Roanoke Inlet, but did not have the resources 
to undertake such an ambitious project (Appendix A).  
The influence of the Petersburg and Norfolk interests on the development of the 
Raleigh to Gaston route and the Wilmington to Halifax route is apparent in the material 
already presented; but the details of the outcome of the conflict, with its disruptive 
effects, require closer examination. By the late 1830s, the Weldon Toll Bridge, with its 
railroad track, became the focus of the hostilities between the Virginia railroads (Figure 
22, Figure 23). This bridge was the only means by which the Virginia railroads could 
access the Wilmington & Raleigh. The Petersburg Rail Road, upon reaching the Roanoke 
River at Blakely, had hoped to build a bridge there and continue their railroad south. The 
supporters of the Weldon Toll Bridge Company exercised their influence to prevent the 
North Carolina Legislature from granting the Petersburg company permission to build 
their own bridge. The Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road purchased the bridge in June of 
1838 (Wilmington Chronicle, 28 October 1840, 11 November 1840). After acquiring the 
bridge, the company attempted to establish a joint arrangement for its ownership with the 
Petersburg Rail Road and the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. 
 
Through the mediation of a committee from the Board, the Portsmouth Rail Road 
Company, who had recently become proprietors of the Weldon Toll Bridge, have 
sold one half of the bridge and rail road from Weldon to Gary’s—4/10 to be paid 
for by the Petersburg Company, and 1/10 by this company; for which the 
company’s bond is to be given for $10,000, payable three years after the 
execution of the title deed.  A free connection is thereby secured with both the 
Petersburg and Portsmouth Rail Roads; and the vexatious delays and interruption 
to which our planters and merchants as well as travelers have been subjected, at 
the Roanoke will occur no more. 
 






Figure 22. The abandoned Seaboard Coastline Bridge over the Roanoke River at Weldon 
is located at the site of the Weldon Toll Bridge. Photograph by Cynthia 






Figure 23. The Roanoke River at this location is broken by islands. The length of the 
bridge is greater than it appears in this photograph. Photograph by Cynthia 
Johnson in November 2000. Copyright owned by James C. Burke. 
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The Petersburg Rail Road backed out of the deal during the ensuing year; and the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, disappointed by the prospects of a 
continuation of the delay in service, contemplated the need for a second bridge near 
Weldon. The Petersburg Rail Road Company obtained permission to build their bridge, 
and its construction was underway at the same time the company began the replacement 
of their rails (Wilmington Chronicle, 1 December 1841, 24 May 1843).  
 Stewart’s article describes how Petersburg politician Francis Rives acquired the 
debt of the Portsmouth Company on the North Carolina portion of the railroad and then 
shut it down. The State of North Carolina stopped Rives from destroying the rails, and 
tried to prevent the loss of an important trade connection.  An article in American Law 
Magazine, “Opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the Case of the State of 
North Carolina v. Francis E. Rives – December Term, 1844,” (July 1845) provides a 
contemporary view of the controversial legal decisions, and explains the events 
surrounding the Francis Rives case in more depth than Stewart.  
 
At the fall term of 1842, of the superior court of Halifax county in North Carolina, 
Rochelle and Smith recovered a judgment against the Portsmouth and Roanoke 
Rail Road company a large debt, to wit: $16,846.80, besides interest and cost. 
Upon this judgment a writ of fieri facias was issued, directing the sheriff of the 
county of Northampton in that state, against the goods and chattels, lands and 
tenements of the company. Under this fi. fa. The sheriff went upon the road at 
Garysburg in Northampton and declared his levy, as follows: “Levied upon the 
Portsmouth and Roanoke Rail-road, from Roanoke to the depot at Margaretsville 
and the warehouses at Concord and Margaretsville depots, together with the land 
on which they are placed.”  What was so levied on was sold by the sheriff at the 
road near Garysburg, and Rochelle became the purchaser. When the sale was 
concluded, the sheriff said to Rochelle the property was his. 
 





Rochelle sold the property to Francis E. Rives, who obtained a deed from the sheriff on 1 
December 1843. According to the article, Rives attempted to negotiate a deal with the 
railroad, but the company and their lawyers did not believe that the sheriff’s sale was 
legitimate. On 6 January 1844, Rives began to dismantle the section of track that he had 
acquired. In the spring of that year, he was indicted on charges in superior court of 
Northampton County. The court decision was against Rives based on provisions within 
the charter of this railroad (and included in the charters of other railroads incorporated in 
North Carolina) that there was a penalty for injuring the road and the railroad.  The 
privileges granted in the railroad’s charter to condemn land and to enter upon adjacent 
lands for building material implied that the railroad was authorized to act in the public 
good.   The state could not authorize a company to take from private property owners 
what was rightfully theirs unless it was for the public good. This had been tested in a 
previous case, Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road Company vs. Davis, where the railroad was 
considered on par with a public road; thus, injuring or obstructing the railroad was akin to 
doing so to a public road. The court also determined that the company’s right to sell the 
iron and wood of the track ended when it was put down for use, then it became part of the 
public way and the company would violate its charter if they removed the track for 
reasons other than its repair or improvement. The court determined that Rives did not 
have a right to a title, and fined him twenty-five dollars. The court was lenient because 
Rives acted after consulting a lawyer (ibid). In “Opinion of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina in the Case of the State of North Carolina v. Francis E. Rives – December Term, 
1844,” the writer discusses the decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina that 
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overturned the conviction of the lower court. The higher court determined that Rives had 
purchased the section of railroad legitimately, and was the rightful owner (American Law 
Magazine, 1845). 
 The North Carolina General Assembly of 1844-45 passed “An Act to provide for 
the reorganization of the Portsmouth and Roanoke Rail Road Company.”  
 
Whereas the Portsmouth and Roanoke Rail Road Company is laboring under the 
pressure of heavy embarrassment which greatly injure and impair its public 
utility, and from which it is represented, that it may be relieved by a new 
organization, whereby the public interests of the late may be protected and 
continued, and without injustice to its creditors ...  
 
– (North Carolina, 1845, Laws, 107) – 
 
 
This act allowed the governor of North Carolina – in conjunction with the Governor of 
Virginia – to appoint commissioners to oversee the sale of the railroad, but preserved the 
rights of those “claiming by purchase any part of the said Rail Road” and the charter of 
the original corporation and its provisions. The engines and cars had to be sold separately 
from the road. The purchaser of the bridge and track in North Carolina had to execute a 
bond with the Literary Fund of North Carolina. The Petersburg Rail Road would have use 
of the disputed bridge and track to Garysburg on terms set by the governors of Virginia 
and North Carolina and the commissioners. A majority of the stockholders of the 
company had to agree to the sale, and the railroad bridge was to be included in the sale to 
the new company. Further, the act clarified and reinforced penalties for injuring the 
railroad that were part of the original charter and added “all such acts as are now offences 
against the State.” Another act passed during the 1844-45 session of the North Carolina 
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General Assembly allows the Portsmouth and Roanoke Rail Road to turn the railroad 
bridge into a toll bridge for horse drawn vehicles and pedestrians (North Carolina, 1845, 
108-111, 119). 
In 1850, the State of North Carolina authorized the Seaboard and Roanoke 
Railroad Company, the antecessor of the failed Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road, to 
issue bonds, and mortgage the company to John J. Palmer of New York. The mortgage 
held by the State on the Weldon Toll Bridge would be transferred to the Seaboard & 
Roanoke Railroad in exchange for bonds on the mortgage. By An Act concerning the 
Seaboard and Roanoke Rail Road (ratified on 28 January 1851), the Seaboard & 
Roanoke Railroad was allowed to change or alter its route from or near Margarettsville in 
Northampton County, near the Virginia line, to cross the Roanoke anywhere between 
Halifax and Weldon. There it would make a connection to the Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road (the route was not changed), and form a through ticket with other companies. 
The Seaboard & Roanoke Railroad and Roanoke Railroad (a North Carolina company) 
was granted the privilege to effect a junction with the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road. An 
Act to incorporate the Roanoke Valley Railroad Company is the realization of the 
proposal contemplated by the citizens of Warren County in April of 1833 – a connection 
to Weldon. Sections 29 and 30 of this act add a provision for transporting troops in the 
employment of the State and exempting railroad employees from militia duty (North 













Figure 24. Details from the U.S. Coast Survey map of 1865 show the convergence of the 
original railroads of the 1830-40s on the Roanoke River between Weldon and 
Gaston. Francis Rives shut down the tracks of Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail 
Road between Margarettsville and Weldon. The railroad reorganized as the 
Seaboard & Roanoke Rail Road. It resumed service to Weldon in 1851. The 
Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road established a connection to Weldon in 1853.  
Source: Cumming, W.P. (1966). North Carolina In Maps. Raleigh, NC: State 










 The idea of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road was conceived and promoted 
by Author Emerson of Portsmouth as a response to Petersburg’s railroad. Petersburg 
blocked state aid to the railroad in 1833, but failed to repeat their success the following 
year. However, the choice of inexpensive strap iron wooden rail construction began to 
fail early. On 10 December 1837, a train derailed because of a loose iron bar and two 
people were killed in the accident. When North Carolinian Andrew Joyner became 
president of the company, he set about making improvements to the railroad and its 
equipment. The company took on additional debt. The railroad failed to meet the 
expectations of Norfolk investors at a time when the area’s businessmen were 
experiencing the deleterious effect of Jackson’s monetary policy. The fatal debt of the 
company was to Clements and Rochelle, the builders of the Weldon Toll Bridge. Rives’ 
plot was deliberate and malicious. This is evident by the damage he inflicted on the 
bridge over Troublefield Creek (N 36.45396, W 77.54260) near Garysburg, and the 
disposal of iron rails into the same creek. For his efforts, the city of Petersburg would 
eventually elect Rives as their mayor. Boston investors would acquire what remained of 
the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road in 1846 (Parramore, Stewart, and Bogger, 1994, 
162-163,172-175).  
 The extension of the Raleigh & Gaston to Weldon was inevitable. The Raleigh 
interests that aligned with Petersburg made a fatal blunder. Weldon was truly the tollgate 
to North Carolina (Appendix G). This was made manifest by the construction of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road with its steamboat line to Charleston. The railroad 
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might have remained solvent had it connected to Weldon, as was the original plan of the 
Roanoke & Raleigh Rail Road plan of 1833. 
In 1877, Walter McKenzie Clark published History of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail 
Road Company Including All the Acts of the General Assembly of North Carolina 
Relating Thereto.  
 
The Company was originally chartered in 1835, to run from Gaston to Raleigh. 
Work commenced soon thereafter. The road was completed through to Raleigh in 
1843. It existed under great difficulties until it was finally sold under a foreclosure 
directed by act of the General Assembly ratified 6th January, 1845. At the sale in 
pursuance thereof the State of North Carolina, through its then Governor, Hon. 
William A. Graham, bought the entire property and franchises. It was then run 
entirely as a State institution until its reorganization under the acts of the General 
Assembly, ratified January 29th, 1851, and 25th December, 1852 … The first 
meeting of stockholders to organize under the new charter was held at Warrenton, 
N. C., 11th and 12th September, 1851, when George W. Mordecai was elected 
President and W. W. Vass, Secretary and Treasurer. The first stockholders' 
meeting held thereafter met at Henderson 14th and 15th January, 1852, when 
resolutions were introduced and adopted looking to a connection with the 
Seaboard Railroad at Weldon. The President also recommended an actual 
connection at Raleigh with the North Carolina Railroad. The road from Gaston to 
Weldon and the entire reconstruction of the whole line was completed in 1853. 
The new bridge at Gaston was completed in 1858. It was burnt down on their 
retreat by the Confederate forces in 1865, and has not been rebuilt. 
 
– (Clark, 1877, 137-138) – 
 
During the fall of 1838, the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road agreed to mortgage “the whole 
property” of the company to the Literary Fund of North Carolina for the sum of fifty 
thousand dollars. The Board took $50,000 of the bonds in March of 1839. On 3 June 
1839, the Literary Board agreed that the balance of the surplus that belonged to the Board 
should be used for purchasing the bonds of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road, secured by 
the  bonds of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road so as to make the company 
164 
 
responsible.  The Board purchased seventeen thousand dollars of Wilmington & Raleigh 
bonds in August. James Owen, the president of the company, noted in a letter to 
Governor Dudley that contractors placed demands on the company at the end of each 
month, and the stockholders were short on funds because they had not brought in their 
crops yet; and the company had to pay forty thousand dollars on a shipment of iron. The 
board purchased more bonds from both railroads that year (Coon, 1908, 988-991, 1012, 
1024-1026, 1033-1037, 1039, 1044). In 1842, the Literary Board purchased bonds for the 
Raleigh & Gaston amounting to $140,000 as of 1 January 1841, and had increased the 
amount to $165,300 by 1 December 1842. For the same period, the bonds of the 
Wilmington and Raleigh increased from $85,000 to $87,000 (North Carolina, 1842, 
Statement A, Statement D). The Treasurer of North Carolina reported on 17 December 
1844 that the state had received $1,433,757.39 of the federal surplus; and this sum was 
dispersed for redemption of State Stock in the Bank of Cape Fear, $300,000, the Literary 
Fund, $200,000, Internal Improvement Fund, $533,757.39, Public Fund, $100,000 (Coon, 
802). “An Act to authorize the foreclosure of the Mortgage of the Raleigh and Gaston 
Rail Road” was ratified on 6 January 1845. The state treasurer was appointed 
commissioner by the court to sell the railroad. The governor was “authorized and directed 
to bid” on the railroad for the state. 
 
That should the Governor of the State, under the preceding section, become the 
purchaser, for the State, of the road and other property, it shall be the duty of the 
board of commissioners hereinafter named to appoint a President and other 
officers necessary to manage and conduct the same on behalf of the State, until 
such time as the State can make some other disposition of the same … 
 
– (North Carolina Laws, 1845, 99) – 
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The state paid $286,500 in principal and $472,913.10 in interest between 1843 and 1854 
on the debt of the Raleigh & Gaston, and $62,443.48 in associated expenses (Brown, 69). 
 The victims of the trade war, the Portsmouth & Roanoke and the Raleigh & 
Gaston, succumbed to the influence of external forces. These included the financial 
downturn following the Panic of 1837, and the strategic maneuvers of their rivals. 
However, geographic factors contributed to their disadvantages. Portsmouth and Norfolk 
fit the model of what James E. Vance, Jr. called “misplaced cities.” That is, in colonial 
times they were well situated to serve the existing settlement patterns and engage in 
economic intercourse with Britain. After the Revolution, the former fifteen colonial ports 
competed for metropolitan status. Each sought to attract the business from the newly 
settled interior away from mercantile rivals. For some commercial centers, such as those 
of the southern tidewater of Virginia, inland navigation was suitable during the early 
years of the nineteenth century. Railroads in the United States were originally designed to 
enhance the economy and status of the original commercial centers. This model differed 
from the European one of railroad construction in that the United States railroads 
exploited? the advantages of the existing settlement pattern (Vance, 1995, 22-25). 
Petersburg was an interior commercial center with access to the Appomattox and James 
rivers as well as interior land routes. Norfolk has the Chesapeake Bay to the north, and 
the Dismal Swamp to the south. Its access to interior commerce before the Portsmouth & 
Roanoke Rail Road was by way of the Dismal Swamp Canal and the James River. Its 
connection to Baltimore and points north was by way of steamboat. The railroad put it on 
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a competitive plain with Petersburg, and losing its degraded ability to compete as 
Petersburg strengthened its position by forming a connection to Richmond. 
 The geographic disadvantages of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road are more 
complex. Raleigh came into existence for political rather than commercial reasons. It was 
not suitably located for inland navigation. Without an interior railroad connection running 
south, a through passage to places south was impractical. It was for all purposes an 
incomplete railroad. The railroad was merely an extension of the Petersburg market into 
the middle piedmont of North Carolina. The Raleigh & Gaston did not share the fate of 
the Portsmouth & Roanoke. While most of the original investors in the railroad were 
ruined, the railroad itself continued to operate under the management of the state, and that 
did not fall into the hands of outside investors is significant. The Francis Rives affair 



















THE WILMINGTON & RALEIGH RAIL ROAD IN THE 1840s 
 
 
This chapter will cover two topics. The first is the expense of maintaining the 
early railroads in North Carolina. Second is the problem associated with the protracted 
undertaking of reconstruction of these roads, and the efforts to replace the steamship line 
of the Wilmington & Raleigh with the Wilmington & Manchester Rail Road. The author 
has elected to focus primarily on events surrounding the operations of the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road, not only because the company was able to survive through this 
difficult period, but also because by 1854, the company had achieved a connection to the 
South Carolina railroads through its sister company. From 1843 to 1854, the Raleigh & 
Gaston cost the state $821,856.58 in principal and interest for the bonds it had endorsed 
(Brown, 59). The company was finally reorganized under “An Act to incorporate the 
Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road Company” during the 1850-51 Session of the General 
Assembly (North Carolina, 1851, 250-258). 
 It would be naïve to assume that the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road could have 
fared better if left to its own devices during the 1840s. The General Assembly of 1848-49 
delivered the salvation of the company on 27 January 1849 – a new issue of bonds 
endorsed by the state (Brown, 40). 
 
An act concerning the Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road Company.  Provides 
that the Company be authorized to mortgage the Road for the sum of $620,000 to 
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raise money to repair the same; and gives a priority to this mortgage over the 
State’s holding as former mortgage.  Also, extends the credit on the bond of the 
Company for ten years. 
 
– (Wilmington Journal, 2 February 1849) – 
 
The fragile and perishable wooden rails of the original construction were a liability that 
limited the earning potential of both railroads; and the State of North Carolina, faced with 
the potential loss a valuable transportation resource, had little recourse but to continue its 
financial involvement. 
 The receipts for the railroad of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company 
for the 1844 were $158,705.34, while its expenditures were $131,646.15, leaving a profit 
of $27,059.19; the receipts of its steamboat line were $130,828.41, with expenditures of 
$71,987.69, leaving a profit of $58.841.32. The total profit of the railroad and steamboats 
was $85,900.51 (Wilmington Chronicle, 20 November 1844). The following table is 
derived from statistics presented at the ninth annual meeting of the stockholders held 14 
November 1844 at Wilmington (Table 1). The average monthly expenditures for the 
steamboats decline over the four-year period, whereas the expenditures for the railroad 
had risen from $5,848.01 in 1843 to $10,970.51. The years 1842 and 1843 reflect a 
decline in receipts. An examination of the proceedings of the annual stockholders 
meeting held on 9 November 1842 cites several reasons that can be associated with the 
decline in receipts. A meeting was held in Washington, DC earlier that year between the 
several companies that served the Atlantic states to establish more uniform rates: a ticket 















1841 13,552.34 11,216.69 10,948.76 9,213.85 
1842 10,736.60 8,496.71 8,818.85 7,825.93 
1843 10,175.73 8,672.02 5,848.01 6,499.17 
1844 13,225.45 10,902.37 10,970.51 5,998.92 
 
Table 1. Average monthly receipts and expenditures for the railroad and steamboats of 
the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company for years 1841 through 1844. 
 Data Source: Wilmington Chronicle, 20 November 1844 
 
 
 A cheap, competing, route south from New York to New Orleans via 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Wheeling, the Ohio River and the Mississippi River had been 
established. A ticket from Philadelphia to New Orleans would cost between thirty-three 
and thirty-five dollars, and the value of money had appreciated with the improving 
financial state of the nation. However, the liabilities of the company were problematic. 
 
It will be seen by the report of your committee that the liabilities of the Company, 
vary but little from the last year.  That about one hundred thousand dollars are 
required of the old debts to which the creditors are justly entitled, and from their 
representations stand greatly in need.  Many of them have been generously 
forbearing, but others have indulged in vexatious suits and levied executions on 
the hire of the negroes employed on repairs, whose attention is daily required to 
watch over the Road and keep it safe for the passage of the Trains.  They were 
seized and taken away regardless of consequences, in the hope of coercing 
payment, when the Company had it not.  Without provision is made for these 
debts these scenes will probably be acted over again. The Directors can suggest 
no other way but an appeal to the Legislature, for the postponement of the 
payment of the Bond due next January, and the endorsement of fifty thousand 
more to pay these debts.  Having already paid fifty thousand dollars on which the 
State was security, the further assistance would only place her liabilities at the 
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same amount first granted.  Such a measure or some other equally efficient is 
required in justice to the creditors and for the protection of the credit of the 
Company. 
 
– (Wilmington Chronicle, 23 November 1842) – 
 
The liabilities of the company as of 1 October 1845 amounted to $668,817.52. 
This included $222,666.67 in bonds sold in England, $85,000 owed to the Literary Board 
with six percent interest, and $250,000 in bonds endorsed by the State bearing seven 
percent. Also included were $15,000 in bills payable at six percent, $42,272.86 in bills 
payable at six percent, $12,793 in script bonds to due to contractors, and $3,939.48 on 
bonds for the hire of slave laborers (the Negro Bonds) due on 1 January 1846. The 
amount of $18,270 in bonds for slave hire was due on 1 January 1847 and $30,875.08 in 
payments due for materials and labor to various individuals. In the midst of this complex 
debt structure, the company sought to have the state relinquish the mortgage it held on the 
railroad’s boats and wharf so that it could borrow more money to extend their rails to 
South Carolina. In addition, the company wanted to establish a sinking fund to service 
their existing debt through a five dollar per share payment from the stockholder 
beginning in 1847, and lasting for five years. The profits from the company, after paying 
expenses and the interest on the debt, were to be applied to the sinking fund. The 
shareholders were to have their contributions to the sinking fund returned with interest 
after the debt was extinguished (Wilmington Journal, 28 November 1846).  
 The year ending 30 September 1847 reflected $331,480.20 in receipts, and 
$259,912.60 in expenses, the remainder was $71,567.60. Repairs to the road had cost the 
company $82,479.03, whereas, $42,093.11 was spent on repairing the boats. The 
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President’s Report from the 1847 annual meeting notes that the cost for repairing the 
boats was very large compared to previous years, and the road repairs would increase 
because the rails needed to be replaced. During the summer of that year, a committee 
from the company traveled north to submit statistics (collected on the counties through 
which the proposed Wilmington & Manchester Rail Road would pass) to experts who 
would determine the accuracy of the company’s prediction on the profits of its sister 
road. The experts tended to think the profits would be greater than the company predicted 
and that the stock of that company would be taken up quickly. The company had, in fact 
pledged to take $100,000 of stock in the Wilmington & Manchester, payable from the 
sale of its steamboats and other property, when the railroad was completed. The report 
continues a projection of profit for the new railroad based on the business of the existing 
railroad for the population of the counties. The population of the counties through which 
the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road passed was 76,850, and the business for the 
previous year had been $102,243.14. The population along the route of the Wilmington & 
Manchester was 130,967. Based on the assumption that revenue is proportional to 
population, the predicted annual income of the new railroad would have been 
$174,241.73.Some $70,479.62 could be added to this amount for the transport of the 
mails (Wilmington Journal, 19 November 1847). 
 The Legislature, however, did not act upon the company’s resolution regarding 
the sinking fund, and the need to replace the rails of the Wilmington & Raleigh. By this 
time, it was widely recognized as a built-in flaw that plagues many of the other railroads 
of the South. 
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In the original outlay for construction, the limited means of the Company, no 
doubt, influenced the Engineer to recommend, and the Board to adopt, the flat 
Rail. This has been the unfortunate mistake in the construction of many of our 
Southern Roads, and is the chief cause why they have been unprofitable to 
Stockholders, while in almost every instance in our county where the Iron Rail 
has been used, the Roads have proven profitable to the Stockholders. When we 
look at the business done on our Road, and the great annual increase in freight and 
local travel, we cannot doubt that if we could command the means to renew the 
Whole Road with Iron Rail, that the local business alone would support it, 
independent of the transportation of the Mail and the long or through travel. 
 
– (Wilmington Journal, 19 November 1847) – 
 
The receipts for the railroad and steamboats ending 1 October 1847 were 
$331,480.20, and expenditures were $259,942.60. The net profits left were $71,537.60. 
The cash on hand left from 1846 was $3,358.56, and the amount in the hands of agents 
was $7,704.09. This added up to a profit of $82,630.25. However, $27,791.52 had been 
applied to the reduction of the debt, $37,121.82 was used toward the payment of interest, 
and $909.42 had been submitted to the Treasurer of State of North Carolina for payment 
of interest. This, with several lesser expenses, left $8,547.18 in the hands of the treasury 
of the company. During the period from 1841 to 1847, the number of way passengers 
increased from 5,498 to 25,396: the number of through passengers peaked at 14,018 in 
1845. In 1844, the company showed its highest profits at $85,900.51; but in 1846, profits 
dropped to their lowest level at $28,140.04. During this year, the receipts were 
$317,822.49, the highest amount to date, and the number of passengers, 11,885 through 
passengers and 20,498 way passengers, was high; however, the expenses for their year 
were $289,682.45. Four hundred fifty-eight people were employed by the company 
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during 1847. Two hundred three were slaves on road repairs (North Carolina, 1848, C: 
16-18, 20-21). 
The receipts for the year ending 30 September 1848 included $113,078.22 from 
through passenger fares, $53,092.04 from way passengers, $12,466.63 for steamboat 
freight, $51,534.51 for railroad freight, and $77,344.79 for the transport of the mails and 
rents. The company had been selling its worn out iron rails and copper from its boats, and 
for this year they received $9,943.31. Their total annual receipts for 1848 were 
$317,459.50; however, the expenses of the year were $238,133.79. These expenses are 
broken down into the major categories of transportation, steamboats, and road repairs. 
The transportation expenses totaled $75,872.13: $13,580.57 for repairing locomotives; 
$12,754.39 for rolling stock; $43,337.17 for payroll and expenses of this department; and 
three new passengers cars were added to the rolling stock at a cost of $6,200.00. The 
steamboat department reported only $8,413.41 in repairs, but the subsistence and pay for 
officers and crew amounted to $60,012.39. Added to $29,648.14 for fuel, the steamboat 
department accounted for expenses totaling $98,073.94. The road repair department 
reported costs amounting to $63,977.04. Of this amount, $30,146.92 was spent on 
materials, $25,800.52 was spent on labor, and $8,029.60 for subsistence and clothing for 
the labor force. Office expenses amounted to 210.68 during that year. Of the remaining 
receipts of $79,325.71, $35,909.68 was applied to interest on the debt, and $37,195.07 
went to the purchase of new iron. This left $6,219.96 in the company treasury (North 




It will be seen by a reference to the foregoing statement of the accounts, that a 
large sum has been expended for New Iron.  This was found to be absolutely 
necessary, to maintain the road in safe running order, for without this outlay, the 
operation of the Company must have necessarily been greatly embarrassed; as we 
could not have continued to run our trains over it with regularity or even with 
safety.—Being satisfied  that it was indispensably necessary to the operations of 
the Company, if not to its very existence, that the Road should be preserved in 
good condition, your Board has applied to the purchase of New Iron all the means 
at their disposal, not required for the necessary current expenses of the Company; 
and being further satisfied that it was false economy to continue the use of the 
light bar, first laid on our Road, and that permanence and stability could only be 
hoped for, by adopting a heavy rail in its stead, they have not hesitated to 
substitute the one for the other. 
 
– (North Carolina, 1848, 25-26) – 
 
The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road as it existed in 1848 was in a precarious 
position: the company was carrying $651,783.16 in debt as of 1 October 1848 (North 
Carolina, 1848, 33), and paying on the interest; the flat iron, wooden rail system that it 
had original adopted was consuming a large portion of the company’s receipts in repairs. 
The company was in need of a further extension of credit to replace the entire one 
hundred six-one miles of the line with heavy iron. The company was at least solvent, and 
the railroad had experience a steady increase of business since its completion. The failure 
of the Raleigh & Gaston had taken place because the company did not generate the net 
profits to maintain the road and make the interest payment on the state endorsed bonds. 
The company defaulted on its interest payments that came due on 1 January 1843. 
However, the net profits of the company had been $31,340.15 for 1841, $27,867.07 for 
1842, and $23,250.95 in 1843. It was in 1844, when the receipts had fallen to $53,460.77 
and the expenditures had risen to $49,470.67, that the net profits of the Raleigh & Gaston 
had fallen by nearly $20,000 (Brown, 1928, 50). The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
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had been making its interest payments, but net profits after this adjustment were meager. 
From the perspective of the investor, the stock of the company was truly “of 
undetermined value.” If the flat iron wooden rails were to continue to be used, the cost of 
repairs would overtake the profits and the State of North Carolina would find itself 
running two railroads, paying off the bonds on both, and paying the cost to renewing the 
rails from the public funds. The latter would have cost the state another half million 
dollars. 
 
The cost of relaying our Road (162 miles) with an Iron Rail of 52 lbs. to the yard, 
at the present price of Iron, from which deduct the value of the old Iron about 
$84,000, and we have the sum of $516,000.  The interest on this sum at 6 per cent, 
per annum, would be $30,960, which being deducted from 86,252.11—the 
difference in the expense of the two kinds of rail as before ascertained, and we 
should make a saving annually of $55,252.11—a sum nearly double the interest of 
the cost of the heavy Iron.  To this add the great additional facilities which such a 
Road would give to the Company in their transportation, and it must be manifest 
to any one who examines the subject, that the true economy of the Company 
would be to substitute the heavy rail. 
 
– (North Carolina, 1848, 27-28) – 
 
The total cost to the state on the accounts of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road 
between 1843 and 1854 had been $821,856.58 (Brown, 1928, 59). The state’s role as the 
largest shareholder in the Wilmington & Raleigh made it a hostage to its own creation, 
for in this position it was responsible for the health of the railroad as were the private 
investors. It is doubtful that the merchants and planters of the east would have been able 
to build the railroad to its extraordinary length without the investment on the part of the 
state. Under these conditions, they were legally bound and socially obligated to 
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promoting the success of the railroad – lest it be forgotten that the dividends on the state’s 
shares were destined to fund its schools.  
“A Bill concerning the Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road Company”, Senate 
Document No. 9, provides for the mortgaging of the entire property of the railroad, except 
its steamboats and the wharf in Charleston, for the relaying of the road in heavy iron. 
 
Whereas, The said Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road Company is desirous of 
improving the said Road by relaying it with new and heavy iron, which will 
greatly enhance the value of the stock held by the State, as well as the individual 
stockholders, and, whereas, to effect that object, it may be necessary for said 
Company to contract a loan. Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly of 
the State of North Carolina, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, 
That the said Wilmington and Raleigh R. R. Company shall be, and are hereby 
authorized to borrow a sum not exceeding $520,000, for the purposes mentioned, 
and shall be authorized, if found necessary, to mortgage the Road, and all the 
property and effects belong to the said Company, for the security of said loan; 
which mortgage, it is hereby declared and enacted, shall be preferred to the 
mortgage, and pledge to be executed under the previous provisions of this Act, 
and all such other mortgages and pledges as may have been heretofore executed 
by said Company, to secure the State against its loss by reason of her endorsement 
for said Company, and in case of default by said Company, the said mortgage so 
to be executed shall be first satisfied. 
 
– (North Carolina, 1848a, 9: Section 10) – 
 
The same bill gave the state the power to seize the profits of the company if the 
interest on the bonds were not paid in a timely fashion. Also included was the power to 
foreclose on the mortgage and sell the road for payment of the bonds, and the transfer of 
half of the state’s stock in the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road back to the company for 
investment in the Wilmington & Manchester Rail Road. The latter provision was 
dependent on the Wilmington & Manchester first securing $400,000 in subscriptions 
from other sources. On 28 January 1851, the state exchanged 2,000 shares of Wilmington 
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& Raleigh Rail Road, with a par value of $60 per share, for a like number shares in the 
Wilmington & Manchester Rail Road, thus allowing the state to take one of its four 
directors from Wilmington & Raleigh and place a single director in the Wilmington & 
Manchester. The state’s investment in Wilmington & Manchester was valued at $203,000 
– more than the State of South Carolina and the Town of Wilmington, but less than the 
total shares of private investors (Brown, 1928, 40-43). Brown had overlooked the 
significance of the exchange of stock; however, such an arrangement gave the state 
leverage in both companies. The report of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road from 
1841 to 1849 was printed in the Wilmington Journal in November of 1849 (Table 2). 
 
 
  NO. OF PASSENGERS. 
Years. Receipts. Expenditures. Profits. Through Way.
1841 297,228.39 241,945.34 55,283.05 9,742 5,498
1842 211,977.48 180,892.65 31,084.83 * *
1843 257,257.82 179,251.00 78,206.82 8,450 13,574
1844 289,533.75 203,633.24 85,900.51 10,358 16,041
1845 288,493.45 212,091.20 76,402.25 14,018 16,393
1846 317,822.49 289,681.45 28,140.04 11,885 20,498
1847 331,480.20 259,912.60 71,567.60 13,073 25,396
1848 317,459.50 275,228.86 42,130.64 11,456 28,327
1849 310,397.00 245,998.58 64,698.42 11,207 27,575
  
Table 2. This table was reproduced from the 19 November 1849 issue of the Wilmington 
Journal. It summarizes the business of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
over nine years. The missing passenger statistics for 1843 are the result of 
loosing documents to fire (North Carolina, 1848, 18). 
 
 
 The total liabilities of the company as of 1 October 1849 amounted to 
$637,294.55, including $222,666.67 in English bonds, $250,000.00 in bonds endorsed by 
the State of North Carolina, $85,000.00 in bonds due the Literary Fund of North 
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Carolina, $16,300.00 due bills payable to banks, and $31,100.30 due to contractors. 
Negro Bonds for the years 1843, 1845 – 1850 amounted to $22,928.99; and the amount 
due on payrolls was $8,505.16. There remained $793.43 due to contractors on scrip 
bonds (Wilmington Journal, 19 November 1949). The payroll of the company included 
the following (Table 3 and 4). Four hundred seventy-one people worked for the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company in 1849, of which two hundred thirty-five 
were slaves included in the Negro Bonds. Two hundred twenty-two slaves were engaged 
in repairs to the railroad. By 1860, the company had acquired twelve slaves at a cost of 
$13,750, but the Negro Bonds due from 1844 through 1860 amounted to $34, 806.48. 
Eleven of the slaves were listed as mechanics and laborers in the shops, or working the 
depots, and were valued at $13,500 – the report does not explain the twelfth slave. The 
superintendent’s report recommends the purchase of an additional twenty slaves to work 
the trains and warehouse, noting that the cost of slave hire had risen about fifteen dollar 
per annum to two hundred and ten dollars per slave. That year, the company paid 
$11,955.30 in subsistence, clothing, and medical care as part of its general expenses. The 
report expressed discouragement in the White laborers hired due to the difficulty in 
finding slaves and free Blacks. The White laborers tended to quit after they had made 
enough money to satisfy their most pressing needs (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road 












3 Captains 1,000 per annum 
3 First Mates 420 
3 Second Mates 240 
4 First Engineers 720 
4 Second Engineers 480 
8 Firemen 192 
6 Wheelsmen 192 
9  Deck hands 120 
3 Stewards 240 
3 Stewardesses 96 
6 Waiters 120 
3 Cooks 180 
6 Knife boys and scullions 72 
3 Deck hands included in Negro bonds 
 
 
10 Wharf hands included in Negro bonds  
 
Table 4.  Employees and Labor of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road from the 1849 
Annual Report on the steamboats (cont) 
 Source: Wilmington Journal, 19 November 1949 
 
 
The statistics from the 1848 annual report and 1849 annual report provide enough 
data to approximate the cost per slave “hire” in payment of the bond, subsistence, 
clothing, and other needs at $120 per annum. The annual report from 1858 provides a 
sum of $190 per slave including hire, subsistence, clothing, and medical care per annum 
(North Carolina, 1848, 25; Wilmington Journal 19 November 1849; Wilmington & 
Weldon Rail Road Company, 1858, 2). . 
 The recovery of the company from the Great Fire of 1843 appears to have been 
aided by the intervention of Edward B. Dudley, former governor and then president of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. Robert H. Cowan’s oration on the life of Governor 
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Dudley given on 8 November 1855, after Dudley had died, describes how the company 
struggled to obtain credit after the fire. 
 
When your offices, and your warehouses, and your work shops, and all of your 
machinery which was not then in actual use, were laid in ruins by the terrible fire 
of 1843, when a heap of smoldering embers marked the spot where all of your 
possessions in Wilmington the day before had stood; when your most ardent 
friends had begun to despair; when your own merchants had refused to credit you, 
and regarded in a business point of view merely, had justly refused, because they 
had already extended their confidence beyond the limits of prudence; when your 
long sinking credit was at last destroyed, and your failure seemed inevitable; Gov. 
Dudley came forward and pledged the whole of his private estate as your security; 
and thus, with renewed public confidence in your solvency your were enabled to 
go on to that complete success which awaited you entirely through his exertions. 
 
– (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road Company, 1855, 63) – 
  
As stated earlier, the company had spent $8000 in 1843 to replace “provisions, 
fixtures &c.” destroyed by the fire; and it was reported that the “Machine shop, 
Warehouse, Offices, &c., are nearly rebuilt” by the end of the summer. The cost of 
building the shop, warehouse, wharf, associated building at Wilmington had been 
$56,691.51. The company had fourteen locomotives in 1840; and the total value of 
locomotives and rolling stock was $170,815.21 (). The average cost of the locomotives in 
1838 had been $7,500 apiece, passenger cars had cost $2,250 apiece, and freight cars cost 
$300. “Five locomotives and some cars” were damaged in the fire, though it was believed 
that some could have been repaired. It appears that several engines were not operational, 
or had been lost, but the addition of a new freight locomotive was supposed to make up 
for the deficiency in motive power completely. It appears the railroad quickly recovered 
from this setback (Wilmington Chronicle, 15 November 1843, 23 August 1843; North 
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Carolina, 1840, 10, Schedule B; 1838, Schedule A; Fayetteville Observer, 3 May 1843; 
Wilmington Chronicle, 17 May 1843, 6 December 1843). The net profits of the company 
by year’s end were $78,206.82; it was an increase of more than double the previous 
year’s profits of $31,084.83 (Table 2).  
 Regardless of whatever differences might have existed among the estimated 
losses, actual losses, and the ultimate expenditures associated with the fire, the loss of the 
company facilities at Wilmington apparently damaged confidence in the company. The 
more serious problem had existed before the fire. On 17 January 1843, the Literary Board 
was authorized to buy up $50,000 worth of the company’s bonds that had fallen due on 
the first day of the year to prevent the company from defaulting. After the fire, the 
Treasurer of the State of North Carolina had to buy up the issue of bonds due on 1 
January 1844 (Brown, 1928, 38-39). Cowan’s statements, in essence, indicted that the 
company had exceeded its credit limit – so to speak. When Dudley offered his personal 
estate as collateral for the company after the fire, it is a sure measure of the desperate 
financial condition of the company. 
 In an 1843 article entitled “Railroads of Virginia and North Carolina” that appears 
in the Farmer’s Register, a writer identified only as a stockholder cites several causes 
why the railroads in these states have not be able to declare dividends. In Virginia, the 
competition between the Petersburg Rail Road and the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road 
diminishes the profits of the Petersburg road while incurring loss to the Portsmouth & 
Roanoke. The change of route of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road to Weldon to 
make connect with the Portsmouth road deprived the port of access to the more fertile 
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regions of the state west of Raleigh. The Petersburg Rail Road, already ten years old, had 
to replace its rail with heavy iron, and this will have to be done to all the railroads using 
strap iron rail construction (Ruffin, 1843, 165). It is certain that the strip-iron rail 
construction was a major factor in the companies’ financial difficulties, but the 
assumption that building the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road to Raleigh would have 
opened the port to the produce of the west was mere speculation. The Raleigh & Gaston 
with “their friends in Petersburg and Richmond” did not see these great profits coming 
from the west of Raleigh. The great benefit of both railroads was not to the shareholder, 
but to the citizens of the state. This becomes unmistakably clear when the particulars are 
stated by Governor William Graham in his 1848 Message to the Senate of North 
Carolina. 
 
These works, though profitless as stock, have yet given advantages to the 
inhabitants of the sections which they traverse, of which they would not willingly 
be deprived ... we must bear in mind, that if these Rail Roads shall cease to 
operate, and the people in their neighborhood shall be driven back to the old 
modes of conveyance, that the change will be equal to the imposition upon them, 
of a tax of certainly Eighty, and perhaps not less than One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars, per year.  
 
– (Graham, 1848, 8:6-7) – 
 
The financial woes of these companies can be reduced to a single problem that was 
known to all after the failure of the Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley effort: the building of 
extensive railroads was beyond the means of private capital. That some capitalists such as 
the directors of both railroads could acquire the means by mortgaging their company 
property did not carry with it the certainty that the profits of the company would be able 
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to service the loans. The State of North Carolina, however, understood that these 






























SUMMARY OF THE HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
 
 
One of the key functions of government is to build and maintain a transportation 
infrastructure that serves the most remote reaches of its domain, so that all of its citizens 
have the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of communication and commerce. In theory, all 
regions within a state should be equally represented in the process of planning of a 
transportation network with their particular needs and resources considered only in 
context of the overall welfare of the state as a whole. Thus the burden imposed on the 
citizenry to finance the undertaking is an equitable arrangement.  
If a state fails to develop a comprehensive policy for transportation 
improvements, or if it lacks the political will to abide by one, the transitory demands of 
the market place will assume the deciding role in these public works. The resulting 
network, could as a set of permanently established routes, preserve sectional divisions 
within a state even though the former economic interests of these sections are no longer 
relevant.  
This volume commenced with a reference to Richard Hartshorne’s “The 
Functional Approach in Political Geography.” It concludes by returning to the same 
article. Particularly, that a state must have a raison d’être – or reason for being – is vital 
and this idea must embrace all sections throughout that state as a whole. This might have 
been easier to define at the Provisional Congress at Halifax in 1776 than in the years 
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preceeding the North Carolina Constitional Convention of 1835. The planter of the east 
desired the status quo, while the farmers of the west needed access to distant markets. 
The merchants of the commerical towns lemented to loss of trade to neignboring states. 
All the while, the North Carolina Legislature was reluctant to fund the preperation of 
accurate state maps (Cumming, 1966, 21-27). North Carolina was an aggregation of 
regions, each with its own reason for being and affinities for interests outside the state. 
The state would not have its raison d’être until its people had a transportation system that 
embraced all regions, public education, and balenced representation. The aggitation for 
railroads propelled political reform, and without political reform the early railroads of 
North Carolina could not be built. Without the aid of the state, if built, they would have 
quickly fallen into ruin. However, the early history of the railroads, with the nessary 
intervention of the state, set the pattern for the extensive railroad construction that 
followed. It appears that the antebellum reason for being was very close to the means of 
being. The very rational idea of the state using the dividends from its shares in railroads 
to fund public education could work if the railroads did not declare them.   
The Memorial of the Convention on Internal Improvement, November 1833 
outlined a system: the state would be bisected north to sound and east to west by two 
routes – rail or combination of rail, navigation, and turnpike – whereby even remote 
communities would be within a reasonable distance from these trunks. The State of North 
Carolina did not adopt this plan; rather they put in a place a policy that allowed for a two-
fifths investment on the part of the state in certain corporations that had been established 
to undertake internal improvement projects when private investors had subscribed to 
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three-fifths of the capital stock. While the state extended this form of aid to a number of 
worthy projects, the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road was the only significant project 
barely able to secure the private capital necessary to qualify for the state’s investment. 
The Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road, an ambitious undertaking chartered without the 
provision of state aid, required state endorsement of its bonds even before it was 
completed. By the end of 1848, the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road Company had defaulted 
on its mortgage and had, in essence, become a state-owned railroad. The Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road was steeped in debt, and had yet to declare a dividend. Both railroads 
needed to be rebuilt with heavy iron to remain in operation. None of the plans to connect 
east to west by rail, particularly the long anticipated Central Rail Road, had been realized. 
Only at this point did the state bring to bear the political will to move towards a state 
system of railroad.  
A review of the history of internal improvements in North Carolina exposes 
several questions about the routes selected for these railroads. What was the cause of the 
paradigm shift from canal projects to railroads? Who proposed the early railroad routes, 
and how were these routes different? Why were the earliest railroads in North Carolina 
built in obscure places on the Roanoke River rather than between the state’s commercial 
towns or connecting with those in South Carolina? The author identified a single answer 
for all these questions. Escalating trade competition between the Virginia commercial 
centers of Petersburg and Norfolk influenced railroad planning in North Carolina. A 
sequence of navigational improvements on the Roanoke River caused the regional shares 
of agricultural resources from the vast river basin to be shifted between these Virginia 
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markets unevenly, thus triggering railroad building as a countermeasure. The main 
purpose behind the plans for building these early railroads was intercepting river 
commerce. Ample documentation supports the position that interests in Petersburg and 
Norfolk subverted railroad development in North Carolina. In fact, nothing testifies more 
to that fact than the significance of Weldon – the “tollgate of North Carolina” – for it 
offered nothing more than a bridge to the lower basin of the Roanoke Canal and the 
agriculture south of the Roanoke. It was the like junction of the North Carolina railroads, 
but the Raleigh & Gaston was drawn into the fatal agreement to build a bridge upriver. 
The trade war between Petersburg and Norfolk was wasteful. When a through 
corridor was established to the north of Petersburg and south to Charleston via 
Wilmington, the bounty of the upper Roanoke was of minor importance.  The steamboat 
line of the Wilmington & Raleigh gave that railroad an immediate advantage. The demise 
of the Raleigh & Columbia Rail Road scheme sealed the fate of the Raleigh & Gaston. 
The consequences of Jacksonian monetary policy were twofold. The federal surplus 
provided that state with the capital to invest in the Wilmington & Raleigh, and the Panic 
of 1837 undermined the finances of private investors in both railroads. It would be safe to 
say that the economic stream piracy hypothesis applies many aspects of the historic 
record. However, the trade conflict between Petersburg and Norfolk was a local 
phenomenon that involved southern Virginia, and was given scope through the collective 
negligence of the legislatures of Virginia and North Carolina.  
David F. Lindenfeld, in his essay on the end of the Weimar Republic, discusses 
the empowering and constraining causes of specific human actions, and applicable 
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aspects of chaos theory. The similarity across differences of scale concept and branching 
concept represent the latter. Structure-like and event-like features exist at the level of 
individual behavior and on the impersonal institutional level. The distinction between 
empowering and constraining causes, as opposed to the relationship between cause and 
conditions, is a more direct approach to finding meaningful patterns in history 
(Lindenfeld, 1999). The constraining causes in the development of the early railroads of 
North Carolina are readily identifiable and have been discussed at length in the early 
chapters of this volume. These include the Panic of 1837 and subsequent national 
economic collapse, the primitive and perishable nature of strap iron wooden rail 
construction, some aspects of the developing American school of civil engineering, the 
absence of a reliable source of domestic iron, and duties imposed on imported iron. In 
North Carolina specifically, the lack of sufficient local investment capital, a poor 
understanding of the nature of railroad construction and the geography of the state by 
railroad promoters, and sectional rivalries constrained early development. North 
Carolina’s vague raison d’être based on Jeffersonian Democracy, the interests of the 
eastern planter class, and the notion that private corporations were the appropriate agents 
of creating state infrastructure retarded internal improvements long before the railroad 
era. The empowering causes range from beneficial policies such as the General Survey 
Act to the ratification of “An Act to Aid the Internal Improvements of This State” by the 
North Carolina General Assembly. There are also a number of negative and unforeseen 
events, such as Fayetteville’s “Great Fire” followed by the “State House Fire,” that 
upturned the status quo, but ultimately empowered the advocates of constitutional reform 
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and internal improvements. This was the “eye-of-the-needle” event, the North Carolina 
State Constitutional Convention of 1835. All the disparate strands of the historical 
narrative converge at this moment, and state government emerges as a fit agency for 
subsequent developments in the uncertain enterprize of building railroads. However, it 
would be naïve to think that the cause of internal improvements was the sole force behind 
constitutional reform, or that the state’s two-fifths investment policy was a qualitative 
improvement over its investment in the earlier navigation companies. Lindenfeld 
provides an alternative methodology for resolving some of the conflicts between 
contributing factors with vague beginnings and events that have a clearly defined period. 
He refers to the causal relationship as “sensitive dependence on local conditions” 
meaning “long-term trends have states at particular places and times, and these must be 
considered as components of causal analysis” (Lindenfeld, 1999, 288). The long-term 
trend of the development of North Carolina’s early railroads was sensitive dependent to 
the particular moment when the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company expressed a 
desire to change their route.  This action seriously altered the presumed geography of the 
proposed state system, and undermined the ambitions of Petersburg interests. 
The similarity across differences of scale concept and branching concept from 
chaos theory is applicable to the historical narrative of all antebellum railroads. This 
includes both the nature of railroads, and the prevailing financial instruments used to 
finance their construction. Railroads are merely another species of road. They did not 
evolve from some pre-existing transportation network, be it turnpike, canal, the colonial 
highways, or Native American trading paths. It is amply clear from the engineers’ 
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surveys that the primary objective in construction was to place track as close to a direct 
line between specific points as possible. In the process, they bisected the meandering 
road networks of the pass, crossed rivers, and traversed area where roads did not exist. It 
relationship to anything of the past is merely coincidental. Railroad iron was precious, 
locomotives worked best when the rails followed a straight path, and spurs could be 
added as needed. The operation of railroad required organization of time, capital, and 
labor on unprecedented scale. The preferred financial instrument used by the companies 
to fund construction costs was the bond. Its recurring sequence of interest payments, 
coupled with practice of using one issue of bonds to secure a new issue, was a debt 
generator. The State of North Carolina used the mortgages of the railroads to secure 
bonds for the railroads, thus making the state liable for the debt should the company 
default and obligated to take over the operation of the railroad. In addition, bonds were 
used to pay for labor, and pay the duties on iron. The one period cycle of decay for the 
original construction was superimposed upon the recurring cycles of bond payments. This 
is a very precarious structure, susceptible to any unforeseen perturbation in the general 
financial environment, and entirely dependent upon receipts. 
Hitherto, this study has been concerned with providing the historical background 
of the early railroad in North Carolina, and many proposals for railroads that were 
entertained during the late 1820s through the 1830s. The historical record strongly 
suggests that the routes of the railroads that were built were strongly influenced by the 
commercial conflict between Petersburg and Norfolk. However, the direction of research 
must shift to geographic analysis to determine what other route options, if any, were 
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practical alternatives that may have had a more favorable outcome. Since these railroads 
and/or route were proposed but not carried, this analysis is a type of counterfactual 
geography. The counterfactual reasoning, advanced by Max Weber, has proven a useful 
tool in historic analysis. It is appropriate for the geographic phenomena of routes and 
railroad construction because the construction methods and cost for the railroads that 
were built are known, the physical geography of landscape where the proposed railroads 
were projected has remain stable, and census records along with other primary documents 
provide statistics about the counties. The existing annual reports of the railroads also 
contribute data about the resources of the companies, their operation, and the volume of 
business conducted on the roads. Together, these sources of data allow for the creation of 
empirical models. If a model proposed railroad proves unworkable, it limits the available 
options. In this way, the particular can be set apart from the flux of unforeseen events 
brought about through the ambition and folly of men. 
 
END OF PART ONE 





































































Statement of Problem 
 The historical narrative presented in Part One suggests that one alternative rail 
network could have been constructed in North Carolina during the 1830s. This network 
would have been the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road as constructed to Weldon, and its 
branch line to Raleigh as originally intended. The branch line would have followed the 
later route of the North Carolina Railroad from Waynesborough (Goldsboro) to Raleigh. 
Given the lack of investment capital and the limited time favorable for new construction 
before the economic downturn of the 1840s, this network would have connected the 
interior of North Carolina to the port of Wilmington and the Virginia markets. It also 
would have formed the first connection in the long anticipated east-to-west Central Rail 
Road. What remains is to prove that the railroad technology of the 1830s was appropriate 
for making an economical crossing of the transition zone between the Coastal Plain and 
Piedmont, and the resulting connection between Raleigh and Waynesborough was 
potentially profitable.  
 
Objectives 
The current trend of transportation analysis assumes a socioeconomic equilibrium 
that serves as the background for the spatial activities of a diverse assemblage of 
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individuals, each negotiating the constraints that separate thought from action. The 
antebellum period of American History does not offer a background of socioeconomic 
equilibrium; rather society and economy, as currently defined, do not necessarily 
converge equally in regions and states. The early development of railroads in North 
Carolina is a multifaceted topic that embraces several sub-disciplines of geography; 
however, a single geographic hypothesis should explain the early evolution of this 
particular network and satisfy all the questions stated previously.  
 
Hypotheses 
 The author suggests two hypotheses, one based on free market competition and 
state government intervention that allows for multiple strategies, errors, and chance; the 
other is deterministic, governed by the route selection of earlier railroads and constrained 
by the limits of finance and technology, where railroads align to form the only possible 
interstate corridor. It seemed appropriate that the author call the first the Economic 
Stream Piracy Hypothesis, named for a phenomenon whereby one stream cuts an 
intersection with another and diverts flow to its own channel. This analogy takes on a 
more literal connotation when one considers that the competing commercial towns of 
Petersburg and Norfolk used their railroads to intercept produce transported on the 
Roanoke River. Most of the early railroad proposals under consideration in North 
Carolina involved building railroads to river landings to stem the transport of produce by 
river to out of state markets. The diversion of the interstate passenger travel and the Great 
Southern Mail from the established route through the interior of North Carolina to the 
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railroad and steamboat line of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road appears to fit this 
hypothesis. The railroad company that is quick to exploit opportunities, becomes 
operational along its full extent at the earliest possible date, and has the resources to 
maintain solvency, if only marginally, determines the route of the interstate corridor until 
another company establishes a more efficient route.  
The Only Option Hypothesis uses prior route selection as the basis for 
determining geographic advantage. Chance, error, and strategies only delay the 
inevitable. The network will conform to the best opportunities that the landscape provides 
in time. Under such constraints, technical and economic factors of an alternative network 
are unfavorable in relationship to the railroads that were built, even if these railroads 
performed poorly.  
 
Assumptions 
  The model of an alternative rail network in the North Carolina of the 1830s is 
counterfactual, and based upon the limited available data derived from the reports of 
railroads built in North Carolina during this period along with reports and surveys from 
their contemporary works. The model assumes that by removing the Raleigh & Gaston 
Rail Road from the network, sufficient capital investment would be available from the 
Piedmont to build the Waynesborough to Raleigh branch line. While it is doubtful that 
the Petersburg interests would find the route as attractive as the Raleigh & Gaston would, 
the supporters of the Central Rail Road concept within the Piedmont could have 
appreciated access to the ports with little more than half the railroad to put down. The 
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only evidence of this assumption is the early subscriptions taken for the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road during 1833.  
 In addition, the economic development that occurred in the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road and Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road corridors in the decades following 
their construction might support the anticipated development within the corridor of 
counterfactual model. The construction of the North Carolina Railroad during the 1850s 
included this route in its extent and certainly contributed revenue to the earlier railroads; 
however, its length was greater. Economy development based on land values, crop 
production, and population growth on the county level for the counties of North Carolina 
that had railroads must serve as the measure of development for the counties included in 

















THE STUDY AREA 
 
 
 Walter Gwynn was the chief engineer for the North Carolina Railroad connected 
Raleigh and Waynesborough (later Goldsboro) in the early 1850s. Earlier in his career, he 
had been the chief engineer for the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, and the Portsmouth 
& Roanoke Rail Road. After the completion of the Weldon branch of the Wilmington & 
Raleigh, Gwynn conducted a survey of the branch line of that railroad from 
Waynesborough to Raleigh. In his report to that company, he noted that he did not 
consider it a practical undertaking at the time, but he did not state the particulars that led 
him to this conclusion. For this reason, it is worth examining the Waynesborough to 
Raleigh section of the North Carolina Railroad with a view of the limitations of 1830s 
rail technology. 
 The route passes through the transition between the Piedmont Province and the 
Coastal Plain Province. The nature of this landscape becomes apparent when viewed as 
elevations. The map given below uses 1 ArcSecond NED data of the region between the 
Waynesborough (west Goldsboro) and Raleigh. The route appears as a white line 
beginning at the junction with the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road in Waynesborough 
(Figure 25). The lowlands of the Neuse floodplain are the prominent feature of the 








Figure 25. Walter Gwynn, the chief engineer for the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, 
was also appointed the chief engineer for the North Carolina Railroad in the 
late 1840s. If an earlier connection between Raleigh and Waynesborough 
(now Goldsboro) had been constructed by the Wilmington company, it 
appears likely that it would have followed the same route selected for the later 
North Carolina Railroad between these places. This map illustrates the route 
divided as a white line beginning at the present junction with the CSX railroad 
(antecessor to the Wilmington & Raleigh). It is layered over elevation data 
illustrating the transition between the Coastal Plain Province and Piedmont 
Province of North Carolina between Waynesborough and Raleigh. 
Data Source: USGS. (2008) 1 ArcSecond NED 69222342. The National Map 
Seamless Server. 





The area depicted in this map combines some similarities of terrain of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road and the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road. The section of 
the route extending from Waynesborough to the Neuse River (22 miles) traverses the 
terraced alluvial landscape of the Coastal Plain within the floodplain of the Neuse River 
Basin. The full extent of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, built on the Coastal Plain 
topography, passes near a strip of subsurface igneous rock between the Contentnea Creek 
area and Halifax County (Councill, 1954, 10-15). This has a negligible influence on the 
grade of the road. The section of the Waynesborough to Raleigh route from the Neuse 
River west of Selma to Raleigh (27.5 miles) crosses terrain similar to that found on the 
route of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road. The builders of the Raleigh & Gaston located 
their road over the rolling hills and ridges of the Piedmont. Significant changes in 
elevation are apparent between these features, including locations that required 
excavation through rock. The cost per mile for building the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail 
Road was approximately $7,000, compared to $12,000 for the Raleigh & Gaston Rail 
Road was $12,000. These figures exclude the cost of bridges (Ruffin, 1838; North 
Carolina, 1840b). To estimate the cost of building a railroad from Waynesborough to 
Raleigh, based upon the cost of 22 miles of Coastal Plain topography and 27.5 miles of 
Piedmont topography, as $484,000 without bridges, equipment, and facilities seems 
simple enough. However, this does not prove that a railroad crossing these two 
physiographic regions could be constructed at the cost per mile as those railroads 
confined within these regions.      
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The section of the route from the Neuse River ascends the Wilson Mills Scarp, the 
Coats Scarp, and enters the Piedmont Province in the neighborhood of Clayton. The 
Piedmont of North Carolina, considered an exotic terrain, was created when the Blue 
Ridge Province collided with a volcanic island arc during the Middle Ordovician 450 
mya. The elevation of the Piedmont Province at its interface with the Inner Coastal Plain 
ranges from 300 to 600 feet above sea level (Thornbury, 1965, 30-36; Daniels, Gamble, 
Wheeler, and Holzhey, 1972, 11-16; Daniels and Gamble, 1978, 44-48; North Carolina 
Geological Survey, 1991).  
The profile of the likely route of a railroad from Raleigh to Waynesborough, 
following the route of the North Carolina Railroad from Raleigh to Goldsboro, shows a 
rise in elevation from 62.38 feet above sea level to a maximum elevation of 406.79 feet 
near the granite quarry between Auburn and Garner. The “Generalized Geologic Map of 
North Carolina” in The Commercial Granites of North Carolina by Richard Councill 
indicates that the Precambrian and Paleozoic granitic rock of the eastern section of Wake 
County extends into Johnston County near the neighborhood of Clayton. East of Clayton, 
the lower Paleozoic slate, flows and pyroclastics occupy more than half of the county to 
the boundary of the Coastal Plain (Councill, 1954, 7). Between Selma and Rosewood, the 
land is a relative smooth terrace averaging approximately 150 feet above sea level 
(Figure 26). In its extent, the route does not appear to demand extensive excavation into 
rock until it enters Wake County. However, the ascent west of the Neuse River suggests 
that heavy locomotives would have been needed to overcome the grades if the railroad 











REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
Counterfactual Causal Analysis 
The review of archival resources and related scholarly works presented thus far 
fail to provide conclusive support for either of the hypotheses. A geographic 
counterfactual analysis, based upon concrete geographic data and the extant technical and 
financial records of the actual railroads, appears appropriate for the resolution of this 
problem. For example, the route of a proposed railroad can be projected on the actual 
physical geography, and technological data from historical railroad surveys can be used 
to create a counterfactual survey. If the mock survey proves the project technically or 
financially impractical relative to the actual railroads, the plan can be dismissed as 
visionary but unworkable. Otherwise, the performance of the actual railroads must be the 
standard for measuring the proposed route.  
Counterfactual analysis is well established in history, but the complexity of 
human interactions, extrinsic events, missing information, and the unexpected influence 
of chaos confound its use on a large scale. In addition, the further a particular event 
recedes into the past, the more the opportunities for acquiring new information decrease 
and what remains is that which survives as a fragment of the general culture. In 
geography, the modeling of probable outcomes of changes on the physical landscape is 
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standard. The field of urban and regional planning is rooted in (spatial) counterfactual 
reasoning. Planners weight the benefits of proposed improvements based on empirical 
data, and recommend those most likely to succeed. Applying counterfactual analysis to 
historical geography offers several advantages over its application in history. Areal units 
are unique in location and many of their qualities are quantifiable. In most instances, 
barring catastrophic events, the physical landscape preserves human activities and 
environmental changes. The site of past human activities, in most cases, can be examined 
directly. Physical features of the landscape, again barring catastrophic events, can be 
treated as a constant in the context of human activity. The projection of alternate land 
usages and/or the construction of cultural landscape elements can be expressed in 
quantifiable units. The object of a spatial counterfactual analysis in historical geography 
is to generate empirical data for hypothetical changes to the cultural landscape that can be 
compared to data from actual human undertakings on the same landscape.                      
History is concerned with actual events, not possible events. However, it is 
difficult to assess the significance of an event without considering the consequence of the 
event not having happened, or contributing antecedent events altering the nature of the 
significant event, or the alternative histories that might have taken place if things had 
happened differently. Epistemological problems associated with counterfactual claims. 
There is no way of validating assumptions about the significance of something that did 
not happen. Yet, the counterfactual claim, as explained by Johannes Bulhof, takes the 
form of a conditional statement such as “if p then q where p and q are any sentence which 
is either true or false.” When p is a counterfactual then the sentence is false. Thus, 
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counterfactuals are modal in that they present a possibility and what follows from it. 
Modal claims are useful in studying the past in that they provide insight into why 
something happened (Bulhof, 1999, 145-146, 159-167).  
 De Mey and Weber describe the function of “thought experiments” in analyzing 
causal relationships. While it is obvious one cannot experiment in the past, these authors 
introduce the concept of “experimental questions.” These fit within a logical framework: 
“Why does object a have property P (at time t)?” and extend with contrasts such as “Why 
does object a have property P (at time t) rather than property P’?” and so on. Using 
several forms, numerous contrast questions are to objects, properties, and times. The 
object can be as discrete as a single individual or as broad as the national economy. Some 
answers to these questions would yield “complete explanations” and others “partial 
explanations.” The first statement attempts to define the only cause of the phenomenon, 
whereas the second statement is a contributing cause of the phenomenon for the same 
question. A contrasting question that presents an alteration of the variables in the original 
question leads to the rejection of some earlier explanations and the strengthening or 
weakening of others. Explanations of the facts and the contrasts can be “weighted” to 
segregate all the contributory causes that differentiate one event from the other that is 
being drawn into comparison (De Mey and Weber, 2003, 28-38). The logical structure of 
counterfactual models has led some researchers to design programs for helping students 
of history understand the causal relationships contributing to certain events. This method 
allows the student to develop the mental skills for recognizing causal relationships rather 
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than extracting this information under the guidance of an instructor (Blow, 2001, 118-
121). 
 German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) advanced a methodology utilizing 
counterfactual reasoning and comparison in his writings in which a causal analysis of the 
actions of individuals also includes their desires for given outcomes and their notions on 
how their desires are to be realized. Psychologist Johannes von Kries influenced the 
development of aspects of this methodology. Von Kries addressed the incomplete and 
generalized nature of human perception. Even descriptions of the results of causal 
antecedents are incomplete. Determining the causal relationship between one event and 
another is a question of “objective probability.” Weber was attracted to the quantitative 
aspects of von Kries’s methods; however, he placed an emphasis on counterfactual 
reasoning as an essential element of causal analysis. He noted that should a historical fact 
with a large historical context be altered or absent it would bring about a divergent course 
of history, and determine the “historical significance” of a fact. Weber considered 
counterfactual reasoning as “conjectural sorting and ranking of possible causes.” The 
absent, altered, or inventing cause is weighted on its influence on the course of 
subsequent events (Ringer, 2002, 163-168). The historical record contains in every 
recorded documented detail a particular context that somebody took pains to preserve. 
Some of this information is critical to establishing significance, and some is 
inconsequential. That the significance of certain recorded events is not fully understood is 
quite possible, and the historian might be unaware of critical information missing from 
the historical record. The weighting of causes in counterfactual reasoning isolates critical 
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and/or contributing events from the mass of historical facts and identifies gaps in the 
record.  
 The holes in the historic record are problematic for several reasons. Hans Kellner 
identifies four responses to missing information. First, there is a tendency to ignore the 
gaps and pull together facts into a seamless narrative. Second, the absence of information 
appears as an obvious break in the narrative. The historian presents an “irritated apology” 
for the gaps in the narrative. Third, the historian relinquishes the role of “omniscient 
narrator” to take a qualified hypothetical approach to certain assertions while avoiding 
the impression that the whole of the work is speculation. Finally, the historian adopts the 
strategy of addressing the nature of the missing information and the mechanism behind 
its loss. Kellner, however, continues with a discussion of the selective processes, both 
from a philosophical and psychological perspective, involved with perceiving and 
preserving information. Culture preserves itself through documents, and uses the most 
“fit” – in the Darwinian sense – to reconstruct a representation of the past. Unrecorded 
information is significant because we have first-hand experience of lost information, we 
judge time and space to be continuous in our experience, and intuitively perceive that 
there is a more of a past than we know about. Kellner continues by describing historic 
records that were destroyed, “information that exists but is unfound,” information that is 
“non-existent in time and space,” and information “not imaginable.” The “non-existent in 
time and space” includes objects of historical imaginations – “what if” scenarios. The last 
category, the “not imaginable,” is particularly enigmatic and serious because knowledge 
of the past informs subsequent events, and we anticipate the discovery of information in 
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the future that could change the context of our knowledge of the past (Kellner, 2001, 275-
290).  
  History is inexorably connected to a place. Even if its agents are in motion, they 
follow a route that has length and direction through the concrete medium of place(s). 
Specific locations can be associated with geographic coordinates and unique positions as 
well as relationships to other places. On any particular day of any particular year, the 
sunrise occurred at a specific time, the moon transits at a specific time. This information 
is historical, but derived through calculation. The soil in a location maintains a record of 
natural and human activities. Tree rings reflect the climate from year to year. Setting an 
event, actual or counterfactual, in a location imposes a set of physical limitations. The 
historical narrative, as mentioned above, is selective in what it records. Authors of the 
narrative’s frequency provide problematic references to places. Even in old surveys, one 
might find a passage such as “two hundred poles from Mr. Johnson’s gate to the large 
oak.” If these features are gone, the research must start at the identifiable points, and 
reconstruct the parcel from the distance and bearings provided.  
 David Henige discusses a number of specific cases where researchers attempted 
to find exact locations of a place mentioned in texts. Not only is he concerned with 
historical documents, but also locations mentioned in legends and those made famous in 
works of fiction. If the place actually exists or existed, the search for its location is often 
hampered by incomplete references in the text. The names of places and the meanings of 
certain words might have changed over time, or place names mistranslated. The work 
might be written in the form of a firsthand account, but in reality, the author merely 
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recorded the accounts of others. Instances also exist in which where the description of a 
place in a text makes it appear real when it is not. If the text of a real event is 
exaggerated, the researcher attempting to find the location might select the wrong site. 
The extrinsic significance of a text, political or ideological, might taint the researcher’s 
objectivity in identifying a site. Henige recommends that researchers should exercise 
caution in accepting or rejecting sites of historic events. Evidence and argument establish 
the validity of a possible site regardless of the need to find such a place. The researcher 
must examine the surviving primary sources and other versions of the text in order to 
identify discrepancies, as well as consulting the critical scholarly works associated with 
the text (Henige, 2007, 237-253).  
 
Spatial Knowledge in Historical Narrative 
 Hitherto, much of this essay has discussed the testing of historical statements, the 
identification of gaps and missing information, and the difficulties of associating places 
mentioned in historical texts that can be associated with a specific location. The content 
of the text transmits information about place, and recognition of spatial form in a text is 
essential to understanding the places it describes. It follows that the reader must possess a 
refined level of geographic knowledge to interpret the text fully. The geographically 
naïve reader conceives a neutral landscape of vague dimensions where the noun assumes 
the iconic form in which the person first became acquainted. River is the primal icon for 
all rivers – the spatial image that the individual has acquired in the learning of the word. 
This form of the word is a pragmatic device that allows the reader to progress through a 
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text using mental stagecraft. The backdrop of human actions described in the text is the 
reader’s personal stock of stereotypical impressions. This psychological phenomenon 
facilitates the comprehension of traditional narrative form by replacing the need for 
detailed descriptions of actual or imagined places with categorical descriptions that draw 
up the imagination of the reader. This is a legitimate device in fiction and drama, but it 
can deprive the historical record of geographic context. However, without the addition of 
long discursive notes on the actual geographic context, the reader’s comprehension of the 
text is part fact and part fantasy. As a result, even the astute reader will disregard the 
significance of the location of the narrative if the writer places the entire burden of 
establishing the representation of place on the imagination of the reader. Landscape is 
more than a scene. It is a unit of the environment, possessing both dimensional properties 
and spatial meaning, which extend beyond the narrative. 
 
Landscape is an ordering of reality from different angles. It is both a vertical view 
and a side view. The vertical view sees the landscape as domain, a work unit, or a 
natural system necessary to human livelihood in particular and to organic life in 
general; the side view sees the landscape as space in which people act, or as 
scenery for people to contemplate. The vertical view is, as it were, objective and 
calculating … The side view, in contrast, is personal, moral, and aesthetic … If 
the essential character of landscape is that it combines these two views (objective 
and subjective), it is clear that the combination can take place only in the mind’s 
eye. Landscape appears to us through an effort of the imagination exercised over a 
highly selected array of sense data. It is an achievement of the mature mind. 
 
– (Tuan, 1979, 90) – 
  
Yi-Fu Tuan ended his statement with the words “mature mind” for an appropriate 
reason: he continues with an examination of how children perceive landscape with 
greater clarity as they acquire a greater understanding of individual elements and envision 
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the activities associated with a particular landscape (90-91). The astute reader of history 
is a “mature mind” by definition, and it follows that if given enough information about a 
historical landscape, he or she will achieve understanding of place that is a unity of the 
objective and subjective at a point in time.  
 Reginald G. Golledge, in his 2002 presidential address to the Association of 
American Geographers entitled “The Nature of Geographic Knowledge,” discussed the 
transition from phenomena focused research in geography to “intellectual” conceptual 
and theoretical expansion within the discipline over a span of fifty years. Technological 
innovations in spatial representation added this development. A significant body of 
research on cognitive aspects – “understanding ‘why’ and ‘how’ in addition to ‘what’ and 
‘where’” – was undertaken during the latter decades of the twentieth century.  
 
The accumulation of geographic knowledge has consequently changed from item 
recognition, place labeling, and place inventory or gazetteering to feature and 
distribution matching in real or image settings, item manipulation, item 
transformation (e.g., using logical reasoning, deductive and inductive inference, 
analysis of complex forms, and multi-modal representation).  
 
– (Golledge, 2002, 1) – 
            
 
It is not a flight of metaphysical fancy to realize that “why” and “how” involves a 
conceptual leap into the past. If we anticipate some future “why” and “how,” we assume 
the a tergo perspective of the projected event. Therefore, spatial reasoning allows the 
mind to contemplate categories of geographic knowledge akin to those for history 
described by Kellner; however, the implied causal relationships in these geographies are 
ground in the concrete world. Geographies non-existent in time and space and include 
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mundane plans for subdivisions, artificial lakes, sewer systems, public parks, and so 
forth. The projected outcomes of these manipulations of the physical landscape involve 
change in the objective and subjective character of a measurable space, whereas, 
imagined consequences of non-existent historical event presents difficulties because 
actual events occupy all moments in time. Lost geographies are actually unfound 
geographies: paleontology, archeology, genetics, and geology contribute location specific 
data that can be realized as geographic knowledge. The truly lost geographies are 
histories of things in motion that have no observed recurrent period and leave no 
identifiable impression on the landscape. 
How much of geographic knowledge is history? History, as a discipline, is the 
study of actual events; and it is a selective study of those significant events. Significant 
events are those deemed to share a causal relationship with latter events also considered 
significant. All history is a type of geographic knowledge as far as all events have a 
spatial existence. Even ideas are spatial events because they are formulated in a location 
and diffused across space. However, geographic knowledge is not history per se; rather it 
is the record of place. The geographer is concerned with the significance of place, 
regardless of causal disconnects in the historical record. Geographic knowledge is a 
function of spatial visualization. Golledge, Dougherty and Bell examined the mental 
processes associated with acquiring spatial knowledge, the required components of 
geographic knowledge. 
 
Spatial visualization is the ability to mentally manipulate, rotate, twist or invert 
two- and three-dimensional pictorially presented visual stimuli. This ability 
involves recognition, retention, and recall of two- or three- dimensional structures 
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in which change among the internal parts is depicted. It may also refer to an 
object manipulated in three-dimensional space. 
 
– (Golledge, Dougherty, and Bell, 1995, 136) – 
 
These researchers continue by explaining spatial orientation, the ability to comprehend 
visual patterns from different viewpoints, and the understanding of spatial relations, 
necessary for acquiring geographic knowledge. Their study involved testing survey-level 
knowledge, or the “bird’s-eye view,” and route-learned spatial information. The results 
showed that map learners excelled in understanding spatial relations within the 
environment, and prior training in geography was an aid in route-learning situations (136, 
151-155). The survey-level knowledge is the objective view described by Tuan. The 
route-leaned knowledge is initially subjective, but the mind forms its objective 
counterpart. Understanding the spatial relations depicted on the objective view of a map 
aids individual spatial understanding on the route-level subjective. 
  The theoretical support for use of counterfactual analysis in the historical rests 
upon the realization that the mature mind has the innate ability to gather information 
concerning spatial relations, intellectually manipulate them, and project their qualities 
into an objective view that exists outside experience. Geographic knowledge is the 
product of spatial reasoning, and its representations as map images and map features – 
such as contour lines, isohyets, symbols, boundaries – and transcends what can be 
observed on the ground. Maps illustrate the concrete and quantifiable, the objective. The 
objects of maps are associated with physical properties and tangible quantities beyond 
what is depicted. Therefore, the representations on maps can be manipulated logically, as 
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with the elements of geometry, to form meaningful proofs. A geographic counterfactual 
analysis disregards the intangible qualities of history, and renders the historical landscape 
as a spatial system. Having established this principal, there remains the task of discussing 
the nature of the human landscape, and the appropriate means by which its empirical 
expressions can be used in a counterfactual analysis. The limits of geographic 
counterfactual analysis are that its processes are tautological and beginning with a body 
of data related to an actual landscape. Conceivably, the complexity of such an analysis 
would be proportional to the size of the study area and its content. Therefore, the 
accuracy of the method should be greater at smaller scales and for a specific geographic 
topic. Like the temporal constraints of counterfactual analysis in history, the size of the 
area introduces more variables and unknowns. Finally, the analysis cannot embrace 
influences that emanate from the human disposition that are beyond quantification, and 
addresses only their use of the land. What remains is the domain of history. 
 At this point, it is necessary to expand the discussion from the view of landscape 
to the qualities of landscape. Carl Sauer, in his seminal work “The Morphology of 
Landscape,” explains the division between the natural and cultural landscape.  
 
The area prior to the introduction of man’s activity is represented by one body of 
morphological facts. The forms that man has introduced are another set. We may 
call the former, with reference to man, the original, natural landscape. In its 
entirety it no longer exists in many parts of the world, but its reconstruction and 
understanding are the first part of formal morphology … The works of man 
express themselves in the cultural landscape. There may be a succession of these 
landscapes with the succession of cultures. They are derived in each case from the 
natural landscape, man expressing his place in nature as a distinct agent of 
modification. 
 




In other words, the natural landscape is significant in that humans use it and the cultural 
landscape emerges connected to it. Sauer stated many years later that the spatial 
differentiation of nature and culture was “the first exercise in learning geography” (Sauer, 
1974, 190). The natural landscape is a starting point for analysis, for its unique character 
cannot fully be divorced from the human landscape it supports; nor with the most 
rigorous efforts can its qualities be completely obliterated.  
  The cultural landscape is considered by some to be a historical contingent 
process. Allan Pred, in the early 1980s, explored the integration of time-geography and 
the social theory of Structuration to develop a regional geography based on particular 
historical conditions of place rather than all-encompassing general laws. Applications of 
the Time Geography proposed by Torsten Hagerstrand are most closely associated with 
transportation planning in the urban context and the concepts of space-time autonomy in 
describing the mobility of individuals and classes of individuals. There are three 
categories of constraints on mobility. Capability constraints are limitations on what tasks 
can be accomplished in an interval of time with a specific transportation technology. 
Coupling constraints are transportation problems that arise from the need to have 
coordinated schedules and tasks with others taking a different path. Authority constrains 
are “the social, political, and legal restrictions on access” (Hagerstrand, 1970; Hanson, 
2004, 3-8). Structuration, as defined by social theorist Anthony Giddens, is “the 
structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure” 
(Giddens, 1984, 376). In many ways, the theory deals with the dialectic between 
individuals, groups, and large social systems as their social interactions are produced and 
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reproduced - often mediated by technology. Pred builds on the work of Hagerstrand and 
Giddens to create a regional model whereby two processes are seen as occurring 
simultaneously over time and space. The first process involves the “intersection of 
individual paths and institutional projects (practice)” becoming “established, 
reproduction, and transformation of power relations” (structure), and the reverse. The 
second process involves the genres de vie, and social reproduction includes the “spatial 
and social division of labor (production and distribution)” and “sedimentation of other 
cultural and social forms” becoming biography formation, socialization (pertains to 
individual development within the social structure) and the “transformation of nature” 
(changes to the environment brought about through human agency). All processes occur 
simultaneously (Pred, 1984, 282-291). It is a model of an interdependent totality that is 
perpetually regenerating and recreating itself. Unlike Ratzel’s “organism attached to the 
land,” it is an engine of new combinations.  
 In many ways, this system is analogous to harmonics. That is, harmonic 
relationships – clear consonances and dissonances – are present in the most random 
sounding of tones by many voices. Waveforms will reinforce themselves and produce an 
increase in amplitude, and thus emerge from a background of cacophony or noise. The 
sounding of a tone and the fifth above it will produce a resultant octave below the 
fundamental. If all the voices are sounding the same sequence of tones repeatedly, but at 
different starting points, different transpositions, and different rhythms, there will be 
moments of random order where the harmonies will appear composed. In the music of 
the twentieth century, many composers experimented with systems and techniques that 
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ranged from the repetitive combinations (minimalism) to the controlled chaos of aleatoric 
music to rule-oriented twelve tone rows (serialism). On the landscape, paths and patterns 
– periodically adjusted – form the framework for channeling the lower level ordering of 
project activities and the movements of individual volition. One set of activities rises to 
dominate then fades into noise, followed by other combinations, and the areal structure 
evolves to a new configuration.  
 States are cultural spatial units that usually interact with other states. As a result, 
there exists the potential for the transfer of technology and/or culture. The widely 
accepted concept for this process in past geographic thought has been diffusionism. 
However, in recent decades scholars challenged its validity because of its tendency of 
being culturally biased, the assumption of a one-way outflow of innovation, and the elitist 
view that the masses are inclined to imitate. J.M. Blaut, during the late 1980s, presented a 
theoretical alternative to diffusionism: uniformitarianism. While this approach does not 
attempt to diminish the significance of individual invention, it recognizes the mediating 
force of a feedback effect whereby invention is improved, modified, and obtains new 
applications in the cultural landscape. Blaut defines the seven diffusion processes of 
uniformitarianism as cellular, ultra-rapid, crisscross, dependent, disguised, phantom, and 
displacement (Blaut, 1987, 30-31, 35-39). 
 The form of diffusion in the uniformitarianism approach that appears most 
relevant to counterfactual analysis is dependent. 
 
In dependent diffusion, assume the diffusion in the same space-time of two traits, 
x and y; y is dependent of x if the diffusion of x is an autonomous process, 
explainable in terms of a definite causal model, and if the diffusion of y is wholly 
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explained by the fact that wherever we find x we tend to find y (for wherever 
reason). Trait y may covary spatially with x, or it may simply be an adventitious 
attachment to x. In such cases we would be in error if we explained the diffusion 
of y with a model postulating an autonomous cause of the diffusion. 
 
– (Blaut, 37) – 
 
The strength of a counterfactual model in geography rests on proving that the presence or 
absence of a diffused element of the human landscape would affect its spatial 
organization with respect to its concomitant dependent being diffused or not. For 
example, introducing fertilizers into a region where they had not been previously used 
can encourage the cultivation of certain crops that the soil could not previously support. 
Consequently, the introduction of this new crop might change the regional economy. Yet, 
the introduction of the fertilizer might be connected to other changes unrelated to this 
crop. Both changes brought about by the fertilizer and crop could bring about innovations 
from within the region, such as a new food product, that would defuse outward. The other 
types of diffusion described by Blaut are associated with very specific situations, such as 
innovation developing in isolated pockets within a region, the rapid introduction of 
innovations into undeveloped regions, diffusion throughout a region in the absence of 
inhibiting factors, and a few novel situations. The dependent form, however, suggests a 
linear association.  
 The prevailing direction of geographic thought does not preclude the use of 
counterfactual analysis for the identification of causal relationships for specific spatial 
phenomena. The quantifiable nature of spatial information, the necessary “objective” 
projection required of spatial reasoning, the inseparability of the physical and human 
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landscape, and the diffusion patterns of innovations recommend its use in geography. The 
use of causal models in the physical sciences is commonplace. Insomuch as geography is 
the study of spatial patterns, paths, and movements and these quantities find their 
ultimate expression in graphic form, counterfactual analysis in these fields offers the 
potential for more productive results than its use in history. This is not meant to suggest 
that it substitutes for rigorous historical research. However, grounding history in the 
physical and cultural realities of place removes the tendency to place past events within 
the mental scenery of personal stereotypes. The selective nature of the historical narrative 
often excludes the particular qualities of landscape, and there are likely instances where 
the answers to causal questions are found only in mundane concrete realities of 
landscape.  
 
Codifying the Paths 
Having discussed the theoretic foundation for the use of counterfactual analysis in 
historical geography, the task of selecting a method of codifying the complexities of 
spatial information used in the analysis remains. Locations and paths are the base 
categories of classifying space, or in geometric terms, points and lines. Locations in 
terrestrial space have XY coordinates and elevations to define their position. Paths 
connect locations and any collinear points between defined locations that in total define 
the topographic profile. A set of paths radiating out from central locations can provide 
enough data to produce a representation of the topography of an area in three dimensions. 
However, the “code key” to all this data is the earth, and given enough locations and 
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paths of varying distances and directions, one can calculate the size of the earth and thus 
the global system of longitudes and latitudes – the key is within the code.  
 Path in the context of human geography includes the dimension of time. Culture 
at all levels involves some type of transaction in space-time. It has inseparable 
mechanical and conceptual aspects that resist reduction to standard units. While the 
movements of humans and the distribution of their activities involve the expenditure of 
energy in the pure sense, the evidence of their efforts exists in artifacts. The paths of 
individual activities are often ephemeral. Noam Shoval and Michal Isaacson, using GPS 
logs and ClustalG software, illustrated the visualization of space-time paths using 
sequence alignment for visitors to Akko’s Old City in northern Israel. The site has a 
number of significant locations available to visitors, starting and ending at a common 
location. The visitor paths and time spent at each location vary, and there are several 
mandatory locations on the tour. The use of the ClustalG software allows for the 
comparison of sequences of time-space activity, and the creation of a taxonomic tree that 
describes classes of visitors. 
 
The research methods used in this study, combining as they do sequence analysis 
with high-resolution spatial data, have potential, not least in opening up new, 
previously infeasible lines of inquiry in geography in general, and in that of time 
geography in particular, where “sequences” are of key importance. The 
application of sequence analysis in the context of time geography would allow 
researchers to aggregate, to create generalized space-time paths, and thereby 
typologies of space-time activities. 
 




ClustalG is a general version of that program ClustalX, developed for biochemical 
applications – nucleic acid and protein. This command-line version ClustalW and the 
graphic version ClustalX are available with detailed documentation on the Clustal 
website (Conway Institute UCD Dublin, 2008).  
 Clarke Wilson of the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation published 
several articles in Environment and Planning that advocated the use of sequence 
alignment analysis over the prevailing practice time-budget analysis. He argued that the 
time-budget studies concentrate on aggregate data while overlooking the more detailed 
and qualitative aspects of individual level data. While researchers can analyze simple 
alignments by conventional means, Wilson recommended the Clustal software used in 
molecular biology for multiple alignments. The software had its limits because it was 
designed to use alphabets of four letters for nucleotides or twenty letters for the amino 
acids (Wilson, 1998). The problem was resolved with ClustalG. 
 Andrew Abbott and Angela Tsay reviewed all the known studies on optimal 
matching and sequence analysis in the social sciences in an article in Sociological 
Methods & Research in 2000. They detail the history of its applications on various data, 
define its processes, and isolate types of problems. 
 
OM algorithms generally work by defining simple algebras that permit the 
creation of metric distances between sequences. These simple algebras involve at 
a minimum the operations of replacement, insertion, and deletion, the latter two 
often known simply as indel. The distance between one sequence and another is 
defined as the minimum combination of replacements and indels required to 
transform one of the pair of sequences into the other. Different replacements can 
be weighted differently in accordance with some theoretically driven scheme. 
Indels can be weighted linearly or, as is more common in the biological literature, 
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assigned a single “gap cost” that may or may not be augmented by a smaller cost 
linear in the length of the inserted (or deleted) material. 
 
– (Abbot and Tsay, 2000, 5-6) – 
       
 
Abbott and Tsay note that some information loss can occur when multidimensional forms 
are reduced to one-dimensional forms, as well as the problems associated with setting 
high-cost indels greater than half the largest substitution cost (12).  
 
Codifying the Landscape 
 The development of a methodology the uses sequences representing the physical 
characteristic of landscape is a different problem from representing spatial behavior. The 
underlying geology and the geomorphic processes acting upon the surface determine the 
particular conditions of landscape. Commonalities exit between different landscape 
structures throughout the globe, but they are diverse in extent and detail. Likewise, the 
context in which a landscape is being examined contributes its own information to the 
methodology. For example, this study is concerned with the feasibility of building a 
railroad from Waynesborough (Goldsboro) to Raleigh using the railroad technology and 
construction practices of the 1830s. The questions that must be answered is how much 
excavation, embankment, trestlework, and bridging is required to create a railroad bed of 
16 feet in width over a distance of 49.43 miles. While an actual railroad was built along 
this route during the 1850s, an earlier railroad must conform to the grade appropriate for 
the use of the lightweight locomotives of the 1830s. This statement is expressed in the 
present tense because it is a doable experiment, albeit an impractical one. The past does 
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not erase technology; it simple removes the practitioners. A counterfactual model of a 
technological object, such as a railroad, is an empirical representation of the thing itself. 
A sequence of code that represents a civil engineer’s approach to topography is a 
shorthand of a survey. Therefore, the researcher must begin with an examination of the 
motive power of the locomotive, and then select the appropriate grade for optimal 
performance of the same. Economics determine how much effort is expended on 
achieving the level grade. If it is more cost effective to employ a power locomotive on 
steep grade rather than excavating for a level grade for a light locomotive, the engineer 
will elect to do so. It follows that there are many possible ways to reduce these practices 
to code sequences. The topography is specific and unique, but there a many combinations 
of methods – thus, many possible sequences representing these methods – for traversing 
the same topography.  
  The codifying of the landscape for construction of a railroad imitates the 
procedures of the survey. The methods mentioned above concerning the use of code 
sequences to describe individual and collective paths are useful in analyzing the function 
of a railroad. The author intends to apply some form of both to the problem presented in 






















In Chapter XVII, the profile of the actual topography of the route was plotted 
(Figure 26). The alignment of the counterfactual railroad grade on the profile provides a 
framework for its division into categories of construction methods – trestlework, 
excavation, embankment, and bridging. Rather than using a large set of characters to 
reference all the details of the topography, the characters will represent the railroad 
construction method likely to have been used with a particular element of the terrain – 
grading (G), embankment (M), excavation (X), piles (P), trestlework (T), and bridging 
(B). “Grading,” used here, refers to leveling the rail bed on a near flat terrain, 
“embankment” is building up the rail bed to level the grade through depressions and 
inclines, and “excavation” is the removal hillside structures. Piles, according to the 
specification described for the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road, are used in soft soil and 
are less than 15 feet high, but usually 7 to 10 feet (Ruffin, 1833, 263). Trestlework is 
appropriate for crossing swamps and lower order streams such as creeks, and bridges are 
needed for higher order streams such as rivers.  
The junction of the North Carolina Railroad and the Wilmington & Weldon 
Railroad occurred on the south side of Goldsboro at N35.37326º, W78.00729º. This is the 
point where a likely Waynesborough to Raleigh connection could have commenced. In 
this study, the divisions of the route are associated with three terrains, Coastal Plain, 
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Transition Zone, and Piedmont. In this way, the code can be associated with an actual 
landscape. The specifications and related costs for the construction of piles and 
trestlework are available in several period documents including all the surveys previously 
mentioned, as well as A Treatise of Wooden Trestle Bridges according to the Present 
Practice on American Railroads by Wolcott C. Foster (Foster, 1904, 1-153). The cost 
estimates provided in the survey for the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road by Walter 
Gwynn allow for the preparation of a table for excavations and embankments up to 36 
inches. Here it receives the term “G” for grading because it is below the height for piles 
and the depth of earth that is removed and is merely a rise in the terrain. Establishing the 
cost of grading as a constant for the entire length of the Waynesborough to Raleigh route 
will isolate the most costly works that this route might have entailed had it been built 
during the same period as the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, the Raleigh & Gaston 
Rail Road, and their counterparts in neighboring states.  Reducing it to several constants 
for different sections corresponding to the two physiographic regions can achieve the 
same ends. A table for the cost per mile in cubic yards of inches of earth removed or 
added can be produced from Walter Gwynn’s specifications for embankments and 
excavations for the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road, along with his estimates (Table 5). 
The median volume for embankment on nine of the ten divisions of this railroad (the first 
is not itemized) is 11,185.08 cubic yards per mile, at a cost of $1,118.50. This is 
approximately six inches of earth added. The median volume for excavation is 10,094.33 











1   1,851.67    $185.17    $166.65 
2   3,740.00    $374.00    $336.60 
3   5,665.00    $566.50    $509.85 
4   7,626.67    $762.67    $686.40 
5   9,626.00    $962.60    $866.34 
6 11,660.00 $1,166.00 $1,049.40 
7 13,731.67 $1,373.17 $1,235.85 
8 15,840.00 $1,584.00 $1,425.60 
9 17,985.00 $1,798.50 $1,618.65 
10 20,166.67 $2,016.67 $1,815.00 
11 22,385.00 $2,238.50 $2,014.65 
12 24,640.00 $2,464.00 $2,217.60 
13 26,931.67 $2,693.17 $2,423.85 
14 29,260.00 $2,926.00 $2,633.40 
15 31,625.00 $3,162.50 $2,846.25 
16 34,026.67 $3,402.67 $3,062.40 
17 36,465.00 $3,646.50 $3,281.85 
18 38,940.00 $3,894.00 $3,504.60 
19 41,451.67 $4,145.17 $3,730.65 
20 44,000.00 $4,400.00 $3,960.00 
21 46,585.00 $4,658.50 $4,192.65 
22 49,206.67 $4,920.67 $4,428.60 
23 51,865.00 $5,186.50 $4,667.85 
24 54,560.00 $5,456.00 $4,910.40 
25 57,291.67 $5,729.17 $5,156.25 
26 60,060.00 $6,006.00 $5,405.40 
27 62,865.00 $6,286.50 $5,657.85 
28 65,706.67 $6,570.67 $5,913.60 
29 68,585.00 $6,858.50 $6,172.65 
30 71,500.00 $7,150.00 $6,435.00 
31 74,451.67 $7,445.17 $6,700.65 
32 77,440.00 $7,744.00 $6,969.60 
33 80,465.00 $8,046.50 $7,241.85 
34 83,526.67 $8,352.67 $7,517.40 
35 86,625.00 $8,662.50 $7,796.25 
36 89,760.00 $8,976.00 $8,078.40 
 
Table 5. This table shows the cost per mile for inches of embankment or excavation 
based upon the estimates for the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road. 
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The total cost of embankment and excavation for the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail 
Road was $346,330.83 in total, or $2,151.12 per mile. This is only a difference of 
$124.13 from the median cost of $2,026.99 per mile for embankment and excavation on 
the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road. What parts of these routes are similar to the 
Waynesborough to Neuse River route?  For example, the scarp located in the third mile 
of the Waynesborough to Raleigh route – with its rise of 20 feet in two-tens of a mile – is 
similar to the scarp at Rose Hill on the route of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
(Figure 27). Beginning one mile south of town on the line of the railroad (N34.81258º, 
W78.02464º) and ending at Ridge Street in Rose Hill (N34.83636º, W78.02982º), there is 
an elevation gain of 13.1 feet. The rise does not appear extreme when viewed from the 
surface (Figure 28). By comparison, the elevation gain at Wilmington from the level of 
Front Street at the railroad depot site to Fifth Street in the railroad cut is a rise of 13 feet, 
followed by a descent to the upper yards of 22 feet. However, the rise from the river 
through the inclined plane to Fifth Street is a rise of approximately 30 feet.  In the early 
years of the railroad, the locomotives in use on the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
lacked the power to make the grade from the river. Flights of stairs led from the 
steamboat dock to the rails at Front Street. An inclined plane of approximately 400 feet in 
length was constructed during the early 1840s, and in late 1854, a train descending the 
incline, unable to stop, ran into the Cape Fear River (Sprunt, 1916, 194-195; Wilmington 
Chronicle, 17 May 1843; Wilmington Journal, 23 December 1854). However, the 
approximate length of the incline was 400 feet and its height was approximately 30 feet – 














Figure 27. This image depicts the elevations of the scarp at Rose Hill. The ascent reaches 
a level of 13.1 feet at Ridge Street. The steepest rise is 10 feet in one-eighth of 
a mile up the face of the scarp. 
 Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, North Carolina-1/9 






















Figure 28. This photograph shows a view looking south at Rose Hill towards the bluff of 
the scarp on the route of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The rails 
follow the topography without extensive excavations or embankments. 











The steepest section of the rise at Rose Hill is an ascent of 10 feet in height over 
the distance of approximately one-eighth of a mile. The Coastal Plain section of the 
Waynesborough to Raleigh route as far as the Neuse River near Selma does not appear to 
present any unusual qualities of topography that would require extensive grading or 
excavation, and it seems appropriate for light locomotives. The costs for excavations and 
embankments on the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, at $2151.12 per mile, seem to be 
reasonable benchmark for estimating the cost of this section of the Waynesborough to 
Raleigh route. The variable costs are associated with the construction of bridges, 
trestlework, and piles. 
Calculating the volume for large-scale excavations or embankments requires the 
calculation of the area of cross-sections. The formula for the regular cross-section is 
   where A is the area of a level section of the road, c is the centerline, d is 
distance between the slopes from center, and w is width of the roadbed. The area of the 
three-level cross-section divides the roadbed into triangles (Figure 29). Its formula is 
expressed as        where one-fourth of the width of the 
roadbed is multiplied by the sum of the height of the sides and then added to the sum of 
the distances of the slopes multiplied by half the center measurement (Davis, Foote, and 
Kelly, 1966, 240-241). This is the basic formula illustrated by John Woodbridge Davis in 
his Formulæ for the Calculation of Railroad Excavation and Embankment published in 
1877. Here, the same figure is described in slightly different terms. The area section 
formula is , where w is the width between the top of the slopes, b 














Figure 29. This diagram illustrates the three-level cross-section of a railroad excavation. 
The terms dl and dr represent the distance from center on the left and right to 
the top of the slopes. The measurement from the roadbed w to the top of the 
center cut is c. The terms hl and hr represent the height of the slopes on the left 
and right sides.       
Data Source: Davis, R.E, Foote, F.S., and Kelly, J.W. (1966). Surveying 









The term S is the ratio of the slope where 
"
 and r = Sr’, l = Sl’ giving  
       2  for the cross-section area.  
 
Supposing w’, c’ to represent width and centre at next station, the area of its 
cross-section may be expressed by a formula similar to the above: half the sum of 
these, multiplied by dist., D, between, and divided by 27, gives a near 
approximate of the volume bet. In cu. yds.  
 
– (Davis, 1877, 7-8) – 
  
 
The volume between these two cross-section can be expressed as 
   4  where the w’ and c’ are the width between the slopes and the 
center measurement of the second cross-section.  
 The prismoidal formula      4    is a common method of 
determining the volume of excavation in cubic yards for railroads and other earthworks. 
The term l is length between the surveyor’s stations, usually 100 feet,  A1 and A2 are the 
areas of the end sections, and Am is the area in the middle derived by averaging the linear 
dimensions of the end sections. The prismoidal formula yields only significantly different 
values from the average ends areas method        when there is an abrupt 
change in cross-section (Davis, Foote, and Kelly, 1966, 245-247).  
 Walter Gwynn, in his report on the survey for the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail 
Road, provides specifications for excavations that allow for a different approach to 
calculating estimates. The length of the roadbed was 13 to 16 feet wide and the slopes 










Figure 30. Walter Gwynn specified in his report on the survey of the Portsmouth & 
Roanoke Rail Road that excavations should have the roadbed at 13 to 16 feet 
wide and the angle of 45 degrees for the slopes (A). Fortunately, the angle of 
the area allows the cross-section to be calculated as a rectangle where the 
height multiplied by the height plus the width of the roadbed equals the area 











   The geometric relationships that result from the requirement to have the slopes set 
at 45 degrees present the opportunity to determine the volume of excavation through a 
nearly symmetrical hillside. Since the sum of two right triangles of the 45-degree slopes 
form a square, and the width times the height of the roadbed for another square or 
rectangle, the sum of the area of both can be expressed as a single square or rectangle. In 
this instance, the volume of excavation is a uniform slice into the landscape where the 
width of the roadbed, for the purposes of this study set at 16 feet, is added to the width of 
the square or rectangle formed from the slopes determined by the height of the cut. 
Turning from the perspective of the cut to that of the profile, the area of the profile above 
the aligned grade of the railroad can be multiplied by the total width of the cut to yield 
the volume of the excavation. This is like cutting a shape from a sheet of paper, and using 
it as a template to cut the same shape from a thick plank of wood. The profile of some 
hills fit the shape of a parabola, whereas the shape in three dimensions would be a 
paraboloid. The area of an ellipse is    where a and b are the semiaxes, a is one-
half of the horizontal chord and b is the semiaxis perpendicular to a at the center. If a 
parabola is the area of a hill profile, the volume of the cut is that area multiplied by the 
width of the roadbed plus the height, since the angle of the slope is 45 degrees (Figure 
31). The formula is     tan 45°  . Since w is 16 feet and the 
tangent of 45 degree is 1.00, it is reduced to the expression . 5   . 5
16 1 . The volume of the excavation is in cubic feet, and must be converted into 





Figure 31. This diagram illustrates a method of calculating the volume of excavation for a 
hill profile that fits the shape of a half ellipse (A). The slope of the sides are at 
a 45 degree angle. The combined area of the two slopes is the square of the 
height h (B), and the sum of the width of the roadbed and the height is the 
width of the cut (C). The volume of excavation is the area inside the parabola 
and the total width of the cut, or the volume within the arch, and less than the 




 Calculating the volume of excavation from profile measurements can never be as 
accurate as from measurements from a three-dimensional rendering or from survey data. 
However, there are two compelling reasons to apply this methodology to particular 
problems. First, if the researcher is working with a limited body of information, such as 
topographic maps, and survey data are not available, the profile is sufficient for a rough 
estimate. Second, if the purpose of the study is to estimate the cost of a hypothetical 
project in relationship to similar works, the average cost of constructing these examples 
from the real world places a constraint upon the variables in the model. The estimated 
cost of the model fits within a constraint equation. For example, if the cost for a railroad 
constructed in the Piedmont is $12,000 per mile, the variables of construction must adjust 
to this constraint. The variables include grade, motive power, excavation, and other 
factors.  
 The counterfactual model of the Waynesborough to Raleigh route can be divided 
into three divisions, Waynesborough to the Neuse River, the Neuse River to modern town 
of Clayton, and from Clayton to Raleigh. Each of these divisions corresponds to a change 
in terrain, and for this reason, it follows that the alignment of grade, the application of 

















Motive Power and Grade 
 
 While later generations of American locomotives had the power to ascend steep 
grades, that a five or six-ton engine of the 1830s would be up to the task is doubtful.  
However, in a table prepared by Jonathan Knight and cited by William Gibbs McNeill 
and W.G. William in their report on the survey for the Louisville, Cincinnati, and 
Charleston Railroad, that larger locomotives had been tested on grades as steep as 92 feet 
per mile is apparent. Knight, chief engineer for the Baltimore and Ohio, observed that a 
7.5-ton locomotive with a 4.5-ton tender could pull a load of 8 tons up an incline of 92 
feet per miles a speed of 10 miles per hour. An 8.5-ton locomotive with a 5.5-ton tender 
could negotiate the same grade pulling a load of 36 tons at the same speed. However, the 
efficiency of both locomotives was decreased by half with an incline of 25 feet per mile, 
and again by nearly half again at an incline of 50 feet per mile. For example, the 8.5-ton 
locomotive with the 5.5-ton tender could pull a 200-ton load at level, a 100-ton load at 
25-feet per mile, and a load of 63-tons at 50 feet per mile. The 7.5-ton locomotive with a 
4.5-ton tender decreased from a 175-ton load at level to a 54-ton load at 50 feet per mile. 
McNeill and Williams noted that many sections of the Baltimore and Susquehannah, 
under construction, had a grade of 90 feet per mile, and the company intended to use 14-
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ton locomotives (United States, 1838, 33-34). For reference, 54 tons are approximately 
the same load as 6.75 bateau-loads.  
 A 7.5-ton Norris locomotive named the George Washington, having 10.25” by 
17.625” cylinders and 48” drivers could haul a weight of 137 gross tons in 35 cars. It had 
been tested on 10 July 1836 on a 377-foot per mile incline, and managed to haul a load of 
9.6 tons. The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road had ordered a locomotive capable of 
hauling 170 tons in 1843. By 1845, the Baldwin Locomotive Works had produced a 15-
ton locomotive with 14” by 18” cylinders and 42” drivers to address the growing demand 
for greater hauling capacity (Warner, 1924, 5; Wilmington Chronicle, 6 December 1843). 
That the early locomotives lost a considerable degree of their hauling efficiency, 
according to the Knight tables, at a grade of 25 feet per mile. To expend resources on 
making a smooth grade with a low incline for the light locomotives was practical, such as 
was practiced in England during the period, rather than have an uneven grade with steep 
inclines and dips using heavy locomotives. 
 The cost of constructing the 86-mile long Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road, without 
locomotives, rolling stock, fixtures, and bridges, was $12,540 per mile, according to their 
chief engineer Charles F.M. Garnett. The cost of the 3,240 feet of bridges cost $155,000 
(Ruffin, 1839, 388). Walter Gwynn estimated the cost of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail 
Road without equipment and fixtures to be $405,133. If the cost of the bridge over the 
Meherrin River ($14,500) and bridge over the Nottoway River ($11,100) are subtracted, 
the amount remaining is $379,533, or $4,929 per mile (Gwynn, 1833, 6-10). The 
Wilmington & Raleigh cost an average of $7,094.34 per mile, but this includes bridges 
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and trestlework. Excavation and embankment cost an additional $2,151 per mile, and the 
completed track $3,906 per mile (North Carolina, 1940b, Schedule A). Applying the cost 
per mile for rail construction to the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, the cost of the rails 
from Waynesborough to Raleigh would have been $179,684.60. The cost for excavation, 
embankment, and trestlework is complicated. Gwynn’s estimates for the Portsmouth & 
Roanoke Rail Road itemize the cost of each. Pile construction on the Charleston & 
Hamburg Rail Road averaged $2,300 per miles, and trestlework between $6,000 and 
$10,000 per mile (Gwynn, 1833; Ruffin, 1833). 
 The 1856 stockholders meeting of the Raleigh & Gaston indicates that the 
company was engaged in filling in the original trestlework of the road, and cutting 
ditches between the Warrenton area and Gaston (Raleigh & Gaston Railroad Company, 
1856, 8-9, 15-16). From an examination of a section of the Raleigh & Gaston near Macon 
in Warren County and commencing at N36.43581º, W78.11362º, it is apparent that the 
locomotives used by the company could make a grade 82.50 feet in a mile. This is 370.45 
feet above sea level to 453.33 feet above sea level (Figure 31). In a similar vein, the 
inclined plane on the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road, at Aiken, South Carolina, 
overcame an even greater change in elevation with the aid of stationary engines. This 
excavation of the inclined plane is a visible feature on the landscape (Figure 32). 
 
One hundred and eighty feet of this descent to the valley of the Savannah, is 
conquered at the point by an inclined plane, 3,800 feet long, have three grades of 
ascent, the steepest of which is 1 in 13. From the foot of the plane, the remainder 
of the descent is overcome in 10 miles, having an average inclination of 18 feet in 
a mile. 
 





Figure 27. This image illustrates the ascent of 82.50 feet over the distance of a mile on 
the route of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road west of Macon, North Carolina.   
Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, North Carolina-1/9 





Figure 28. The line in the center of this image is the site of the inclined plane on the 
Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road at Aiken, South Carolina. This manmade 
feature can be seen from outer space. 
 Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, The National Map. 
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That the change of elevation between the Coastal Plain and the Piedmont transition at the 
Neuse River along the projected Waynesborough to Raleigh route would not have been 
so great an obstacle seems probable. However, a distinct difference exists between the 
eastern and western sections of this route. The elevation gains on the Waynesborough to 
the Neuse River section do not exceed 40 feet over a mile in ascent or 30 feet in descent, 
but on the Neuse River to Raleigh section, the maximum ascent is 73 feet, and the 
maximum descent is 70 feet.  
 
The Counterfactual Railroad 
 Let the model of the Waynesborough to Raleigh route begin with construction of 
the road at both of the lines. The model is set in early 1837 at the time work commences 
on the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The objective of the planners is to have the 
route open to Raleigh when the Wilmington & Raleigh reaches Waynesborough in 
February 1839. While the Raleigh Division initially would have to proceed without iron, 
the grading and the preparation of the rails to receive the iron could proceed. The Raleigh 
Division will commence at the point where the latter North Carolina Railroad enters the 
Raleigh yards near Cabarrus Street, N35.77406º, W78.64459º, at an elevation of 312 feet 
above sea level. The Waynesborough Division would begin at the junction with the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, N35.37326º, W78.00729º, at an elevation of 78 feet 
above sea level. Iron would be delivered to Beaufort, transported through the Clubfoot & 
Harlowe Creek Canal to New Bern, thence to Waynesborough by steamboat. Ten miles 
of this division would come into operation first, and subsequently, the next opening 
242 
 
brings the railroad to the Neuse. A third group, the Neuse Division, would have been 
working on a bridge over the river, and preparing the grade for putting down sleepers and 
wooden rails.  
 
The Waynesborough Division 
Preparing the first string of code to represent the Waynesborough to Raleigh route 
starts with the key (WR0), followed by the assumed method for the flat terrain of the first 
two-tenths of a mile, grade (G). A shallow first-order stream empties into the Neuse 
River in the second two-thirds of a mile. This suggests the use of piles (P). The third and 
forth two-tenths are nearly level with the first, represented with grade (G). The fifth 
section of the mile is nearly occupied by the Little River, a tributary of the Neuse. This 
would be bridged (B). The final element of the code is the elevation gain, positive or 
negative, over the distance of the miles rounded to the nearest whole numbers in feet. The 
full code for the first mile of this route from Waynesborough to Raleigh, following the 
approximate course of Walter Gwynn’s survey for the North Carolina Railroad, is 
expressed as WR0 GPGGB -6. The second mile rises from the floodplain of the Little 
River and regains 6.64 feet over six-tenths of a mile. The code would read as follows: 
WR1 MMMGG +7. The third mile of the route proceeds on a gentle incline for eight-
tenths of a mile until it encounters a scarp with a sudden rise of approximately 20 feet in 
the last two-tenths of a mile (Figure 29). This feature would require excavation to 














Figure 29. This image illustrates the elevation data for the terrain containing the three-
mile section of railroad previously coded. Number 1, in the lower right, is a 
first order stream flowing into the Neuse River. The route of the railroad 
crosses the Little River, a tributary of the Neuse. Number 2, in the upper left, 
shows the line of the railroad ascending a scarp. 
 Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, North Carolina-1/9 









 While such a code is merely shorthand for a particular method of railroad 
construction, and based upon the interpretation of a limited body of information, it 
originates with an examination of modern USGS topographic quadrangle maps. 
Therefore, one can use the coordinates provided in the table to verify the actual 
topography through available geodatasets and aerial photographs, or field methods. 
 The next two miles of the Waynesborough and Raleigh route, based upon the 
actual route of the relevant division of the North Carolina Railroad, continue through 
Coastal Plain terrain with an elevation gain of 22.5 feet, and ending on the edge of a first 
order stream. The code sequences for these two miles are WR3 XGPPG +20 and WR4 
MGGXX +2 respectively. The entire five miles of the route, with coordinates beginning 
each sequence, are compiled together (Table 6). The combined sequences without 
reference keys appear as GPGGBMMMGGGGGGXXGPPGMGGXX, a form 
representing a mirror of the profile. Grouping the elements of this sequence into 
categories over distance produces an easy to read form (Table 7). The totals for the 
sequence are 13G + 4M + 4X + 3P + B, or 2.6 miles of grading, 0.8 miles of 
embankment, 0.8 miles of excavation, 0.6 miles of piles, and 1 bridge. While the bridge 
does not take up a full two-tenths of a mile, it is the predominate feature in that segment. 
 The next five miles of the route are a smooth ascent with a net elevation gain of 
24 feet. The route crosses three tributaries of Charles Branch. All are first order streams, 
but the cut in the terrain is wide and deep. It resembles the streams of Brooks Swamp on 
the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, and for this reason, it seems likely that trestlework 






Reference Sequence Elevation Gain Coordinates 
WR00 GPGGB -6 N35.37326º, W78.00729º 
WR01 MMMGG 7 N35.38134º, W78.02177º 
WR02 GGGGX 36 N35.38948º, W78.03579º 
WR03 XGPPG 20 N35.40035º, W78.04754º 
WR04 MGGXX 2 N35.41057º, W78.06002º 
 
Table 6. This table includes the elements of the survey code sequences and coordinates at 




G * G G * * * * G G G G G G *  * G * * G * G G * *
* * * * * M M M * * * * * * * * * * * * M * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * X X * * * * * * * X X
* P * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * P P * * * * * *
* * * * B * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
0
0 
* * * * 0
1 
* * * * 0
2 
* * * * 0
3 
* * * * 0
4 
* * * *
     
Table 7. The elements of the five miles of the code sequence appear in this table divided 
by category and distance.  
 
 
Reference Sequence Elevation Gain Coordinates 
WR05 GGPTT -7 N35.41868º, W78.07476º 
WR06 TGGGG 14 N35.42682º, W78.08946º 
WR07 MGGGG 7 N35.43495º, W78.10416º 
WR08 GGGGG 3 N35.44314º, W78.11881º 
WR09 GMGGG 7 N35.45131º, W78.13348º 
 
Table 8. The table shows the code sequences and coordinates for the next five miles. The 
only significant difference is the character “T” for trestlework. Trestlework was 
selected for crossing the three tributaries of Charles Branch based upon the use 
of trestlework at Brooks Swamp on the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
(Appendix E).  






 The route continues through the Coastal Plain for approximately another twelve 
miles until it reaches the transition into the Piedmont at the Neuse River (Figure 30). The 
last three miles of this section of the line are a descent onto the floodplain of the river 
(Table 9). When divided into categories, the elements of the complete section from the 
junction at Waynesborough with the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road to the Neuse 
River represent a steady ascent over moderate topography. The prevailing construction 
method is grading. Two bridges (on the same line with trestlework) exist, one at the Little 
River and the other over the Neuse. Trestlework corresponds with low order streams that 
cut deep ravines into Coastal Plain sediment. Piles, placed over shallow streams, appear 
occasionally in the table. Embankments appear between slight undulations in the terrain, 
and excavations cut into the same. This section of the route does not seem to present any 
difficulties beyond those found on the Wilmington to Waynesborough section of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh. 
 A difficult grade does commences, however, at the Neuse River, an elevation rise 
of 59.12 feet, although the bridge height relative to the bank of the river does reduces the 
ascent from an elevation of 155 feet above sea-level on its east bank to approximately 
175 feet above sea-level on its west bank. The combined span of the hypothetical 1830s 
trestlework and bridge covers eight-tenths of a mile. The extreme change in elevation in 
the route from the Neuse to the outskirts of 1834 Raleigh, near the site of the old 
Government House, occurs about two miles from town at Walnut Creek where the 
descent of 70 feet is followed by an ascent of 73 feet (Swain, 1867; Table 10; Table 11). 





Figure 30. The route of the railroad crosses the Neuse River 22 miles from its starting 
point at Waynesborough (Goldsboro) where the route begins to transition for 
Coastal Plain terrain to Piedmont terrain. 
Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, North Carolina-1/9 
ArcSecond.” The National Map. 
 
 
Reference Sequence Elevation Gain Coordinates 
WR10 MMMGG -4 N35.45945º, W78.14817º 
WR11 GGGGM 1 N35.46765º, W78.16284º 
WR12 XTPXP -9 N35.47570º, W78.17767º 
WR13 TTTTG 13 N35.48394º, W78.19233º 
WR14 PTTMM 3 N35.49209º, W78.20705º 
WR15 GGPPX -5 N35.50024º, W78.22175º 
WR16 XGGGP 3 N35.50841º, W78.23643º 
WR17 XGGGG 28 N35.51660º, W78.25098º 
WR18 GGGGG 0 N35.52465º, W78.26580º 
WR19 GGGGG -24 N35.53274º, W78.28057º 
WR20 GTTGT -19 N35.54088º, W78.29536º 
WR21 TTGTB -28 N35.54903º, W78.31009º 
 
Table 9.  This table shows the code sequences, elevation gain, and coordinates of 12 





G * G G * * * * G G G G G G *  * G * * G * G G * *
* * * * * M M M * * * * * * * * * * * * M * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * X X * * * * * * * X X
* P * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * P P * * * * * *
* * * * B * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
0
0 
* * * * 0
1 
* * * * 0
2 
* * * * 0
3 
* * * * 0
4 
* * * *
 
G G * * * * G G G G * G G G G G G G G G G * G G G
* * * * * * * * * * M * * * * * * * * * * M * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * P * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * T T T * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
0
5 
* * * * 0
6 
* * * * 0
7 
* * * * 0
8 
* * * * 0
9 
* * * *
 
* * * G G G G G G * * * * * * * * * * G * * * * * 
M M M * * * * * * M * * * * * * * * * * * * * M M
* * * * * * * * * * X * * X * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * P * P * * * * * P * * * * 
* * * * * * * * * * * T * * * T T T T * * T T * * 
1
0 
* * * * 1
1 
* * * * 1
2 
* * * * 1
3 
* * * * 1
4 
* * * * 
 
G G * * * * G G G * * G G G G G G G G G G G G G G
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * X X * * * * X * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * P P * * * * * P * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
1
5 
* * * * 1
6 
* * * * 1
7 
* * * * 1
8 
* * * * 1
9 
* * * *
 
G * * G * * * G * *
* * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * * * 
* T T * T T T * T B
2 
0 
* * * * 2 
1 
* * * * 
 
Table 10. These sequences represent the route from Waynesborough to the Neuse River. 
It is entirely in the Coastal Plain physiographic region. 
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In order that the code sequences describe the conditions of the landscape so the 
estimate approaches accuracy, the characters M, X, P, T, and B must be assigned 
dimensions. This is possible by deriving the length and depth of these works from the 
profile of the landscape, and adding these figures to the charters as a subscript. For 
example, trestlework over a ravine 313 feet wide and 21 feet at its maximum depth is 
expressed as T(313,21). The cost of track construction is a set of variables that can be 
plugged into the length of the projected route, and these figures are derived from the 
estimates for the railroad’s closest neighbors at a particular time. Grading, the 
predominate character in the sequences, is the building up of the rail bed to level below 
the height required for piles. Walter Gwynn provided in his survey for Portsmouth & 
Roanoke Rail Road the width the roadbed at 12.5 feet with slopes of 33.3º. He also 
included the cost of nine and a half cents per cubic yard for excavation, and ten cents per 
cubic yard for embankments (Gwynn, 1833, 6-7). The cubic yards of earth above and 
below the level line to three feet can be calculated as a constant for the whole line. 
Embankments are three to six feet above level, and excavations are cuts exceeding three 
feet. The area of each can be calculated in cubic yards and added as a subscript for M and 
X.  
It follows that two or more characters of the same type following consecutively 
are part of the same structure (B in one sequence followed by B in the next sequence is 
the same bridge). The same is true for the other characters, so their lengths combine. The 
depth, however, is not added. It appears as the third or more subscript character, such as 
T(313, 21, 18). This means that the length of 131 feet is that of one trestle occupying 
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conjoining parts of two different two-tenths of mile units. Both numbers are measured at 
the lowest point in the units, thus with the length they describe a curve. The same is true 
of embankments and excavations. The code is reduced by removing characters that 
describe the same structure, and those costs that are constant for the whole route.  
 Two rivers flow within this twenty-one mile section, the Little River (at 
approximately 150 feet) and the Neuse (at approximate 100 feet). Their widths are close 
to the lengths of the Meherrin and Nottoway rivers on the line of the Portsmouth & 
Roanoke Rail Road. Walter Gwynn gives the cost of the bridges over these rivers, 
including abutments, as $14,500 and $11,100 respectively. These figures will suffice for 
the hypothetical bridges over the Little and Neuse rivers, B (150) + B (100) = $25,600. A 
level line, run across the minor streams and their low-lying areas provides the length 
(Level Length) and height (Height at Level) for piles and trestlework alone the same 
section of the line (Table 11). The first stream on the route is a shallow stream, WR00 – P 
(528, 3.59), followed by the Little River, WR00 – P (844.80, 14.5). However, this segment 
contains a bridge. The 150 feet of the bridge and its abutments replaces this element, thus 
WR00 - P (528, 3.59) B (150, 14.5). The flood plain of the Little River is set with piles at a 
maximum of 6.9 feet at level for a length of 483.36 feet, WR01 – P (483.36, 6.9). Charles 
Branch is a large feature with three contributing first order streams covering parts of 
WR05 and WR06. The first two streams are at the level that requires piles, and is 
expressed as WR05-06 – P (2816.55, 14.05, 3.58) where the total length of piles is 2,816.55 feet, 
and the heights are 14.5 feet (high) and 3.58 feet (low).  This would bring the grade close 










Mile Coordinates Stream Name Level Length Height at Level Method 
WR00 N35.37479º, W78.01098º Unnamed 528.00 3.59 piles 
WR00 N35.37972º, W78.01938º Little River 844.80 14.5 piles 
WR01 N35.38668º, W78.03283º Little River 483.36 6.9 piles 
WR05 N35.42144º, W78.07981º Charles Branch (1) 686.40 3.58 piles 
WR05 N35.42328º, W78.08315º Charles Branch (2) 2,130.15 14.05 piles 
WR06 N35.42654º, W78.08905º Charles Branch (3) 897.60 19.47 trestle 
WR12 N35.47571º, W78.17769º Unnamed 3,801.60 25.41 trestle 
WR12 N35.48204º, W78.18895º Unnamed 1,267.20 16.65 piles 
WR13 N35.48393º, W78.19234º Unnamed 4,488.00 16.93 piles 
WR15 N35.50177º, W78.22342º  Moccasin Creek 4,699.20 20.05 trestle 
WR20 N35.54089º, W78.29537º Unnamed 3,220.80 22.24 trestle 
WR20 N35.54785º, W78.30795º Unnamed 792.00 10.13 piles 
WR21 N35.55176º, W78.31493º Unnamed 1,742.40 18.16 trestle 
WR21 N35.55568º, W78.31982º Neuse River 1,278.40 19.02 trestle 
 
Table 11. This table illustrates the length and height of hypothetical pile and trestlework 
construction at streams and lowlands along the route from Waynesborough to 















The third stream at Charles Branch has a depth from level that requires 
trestlework, WR06 – T (897.06, 19.47). The entire expression for Charles Branch is WR05-06 
– P (2816.55, 14.05, 3.58) T (897.06, 19.47). An unnamed set of first order streams with lowlands 
between miles 12 and 13 requires trestlework and piles, WR12-13 – T (3801.6, 25.41) P (5755.2, 
16.65, 16.93 ). Moccasin Creek requires trestlework with a maximum height from level at 
20.5 feet, WR15 – T (4699.2, 20.5). At miles 20 and 21, the route crosses a lowland cut with 
three low order streams and crosses the Neuse River, WR20-21 – T (3220.8, 22.24) P (792, 10.13) 
T (1742.4, 18.16) B (100). The entire sequence for this leg of the Waynesborough to Raleigh 
route is expressed as WR00-21 – P (528, 3.59)  B (150, 14.5)  P (483.36, 6.9)  P (2816.55, 14.05, 3.58) T 
(897.06, 19.47)  T (3801.6, 25.41) P (5755.2, 16.65, 16.93 ) T (4699.2, 20.5) T (3220.8, 22.24) P (792, 10.13) T (1742.4, 18.16) 
B (100). The sum of the lengths of pilings for the entire section is ∑ LP = (528 + 483.36 + 
2816.55 + 5755.2 + 792.4) = 10,375.51 = 1.96 miles. Using the estimates for pile 
construction on the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road, averaging $2,300 per mile, the 
total cost of piles on this section would be $4,508. The sum of lengths of the trestlework 
is expressed as ∑ LT = (897.06 + 3801.6 + 4699.2 + 3220.8 + 1742.4) = 14,361.06 = 2.72 
miles. The estimates for the trestlework on the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road range 
from $6,000 to $10,000 per mile. Using an average of $8,000 per mile, the total for the 
2.72 miles of trestlework becomes $21,760. The total cost estimates for this section of the 
route include the sum of the cost of piles and trestlework, the total cost of bridges (B), the 
cost of grading mile times the number of miles (G), and the cost per mile for rails and 
superstructure (S). This expressed as ∑ (LP + LT + B + 21G + 21S) = 4,508 + 21,760 + 
25,600 + 45,173.52 + 81,776.17 = $178,817.70 or $8,515.13 per mile. This is greater 
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than the $7,094.34 per mile costs for the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road by $1,420.79, 
but far less than the $12,540 per mile cost of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road. Even if the 
hypothetical estimate were high, it is within a reasonable cost range relative to the 
Wilmington & Raleigh. 
 
The Raleigh Division 
The sequences for Raleigh Division will be given the prefix RW, representing 
Raleigh to Waynesborough. For convenience, locations that appear on modern maps will 
be referenced in the analysis. Period maps, such as the MacRae-Brazier Map of 1833, do 
not include enough readily recognizable places in eastern Wake County to be helpful. 
The first section of the road is five miles in length, RW00-05, extending along the route 
of the North Carolina Railroad from the southern end of the yards at Raleigh to the 
neighborhood of Garner. An examination of the profile of the landscape on this route 
illustrates the several problems that the chief engineer would have encountered 
immediately. Unlike the Waynesborough Division, the route of the railroad would 
involve steep grades and excavation through rock. The first challenge is the descent to 
Walnut Creek. The ascent from this point must deviate from a straight line in a series of 
curves to avoid heavy excavation (Figure 31). Over this distance, the track makes a steep 
descent to, and steep ascent from, Walnut Creek. The remaining distance of the five-mile 
section includes inclines ranging from a descent of 14.13 feet to ascents of 33.52 feet 
(Table 12). A civil engineer, working within the constraints of 1830s railroad technology, 
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Item Coordinates Elevation in Feet Distance in Miles Rise in Feet Run in Miles 
1 N35.77062º, W78.64205º 308.18 0.28 -3.82 0.28 
2 N35.76069º, W78.63601º 259.19 1.04 -48.99 0.76 
3 N35.75674º, W78.63442º 229.32 1.33 -29.87 0.29 
4 N35.74976º, W78.63472º 253.49 1.83 24.17 0.5 
5 N35.74609º, W78.63670º 301.43 2.1 47.94 0.27 
6 N35.73869º, W78.63731º 320.16 2.64 18.73 0.54 
7 N35.73687º, W78.63619º 317.77 2.79 -2.39 0.15 
8 N35.73478º, W78.63493º 312.04 2.95 -5.73 0.16 
9 N35.72904º, W78.62906º 345.56 3.47 33.52 0.52 
10 N35.72537º, W78.62683º 349.93 3.75 4.37 0.28 
11 N35.72185º, W78.62697º 371.11 4 21.18 0.25 
12 N35.71969º, W78.62649º 356.98 4.15 -14.13 0.15 
13 N35.71615º, W78.62454º 377.53 4.42 20.55 0.27 
14 N35.71295º, W78.62050º 378.13 4.75 0.6 0.33 
15 N35.71134º, W78.61644º 373.99 5 -4.14 0.25 
 
Table 12. Items 1 through 5 represent the descent to and ascent from Walnut Creek over a 
distance of approximately two miles. The remaining distance includes ascents 
















 Before addressing other aspects of this five-mile section of the railroad, the 
problem of traversing the area of Walnut Creek must be solved. An examination of the 
modern landscape through field study shows that the modern railroad follows the contour 
of the valley, passing below an interchange on present-day Interstate 40. A wider view 
using 1/9 ArcSecond elevation data gives a fair impression of the size of this valley, and 
the continuation of the incline beyond (Figure 32). Since the route of the North Carolina 
Railroad is the route of the counterfactual model, it is easy enough to assume that an 
earlier incarnation of road could negotiated the near fifty feet per mile undulation with 
the right motive power, say a locomotive of 20 to 30 tons. However, such locomotives 
were a feature of the second generation of railroads. Further, the wooden rails were ill 
suited to the stress on downhill curves (Boyden, 1830). This situation suggests several 
solutions: the use of stationary engines on inclined planes, the construction of an 
extensive bridge such as George Stephenson’s Sankey Viaduct on the Liverpool & 
Manchester Railway, or start work on the railroad south of Walnut Creek. The latter 
option would place the beginning of the railroad 2.01 miles from Raleigh, and that the 
shareholders would approve the proposition is unlikely. The use of stationary engines, 
such as were used on the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road to assist trains on their 
descent to and ascent from Walnut Creek, might be the most economical approach, but it 
not necessarily the most practical solution. By contrast, building a viaduct one and three-
quarters miles long would be a prolonged undertaking that would consume too much 
capital. The Raleigh & Gaston’s bridge on the Roanoke was only 1,000 feet, including 











Figure 32. The elevation of the route of the North Carolina Railroad in the area of Walnut 
Creek, built during the early 1850s, would present significant challenges to a 
civil engineer during the 1830s. The methods of the latter construction 
involved deep excavations into the banks on each side of the ravine, and 
cutting curves around hills. 
Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, North Carolina-1/9 












 Several period documents suggest other aspects and alternatives solutions to this 
problem. The 1838 survey for the Winchester & Potomac Railroad cites similar 
circumstance of steep inclines on the Liverpool & Manchester Railway. 
 
Upon the Liverpool and Manchester railroad, in England, which is considered the 
greatest work of this description in Europe, heavy and bulky articles of commerce 
are transported daily, by locomotive steam-engines, surmounting, at rapid 
velocities in each direction of the trade, an inclination as great as 1 in 96, or 55 
feet ascent per mile for 1½ mile in length. These inclinations (called the “Whiston 
and Sutton planes”) are more than once and a half as great, and are just once and a 
half as long, as the greatest inclination which would occur upon the eastern route 
of the Winchester and Potomac railroad, in case it should occupy the valley of 
Long Marsh as a portion of the route. It is true, that in order to maintain the 
desired speed in surmounting the elevations of the Whiston and Sutton planes, the 
load of each locomotive engine is reduced, and assistant engines become 
necessary, capable of ascending those planes with twelve tons of goods at ten 
miles per hour. Upon other parts of the road, varying in its profile from a level to 
inclinations of 1 in 880, or 6 feet rise per mile, the loads for each locomotive is 20 
tons of goods, exclusive of the weight of the wagons, conveyed with a speed of 12 
miles per hour. 
 
– (United States, 1838e, 11) – 
 
Albert Johnson, master mechanic for the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road during the 1850s, 
previously with the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad during the mid-
1830s, describes a Stephenson locomotive owned by the company as being eight tons in 
weight, having 10” by 16” cylinders, and four driving wheels. This railroad featured more 
bridging than the Petersburg Rail Road, and the cost per mile was $13,934. However, the 
Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road had four ascents of 32.20 feet per mile, one descent of 
50.15 feet per mile, and one descent of 93.45 feet per mile. Some embankments reached 
the height of 32 feet, and excavation existed that were as deep as 30 feet near the 
Roanoke (Johnson, 1858; Ruffin, 1839, 388; RJ, 1837). Given this set of facts, it is likely 
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that the five miles would have used construction practices similar to those of the 
Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road and those built in the Piedmont of Virginia. Like these 
railroads, the five miles of the counterfactual model follow a north-to-south route, crosses 
streams that are flowing west to east, and the terrain ranges from 250 to 350 feet above 
sea level with ascents reaching beyond 400 feet above sea level. An engine of eight and a 
half tons with a five and a half ton tender would be sufficient to pull a 100-ton load up a 
grade of twenty-five feet per miles, or a sixty-three ton load up a grade of fifty feet per 
mile (United States, 1838, 34). Therefore, it would appear best to excavate the descent 
from Raleigh so that the grade would not exceed fifty feet per mile, and the ascent should 
be the same. 
 Walnut Creek is approximate 55 feet across with banks at an elevation of 226-230 
feet above sea level at the point where the railroad bridges it. The center of the stream is 
1.33 miles into the route. For the first mile from Raleigh, the elevation descends from 312 
feet to 257 feet. Looking ahead, the change of elevation from 3.00 miles to 3.60 miles is 
41.93 feet. The two-mile section of railroad will be divided in section of three-tenths of a 
mile because this subdivision best fits the shape of the valley and the desired grade. The 
first three-tenths (1,584 feet) involves grading from 312 feet to 300 feet in elevation. The 
elevation at 0.6 miles is 271.44 feet, at 0.9 miles is 254.39 feet, and at 1.2 miles it is 
242.49 feet. If the descent begins from 300 feet in elevation at 0.3 miles, elevation at 250 
feet must be set at 1.3 miles into the route, or 6,864 feet. The elevation at this point on the 
profile is 232.16 feet, where the height of the grade should be 250 feet if the grade is to 
be 50 feet per mile. The 1830s solution to the problem is to build one mile of trestlework 
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from 0.03 miles to 1.30 miles. The trestlework would average 18 to 20 feet in height, or 
G(1584) T(5280, 20, 18), followed by a bridge with abutments and embankments, all totaling 
1,056 feet and leveled at an elevation of 250 feet. As stated above, Walnut Creek is 55 
feet across at this point, and the height to the bridge is approximately 25 feet above the 
creek. The Rockfish Creek Bridge on the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road appears 
closest to the design that an engineer of the period would select for Walnut Creek, 
namely a lattice truss bridge resting on stone piers with brick or stone abutments. 
However, the original cost of this bridge is not available. The stone bridge over the 
Nottoway River on the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road was estimated at $11,100, and 
the one hundred and eighty-foot bridge over Fontaine’s Creek on the Greensville & 
Roanoke Rail Road cost $10,500 (Gwynn, 1833, 7; New York Farmer, 29 May 1837). Of 
these two bridges, the description of the bridge over the Greensville & Roanoke, 
including its abutments, pier spacing, and embankments appears close to the needs of this 
section of the line. The ascent from this bridge retains the grade of 50 feet per mile. The 
line reaches an elevation of 275 feet at the second mile, with the incline beginning with 
1,525.6 feet of excavation into the hillside beyond the bridge. Like its latter counterpart, 
the railroad ascends the west side of the hill in a curve. After rounding the hill, the 
railroad should cross 897.6 feet of trestle, then begin the ascent of another hill. The 
second mile ends with 216.8 feet (Figure 33). The term T(897, 15) can be included in the 
sequence. To determine the depth and shape of the excavation, the topography must be 
examined to determine the slope of the hillsides beginning at 250 feet elevation, ending at 
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The distance of one hundred feet is selected because to measure this distance on the 
topographic maps and datasets used in this study is easier. Direct observations would of 
course be more precise. At the beginning of the first excavation, the slope of the hill is 
five feet higher from center and two feet lower from center across the width of one 
hundred feet. At the end of the excavation, the upper part of the slope is four feet higher 
from center, and the lower is one foot below. The cross-section of the slope of the first 
hill is a rise of three feet over a distance of 100 feet. Using the formula   ∆ , 
wherein the angle of incline is the arctangent of the rise divided by the run, the angle of 
the incline of the hill is 1.72 degrees. If the roadbed is 16 feet and the tangent of 1.72 
degrees is 0.03, then the rise over 16 feet is 0.48 feet. The rise at the center of the roadbed 
is 0.24 feet. If the angle is 1.72 degrees, the height is 5 feet at 100 feet on level and 2 feet 
at 0.00 feet on level for the beginning cut, then the vertex of the angle is at -66.5 feet. The 
height of the center of the railroad cut at center is 0.03 multiplied by 74.5 (66.5 plus 8), or 
2.24 feet. Since the beginning of the 100-foot measure begins at the roadbed, the level-
line is the 250 feet level of the bridge, and the roadbed is 2 feet below the hillside as it 
comes off the bridge, the cut is 2.00 at 0.00 feet width, 2.24 at 8.00 feet width, and 2.48 
feet at 16.00 feet width. Using a 1.5:1 proportion, a common ratio for uneven sides for 
canals and railroad, the downhill line would be -3 feet from the from 0, and uphill line 
would be 3.72 feet from 16 feet at 19.72 feet. The total width across the cut, including 
sides, would be 22.72 feet. The uphill elevation at width 19.72 is 2.59 feet, on level cut 
the height should be 2.48 feet. The downhill elevation is 1.9 feet, whereas on a level cut 
is should be two. The appropriate formula for determining the area of the excavation 
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cross-section is the Three-level Section,        . Here, w is the 
roadbed width at 16 feet, c is the center height at 2.24 feet, hl is 1.9 feet, and hr is 2.59 
feet. The right hand distance from center to the top of the cut is 11.72 feet, and the left 
hand distance from center is 11 feet. The result is   1.9 2.59   . 11.72 11
45 square feet. The same process can be applied to the end cut at the top of the hill. The 
angle remains the same. The area for this cut is 0.97 1.52 . 9 9.48
21.51   square feet. The Average End Areas formula, 
 
, is sufficient to 
determine the approximate volume of this excavation. The result is 50,733.83 cubic feet, 
or 1,879.03 cubic yards.  
 The profile is somewhat deceptive on the second hill. The line of the railroad 
crosses the trestle to an elevation of 273.45 feet, and rises to 275 feet at the end of the 
second mile. It cuts into a mound that has an elevation of 288.42 feet at the end of the 
second mile. The elevation of the hillside at the end of the trestle is 276 feet. The center 
measurement of cut is 2.55 feet. The left and right side are symmetrical because the top 
of the mound is flat: thus the Regular Cross-sections formula,      can be 
used. The distance of the top width is 23.65 feet, and the area of this first cut is 80.71 
square feet. The center of the end cut is 13.42 feet, and the top width is 56.26 feet. The 
top of the cut appears flat. Using the same formula, the total is 862.37 square feet, and 
applying the average ends areas formula, the volume becomes 102,230 cubic feet, or 
3786.3 cubic yards. The sequence for this two-section can be expressed as RW00-01 – 
G(1584) T(5280, 20, 18) B($10500) X (1879.03 cy) T(897, 15) X(3786.3 cy).  
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 The object of aligning the next three miles of the route is to ascend from 275 feet 
to 325 feet in 1.25 miles, then ascend another 49.32 feet over a distance of 1.75 miles to 
an elevation of 374.32 feet. The first ascent curves upward from the base of a hill, where 
a stream runs between it and a hill west of it, and several first order streams flow down 
the side of the first hill. By following these streams up through the crenulations on the 
hillside, one finds that the top of the hill is 335 feet in elevation. The profile of the 
landscape on the route of the railroad at the base of the hill has elevations of 294.04 feet 
at 0.3 miles, 323.88 feet at 0.6 miles, 312.63 feet at 0.9 miles, and 320.9 feet at 1.2 miles. 
On a rise of 50 feet over a distance of 1.25 miles, the grade should increase by 12 feet in 
0.3 miles, in this case, starting from the elevation of 275 feet and ending at 287 feet. The 
excavation depth, or the difference in elevation between the ground line and the grade 
line, is 7.04 feet. The differences between the ground line and the grade line for the entire 
1.25 miles measured at 0.3-mile increments are 12.47 feet at 0.0 miles, 7.04 feet at 0.3 
miles, 20.6 feet at 0.6 miles, 2.00 feet at 0.09, -1.65 feet at 1.2 miles, and -3.73 feet at 
1.25 miles. The regular cross-section formula can be used for estimating the areas for the 
first three cuts. The cross-section areas are 432.77 square feet at 0.00 miles, 130.66 
square feet at 0.3 miles, and 966.14 square feet at 0.6 miles. Excavation ends at 0.69 
miles, or 3,643.2 feet, where a stream crosses the route of the road. The end cut at 0.69 
miles is 16.47 feet deep, and the cross-section area is 670.41 square feet. The total 
volume of the excavation of this section of the road is 84,388.86 cubic yards. The 
trestlework that follows is 1,108.8 feet long and 16 feet high. From 0.9 miles to 1.2 miles, 
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19 inches of embankment consisting of 12,435.5 cubic yard of earth needs building up, 
followed by 264 feet of embankment built to 3.73 feet, or 4,920.66 cubic yards.  
 Beginning at 325 feet at 1.25 miles, the ground line reaches the elevation of 
347.74 feet at 1.5 miles. The grade line is 0.46 feet at 1.27 miles and climbs to 337.03 
feet at 1.5 miles, 7.03 feet below the ground line. The total volume is 4,362.17 cubic 
yards. At 1.65 miles, the grade line is 18.17 feet below the ground line. The volume of 
this 792-foot section of excavation is 14,259.52 cubic yards. The depth of the cut 
decreases to 7.31 feet at 1.80 miles, another section of 792 feet with a volume of 
14,418.06 cubic yards. At 2.00 miles into this section, the ground line is 370.94 feet and 
the grade line is 346.08 feet. The cut is 24.86 feet at this point, and total volume of 
excavation from 1.80 to 2.00 miles is 29,761.6 cubic yards. The ground line is 7.03 feet 
above the grade line at 2.15 miles, and the excavation between 2.00 and 2.15 miles is 
22,167.2 cubic yards. From 2.15 to 2.40 miles, the cut ranges from 7.03 to 20.2 feet, and 
the volume of excavation is 27,423.49 cubic yards.  The cut diminishes to 6.35 feet at 
2.52 miles with a volume of 12,842.72 cubic yards. The ascent reaches its maximum at 
2.88 miles with the last cut at 10.39 feet to the grade line. After the last excavation of 
17,132.54 cubic yards, the grade is level. The entire section of three miles would require 
the excavation of 226,756.2 cubic yards, the building up of 4,920.66 cubic yards of 
embankment, and 1,108.8 feet of trestlework.  
 All of the terms that describe the first five miles of the Raleigh Division can be 
combined into a single sequence, RW00-04 – G(1584 cy) T(5280, 20, 18; 1108.8, 16; 897, 15)  B($10,500) 
X(232421.8 cy)  M (4920.66 cy). In estimating the cost of excavation and embankment, the price 
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of 15 cents per cubic yard seems appropriate for the soil of this region. It has more clay 
and rock that the Coastal Plain soils, and might fit more closely to the soils on parts of the 
Western & Atlantic Railroad (United States, 1837a, 33). If so, the cost of excavation and 
embankment on this section of the road would have been $35,601.37. The cost of grading 
of 1,584 cubic yards at the same rate would be $237.60. The estimated cost of the 
trestlework, based upon the average of $8,000 per mile, would be $11,037.88. The cost of 
rails and superstructure would have been $19,470.52. The total cost for this section of 
five miles of track amounts to $35,601.37 + $237.60 + $11,037.88 + $19,470.52 = 
$66,347.37, or $13,269.47 per mile. This is approximately $1,270 greater than the 
average per mile cost of the Raleigh & Gaston.  
 In the next two miles, the elevation of the terrain climbs from 374.32 feet to its 
maximum of 406.82 feet two miles into this section. In the third mile, the elevation 
descends to 330.24 feet. The proximity of a quarry near along the route suggests that 
excavations might have to be made into granitic formations. This should be avoided when 
possible. The nine large crenulations in the hillside suggest the need for culverts (Figure 
34). Using Walter Gwynn’s estimates for stone drains from his survey for the Portsmouth 
& Roanoke Rail Road, each drain or culvert would have cost $1,000. The grade line rises 
to 16.22 feet at one mile, and 32.44 feet at two miles. The ground line is 3.26 feet below 
the grade line at one mile. It appears that embankments are needed for some, if not most, 
of the two-mile section. The method used to estimate the volume of the embankments is 
based upon averages derived from the profile (Davis, Foote, and Kelly, 1966, 247-249). 













Figure 34. The landscape at Garner on the route of the North Carolina Railroad, and the 
route of the counterfactual model, is cut with at least nine substantial 
crenulations. The presence of a quarry in the lower right suggests that the 
builders would have to excavate granitic rock in places. 
Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, North Carolina-1/9 













This will be compared to the measurement of the grade line at the same intervals, and the 
differences will be averaged. The average measurement below the grade line is 5.73 feet, 
and the average measurement above the grade line is 2.22 feet (Table 13). These 
measurements give a general impression of the profile compared to the grade from the 
beginning of the fifth mile to the beginning of the seventh mile, or a total of 10,560 feet 
(Figure 35). The next task is to measure the length of the portion of the length below and 
above the grade line. The length of the ground line below the grade in the first mile is 
3,960 feet, and the length above is 1,320 feet. In the second mile, the length below is 
3,168 feet, and the length above is 897.6 feet. The remaining 1,214.4 feet is so close to 
the grade that it would be categorized as grading at six inches. The total length of 
embankment for the two-mile section is 7,128 feet, the total length of excavation is 
2,217.6 feet, and the total length of grading is 1,214.4. Since the average height of 
embankment is 5.73 feet, the distance to slope stake is   = 8.00 + 1.5 + 5.73 = 
15.23 feet. The average cross-sectional area is    = 5.73(8 + 15.23) = 133.11 
square feet, and the total volume of the embankment is .  = 35,140.48 cubic 
yards. The volume of excavation is 3,595.80 cubic yards, and the volume of grading to 
six inches for a length of 1,214.4 feet is 2,681.8 cubic yards (Table 5). In preparing the 
sequence for these two miles, the nine culverts can be included in the category of bridges 
for the sake of convenience, B($9000). The volume of earthworks is expressed as G(2681.8 cy) 
X(3595.80 cy) M(35140.48 cy). The cost of grading and embankment can be set at fifteen cents 
per mile as with the previous section. However, the proximity of rock suggests the cost of 







Distance in Miles Grade Line in Feet Ground Line in Feet Difference in Feet
0.00 374.32 374.32 0
0.1 375.94 368.17 7.77
0.2 377.56 374.33 3.23
0.3 379.18 377.24 1.94
0.4 380.81 374.16 6.65
0.5 382.43 370.92 11.51
0.6 384.05 379.77 4.28
0.7 385.67 387.39 -1.72
0.8 387.29 392.99 -5.7
0.9 388.92 389.43 -0.51
1 390.54 392.04 -1.5
1.1 392.16 384.12 8.04
1.2 393.78 398.13 -4.35
1.3 395.4 385.48 9.92
1.4 397.03 389.98 7.05
1.5 398.65 390.03 8.62
1.6 400.27 396.1 4.17
1.7 401.89 403.55 -1.66
1.8 403.51 403.63 -0.12
1.9 405.14 404.34 0.8
2 406.76 406.19 0.57
 
Table 13. This table shows the difference in between the grade line and the ground line 





































st for this s
Betwe











o tenths of 
et, and the a
cavation th
 cubic yard 
sive as in cu













e for the tw




tting into a 
ssuming th
from the hig









































 survey of t
). However
e, and the a
ation would
ns, the cost 
ost estimate
tion, and $9


















, none of the
verage depth















n the grade 
7. It is divid
 the grade is
 feet.  
n & Cincinn
 excavation
 of the 
surface clay























per mile so closely that the entire mile can be graded at 14 inches. This is approximately 
half the difference between the ground and the grade over the entire distance, or 29,260 
cubic yards. This would have cost $4,389 at $0.15 per mile. The grading can be 
continued into the next mile for 1,372.8 feet, costing $1,141.14. It was followed by 475.2 
feet that required an embankment of 5.85 feet. The volume is 6,545.17 cubic yards 
calculated from the average depth. The cost, at $0.15 per mile, is $981.77. The next 2,112 
feet from 3.35 miles to 3.75 miles of this section involve an ascent up several hills to 
10.26 feet with a midway height of 6.62 feet. In the sequence it can be represented as 
P(2112, 6.62, 10.26). This is a location where embankments are preferable. However, piles 
could suffice for initial construction. In addition, between 3.15 miles and 4.14 miles of 
this section, has a total descent of approximately a foot, so the object is to level out the 
grade. Using piles for the 2,112 feet, estimated at an average cost of $2,300 per mile on 
the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road, would produce a cost of $920.  
 At 3.48 miles, there is a hill 1,267.2 feet in length and 6.72 feet in height, that 
requires excavation. Using the procedures as above, the estimate of the volume is 
7,931.09 cubic yards. Applying the hard gravel rate of $0.25 per mile used on the 
Charleston & Cincinnati survey, this excavation would have cost $1,982.77. The railroad 
in the final mile of this section needs to cross three branches of White Oak Creek. The 
next mile of this division present several difficulties. The problem is clearly visible in the 
North Carolina-1/9 ArcSecond elevation data image. The construction of the roadbed of 
the North Carolina Railroad at White Oak Creek involved deep excavations into the hills 
between the branches of the creek (Figure 36). It is necessary to address construction on 
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both RW09 and RW10 because the physical landscape on both belongs to creek 
catchment.  
Beginning in RW09, the first excavation begins at 0.00 feet and ends at 1,056 
feet. At this point, the cut has descended to a depth of 5.54 feet from an elevation of 
343.58 feet to 338.04 feet. The volume of this excavation can be estimated from the 
profile to be 2,496.07 cubic yards, costing $374.41 at the loose gravel rate of $0.15. This 
figure is the result of treating the top of the cut as a level, and the descent of the cut as an 
angle. The first branch of White Oak Creek commences at the end of this cut. It takes 
422.4 feet of piles with a maximum length of 8 feet to cross this stream, costing $184. 
The next cut begins at a depth of 1 foot on the opposite side of the stream. It extends for a 
distance of 528 feet to the next branch, whereupon it is at a depth of 5.9 feet. However, 
the cut is 6.81 feet at the middle of its length, at 264 feet. Using the prismoidal formula, 
the estimate for the volume of this cut is 2,668.55 cubic yards, costing $400.28. A trestle, 
with an average height of 14 feet, extends 792 feet over the second branch, costing $900. 
Over this span, the railroad descends 5.8 feet from an elevation of 330.8 feet to 325 feet. 
The next 792 feet of the route pass over near-level ground. It requires grading at 12 
inches, and the resulting volume is 3,696 cubic yards, costing $554.4. The last stream in 
mile RW09 is situated at the base of a ravine that measures on the level line of 325 feet 
for a distance of 1,689.6 feet. The actual stream is insignificant, and flows at the base of 
the ravine 35 feet below at center. However, only 475.2 feet of the ravine are below an 
















Figure 36. This image illustrates the hillside hollow at the head of White Oak Creek. The 
deep excavations are clearly visible in the hills on either side of the creek. 
Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, North Carolina-1/9 











 The engineer of the 1830s would have preferred to keep the track at the 325-foot 
level across this ravine because on the opposite side deep excavations are required to 
maintain the rise of 39 feet per mile through RW10. The 475.2 feet need a bridge with 
stone abutments and piers. The bridge over the Northeast Cape Fear River on the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road was 360 feet long with two stone abutments, two stone 
piers that were 36 feet in height, divided into three spans (Wilmington Advertiser, 10 
November 1837). It follows that a bridge of 475 feet would have four spans, three stone 
piers, and two abutments. The Charleston & Cincinnati railroad survey provides 
estimates for the construction of bridges extending 600 feet over the French Broad River, 
and four bridges between Butt Mountain Gap to five miles beyond Asheville that were 
100 feet long. The cost of constructing the superstructure of a bridge that was 600 feet in 
length was $6,000. However, the masonry for the same cost $13,334. The total cost of the 
bridge over the Meherrin River on the Portsmouth & Roanoke was $14,500 in total 
(United States, 1838, 37, 40; Gwynn, 1833, 8). By taking 4.75 of cost of one of the bridge 
on French Broad, including the masonry, the estimate is $15,306. It is safe to assume for 
the purpose of this study that the high estimate for the bridge over the last branch is 
$16,000. The remaining 1,214 feet on sides of the bridge, being above the 300-foot level, 
are trestlework with a maximum height of 25 feet, costing $2,300. To this, $19,470.52 is 
added for rails and superstructure for the last five miles.  
 The mile RW10 is entirely excavation of an ascent of 39.25 feet over the distance 
of 5,016 feet. The relationship between the ground line and the grade allows for a rough 
estimate of the volume of the excavation. By drawing a perpendicular line from the rising 
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grade line at 2,745 feet to the highest point on the ground line, at an elevation of 374.11, 
the height of the perpendicular is 29.36 feet, or round to 30 feet since this is a round 
estimate. The grade line can be considered the base of a triangle, the perpendicular its 
height, and the ground line follows closely the hypotenuse in this particular case. The 
area of this triangle is 41,175 square feet. Since the proportion of the slopes of the cut is 
1.5:1, the width of the top of the cut is the sum of the width of the roadbed and the height 
of the cut multiplied by one and a half, 16 + (30 × 1.5) = 61 feet. The left and right slopes 
mirror each other, so one inverted forms the same width in the opposite direction. The 
area of the triangle is multiplied by the width to estimate the volume, 41,175 × 61 = 
2,511,675 cubic feet, or 93,025 cubic yards. In like fashion, another triangle fits the 
remainder of the grade, using the same perpendicular with a base of 2,271 feet. It 
terminates at the end of the excavation, and has a volume of 2,077,416 square feet, or 
76,941 cubic yards. The total estimated volume for RW10 is 169,966 cubic yards. At 
$0.15 per mile, the cost of the excavation would be $25,494.90. The rails and 
superstructure for RW10 would cost $3,894.10. Thus far, maintaining a grade appropriate 
for the light locomotives has been costly on the Raleigh division of the route. The total 
cost for the eleven miles is $162,704.70, or averaging at this point $14,791.33 per mile. 
 Mile RW11 requires 732.9 feet of grading at 24 inches, and 36 inches of grading 
for 944.1 feet. The total volume of grading would be 20,204.8 cubic yards over a distance 
of 1,677 feet. From here, the route encounters a ridge, presumably sediment washed 
down from higher elevation, which covers a distance of 1,795.2 feet and reaches a height 
of 12.77 feet. The center cuts are 3.26 feet, 5.34 feet, 9.02 feet, 10.24 feet, 12.77 feet, 
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3.34 feet, 5.75 feet, and 3.35 feet. Over a distance of 105.6 feet, the cut decreases to level 
from 3.35 feet. The distances between the measurements are 158.4 feet, 264 feet, 158.4 
feet, 158.4 feet, 580.8 feet, 105.6 feet, 264 feet, and 105.6 feet. The cross-sectional areas 
in square feet are 55.06, 106.85, 230.28, 278.63, 397.85, 56.81, 118.59, and 57.03. The 
volume is 318,698.10 cubic feet, or 11,803.63 cubic yards. The remaining 1,795.2 feet of 
the miles can be grade at six inches, amounting to 3,964.4 cubic yards of roadbed. 
Toward the end of the mile, the route enters Johnston County. The subtotals for this mile 
are 24,169.20 cubic yards of grading at $3,625.38, and 11,803.63 cubic yards of 
excavation at $1,770.54. Without rails and superstructure, the estimated cost of this mile 
is $5,395.92.   
 There is a relatively smooth descent in RW12 that extends for 4,647 feet from 
364.42 feet to 325.22 feet, a fall in elevation of 39.2 feet. It requires grading at an 
elevation of one foot over this distance. The volume amounts to 21,683.2 cubic yards. 
The soil appears by its proximity to several streams to be a mix of loam and clay. The 
cost of grading can be reduced to $0.10 per mile, as with the soil on the Waynesborough 
division. The cost of grading on this mile is $2,169.32. Towards the end of the mile, the 
road encounters the lowlands draining into Little Creek. Here, 633 feet of piles are 
needed to level the road at an elevation of 325 feet. The cost estimate for the piles is 
$289.  
 Two miles remain to the Raleigh division. Trestlework begins at the start of mile 
RW13 as it passes over a small stream. It ascends from 325 feet to 334 feet over a 
distance of 1,000 feet to avoid the same ascent at steeper angle on the opposite side of the 
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stream. The estimate for the trestlework is $1,515.20. The height of the trestlework is 
approximately 20 feet directly above the stream, but it diminishes in height in relation to 
the stream bank on its ascent. There is a mound, 369 feet wide and 5.67 feet in height, at 
the end of the trestlework. It has a rounded profile, and it is necessary to cut through it to 
continue trestlework over a second stream. The formula suggested in Chapter XIX for 
rounded hills, with modifications for 1.5:1 slopes, . 5   . 5 16
1.5  , appears appropriate for this feature The estimated volume of this excavation is 
40,158.30 cubic feet, or 1,487.34 cubic yards at a cost of $148.73. This is followed by 
633 feet of piles that cross the second stream and ascend 10 feet to an elevation of 344 
feet. The cost for piles is $275.74. There is a second mound at the end of the piles that is 
792 feet in length and 9.21 feet at its center. The estimated volume of the excavation is 
6,326.25 cubic yards, costing $623.63. For the remaining distance in this mile, grading at 
24 inches is needed for 1,267 feet followed by grading at 1,162 feet of grading at 12 
inches. The volume of the grading is 18,515 cubic yards, costing $1,851.50. The total 
cost of RW12 and RW13, without rails and superstructure, is $6,873.12.  
RW14 is the last mile of the Raleigh division and it terminates in the center of the 
modern town of Clayton in Johnston County. Since this is an urban landscape, one has to 
exercise care in distinguishing manmade structures, such as highway embankments, from 
the natural topographic features. The level line is set at 334 feet for the entire mile. After 
taking eleven measurements for cuts ranging from 0.1 to 13.89 feet, the volume can be 
determined using the average end areas formula, 20,202.83 cubic yards.  The cost of this 
final mile of excavation is $2,020.28. The estimated cost of miles RW11 through RW14 
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is $29,865.72 with rails and superstructure. The total estimate for the Raleigh division is 
$192,570.42, or $12,838.03 per mile. 
 The sequences of this division include RW00-04 – G(1584 cy) T(5280, 20, 18; 1108.8, 16; 897, 
15)  B($10,500) X(232421.8 cy)  M (4920.66 cy), RW05-06 – B($9000) G(2681.8 cy) X(3595.80 cy) M(35140.48 cy),  
RW07-08 – G(29260 cy) G(7607.6 cy) M (6545.17 cy) P (2112, 6.62, 10.26) P (2112, 8) X (7931.09 cy), RW09 – 
X(2496.07 cy) P (422..4, 8) X (2668.55 cy) T (792, 14) G (3696 cy) B ($16000) T (1241, 25), RW10 – X(169966 cy), 
RW11 – G(20205.8 cy) X(11803.63 cy) G(3964.4 cy), RW12 – G(21683.2 cy) X(147.34 cy) P(633, 10) X(6326.25 
cy)G(18515), RW14 – X(20202.83).  
 
The Neuse Division 
The Neuse Division (identified by the letter “N”) begins at the abutment of the bridge on 
the west side of the Neuse River. This is mile NR00, meaning the first mile at the Neuse 
built in the direction of Raleigh. For the Waynesborough Division, the total rise in 
elevation from the site of Waynesborough to the present day town of Selma, two miles 
east of the Neuse River, is approximately 88 feet. After crossing the Neuse River, the line 
of the railroad ascends 36.77 feet in the next mile followed by a climb of 45.14 in the 
following mile. The topography does not present a smooth incline; it is an undulating 
landscape of hills requiring excavations. For example, in NR00 the ascent does not begin 
at the elevation of river but at the bridge abutment. The maximum elevation within this 
mile is 179.20 feet above sea level. The abutment of the bridge is at 150 feet above sea 
level, and 30 feet above the bed of the Neuse. Trestlework of 528 feet in length must be 
built from the abutment to the bridge, at $1,000 The hill at the end of the trestlework is 
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rounded nearly symmetrically (Figure 37). Applying the formula . 5 . 5  gives the 
area of the cross-section of hill from the 150-foot level, 0.5 0.5 580 8.5  
3,945.78 square feet. The area under the grade line, a right triangle, is subtracted from the 
profile from level line, 3,945.78 – 1,026.60 = 2,919.18 square feet. Following the grade 
line to the center of the hill, the measure to the top of the hill is 6.88 feet, and is the 
maximum depth of the cut. To get a rough estimate of the excavation, the area of the 
resulting cross-section is multiplied by the width of the cut, including sides, 16 + (1.5 × 
6.88) = 26.32 feet. The resulting volume is 2,845.66 cubic yards. Since this cut is located 
at a bend in the river and gravel pits are located in this area, the estimate will use the per 
cubic yard rate of $ 0.25 for hard gravel (United States, 1838, 39). The estimate for this 
excavation is $711.42. 
After excavating through the first hill in mile NR00, a small stream needs to be 
crossed with 792 feet of piles with a maximum height of 11 feet, costing $345. The next 
excavation begins at the end of the piles at an elevation of 158.38 feet.  The cut depths to 
the grade line measured from the start of the mile are 7.95 feet at 2,587.2 feet, 3.85 feet at 
2,649 feet, 8.97 feet at 3,009.6 feet, and 0.00 feet at 3,590 feet from the ground line. 
Applying the regular cross-section formula, the volume of this excavation is 6,409.64 
cubic yards. The cost at $0.25 per cubic yard is $1,602.51. This mile also contains 1,300 
feet of grading at 25 inches, totaling 14,106 cubic yard. The cost at $0.15 per cubic yard 
is $2,115.90. The route of the railroad ascends 45.57 feet over a mile, from 179.20 feet to 
224.77 feet, in NR01. The grade line closely follows the ground; grading at 12 inches 
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This will yield the addition or removal, in places, of 24,640 cubic yards of earth. The 
route has diverged from the Neuse depositions of gravelly sediments so the estimate per 
cubic yard can be reduced to $0.10. Grading of the whole mile would amount to $2,464. 
There is a rise of 19.41 feet, from 224.09 to 243.50, in mile NR02. However, there is as 
sudden rise 1,584 feet into the mile NR03. This appears to be the Wilson Mills Scarp 
(Daniels, Gamble, Wheeler, and Holzhey, 1972, 11). By applying pile construction on an 
incline from 224.09 to 232.30 feet in elevation for a distance of approximately 2,059 feet, 
the scarp can be traversed economically for $897. The maximum height of the piles is 
approximately 12 feet. The remaining 3,221 feet in the mile can be graded at 36 inches. 
This would yield a total of 54,757 cubic yards of earth moved at a cost of $5,475.70.  
 Beginning 316 feet into mile NR03, the grade line must ascend 5.00 feet from 
243.50 feet to 250 feet in elevation over a distance of 1,109 feet. This distance can be 
crossed with piles at a maximum height of 12 feet. Within this mile, the railroad crosses 
two first order streams that ultimately drain into Poplar Creek. Piles at a maximum height 
of 12 feet extending 845 feet in length can be used for the first stream, and 1,605 feet of 
piles at a height of 14 feet will cross the second stream. At a distance of 4,987 feet into 
this mile, 293 feet of piles measuring 4.00 feet in height are necessary to maintain an 
elevation of the grade at 250 feet.  In total, 3,852 feet of piles at an average cost of $2,300 
per mile totals $1,677.45. The remaining 1,428 feet in the mile require grading at 16 
inches to maintain the grade, the volume of which is 9,202.66 cubic yards. The proximity 
of a gravel pit within this mile suggests that the rate of $0.15 per cubic yards is 
appropriate. The estimate for grading in this mile is $1,380.40.  
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 The grade in mile NR04 is influenced by the ascent that occurs in NR05.  A steep 
incline in RW05 rises from 256 feet to 296 feet in 0.8 miles. To extend this rise to a full 
mile would be better. The grade reaches the elevation of 250 feet in NR03. It will be 
necessary to ascend 5.00 feet half way into NR04 to be at level when beginning the 
ascent in NR05. The Carolina Bay in NR04 can be traversed with 2,429 feet of piles with 
a height of 10 feet. The piles follow a grade that ascends 6 feet. The estimated cost of the 
piles is $1,058 (Figure 38). At this point a hill appears that has a maximum height of 11 
feet above the grade line and extends a distance of 1,795.2 feet in NR04. Applying the 
regular cross-section formula for cuts in feet at 8.39, 10.73, 8.48, 9.96, 6.52, and 6.79, the 
volume of this excavation is 8,850.5 cubic yards. The cost at $0.10 per cubic yard 
amounts to $885.05. The proximity of the Carolina Bay suggests that this structure is 
sand and loam, is therefore less expensive to excavate. The last 1,050 feet of this mile are 
relatively level with the grade line, and they can be graded at 6.00 inches. This would 
amount to 2,330 cubic yards moved at a cost of $233.  
The grade line in mile NR05 rises 40 feet over a mile, or a rise of approximately 
8.00 feet every 0.2 miles. The median difference between the ground line and the grade 
line over the entire mile is 5.00 feet. By applying the formula for regular cross-section, 
    , the volume of the excavation can be calculated at 22,977.9 cubic yards. 
The cost of this excavation would amount to $2,297.79. Mile NR06 is relatively level for 
2,745 feet; thereafter, the grade ascends 18 feet, with an intervening descent of 16 feet. 
Trestlework, extending 2,534 feet with a maximum height of 25 feet, is needed to 










Figure 38. This image illustrates the elevation data for the area that includes NR02 
through NR04. The grade must traverse three first order streams in NR03, and 
a Carolina Bay in NR04.      
Source: USGS. (2008). “1/3 ArcSecond NED CONUS, North Carolina-1/9 












The cost, based upon the high estimate of $10,000 per mile for such work on the 
Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road, would be $4,800. The first 2,745 feet of this mile 
must be graded to a height of 12 inches. This would entail the moving of 1,268.8 cubic 
yards of earth, at a cost of $126.88. The trestlework continues into NR07, rising from 313 
feet in elevation to 319 feet over a distance of 2,851.2 feet. However, the maximum 
height of this trestlework is 14 feet. The estimated cost is $4,831.82. At the end of the 
trestlework, the ground line remains level at elevation of 319 feet for a distance of 528 
feet. Grading at 9.00 inches is sufficient to prepare the ground for the superstructure of 
the road. The volume of earth moved during the grading is 1,798.5 cubic yards, costing 
$179.85. Trestlework resumes 3,379 feet into mile NR07. The maximum height of the 
trestlework in the remainder of the mile, 1,900 feet, appears to be no more than 10 feet; 
however, the grade line must ascend to an elevation of 313 feet at a distance of 2,006 feet 
into NR08. This means that the trestlework will ascend 5.35 feet by the end of mile 
NR07. As a result, the maximum height of the trestlework at the end of this mile is 
approximately 16 feet. The cost of this section of trestlework is $3,598.48. 
 Two full miles remain in this division, NR08 and NR09. The route of the railroad 
is now entering Piedmont terrain. In both miles, there are ridges approximately 340 feet 
in elevation, and declivities that are as deep as 20 feet, but average around 12 feet. As 
with other parts of the road, the preferred method for initial construction is trestlework 
and piles. Thereafter, these works can be filled in with embankments for the “permanent 
way.” Mile NR08 begins with 2,006 feet of trestlework with a maximum height of 12 
feet, at a cost of $3,799.24. It is followed by 580 feet of grading at 24 inches on the first 
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ridge of this mile. The volume of grading is 6,002 cubic yards, costing $600.20. Piles, 
extending 739.2 feet from the first ridge to the second ridge, ascend 8.00 feet from 300 
feet in elevation to 338 feet. The maximum height of the piles is approximately 14 feet, at 
a cost of $332. The second ridge requires grading at 12 inches for a distance of 897.6 
feet. The volume of grading is 4,188.8 cubic yards, costing $418.88. The last 1,425.6 feet 
of NR08 contains piles with a maximum height of 14 feet, at an expense of $621. 
 Mile NR09 enters modern-day Clayton at approximately 2,798.4 feet into its 
extent. This length can be traversed with piles set on a level grade line of 338 feet. The 
maximum height of the piles is 22 feet; however, most range between 10 and 18 feet in 
height. The piles would cost $1,219. The next 475.2 feet require grading at 36 inches. 
The volume of the grading amounts to 8,078.4 cubic yards at a cost of $807.84. The last 
portion of this mile should contain 1,476 feet of piles with a maximum height of 11 feet, 
and 530.43 feet of grading at 36 inches. The expense of the piles amounts to $642.94. 
The grading, amounting to 9,017.31 cubic yards of earth moved, would cost $901.73. 
 In mile NR09 + 1,445 feet, the Neuse Division and the Raleigh Division join. The 
grade over this length is a gentle descent from 338 feet to 334 feet. Grading to receive the 
superstructure at 9 inches is all that is required for this section of the road. The volume of 
the grading is 4,922 cubic yards, at a cost of $492.20. 
 The sequence for the Neuse Division is NR00 – T(528, 30) X(2845.66 cy) P(792, 11) X 
(6409.64 cy) G (14106), NR01-02 – G(24640, 12 cy) P(2059, 12) G(54757 cy) , NR03 – P(3852, 12, 12, 14, 4) G 
(9202.66 cy), NR04 – P(2429, 10) X(8850.5 cy) G(2330 cy), NR05 – X(22977.9 cy), NR06 – T(2534, 25) 
G(1268.8 cy), NR07 – T(2851.2, 14) G(1798.5 cy) T(1900, 16), NR08 – T(2006, 12) G(6002 cy) P(739.2, 14) 
286 
 
G(4188.8 cy) P(1425.6, 14), NR09 – P(2798.4, 10, 18, 22) G(8078.4 cy) P(1476, 11) G(9017.31 cy), NR09+1,445 
feet – G(4922 cy). The total cost of this division of the road is $45,504.58, excluded rail and 
superstructure, or approximately $5,000 per mile. With rails and superstructure, this 
division would cost $82,771.11. The topography of the Neuse Division was suitable for 
the use of piles and trestlework. This reduced the need for heavy excavation and the 
building of embankments 
 
The Estimate 
 The cost of building the railroad, including rails and superstructure is estimated at 
$178,817.70 for the Waynesborough Division, $192,570.42 for the Raleigh Division, and 
$82,771.11 for the Neuse Division. In all, the total is $452,099.23, or approximately 
$10,000 per mile. The sequences for the individual division illustrate three distinct 
construction practices. The Waynesborough Division traverses the flood plains and 
terraces of the Coastal Plain. The banks of rivers are low, so the bridges do not require 
towering piers. Many streams can be bridged with trestlework. Piles and grading are the 
most common practices, and the line of the railroad is straight. Ascents and descents in 
arcs are typical of the Raleigh Division. Heavy excavation and embankments are required 
to keep a smooth grade, and the bridging of minor streams often involves building high 
bridges at great expense. The sequences reflect the topography of the Piedmont. The 
Neuse Division represents the transition between the Coastal Plain and the Piedmont. A 
few heavy excavations are required amid rolling hills; however, the climb in elevation is 
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gradual. Piles and trestlework are adequate substitutes for embankments because the line 
of the railroad is straight, and the inclines over a mile are small. 
 This estimate is based on a maximum grade of 50 feet per mile, and even through 
it follows the route of the North Carolina Railroad, it resembles it only slightly. The 
grade of this railroad is more difficult that the counterfactual model. The accuracy of the 
model is limited. Linear measurements within a mile can be off by ± 52.8 feet, or 0.01 
miles. Depth measurements are more accurate; usually to the nearest foot. The per cubic 
yard rate for excavation are judgments based an interpretation of topographic quadrangle 
maps, and tend to err towards a great expense than might have been incurred.  
 Based upon early subscriptions taken for the Wilmington & Raleigh in 1833 that 
amounted to $520,000, from Wake, Johnston, Chatham, Sampson, Duplin, Brunswick, 
and New Hanover, it seems within reason that the subscriptions for this railroad could 
have been solicited within the state (Raleigh Register, 3 September 1833, 17 September 
1833). For the purposes of this study, it is safe to say that the topography does not present 
any problems that the prevailing locomotive and rail construction could not overcome. 
The construction of a railroad between the Coastal Plain and Piedmont on North Carolina 
was a realistic project, had it been undertaken in the 1830s. In fact, most of the 
counterfactual railroad has the advantages of passing through the Coastal Plain for most 
of its extent. Further, its total cost and per mile cost is less than the Raleigh & Gaston 
Rail Road, though greater than that of the Wilmington & Raleigh. 
 The counterfactual model of a railroad from Waynesborough to Raleigh could 
have been built during the 1830s had the financial interests in Raleigh and Wilmington 
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maintained their commitment to connect the two towns. From a technical standpoint, the 
project was practical within the limits of the technology, and sections of the route 
resembled railroads that had been completed before 1840. In terms of the cost of 
construction, the model falls below the cost of the Raleigh & Gaston. It has the unique 
advantage of practically fulfilling the long anticipated Central Rail Road by forming its 
stem. As to its potential to turn a profit and enhance the economy of the middle Piedmont 
at that earlier date remains the question. One can only estimate these “what if” situations 
based upon the economic impact the actual railroads had upon the economies of the 
counties through which they passed up to the year 1860. Census data is the most reliable 
source to draw such conclusions. The annual reports of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail 
Road (later the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad) should reflect the change in 
transportation patterns and revenue after the connection to the Piedmont was established 
in the 1850s. The historical record either supports the model of the counterfactual 
network, or renders evidence that it would have been productive, regardless of the 
practicality of its construction. 
 
Pattern of Transportation 
 The “General Return of Receipts and Expenditures of the Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road Company from first May to first November, 1840” appears in the company’s 
annual report to the Board of Internal Improvements for that year. This sheet of 
tabulations breaks down the month-to-month activities of the company in the half-year 
after its completion. Fortunately, it includes freight volumes and a breakdown of 
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passenger the line (Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, 1840). This is the first 
document that illustrates the pattern of transportation with the railroad function without 
interruptions due to construction. Passengers and freight could pass freely along its whole 
extent. The pattern becomes obvious when this data is graphed. 
 The volume of “way” passengers, those travelling from one station to another on 
the line, fluctuated by a few hundred during the six-month period. However, the volume 
of “through” passenger, travelers using the railroad to pass from one end of the line to the 
other, displays a distinct pattern over the same period. In essence, “through” passengers 
were using the Wilmington & Raleigh as a conduit for destination to the north and south. 
During the summer months, the volume of traffic trended toward northern destinations. 
The pattern reversed in the fall. Overall, the number of “through” passenger far exceeded 
those making trips along the line (Figure 39). The Wilmington & Raleigh functioned as 
the rail corridor through North Carolina. Its steamship line completed the connection to 
South Carolina (Figure 40). The receipts from freight remained nearly flat during this 
period, which the volume of freight fluctuated by approximate 20,000 tons in both the 
positive and negative direction (Figure 41, Figure 42). In 1841, there were 9,742 
“through” passengers and 5,498 “way” passengers. Unfortunately, the passenger statistics 
for 1842 were lost in the “Great Fire” of 30 April 1843. The statistics that have survived 
for the years 1843 through 1849 show an increase in “way” travel that climbs to more 
than twice the traffic to the adjoining states. From 1847 through 1860, “way” passenger 
increased far ahead of “through” passenger travel. By examining the mouth-to-month 
passenger volumes for the year 1854-55 and 1859-60, it becomes clear that the yearly 
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patterns of both “way” and “through” travel retain seasonal oscillations. However, the 
differences between north and south travel through the years was less pronounced by 
1860, and the volume of “way” travel had increased  (North Carolina, 1848, 18; Figure 
43; Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road Company, 1855, 20, 26; Wilmington & Weldon 
Rail Road Company, 1860, 45-46; Figure 44; Figure 45; Figure 46).  
Overall, the growth in “way” travel along the line of the Wilmington & Raleigh 
(Weldon) Rail Road suggests economic development within the counties in the corridor. 
The growth of “through” traffic increased between 1854 and 1857. In 1854, the 
Wilmington & Manchester Railroad replaced the steamboat line of the Wilmington & 
Raleigh, thus facilitating travel to the South. Still, “through” passenger statistics represent 
the normal flow of communications between North and South, and the volumes had been 
constant over the railroad’s twenty-year history. The former emphasis placed upon 
interstate travel in the early plans proves to be less significant when viewing the statistics 
for latter regional travel. While the revenue from “way” travel is less, its volume reflects 
regional economic growth. The North Carolina Railroad was completed within ten miles 
of Raleigh by September 1854, and was expected to be in operation by November 
(Wilmington Journal, 18 September 1854). Little mention of it was made in the 1855 
annual report of the Wilmington & Weldon, but by the next year, the company witnessed 
an increase in freight receipts of $42,000 before transportation on the North Carolina 
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The North Carolina Rail Road has, as was anticipated by its projectors, been 
productive of a large increase of business to this Road.  The receipts from freight 
alone from that Road, during the last fiscal year, have been more than $42,000, 
tho’ the business has not yet assumed a form of order and regularity.  The citizens 
of Wilmington foresaw, at an early day, that this great work must be the means of 
bringing to their town the bulk of the produce of Western North Carolina.—
Liberal aid was therefore extended to the work, for which they may now, if they 
will, reap a plentiful harvest. With 43 miles of Rail Road distance in their favor, it 
is impossible for any market town beyond the limits of the State to compete with 
them successfully for this trade. This Road is, however, open to all.  Free trade is 
the policy of its messengers.  Those who prefer going to Portsmouth or Petersburg 
can do so by this Road, via Goldsboro’ and Weldon, upon the same terms they 
can come here.  That is, the cost for transportation to Weldon is the same as it is 
to Wilmington. Arrangements were made in May last, with the North Carolina 
Rail Road Company, to run freight trains through from Charlotte to Wilmington, 
so that we can now guarantee the most prompt delivery of freight in the West or 
East. A similar arrangement will soon be perfected with the same Company and 
the Sea Board and Roanoke Company, by which freight from Portsmouth can 
reach points West of Raleigh as soon and as cheap as by any other route. 
 
– (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road Company, 1856, 13-14) – 
 
 
The advantage of the 43 miles, the direct distance between Raleigh and Goldsboro, gave 
the farmers of the middle Piedmont more market options than sending their produce to 
Petersburg. This had always been the case on the Wilmington & Raleigh; farmers had the 
choice of Petersburg, Portsmouth, or Wilmington. Goldsboro, having become a receiving 
point for cotton, received 6,104 bales in 1860, and all but one bale of that was delivered 
to Wilmington. The other stations along the line of the Wilmington & Weldon received 
far less (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road Company, 1860, 39). This fact supports the 
statement that the connection to the North Carolina Railroad would place Wilmington 
ahead of the out-of-state competition.  
 The decline of freight and passenger travel on the Wilmington & Weldon Rail 
Road in 1858 can be attributed to the Panic of 1857, and the directors acknowledge this 
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in their 1858 report to the stockholders (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road Company, 
1860, 3-4). The national recession that followed the Panic of 1857 lasted from one to one 
and half years in most of the eastern commercial centers, and its impact was felt in rural 
communities. In the interior, westward expansion was disrupted as railroads failed and 
their bonds fell in value. The initial cause can be traced to the failure of railroads in the 
western lands, mortgage defaults of the same lands that followed a period of land 
speculation, declining commodity prices, and a lack of liquidity in the eastern banks, 
because of the declining value of mortgages and railroad bonds that could be unloaded 
(Calomiris and Schweikart, 1991, 808-815). The contemporary reader is familiar with 
this type of financial derangement. It differs from the Panic of 1837 in that it was not 
driven by the ideology of decentralization of capital, or the power struggle between 
Jackson and Biddle, and their supporters. Speculation was the root cause of this economic 
downturn, and its evolution was propelled by a few notable unforeseen events. While the 
Panic of 1857 belongs to the continuation of this work, that merchants, banks, and 
railroad in the South were more effective in coordinating their response to the recession 
than other regions is worth noting (Calomiris and Schweikart, 1991, 831-832).  
 The freight receipts for the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road/Wilmington & 
Weldon Rail Road steadily increased from 1847 to 1860, with plateaus between 1852-53 
and 1857-58 (Figure 47). Between 1854 and 1860, traditional products of the Coastal 
Plain Region such as naval store went into decline as cotton continued its rise. Wheat and 
flour production spiked during 1857-58, but declining demand for grain forced down 
prices at the end of the Crimean War. However, the market for cotton increased 
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(Calomiris and Schweikart, 1991, 813, 815-816; Figure 48). By 1860, the total receipts of 
the company from all sources were $500,209.56, the greatest amount to date (Wilmington 
& Weldon Rail Road Company, 1860, 33). The relaying of the Wilmington & Raleigh’s 
rails in the early 1850s had contributed to the company’s efficiency, but connection with 
the North Carolina Railroad had enhanced its service. 
 
Patterns of Economic Development 
 Between 1815 and 1833, land value had declined significantly. The counties that 
experienced the greatest loss in land values, with the exception of Randolph and Rowan 
counties, were east of the fall line (Coon, 1908, 622-623; Table 14). An examination of 
the cash value of farms, from The Seventh Census of the United States for the same set of 
counties shows a substantial increase in the value of agricultural land in 1850 relative to 
general land values in 1833. The routes of the early railroads passed through several that 
had shown increases in farm value (United States, 1853a, 318-319; Table 15). By 1860, 
the cash value of farms in the 32 counties that had the greatest decrease in land values in 
1833 increased from their 1850 cash values significantly (United States, 1864, 104, 108). 
Most increased by double, and some by three times. The median increase across the 
whole group was 90.87 percent. By this time, several railroads had been built in these 
counties, or were under construction. These included the North Carolina Railroad that 
passed through Carteret, Craven, Lenoir, Wayne, and Johnston counties in the east; and 
in the Piedmont, Rowan County, one of the two counties to the west on the original list. 
The Wilmington & Manchester Railroad passed through Brunswick County, and the 
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County  Land Value in 1815  Land Value in 1833 Decrease Percentage of Decrease 
Hyde 813,287 238,615 574,672 71% 
Craven 1,787,931 691,646 1,096,285 61% 
Lenoir 724,996 333,491 391,505 54% 
Washington 437,512 227,072 210,440 48% 
Brunswick 516,189 289,277 226,912 44% 
Jones 711,020 399,702 311,318 44% 
Rowan 2,176,720 1,389,009 787,711 36% 
Camden 412,618 272,539 140,079 34% 
Wayne 1,144,620 770,431 374,189 33% 
Currituck 343,473 232,185 111,288 32% 
Sampson 769,301 528,104 241,197 31% 
Pitt 1,399,719 961,499 438,220 31% 
Onslow 605,153 416,192 188,961 31% 
Greene 549,244 382,964 166,280 30% 
Carteret 385,131 276,016 109,115 28% 
Cumberland 1,293,805 942,721 351,084 27% 
Hertford 830,081 606,206 223,875 27% 
Bertie 1,350,096 995,809 354,287 26% 
Nash 703,034 518,871 184,163 26% 
Tyrrell 332,014 247,141 84,873 26% 
Beaufort 810,819 605,040 205,779 25% 
Johnston 846,865 632,947 213,918 25% 
Duplin 729,097 550,812 178,285 24% 
Halifax 2,061,540 1,569,893 491,647 24% 
Chowan 645,360 497,921 147,439 23% 
New Hanover 1,293,399 998,902 294,497 23% 
Granville 1,161,446 901,545 259,901 22% 
Franklin 916,713 716,220 200,493 22% 
Bladen 554,276 435,645 118,631 21% 
Perquimans 563,021 445,351 117,670 21% 
Edgecombe 1,926,572 1,524,986 401,586 21% 
Randolph 891,207 712,392 178,815 20% 
 
Table 14. The greatest loss in land values in North Carolina between 1815 and 1833 
occurred, with the exception of Randolph and Rowan counties (in blue), in the 
counties east of the fall line.  
Data Source: Coon, Charles L. (1908). The Beginnings of Public Education in 







County Land Value in 1833 Farm Value in 1850 Increase Percentage Increase 
Hyde 238,615 1,141,635 903,020 378.44% 
Camden 272,539 981,280 708,741 260.05% 
Lenoir 333,491 1,191,461 857,970 257.27% 
Sampson 528,104 1,804,729 1,276,625 241.74% 
Currituck 232,185 736,357 504,172 217.14% 
Duplin 550,812 1,407,443 856,631 155.52% 
Perquimans 445,351 1,032,968 587,617 131.94% 
Wayne 770,431 1,613,294 842,863 109.40% 
Bladen 435,645 882,413 446,768 102.55% 
Greene 382,964 767,803 384,839 100.49% 
Brunswick 289,277 521,059 231,782 80.12% 
Washington 227,072 367,882 140,810 62.01% 
Johnston 632,947 1,025,006 392,059 61.94% 
Chowan 497,921 794,615 296,694 59.59% 
Granville 901,545 1,406,027 504,482 55.96% 
Randolph 712,392 1,031,503 319,111 44.79% 
Cumberland 942,721 1,295,053 352,332 37.37% 
Edgecombe 1,524,986 2,030,223 505,237 33.13% 
Tyrrell 247,141 319,493 72,352 29.28% 
Onslow 416,192 536,676 120,484 28.95% 
Bertie 995,809 1,209,847 214,038 21.49% 
Nash 518,871 629,556 110,685 21.33% 
Jones 399,702 467,271 67,569 16.90% 
Franklin 716,220 832,196 115,976 16.19% 
Pitt 961,499 1,115,174 153,675 15.98% 
Craven 691,646 778,301 86,655 12.53% 
Hertford 606,206 616,879 10,673 1.76% 
New Hanover 998,902 1,002,957 4,055 0.41% 
Beaufort 605,040 605,014 (26) 0.00% 
Halifax 1,569,893 1,546,642 (23,251) -1.48% 
Rowan 1,389,009 1,071,546 (317,463) -22.86% 
Carteret 276,016 151,900 (124,116) -44.97% 
 
Table 15. By 1850, many of the same North Carolina counties that had experienced a 
decline in land values between 1815 and 1833 showed a higher cash value for 
farms than previous land values. Of these counties, those through which the 
early railroads passed, with the exception of New Hanover and Halifax, 
showed high farm values relative to earlier land values (in bold). Beaufort, 
Brunswick, Carteret, Craven, Onslow, and New Hanover are coastal counties. 
Randolph and Rowan are Piedmont counties (in blue). 
Data Sources: Coon, Charles L. (1908). The Beginnings of Public Education 
in North Carolina, Raleigh: Edwards & Broughton Printing Company, 622-
623; United States. (1853a). The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850. 
Washington: Robert Armstrong, 318-319.   
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The Wilmington & Weldon Railroad had built a branch line to Tarboro in Edgecombe 
County (Table 16). Now, nearly all these countries were within a reasonable distance of a 
railroad, or could access one by river. The significance of the east to west corridor, the 
North Carolina Raleigh, is fully demonstrated by the increased farm values. That it was 
the agency of economic development in the Piedmont is well known. However, in the 
east it brought the Wilmington & Raleigh (Weldon) and the Raleigh & Gaston into a 
network.  
 The increased volume of cotton transported on the Wilmington & Raleigh 
(Weldon) Rail Road during the 1850s was documented in the company’s annual reports 
(Figure 48). Agricultural data from the Census of the United States for 1840, 1850, and 
1850 illustrate the changing proportions of cultivation of this crop in the counties on the 
route of the Raleigh & Gaston, the Wilmington & Raleigh (Weldon), and the neighboring 
county of Wake (Table 17). The two railroads share Johnston County as a neighbor. 
Wake, Franklin, Granville, and Warren counties, and the neighboring counties of Wake, 
Chatham and Orange counties, were within the service area of the Raleigh & Gaston Rail 
Road. New Hanover, Duplin, Edgecombe, Nash, and Halifax counties are on the route of 
the Wilmington & Raleigh (Weldon) Rail Road.  
Cotton is not the type of crop that a farmer would cultivate in great quantities if 
there were not a specialized market for it. In 1840, Wake County produced 2,391,996 
pounds of cotton, 14 percent of the output of the counties having access to railroads for 
the same crop; whereas the counties along the route of the Raleigh & Gaston and the 





County Farm Value in 1850 Farm Value in 1860 Increase Percentage 
Franklin 832,196 2,453,250 1,621,054 194.79% 
Nash 629,556 1,736,608 1,107,052 175.85% 
Pitt 1,115,174 3,052,010 1,936,836 173.68% 
Rowan 1,071,546 2,924,631 1,853,085 172.94% 
Carteret 151,900 411,945 260,045 171.19% 
Bladen 882,413 2,244,488 1,362,075 154.36% 
Onslow 536,676 1,337,923 801,247 149.30% 
Granville 1,406,027 3,457,365 2,051,338 145.90% 
Edgecombe 2,030,223 4,974,920 2,944,697 145.04% 
Halifax 1,546,642 3,699,426 2,152,784 139.19% 
Duplin 1,407,443 3,131,621 1,724,178 122.50% 
Greene 767,803 1,658,998 891,195 116.07% 
Hertford 616,879 1,321,818 704,939 114.28% 
Jones 467,271 963,266 495,995 106.15% 
Lenoir 1,191,461 2,432,030 1,240,569 104.12% 
Washington 367,882 704,919 337,037 91.62% 
Camden 981,280 1,865,734 884,454 90.13% 
Beaufort 605,014 1,130,020 525,006 86.78% 
Wayne 1,613,294 3,012,511 1,399,217 86.73% 
Craven 778,301 1,376,387 598,086 76.85% 
Randolph 1,031,503 1,791,483 759,980 73.68% 
Sampson 1,804,729 3,110,749 1,306,020 72.37% 
Johnston 1,025,006 1,750,771 725,765 70.81% 
Bertie 1,209,847 2,061,153 851,306 70.36% 
Currituck 736,357 1,175,495 439,138 59.64% 
Hyde 1,141,635 1,700,075 558,440 48.92% 
Perquimans 1,032,968 1,537,770 504,802 48.87% 
Brunswick 521,059 755,766 234,707 45.04% 
Tyrrell 319,493 455,845 136,352 42.68% 
New Hanover 1,002,957 1,381,687 378,730 37.76% 
Chowan 794,615 989,606 194,991 24.54% 
Cumberland 1,295,053 1,536,839 241,786 18.67% 
 
Table 16. This table illustrates the increase in the cash value of farms from 1850 to 1860 
in the same counties that had the worse decline in land values between 1815 
and 1833. All the counties in bold type have railroads running through them, 
including Rowan Counties in the Piedmont (in bold blue).  
Data Source: United States. (1853a). The Seventh Census of the United States: 
1850. Washington: Robert Armstrong, 318-319; United States. (1964). 
Agriculture of the United States in 1860. Washington, DC: Government 








County Cotton, 1840 Cotton, 1850 Cotton, 1860 
 Chatham            399,728           276,000           320,000  
 Duplin        1,346,229           184,400           468,400  
 Edgecombe        2,445,000       1,238,800       7,655,200  
 Franklin            538,320           352,000       1,069,200  
 Granville            479,499             30,400             51,200  
 Halifax        2,905,573           696,000       4,172,800  
 Johnston            401,169           301,200       1,156,800  
 Nash        5,210,724           138,000       1,102,400  
 New Hanover              50,728               1,200             52,000  
 Orange            253,437           922,000           339,200  
 Wake        2,391,996           823,600       2,444,800  
 Warren            380,954             66,000             62,800  
 Wayne            402,175           134,000       1,624,800  
 
Table 17. This table shows the volume of cotton cultivated, in pounds, from the United 
State Census for the counties on the Raleigh & Gaston, and the neighboring 
counties around Wake County; and the counties through which the 
Wilmington & Raleigh (Weldon) Rail Road are included. 
Data Sources: United States. (1841d). Compendium of the Sixth Census. 
Washington, DC: Thomas Allen, 180; United States. (1853a). The Seventh 
Census of the United States: 1850. Washington: Robert Armstrong, 318-319; 
United States. (1864). Agriculture of the United States in 1860. Washington, 



































































































Petersburg, Virginia was a center for cotton processing, and the only market within a 
reasonable distance for this product. Though these figures were recorded in 1840 census 
after the Raleigh & Gaston was completed, this might explain both the appeal of the 
Raleigh to Gaston route and the resistance put up by interests in Raleigh and Petersburg 
when it was learned that the officers of the Wilmington & Raleigh had changed the route.  
By 1850, almost all of the counties were producing less cotton than they had in 
1840. Orange County was the exception, producing 253,437 pounding in 1840, 
increasing to 922,000 pounds in 1850. Wake County decreased cotton cultivation to 
823,600 pounds (Table 17). The proportions of cultivation within this set of counties 
show increased percentages for the low volume counties such as Chatham, Franklin, and 
Johnston; and decreased percentages for the high volume counties such as Edgecombe, 
Halifax, and Wake (Figure 50). The spatial distribution of this commodity is less 
concentrated at nodes, and concentrations of volumes are developing on the periphery. 
Edgecombe, Halifax, and Wake counties emerge as the leaders in cotton cultivation in 
1860. However, Wake County had not increased much above the 1840 volume; Halifax 
had increased cultivation by over a million pounds, and Edgecombe was over five million 
pounds. The percentages show the high proportion of production in Halifax and 
Edgecombe (Figure 51). Wayne County has more than tripled its volume since 1840, and 
Johnston County production has doubled. Johnston County decreased volume by 
approximately 100,000 pound in 1850, but increased it to 1,156,800 pounds in 1860. As 
mentioned earlier, Goldsboro had received 6,104 bales, or 2,441,600 pounds, of cotton in 
1860. The counterfactual model of an early railroad connecting Waynesborough to 
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Raleigh through Johnston County could have been productive. On the weight of the data 
presented on just one commodity, cotton, the large volumes cultivated in Johnston and 
Wake in 1840 could have passed half the distance to Waynesborough. From there, the 
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 The counterfactual model of a railroad between Raleigh and Waynesborough 
presented in this research supports the economic stream piracy hypothesis. That the 
investors in Raleigh and the Piedmont who supported the original route of the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road could have gone with the original plan to connect these 
places after learning that the commissions of that company wanted to change the route is 
a possibility. That Walter Gwynn, chief engineer of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail 
Road, would survey the route for a Raleigh branch line commencing at Waynesborough 
on completion of that railroad’s main trunk, and latter oversee its construction as part of 
the North Carolina Railroad, reinforces the decision to select the existing the model. 
While adjusting the grade along this route to accommodate the railroad technology of the 
1830s, a maximum grade of 50 feet per mile for 8.5-ton locomotives pulling maximum 
loads of 100-ton, entailing extensive excavation, embankment, and bridging within a 
short distance of Raleigh, the task did not exceed the technological limitations of the 
period. Further, a greater portion of the route could be undertaken using the same 
techniques proven effective on the Charleston & Hamburg Rail Road.  
 From an economic standpoint, the counterfactual model shows, even though its 
estimated costs are based upon a small body of period surveys and treatises, that building 
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a railroad between Waynesborough and Raleigh would have cost at least half that of the 
Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road. Even if it had cost $12,000 per mile, it would have 
achieved the same ends, connecting to Petersburg, providing that the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road connected to Weldon; and adding the advantage of also connecting to 
Wilmington and Norfolk. Given such opportunities for success, why was the Raleigh & 
Gaston construction chosen instead? 
 There are several interrelated explanations for the building of the Raleigh & 
Gaston, all associated with the change of route of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. 
The historical record evidence is sparse and contradictory. James Sprunt records long 
after the fact, and without references, that the commissioner of the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road changed the route because the people of Raleigh did not support it. 
However, period newspaper accounts of early efforts to secure subscriptions for the 
railroad in 1833 show that there was support in Raleigh and the other places in the 
Piedmont. The letters by writers “Roanoke” and “Petersburg” in the Wilmington 
Chronicle years latter testify to active resistance put forth by interests in Raleigh and 
Petersburg upon learning that the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road would go to Weldon. 
To understand why investors in the Piedmont would not support the building of a railroad 
between Wilmington and Raleigh that would enhance their commerce is difficult. Unless 
they labored under the illusion that investors in the east would undertake the project 
anyway, or they anticipated greater profits from connections elsewhere, the notion that 




A scenario that seems more plausible, but difficult to verify, is that the investors 
at Wilmington and their associates in the eastern counties perceived an obvious 
opportunity. Their railroad could join with the Halifax & Weldon Rail Road, take 
advantage of the existing Weldon Toll Bridge to connect to the Virginia railroads, and 
use the port of Wilmington to establish immediate connections to the south. While the 
Memorial of the November 1833 convention on internal improvements advocated a 
monumental plan to expend five million dollars on a state system that would relegate the 
port of Wilmington to an outpost off the main line, and Gavin Hogg, in his report of the 
Selection Committee on Internal Improvements denigrated the commerce of the port, an 
unnamed few in the east took the “go it alone” approach. The interests in Raleigh and 
Petersburg were of course blindsided.  
 Regardless of the particulars, the changing of the route of the Wilmington & 
Raleigh was a sound planning decision because it utilized existing advantages, could be 
set in operation early, and constituted with its steamship line a completed and economical 
route connecting south. By contrast, the Raleigh & Gaston had immense disadvantages. 
Some were rooted in the mythology of the so-called “Metropolitan Route” through the 
interior advocated by Colonel Long and others. The success of the Raleigh & Gaston and 
the Greensville & Roanoke depended on the construction of the Raleigh & Columbia Rail 
Road. If there were a first law of planning, it would be never to undertake a commercial 
project that cannot function profitably as a “stand alone” entity in the event that the 
projected works of others never materialized. The building of the Raleigh & Columbia 
Rail Road would have involved putting down a greater length of track than the 
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Wilmington & Raleigh, would have required the transportation of iron from the coast and 
sources of capital from South Carolina. When the line was completed to the North 
Carolina, a considerable distance to Columbia would remain. This, however, is not the 
only flaw of the Raleigh & Gaston. It was incorporated in haste without an appeal for 
state investment, and it was undercapitalized. The chief logical obstacle of the company 
was having to build its own bridge over the Roanoke River, and receive shipments of iron 
and equipment via Petersburg. The Wilmington & Raleigh could receive iron and 
equipment at both end of construction, Norfolk and Wilmington. It could also offer a 
“through ticket” to Charleston while still running stages. For an unbiased position, in 
spite of the state’s extraordinary efforts to preserve the Raleigh & Gaston, the rail was a 
lost cause from the moment that the Post Office Department awarded the contract for the 
“Southern Great Mail” to the Wilmington & Raleigh in 1838. Yet, as early as 1835, had 
the investors in the Raleigh & Gaston put their support behind the established Raleigh & 
Roanoke Rail Road with a route that would have formed a connection near Weldon and 
was slated for state investment, the outcome might have been less dire. This was, decades 
later, a connection that determined the future of the Raleigh & Gaston, and the route has 
survived to this day. History has consumed the Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road, the old 
town of Gaston, and the bridge over the Roanoke build by the Raleigh & Gaston Rail 
Road Company.  
The conditions of North Carolina in the 1830s, including intrinsic and extrinsic 
factors, favored building the first railroad from the coast to the interior, and north-to-
south within the Coastal Plain. State investment in railroad projects was necessary. The 
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amount of private investment capital was insufficient to support the construction of 
extensive railroads. In addition, as evidenced by the Panic of 1837 and subsequent 
depression, an event that hurt both the shareholders of the Raleigh & Gaston and the 
Wilmington & Raleigh, the role of the State of North Carolina as shareholder ensured the 
survival of the railroad even though private investors were ruined. 
 
The Hypothesis 
 The first period of railroad development was influenced by the desire of the 
Virginia commercial centers of Norfolk and Petersburg to gain control of the agricultural 
output of the Roanoke River Basin. The completion of the Dismal Swamp Canal, in 
combination with the earlier closing of Roanoke Inlet, allowed Norfolk to enjoy trade 
with the lower reaches of the Roanoke Valley through Albemarle Sound. The opening of 
the Roanoke Canal around the Great Falls of the Roanoke gave Norfolk an advantage 
over the interior market of Petersburg because the produce from the upper reaches of the 
Roanoke could proceed to Norfolk without breaking bulk at the fall. Formerly, wagons 
would transport these products to Petersburg. The building of the Petersburg Rail Road to 
Blakeley, opposed the lower outlet of the Roanoke Canal at Weldon, and gave Petersburg 
the advantage in 1833. The construction of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road, along 
with its arrangement to use and later purchase the Weldon Toll Bridge, shifted the 
advantage to Norfolk in 1837. The incorporation of the Halifax & Weldon Rail Road in 




 The pivotal event during this period was the blocking of the Petersburg Rail 
Road’s petition to the General Assembly of North Carolina by the friends of the Weldon 
Toll Bridge Company to build a bridge over the Roanoke near Weldon. The Petersburg 
Rail Road opted to support the building of the Greensville & Roanoke Rail Road instead. 
This railroad was a spur of the Petersburg Rail Road to be built to a landing above the 
Great Falls for the purpose of intercepting produce before it was transported through the 
Roanoke Canal. In name, these early Virginia railroads were public works, but in essence 
they were instruments of trade warfare, economic stream piracy.  
 North Carolina had a history of endorsing grand plans for a system of internal 
improvements, which time proved to be increasingly necessary, but the state lacked the 
political consensus to carry them into reality. This condition was exaggerated by the 
ideology that the construction of public works is better left to private companies that are 
apt to guided by self-interest; and the perennial cultural phenomenon of sectional 
differences. By the early 1830s, progressive individuals within the state perceived the 
potential of building railroads rather than a system of canals. Joseph Caldwell and James 
Iredell, Jr., were early proponents of this technology in the late-1820s. Iredell proposed a 
railroad from Fayetteville to the Yadkin River to stem the transport of produce into the 
markets of South Carolina, and Caldwell proposed a grand scheme to build a railroad 
from Beaufort Harbor to the North Carolina mountains. While the latter was decades 
ahead of the existing technology, the idea of build railroads to traverse vast distances 
shaped the character of early railroad planning in the state. The early plan to build a 
railroad from Wilmington to Morganton via Fayetteville, the first Cape Fear & Yadkin 
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Valley Rail Road, proved beyond the means of private investors when it failed to meet 
the capital required of its charter. The Central Rail Road also suffered the same setback. 
The purpose of the two internal improvement conventions of 1833 was to define a state 
system of internal improvements that would benefit for all regions of the state, and to 
seek the support of the state by appealing to the General Assembly. In theory and in 
spirit, the state plan expressed in the Memorial of the convention embodied the desire to 
seek the greater good for the citizens of North Carolina, but its plan for great railroads, or 
some combination of railroad, canals, and roads, to span the state from the Roanoke to 
the South Carolina and from the coast to the mountains, was as visionary as any scheme 
that had come before. 
 The plan to build a railroad between Wilmington and Raleigh emerged from the 
meeting of the convention on internal improvements on 4 July 1833. Its demise was not 
the result of any technical difficulty associated it might encounter in its execution, or the 
expense of building the distance from Waynesborough to Raleigh. Investors at 
Wilmington and in the east recognized what they believed to be a course of action that 
offered the potential of greater returns on their investment that was in direct conflict with 
the objectives of certain commercial interests in Raleigh and Petersburg’s lobbyists in the 
North Carolina Legislature. Apparently, the General Assembly of 1835 was not 
particularly sympathetic to their exertions to withhold a new charter to the Wilmington & 
Raleigh.  
Through this conflict, which has garnered little attention, one can see the 
evolution of a state policy. The commercial conflict between Norfolk and Petersburg 
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represented an extreme of laissez faire capitalism given scope in an underdeveloped 
nation to the point where regional centers behaved as slightly more constrained Italian 
city-states presided over by a merchant ruling class. In practice, Adam Smith’s “hidden 
hand” often gropes in the dark and guides men to selfish acts. When Francis Rives began 
to dismantle the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road, the State of North Carolina had no 
recourse but intervene. While failing to secure a conviction of Rives, the State blocked 
his petition for a charter, and aided the reorganization of the Norfolk company. Indeed, 
this was the proper action, for Rives and his masters in Petersburg compromised the trust 
of the State of North Carolina. Not only was the taking up of the track of the Portsmouth 
& Roanoke Rail Road an affront to the people of North Carolina who had become 
dependent upon it for their convenience and commerce, but it also overlooked the fact 
that the state had granted the privilege of its existence in the first place. With the 
incorporation of the North Carolina Railroad in 1849, transportation policy and 
commercial interests were brought into balance for the public welfare. 
 
Recommendations for Further Study 
 This volume is merely an exploration into the beginning of North Carolina’s 
railroad history, and its assembly has been tempered by requests from preservationists 
and archaeologists working with structures and artifacts to establish the significance of 
North Carolina’s first railroads in the context of the history of the American railroads. 
The research presented here provides some information on the technology, cultural, and 
economic particulars relevant to the construction of the first railroads; however, this work 
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can be expanded to provide the practitioner with the tools to interpret the places that 
remain on the landscape and the artifacts in its soil. 
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ANTEBELLUM PLANS FOR REOPENING ROANOKE INLET 
 
 
Roanoke Inlet closed between 1792 and 1798, thus depriving the northeastern 
North Carolina port towns of an outlet to the Atlantic. In 1820, Hamilton Fulton, civil 
engineer to the State of North Carolina, devised a plan for reopening the inlet. During the 
next twenty-five years, civil engineers in the employment of the State of North Carolina 
and engineers of the United States Army Topographical Bureau conducted a number of 
surveys of the Albemarle Sound region while Congress considered the practicality of the 
plan. The project was never undertaken. 
The maritime commerce of the Albemarle Sound region of North Carolina 
expanded during the closing decades of the Colonial Era as more land in the vast 
Roanoke River Basin came under cultivation. The closing of Roanoke Inlet in the late 
1790s curtailed the development of a major port in the state’s northeast. Beaufort Harbor 
and the port of Wilmington were located too far to the south to be beneficial; and the 
Dismal Swamp Canal, completed in 1805 (improved during the 1810s), attracted the 
produce entering Albemarle to the Norfolk market. Hamilton Fulton, while serving as 
civil engineer for the State of North Carolina, prepared a plan for reopening Roanoke 
Inlet in 1820. The plan involved dredging Roanoke Inlet and closing Croatan and 
Roanoke sounds to prevent the flow from Albemarle Sound to Pamlico Sound from 
causing Roanoke Inlet to close again (Combs, 2003, 1:1-27; Merrens, 1964, 85-172; 
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Murphey, 1818, 18; North Carolina, 1820, 11, 14-15). The State of North Carolina did 
not have the resources to undertake such an ambitious project at the time. The United 
States Government, considering the project’s potential for improving commerce and 
national defence, commissioned additional surveys. 
The sequence of gradual changes that occurred around Roanoke Island prior to 
Fulton’s visit is recorded on several historic maps. The Edward Moseley Map of 1733 
shows marshland extending across Croatan Sound between Roanoke Island and the 
mainland. He labels Croatan Sound “The Narrows,” and includes a note about Roanoke 
Inlet: “Roanoke Inlet has generally 10 feet at low water, where it rises commonly about 4 
feet, but those Shoals shifting, it was not thought proper to lay them down at large, as ye 
other Harbours. The Channel may be seen within from ye Mast head (tho’ ye Bar breaks) 
so as to guide a Vessel in.” The John Collet Map of 1770 provides more detail of shoals 
surrounding Roanoke Island. The narrow channel through Croatan Sound is labeled as 
“Through Fare,” and there is a cluster of marshes between Roanoke Island and the 
mainland at the southern mouth of this channel. The Price-Strother Map of 1808 shows in 
intricate detail the marshland connecting Roanoke Island to the mainland. The passage 
through the marshland is little more than a ditch. The shoaling of Roanoke Inlet appears 
to be filling in the passage from the sound side. The MacRae-Brazier Map of 1833 shows 
the area of Roanoke Inlet completely filled in, and the marshes of Croatan Sound 
partially scoured out (Cumming, 1966, Plate VI, Plate VII, Plate IX, X). 
In 1882, W.C. Kerr, the geologist for the State of North Carolina, prepared a map 
of the state incorporating information from surveys undertaken from 1820 to that date. He 
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identifies several former inlets on the Outer Banks and the dates these inlets closed.  
Cheeseman’s Inlet, south of Beaufort, closed in 1806; Cedar Inlet, north of Cape 
Lookout, in 1805; Chickamicamico (Chickinocommock) Inlet, north of Cape Hatteras, in 
1795; Roanoke Inlet, east of Roanoke Island, als in 1795; New Currituck Inlet, east of 
Knotts Island, in 1828; and Currituck Inlet, near the Virginia line, in 1775 (Cumming, 
Plate XIV). Oregon Inlet, Hatteras Inlet, and Ocracoke Inlet have remained open. 
Hamilton Fulton had arrived in North Carolina to begin his employment as the 
state civil engineer in 1819. The Board of Public Improvements gave Mr. Fulton 
instruction to investigate the possibility of opening an inlet at the lower end of Albemarle 
Sound. Fulton reports having visited Roanoke Island on 14 March 1820. His initial 
comments to the Board suggest that he does not consider the reopening of Roanoke Inlet 
a practical undertaking. He believes that the closing of the inlet was associated with the 
increase of flow between Albemarle Sound and Pamlico Sound. He also thought that the 
sand that made the closure had been shifted south across Roanoke Sound from Nags 
Head. Residents of Roanoke Island gave Fulton an idea of the rate of this change. 
 
There are people now alive on Roanoke Island, who remember the passage 
between Albemarle and Pamplico Sounds being confined to what is still called the 
ship channel. Since that time another channel has gradually opened, which is now 
one mile and a quarter in width, with soundings, in some places, twenty-four, and 
others thirty feet deep. This circumstance plainly shews the effect of the waters 
passing and repassing through the marshes. It became a matter of course, as these 
channels increased in width, so did the quantity of water issuing into the Sea by 
the Inlet decrease in a proportional degree. 
 





Fulton proposed that dams made of piles with stone embankments should be built 
across both Roanoke Sound and Croatan Sound, and that Roanoke Inlet be reopened by 
dredging. These embankments would have spanned Croatan Inlet from Fleetwood’s 
Fishery to Pork Point on Roanoke Island, and from the east side of Roanoke Island to 
Ballast Point across Roanoke Sound (Figure A4). He estimated that the cost of this 
project would cost $2,363,483 for the stone embankments and dredging, and $1,157,186 
for timber and earth embankments (North Carolina, 1820, 16-22). Mr. Fulton’s plans 
were submitted to the United States Engineers (administered by the War Department 
under then Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun), and their report was printed in the Report 
to the Board of Public Improvements of North Carolina the following year. The report of 
General Bernard, Colonel Gratiot, and Major Totten, prepared by Col. W. K. Armistead, 
Commander of the U.S. Engineers, supported Fulton’s plan. However, there was some 
concern that sediment would eventually be deposited on the ocean side of the opened 
inlet and render it too shallow to be useful; and it also concerned them that the water in 
Albemarle Sound would find a new outlet to Pamlico Sound when Croatan and Roanoke 
sounds were closed. The most obvious difference between Fulton’s 1820 map and the 
present geography of Croatan Sound is that Fulkers Island, the nearby islands, and the 
marshes at the southern end of the sound are gone. 
The United State Engineers expressed their concern about the waters of 
Albemarle Sound forcing a new channel through lowlands west of Croatan Sound. They 
anticipated that the water level in Albemarle would rise. Mr. Fulton, in his response to 
this report, does not believe this is possible, but he cites an unnamed source that he does 
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not place any reliance that a canoe can travel from the Alligator River to Pamlico Sound 
by way of connecting creeks. He also notes that fresh stumps of pine and cedar on the 
seashore at Nags Head indicated a recent encroachment by the ocean (North Carolina, 
1821 16, 21). 
 An alternative plan is suggested by Captain Hartman Bache, of the Topographical 
Engineers that is based upon a survey carried out from 1827-1828. Bache, like Fulton 
before him, cites historical sources for the previous condition of Roanoke Inlet. James 
Wimble’s 1838 chart of the coast of North Carolina with soundings, later incorporated 
into Captain John Collet’s 1770 map of North Carolina, as well as The History of 
Carolina, by John Lawson, Gentleman Surveyor General of North Carolina published in 
1709. Bache notes that there is little doubt that Roanoke Inlet had been used by small 
vessels. He also mentions that even though the soundings for the former inlet were at nine 
feet on the bar, the sound was merely six feet. He agreed that the washing away of the 
marshes on Croatan Sound  had caused the inlet to fill, and he believes that “no human 
foresight can predict the precise result” of an improvement when the forces involved are 
“so various and powerful.” Yet, Bache had determined the project would be useful, and 
he offers a less expensive alternative to Fulton’s plan. This plan featured a tide lock so 
that outbound vessels could gain access to the ocean with the channel being ten feet wide 
and three hundred feet long, lined with stone, and set at a depth of ten feet “below the 
common level of the sound.” While the channel would not benefit ships attempting to 
enter Albemarle Sound, it would provide outbound trade with a direct outlet (United 
States, 1829, 12-22, 24).  
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 The Letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting A Report of the Survey of 
Roanoke Inlet and Sound, in the State of North Carolina dated 24 February 1829 is a 
recapitulation of the afore mentioned surveys for the US House of Representatives 
(United States, 1829a). The Resolution of the Legislature of North Carolina, Upon the 
subject of re-opening the Old Roanoke Inlet was authored by Charles Fisher and D.F. 
Caldwell, transmitted by Governor Stokes; and intended to solicit aid from the Federal 
Government for the languishing project (United States, 1831). The following year, a 
report on Roanoke Inlet was referred to the Committee on Internal Improvements of the 
House of Representatives to accompany H.R. 517 confirming the acts of incorporation 
for the Roanoke Inlet Company granted by the North Carolina Legislature in 1821 and 
1828, and to consider re-surveying the inlet. On 15 February 1830, a convention was held 
at Edenton, North Carolina to discuss reopening the inlet. The citizens of the eastern 
section of North Carolina prepared a memorial to Congress to encourage action on the 
project (United States, 1832).  
 In the spring of 1840, civil engineer Walter Gwynn undertook a survey for North 
Carolina’s Board of Internal Improvements to determine the practicality of reopening 
Roanoke Inlet. Gwynn, a West Point trained civil engineer, had already distinguished 
himself in Virginia as well as North Carolina as the chief engineer for several early 
railroads. The report of his survey contains more information about hydrologic processes 
than the previous reports. Like his predecessors, he agreed that the opening of the 
marshes at Croatan Sound was the cause of the closing of Roanoke Inlet; but he provides 
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more information about the extreme nature of the cutting through of the water from 
Albemarle Sound. 
 
And, all along above the marshes, we have evidence of the continuing 
encroachment of the waters of the sound. Stumps are found as high up as Mann’s 
point, both on the shores of Roanoke island and the main land, stretching out from 
a hundred yards to a mile into the sound, and, in some places, reaching nearly 
across it; and the recent abrasion of the banks is shown by bare roots of hundreds 
of trees – some recently fallen, others in a tottering condition. 
 
– (United States, 1841, 3) – 
   
 
Noting accounts of older local residents, he learned that the channel through the 
marshes was once narrow enough to be crossed with a fence rail. He suspected that at 
some distant time Roanoke Island was connected to the mainland. Like Fulton, he 
verified that the water level in Albemarle Sound was higher than that of Pamlico Sound; 
but he noted that the water flowing into Pamlico Sound had not brought about any 
improvement to Ocracoke Inlet. The current coming from Albemarle Sound interfered 
with the combined currents of the Neuse and Pamlico rivers, and the reduced velocity 
caused sediments to fall out of suspension to form shoals at the entrance to Ocracoke 
Inlet. Based on his own observations and those of others, he dismisses the notion that 
Roanoke Inlet was filled by blown or shifting sand from Nags Head; and the sediment 
deposited at the site of the old inlet was not brought there by ocean currents (United 
States, 1841, 3-7). 
 The final historical document worth noting is entitled Roanoke Inlet, At Nag’s 
Head dated 10 February 1846 and presented to the Committee on Commerce of the US 
House of Representatives – read, and laid upon the table. The report, authored by Captain 
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Campbell Graham of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, contains a few details 
related to the closing of Roanoke Inlet. Graham accompanied Walter Gwynn on his 1840 
survey, and they observed that the current between Albemarle and Pamlico had carried 
away several islands. Further, they determined from interviews that Roanoke Inlet began 
closing in 1792, about the same time the marshes on Croatan Sound started to give way. 
Referring to the recently published Westover Manuscripts of William Byrd, Graham 
notes that a storm had opened a New Currituck Inlet five miles south of Old Currituck 
Inlet in 1713. Prior to this event, the Northwest River, in Currituck County, had not been 
known to ebb and flow. Byrd observed that Old Currituck Inlet was closing in 1728. 
Graham’s research found no instance of an inlet closing as the result of a storm; rather the 
outflow through an inlet was diverted to other channels that had been opened. Graham 
places the closing of Roanoke Inlet to be complete in 1798, the closing of the New 
Currituck to be about ten to twelve years prior to his report, and he was not sure when 
Caffee Inlet closed. Graham  recommended omitting the embankment across Roanoke 
Sound in Hamilton Fulton’s plan, or leaving a section open so that water could pass from 
Albemarle Sound to Pamlico Sound to the east of Roanoke Island as it once did. He 
estimated that the watershed feeding into Albemarle Sound covered about seventeen 















THE CENTRAL RAIL ROAD 
 
 
 Joseph Caldwell (1773-1835), the first president of the University of North 
Carolina published the discourses on the concept of a Central Rail Road under the nom de 
plume “Carlton” in 1828. Caldwell began formulating his ideas after a trip to Europe in 
1824 to purchase books and scientific instruments for the university. The railroad was to 
span the length of the state from the mountains to Beaufort harbor (Caldwell, 1860, 62-
63). On pages forty-three through forty-five of The Numbers of Carlton, Caldwell 
provided a table of locations throughout North Carolina within a distance of 
approximately fifty miles of the projected route of his Central Rail Road (Caldwell, 1828, 
43-45).  The author has selected locations within thirty miles of the proposed route that 
are readily identifiable on The First Actual Survey of the State of North Carolina of 1808 
by Jonathan Price and John Strother (Cumming, 1966, Plate IX). Using known locations 
of places and streams, the 1808 map was georeferenced with modern USGS 7.5 Minute 
Topographic Quadrangle Maps to obtain map coordinates (Table B1, Table B2). The 
distance of thirty miles approximates about an eight-hour day travelling by wagon at four 
miles an hour, a figure given in Caldwell’s text for a regular line of horse-drawn carriages 
(Caldwell, 1828, 23). These coordinates describe locations on the Price-Strother map, and 
may not be accurate for identifying the exact locations of places such as a courthouse, 
plantation, or ironworks.  
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Location Distance From Track (ml) Coordinates 
New Bern 0 N35.10849, W 77.03825 
Beaufort 0 N34.71911, W76.66319 
Raleigh 0 N35.78031, W78.63881 
Lexington 0 N35.82401, W80.25341 
Boon's Ford 0 N35.77820, W80.46423 
Jones Ferry 0 N35.83277, W79.21912 
Cross Roads, Randolph 0 N35.82891, W79.86516 
Gen. McDowell 0 N35.81130, W81.70553 
Redfield Ford 3 N35.73147, W79.10655 
Bethany Church 3 N35.86264, W79.81376 
Statesville 5 N35.78262, W80.88731 
Pittsborough 5 N35.72014, W79.17727 
Kinston 6 N35.26603, W77.58738 
Green, C.H.N.E. 6 N35.39882, W77.96450 
Randolph C.H. 6 N35.70803, W79.81376 
Island Ford 6 N35.75570, W81.08788 
Morganton 7 N35.74539, W81.68481 
Quaker M.H. Cane Creek 8 N35.87950, W79.31006 
Smithfield, S.W. 9 N35.50847, W78.33948 
Salisbury 10 N35.67097, W80.47416 
Swanano Gap 12 N35.59789, W82.39989 
Col. Carson 12 N35.61931, W81.96930 
Trenton 12 N35.06699, W77.35281 
Allemance Church 13 N35.96625, W79.57803 
Concord Iron Works 14 N35.81599, W81.41506 
New Garden M.H. 18 N36.01829, W79.82560 
Hillsborough 20 N36.07538, W79.09974 
 
Table B1. These locations given in Joseph Caldwell’s The Number of Carlton are twenty 
mile or less from the projected railroad. Many appear on the 1808 First Actual 
Survey of the State of North Carolina by Jonathan Price and John Strother. By 
georeferencing locations on the Price-Strother map with USGS Topographic 
Quadrangle Maps, coordinates can be assigned to these locations. 
Data Sources: Caldwell, Joseph. (1828). Numbers of Carlton. New York: G. 
Long; Cumming, W.P. (1966). North Carolina in Maps. Raleigh: State 












Location Distance From Track (ml) Coordinates 
Wilkesborough 21 N36.14674, W81.16072 
Greensborough 21 N36.07255, W79.79211 
Salem 21 N36.06290, W80.23149 
Greenville 22 N35.61123, W77.37278 
Asheville 22 N35.59512, W82.55143 
Narrows of the Yadkin 22 N35.41815, W80.09225 
Lincolnton 25 N35.47385, W81.25466 
Concord 26 N35.41117, W80.57132 
Washington 26 N35.54678, W77.05226 
Bethany, Stokes 26 N36.18167, W80.34059 
Montgomery C.H. 26 N35.35847, W79.89451 
Flint Hill 27 N35.45213, W81.66650 
Henderson, Montgomery 28 N35.34186, W80.07359 
Forney's Iron Works 30 N35.63394, W81.22924 
Louisburg 30 N36.09967, W78.30113 
Hopewell Church 30 N35.35366, W80.88877 
Moore C.H. 30 N35.34586, W79.41700 
 
Table B2. These locations given in Joseph Caldwell’s The Number of Carlton are 
between twenty-one and thirty miles from the projected railroad. 
Data Sources: Caldwell, Joseph. (1828). Numbers of Carlton. New York: G. 
Long; Cumming, W.P. (1966). North Carolina in Maps. Raleigh: State 











 A modern map of counties in North Carolina using a Census 2000 TIGER/Line® 
Files polygon geodataset illustrates the present county orientation of these coordinates 
(US Census Bureau, 2000). Placing these locations on the present-day map of the 
counties is a convenience. Many new counties were created after 1828. It is apparent that 
the route of Caldwell’s Central Rail Road follows a straight line from Raleigh to the 
mountains bypassing many towns that later became large urban centers. Locations listed 
in Caldwell’s table as zero miles appear of the map legend as stations even though this is 




















Figure B1. The route of Joseph Caldwell’s Central Road and locations within thirty miles 
can be mapped using the 1808 Price-Strother The First Actual Survey of the 
State of North Carolina georeferenced to USGS 7.5 Minute Topographic 
Quadrangle maps. The coordinated are then located on a modern map of North 
Carolina counties. Stations, or locations in Caldwell’s table given as zero, are 
illustrated in red. Recognizable towns and places within thirty miles of the line 
(but not on it) appear in black. Less familiar places or physical features are 
numbered. 
Data Sources: Caldwell, Joseph. (1828). Numbers of Carlton. New York: G. 
Long; Cumming, W.P. (1966). North Carolina in Maps. Raleigh: State 
Department of Archives and History, Plate XI; US Census Bureau. (2000). 
Census 2000 TIGER/Line ® Files [machine-readable data files]. MAPdata USA 










NOTES ON THE ESTIMATES FOR THE CAPE FEAR & YADKIN RAIL ROAD 
 
 
The Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road scheme represents a testing of limits: the 
commercial centers of the lower Cape Fear provided all the investment capital - about a 
third of what was required - and the west was unable to raise any funds. It was clear that 
railroad projects of great length that crossed into different economic regions could not be 
funded with local investment capital alone. Investment on the part of the state, or money 
borrowed from large domestic financial institutions and/or foreign banks, or both of these 
sources, would be required. Even more significant, there were a number of technical 
problems that were associated with building this railroad and others like it - a type that 
was unprecedented in the early 1830s - that shed light on the difficulty of uniting North 
Carolina east to west by rail. On cost per mile alone, there were issues that had to be 
addressed. For example, Mr. Rawle's survey placed the cost per mile for single track at 
$2,278.64, yet the cost per mile for the experimental Fayetteville Rail Road was $4000 
per mile. The investors in the Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road apparently expected a 
lower estimate. To obtain a more realistic idea of the possible cost, it is useful to examine 
data from a survey from a contemporary railroad that was actually built. The Report of 
Walter Gwynn, Esq. Engineer to the President and Directors of the Portsmouth and 
Roanoke Rail Road Company of 1833 is an appropriate source to examine for several 
reasons. Gwynn, a West Point graduate, had acquired extensive knowledge and 
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experience from his work on the Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road survey, and his work on 
the Petersburg Rail Road before becoming engineer for the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail 
Road; and he would serve as chief engineer for the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road and 
the North Carolina Railroad.  The report itemizes the cost of construction for ten 
divisions of the line. Topographic information for specific geographic locations and the 
length of grades are included, and the report also describes the methods of construction 
and type of materials used. 
Division II of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road began at Main Street in 
Suffolk and continued southwest for ten miles. The estimated cost of this section of 
railroad was $55,846.18, which included excavation of 108,923 cubic yards of earth at 
$10,347.68, 128,213 cubic yards of embankment at $12,821.30, four stone drains costing 
$1000, the abutment and bridge at Smith's Branch costing $4200, six truss bridges at 
$600, one hundred and sixty tons of iron at $7,200, six tons of spikes at $1188, $150 for 
splicing plates, 105,600 lineal feet of heart pine rails at $5,280, 10,560 sills (crossties) at 
$5,280, 21,120 oak wedges at $739.20, and $7,040 for carpenters' work (Portsmouth and 
Roanoke Rail Road Company, 1833, 7). This estimate comes close to $5,600 per mile. If 
Walter Gwynn's estimates are reflective of the most durable method of construction 
considering the availability of materials, Mr. Rawle's estimate was not realistic, and the 
cost per mile for the experimental railroad at Fayetteville did not even represent the cost 
of traversing the coastal topography, much less the piedmont and mountains. Gwynn 
gave the intended length of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road at 77 miles, and he 
estimated its total construction cost at $405,133.76 without warehouses, shops, and other 
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accoutrements (ibid, 4, 10). Using these figures, it would take at least $500,000 to build a 
railroad from Wilmington to Fayetteville that commenced on the west bank of the Cape 
Fear. The distance is about 90 miles over coastal plain topography. This does not include 
the cost of locomotives, rolling stock, shops, depots, and warehouses.  If track 
construction costs alone were considered for a railroad with a direct route without 
topographic considerations (as the crow flies) from Wilmington to Morganton via 
Fayetteville, the Narrows of the Yadkin, and Salisbury (247 miles), the cost for materials 
would have been $663,862 or $2688 per mile - a figure close to Mr. Rawle's estimate, but 
completely detached from the necessity to build bridges, trestles, and embankments in 
greater expense and difficulty as the railroad advanced through the state's diverse 
geomorphic regions. 
Though there were other methods of rail construction in use by the 1830s, the 
wooden rail method was cheap and allowed for quick construction. Walter Loring Webb 
provides an illustration of this system in his book, Railroad Construction, Theory and 
Practice (Webb, 1945, 303-319). The cross-section illustration of a wooden rail from the 
Quincy Rail Road of 1826 in his chapter on rails shows that the inner third of the rail was 
mitered to accommodate the wheel flange. Iron straps were mounted on the middle third 
of the top of the rail, and the outer third of the rail's upper surface remained bare. Mr. 
Rawle's estimate includes specifications for rail construction. The rails should be made of 
5" by 9" heart pine, the sills should be 1 foot, and the iron should be 2 inches by ½ of 
inch (Raleigh Register, 17 May 1833). Walter Gwynn's instructions are more detailed. He 
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The superstructure, then, which I propose to adopt, will be heart pine rails, nine 
by five inches, plated with iron bars two inches wide, and half an inch thick, 
resting on white or post oak sills, ten by twelve inches, and eight feet long, placed 
across the road, five feet apart from centre to centre. The rails will be placed 
parallel to each other four feet eight and a half inches apart, let into the sills and 
properly secured by white oak wedges. The sills will be notched for the reception 
of the rails and wedges and hollowed out in the middle, so as to admit of the 
construction of a path over them, which will add considerable stiffness to the 
road, at a very moderate expense - and adapt it to the use of either horse or 
locomotive power, or both. 
 
– (Gwynn, 1833, 5) – 
 
 
It should be apparent that the materials used for constructing the early rails was 
perishable and would require constant maintenance during its brief period of service. It is 
indicative of a need to build quickly and cheaply. Hopefully, the revenues from its use 
could keep pace with the mounting expenses if sections of the line were put into use 
during construction. The Cape Fear & Yadkin Rail Road plan along with its companion 
in length, the Central Rail Road, required a more durable construction. Such epic 
undertakings would require many years to complete and even longer to show a profit. 
Planners of these railroads would have had to anticipate the inevitable tendency to build 
faster and more powerful locomotives. Unfortunately, railroad technology was still in its 
infancy in the 1830s, and civil engineers had not established standards for construction. 
T-iron rails on closely spaced crossties answered the needs of the great railroads, but it 
356 
 
would not become apparent until the short-line regional railroads had to replace their 
wooden rails with iron.  
Another technical concern is the relationship between grade, velocity, and 
maximum load. Throughout the 1830s, engineers in Europe and America conducted 
experiments with various locomotives on inclined planes. De Pambour’s study of 
locomotive power was the most rigorous and empirical. His calculations considered all 
conditions of the machine and the required tasks from the length of the stroke to the 
resistance of the atmosphere. G.W. Whistler conducted traction experiments on the 
Boston & Lowell Rail Road using a locomotive of his own design with an engine weight 
of nine tons and having five tons instant weight on the driving wheels. This locomotive 
was able to pull 388 tons without losing traction. These engineers represent only a few 
that were adopting scientific methods in an effort to understand the potential and 
limitations of the steam locomotive. Grade tables, such as those included in a report 
prepared by the office of the Secretary of War concerning the survey of the Charleston & 
Cincinnati Rail Road, were one of the products of this research.   These tables were 
highly useful in determining what size and power a locomotive needed to possess to 
negotiate certain grades (United States, 1838, 30-34).  
While the report mentioned above post-dates the survey for the Cape Fear & 
Yadkin Rail Road by several years, it illustrates the potential problems that would result 
from using the method of rail construction described by Rawle and Gwynn for any 
railroad that was intended to be built in or to western North Carolina.  Heavy, powerful 
locomotives would be required for even modest grades, yet the trade off would be track 
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damage and excessive maintenance; or if less powerful locomotives were used, the initial 
cost of grading and embankment would fall far beyond what was estimated. The type of 
locomotive Walter Gwynn recommended for the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road was a 
light engine of no more than five tons so as to reduce "wear and tear and repairs" to the 
track (Portsmouth and Roanoke Rail Road Company, 1833, 4-5). It should be noted that 
the Petersburg Rail Road, completed in 1833, had to replace its wooden rails with T-iron 
ten years later (Wilmington Chronicle, 24 May 1843), and the Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road Company elected to replace their original rails - also of the same type of 
construction - in 1849 with 50 lbs per yard iron rail (Wilmington Journal, 26 January 
1849).  In addition to the rail, the company had to replace the crossties. 
 
In relaying the Road, we found that the Sill were so much decayed that it would 
be bad policy to let them remain, especially, those that had been covered up with 
earth. The Road had been originally laid with the Sill 3/4th exposed to the action 
of the atmosphere, the plan of covering them up afterwards adopted, with the 
view of rendering the road-way more firm and steady. Experience has proven to 
us, that the durability of the Sill or cross ties, thus covered up, when compared 
with those exposed in part, is in the proportion of 3 to 5 - the sills left exposed 
lasting 5 to 6 years, while those that had been covered up with earth, but 3 years. 
 
– (Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road, 1850, 11) – 
 
 
It can be hypothesized that if the Cape Fear and Yadkin Rail Road and Central 
Rail Road were built in the early 1830s using the wooden rail method, the problems 
associated with grade would not be the roads’ only problems. The eastern section of the 
roads would be plagued by rotting sills three to six years after they were laid while the 
western section would be pounded to splinters by heavy locomotives. When the 
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Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road replaced 161½ miles of rails and crossties, it cost the 
















































THE DEPOT SITE AT WILMINGTON 
 
 
 The Western Route of Walter Gwynn’s 1835 survey of the Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road begins at in an area of Wilmington known as “Dry Pond” (Ruffin, 1836, 348). 
John MacLaurin writing under the nom de plume Senex, Jr., describe “Dry Pond” as a 
“bounteously full of water in the wet season and guiltless of moisture in the dry, the sat 
placidly on the snow-white sand amid the scrubby oaks and prickly pears and wire grass” 
located on the southern boundary of Wilmington. The site of John Barnes’ farm was 
located beyond “Dry Pond” at would become the block bounded by Wooster, Queen, 
Seventh, and Eighth streets. The east-to-west boundary of Wilmington extended from 
Fifth Street to the Cape Fear River; and the north-to-south boundary extended from 
Campbell Street to “Dry Pond.” The farm covering approximately five acres and 
MacLaurin describes it as a “little plot of bald sand-hill land” (Sprunt, 1916, 160-162, 
169). Gwynn’s survey continue by indicating the route continue “due north to the head of 
market street” and east toward a “Love Grove” where it crosses Smith’s Creek (Ruffin, 
1836). MacLaurin gives the location of the head of Market Street as between Seventh and 
Eighth streets, and Love Grove Plantation as being on Smith’s Creek (Sprunt, 1916, 162, 
169). The survey continues over level ground to Prince George’s Creek, crossing between 
the Burgwyn dwelling and mill, and continuing to the Northeast Cape Fear River near the 
site of the old bridge. The Burgwyn plantation was located near Prince George’s Creek 
360 
 
east of the Castle Haynes estate across the county road (Sprunt, 1916, 72). The western 
route continues from the Northeast Cape Fear for forty-seven mile to the head of Bear 
Swamp, cross both Rockfish Creek and Stewart Creek; passing west within two and half 
miles of South Washington and seven miles of Kenansville. With the exception of the 
section of the route in Wilmington, the track from Smith’s Creek the Northeast Cape Fear 
River appears conform to the survey. An alternate to this route provided in the survey 
begins at the timber pens on the west side of the Cape Fear River at Wilmington, and then 
follows the one mile where it “crosses over and passes along the dividing ground of the 
Cape Fear and the Northeast Cape Fear to the head of Long Creek. The tracks would 
follow the divide between Long and Moore’s creeks, and between Moore’s and Rockfish 
creeks with crossing of Turkey and Stewart creeks; final reaching the head of Bear 
Swamp (Ruffin, 1836).  
 The Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road had acquired a number of parcels in New 
Hanover County were consolidated into a single deed in 1840. The parcels in this deed 
are listed below in chronological order. 
 
1. M. McKay conveyed to the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company 
by a deed dated 19 April 1834 the southwest corner parcel of Lot 22 of 
the Marsden Campbell Plot (drawn up by Alexander MacRae). The 
parcel measure 165 feet fronted the northern boundary of town, from 
the southwest corner of Lot 22 running east to a parcel owned by 
Pompy Mazell, and 66 feet parallel to Front Street. There was another 
parcel associated with this deed, also in Lot 22 of the Campbell Plot, 
that fronted the boundary of town on the south, Front Street on the west, 
and Second Street on the east, and Lot 23. 
 
2.  A parcel containing approximately six acres was conveyed by Robert 
S. McCombs by a deed dated 18 November 1836 to the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road. The was a lot of about six acres, located 430 feet 
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from the town line, on the south side of Market Street. The lot extends 
on the north side of Market Street. For the description in the deed, the 
parcel appears to be two blocks, 20 poles squares (330 feet by 330 feet), 
with and additional 60 feet, and the northern side of the north parcel is 
angled at 80º west. 
 
 
3. P.K. Dickinson conveyed by a deed dated December 1836 the lots 132 
through 134 A on west side Front Street in the town of Wilmington to 
the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The length fronting the street was 
198 feet. 
 
4. A deed dated 4 December 1836 conveyed by A.A. Wanett to the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road lots 3, 4, and 5 of the Campbell land 
at the northwest corner of the northern boundary street. Beginning 132 
feet from the corner, continuing 198 feet on Front Street, then 135 feet 
west towards the Cape Fear River. 
 
 
5. William Calder Frederick and Edwin Kidder conveyed to the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road on 3 December 1836 a parcel 
measuring 66 feet by 135 feet referred to a lot number 2 in the 
Campbell plot located 66 feet from the northwest corner of the street on 
the northern boundary of town. 
 
6. A parcel of 150 acres, less one-forth acre reserved to John D. Jones for 
a tomb and house, in Love Grove, was conveyed to the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road on 14 February 1837. The beginning of this parcel 
was at a stake on the bank of Smiths Creek on the old ferry landing a 
little above or nearly opposite where the cause way leads to the ferry or 
bridge, the running 3º west a distance of 18 pole (297 feet), then 187 
poles (3085.5 feet) “to a stake at the crossing of the old road,” then 
turning 50º degrees east and proceeding 180 poles (2970 feet) “to a 
spruce pine at the corner of Campbell's field,” then 46 poles (759 feet) 
to a cider on the creek bank growing among some lime stones partly 
above the ground there down the various courses of the creek to the 
First Station.”   
 
 
7. E.E. Piece and William Armstrong conveyed a parcel to the Wilmington 
& Raleigh Rail Road on 15 November 1837 containing 561.5 acres. It is 
described as beginning at a pine stump on Smith’s Creek then running 
80º east a distance of 213 poles (3514.5 feet), then 10º west 340 pole 
(5619 feet) to a stump near Hugh Cowan’s gate, the west six poles (99 
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feet) to a swamp stream, then following the western branch of the 
stream 42 pole (693 feet), then west 298 pole (4917 feet) to a stake in a 
bay, then 206 pole (3399 feet) east, the, turning 86º a distance of 84 
poles (1419 feet) to a pine of the south side of the branch, then east 150 
poles (2475 feet) to the First Station. 
 
8. P.W. Fanning conveyed to the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road by a 
deed dated 23 December 1839 a parcel beginning the near the northern 
boundary of town, 77.5 feet to an alley then eastward running alley 130 
feet, then 77.5 feet southward parallel Second Street, then westward 130 
feet to the beginning of the tract. 
 
 
All the parcels are within New Hanover County, and the consolidated deed can be found 
in the office of the Register of Deeds for New Hanover County (New Hanover County, 
1840). 
 A closer examination of the 1840 deed brings to light several items of interest. 
The oldest of the deeds incorporated in this deed is the 19 April 1834 McKay parcel. The 
acquisition of this property predates the company’s 1835 charter. The lots of the Marsden 
Campbell plot comprise the railroad’s land on the east bank of the Cape Fear River. 
Marsden Campbell’s plantation was named Clarendon and the division of his land into 
individual parcels follows a scheme of block of 330 feet square separated by streets of 66 
feet in width. Each block is divided in to five 66 feet by 330 feet lots that are in some 
case subdivided into lots that are 66 feet by 165 feet (Sprint, 1916, 57). The original 
scheme of the Campbell Plot is preserved on modern parcel map because the railroad 
occupied this land for over a century and none of it was subdivided into smaller parcels 
(New Hanover County, 2000, 2000a). This section of a modern parcel map of part of the 
railroad property bounded by Front Street, Third Street, and Red Cross Street preserves 
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the divisions of the Campbell Plot. These are the 330 feet by 300 feet blocks, the five 66 
feet by 330 feet lots, the 66 feet by 165 feet subdivided lots, and the 66 feet wide streets. 
 On the modern map, parcel number 6533 appears to contain the land that the 
railroad acquired in 1834 at the corner of the northern boundary (now Red Cross Street) 
and Front Street. This later became the southwest corner of Block 232 on the town plot; 
and this number appears in the triangle in the center of this map. A.C. Dickinson’s Plan 
of Wilmington, North Carolina as extended by Act of Legislature 1848, Survey'd By A. C. 
Dickinson illustrates the track arrangement of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road from 
its dock at the foot of Campbell Street to it northeast turn towards Love Grove. Each 
block is divided in to five lots that are 66 feet wide.  The J.L. Becton map of 1929 shows 
the entire extent of the dept facilities at Wilmington. This includes the vast ACL Upper 
Yards at Love Grove. The “old road” referred to in the deed dated 14 February 1837 
appears to be McRae Street. Sprunt places the location of the Cowan plantation 
“Paradise” on the bluff beyond Harnett Street; and the land below the bluff at Bladen 
Street was a swamp (Sprunt, 1916, 160). The old road presumable led to the cause way 
and old ferry landing mentioned in same deed. If so, it appear that this public road was 
preserved.  
 However, of the deeds complied into the consolidated deed dated 11 September 
1840, the parcels on Market Street deeded to the railroad by Robert S. McCombs on 18 
November 1836 have no relationship to any railroad facilities or extent of track in the 
railroad’s history. While the remaining deeds were incorporated in the railroad’s property 
and remain so well into the twentieth century, and they are all located on the northern 
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boundary of town; the Market Street parcels are remotely located, and appear to have 
been sold off at some point. Why would the railroad acquire this land?  
 The site of the depot and shops was not chosen until early 1837 (Carolina 
Observer, January 26, 1837). The company had acquired lots at the river in early 
December. The lots on Market Street were acquired in November, three months after 
Walter Gwynn’s survey was submitted (New Hanover County, 1840). Further, it seems 
unlikely that the railroad, in 1837, could have foreseen the need for acquiring so much 
land on Smith’s Creek for what would become the Upper Yards. Hypothetical, the 
company may have considered placing their railroad depot at the head of the town’s main 
street, and run track along the eastern boundary of town to the southern boundary. In this 
instance, the docks at the foot of this boundary could be used for the steamboat line. It 
would seem probably if when the dimensions of the parcel, beginning 430 feet from the 
eastern boundary at Fifth Street, form a polygon that abuts a track arrangement of a 
north-to-south section extending from Market Street to the southern boundary of town; 
and a section, extending from Market Street to the southern tip of the lands that would 
become the Upper Yards, which paralleled the angle of old road. 
 On a modern topographic quadrangle map of the City of Wilmington a line can be 
drawn from Castle Street (the Dry Pond area) to Market Street along Seventh Street, and 
another from the corner of Seventh and Market streets, along the line of the old road 
(McRae Street) to the western edge of the Upper Yards. This seems to be a reasonable 
interpretation of Walter Gwynn’s recommendation of the tracks through Wilmington. 
The survey of the parcels found in the 1840 is a little more difficult to interpret: the deed 
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includes references such as “thence No. 82 East 360 feet” and “then No. 12 west 40 
poles.” These markers are not helpful. However, the size of the parcel convey to the 
railroad was approximately six acres.  
A town block was 330 feet by 330 feet and four of them together would have 
made ten acres i.e. a square that is 40 poles on each side not including avenues dividing 
them. Five acres would consist of two town blocks; and an additional 43560 square feet 
(132 feet by 300 feet) would make six acres. By dividing this rectangular parcel into two 
angle using the Pythagorean Theorem (a2 + b2 = c2, 1322 + 3302 = x2, 17424 + 108900 = 
x2, 126324 = x2, √126324 = x = 355.42), the resulting triangular parcel would measure 
132 feet by 330 feet by 355.42 feet. Since 132 is one forth of 330, and their intersection 
form a right triangle, the angles are 14.03 degrees, 75.97 degrees, and 90 degrees. This is 
close to measurements mentioned in the 1840 deed, but it mentions specifically the 
measurements of 80 degrees and 360 feet; thus with the base of the angle being 330 feet 
and the hypotenuse being 360 feet, the remaining measurement is 143.87 feet. This yield 
a triangle with the angles 12.95 degrees, 77.05 degree, and 90 degrees, and the remaining 
portion of the acre would be less than half an acre. If the hypotenuses of these triangles 
are extended towards Love Grove they will overshoot the old road; however, a line 
running east 14.03 degrees from the corner of Market and Seventh streets will join the 
main track in the Upper Yards more directly than following the old road. Fifth Street, the 
old eastern boundary, is 100 feet wide, so the 430 feet mentioned in the 1840 deed would 
place the beginning stake at the east side of Sixth Street. The survey of the parcel 
eventually returns to this stake. While it is difficult to ascertain the actual shape and 
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orientation of the parcel with the limited, and sometimes contradictory, information 
provided in this deed, it would be safe to conclude that it was a two and one quarter block 
situated lying between Fifth and Seventh streets being bisected by Market Street or 
located on its northern side. 
 The acquisition of the of the town lots of Front Street from P.K. Dickinson and 
the river side lots outside the northwest boundary of town from A.A. Wanett, William 
Calder Frederick and Edwin Kidder in December of 1836 indicate that the company 
intended to locate its docks on the northern boundary of town. The lots at the river that 
are described in these deeds appear on the modern parcel (New Hanover County, 2000). 
They are situated around the Front Street Bridge and extend to the Cape Fear River, and 
are bounded on the south by Red Cross Street, the former northwester boundary of 
Wilmington. The east bank of the Cape Fear River was much closer to Front Street in the 
1830s: according to the Wanett deed, the low water mark was 135 feet from Front Street 
at this location. The bridge at Front Street crossed a ravine in which a small street one 
coursed. The stream extended towards the Upper Yards; and since the track at the 
Wilmington facilities were abandoned in the 1980s, the stream has emerged again since 
the drainage system at the tracks ceased to be maintained (Figure D1). This stream is also 
mentioned in the deed dated 14 February 1837 in the consolidated deed of 1840 as a 
creek with partially exposed deposits of limestone leading down to the First Station. The 
track, as it appears in the 1848 Dickinson map, was originally run through this ravine to 
the river; and later when the railroad acquired land north of the ravine, the tracks were 















Figure D1. The stream running through the ravine of the railroad cut at Wilmington is 









As of 1837, the railroad had six acres at Market Street, its docks at the Cape Fear outside 
the northern boundary of Wilmington, a few lots on Front Street, and 150 acres at Love 
Grove.  
The abundance of space in Love Grove would seem a likely place to set up the 
shops; however, in order that the locomotives and ships could be maintained together, the 
railroad began building the shops and depot close to the river (Wilmington Advertiser, 10 
November 1837; 23 November 1842). The land deeded to the company by Piece and 
Armstrong in November of 1837 cover 561.5 acres. As stated earlier, four town blocks 
amounted to ten acres; thus, forty bocks would amount to one hundred acres. The total 
land conveyed to the company by this deed was equal to 244.6 blocks – nearly equal to 
fifteen blocks by fifteen blocks square. While some of this land was necessary for the 
railroad facilities, the likely use for this land may have been for wood.  
The Nicholas Schenk Diary notes that the railroad company built a trestle from the bluff 
to the docks to deliver wood to the steamboats (Schenk, 1905, 119). The company’s 
steamship Wilmington, for example, burned a cord of wood an hour (Wilmington 
Advertiser, 27 September 1839). The amount of space the railroad facilities occupied, and 
the blocks through which its track cut, is a small fraction of the land the company 
acquired. The stockholders report of 1860 provides a total of 5596.625 cord used in its 
“Consolidated Report of the Service of Locomotives” for the year; and list twenty-two 
stations (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road Company, 1860, 17, 35). The 1855 
stockholders report states that six to eight station were used for taking on wood and 
water; and the average passenger train used 5918 cords per year at forty miles per cord, 
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and a freight train would use 2975 cords per year at 29 miles per cord (Wilmington & 
Weldon Rail Road Company, 1855, 15-17). Thus, it can be assumed that at least one-
tenth of the wood consume must have been loaded at Wilmington before the locomotive 
had to be refueled. This would mean that between 500-600 cords per year had to be cut at 
Wilmington. Over a period of twenty year of operation, the volume of wood from 
Wilmington, by these estimates, would have been between 1,280,000 and 1,536,000 
cubic feet. The land above Campbell Street, the site of the railroad cut, was woods and 
swampland, and the land on the eastern boundary was woods (Sprunt, 1916, 160, 162). 
However, situating the docks, warehouse, shops, and depot at the river on the northern 
boundary of town is advantageous. The distance between the company docks and the 
later become the Upper Yards was approximately 2.74 times shorter than the distance by 
rail and road to the river on the southern boundary. It would also take 1.7 times the length 
of track; and based upon the cost of Gwynn’s survey of the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail 
Road, the track across town would have cost the company approximately $6700 with no 
particular advantages (Gwynn, 1833, 7). 
 Gwynn’s alternate location for the beginning of the railroad was on the west bank 
of the Cape Fear River opposite Wilmington. This site is the approximate location of the 
1890 terminus of the Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley Railroad (Sprunt, 1896, XLIX).  
  
The line commences at the timber pens, and runs upwards along the margin of the 
river about a mile; thence it crosses over and passes the dividing ground between 
the Cape Fear and its north-west branch, to nearly the head of Long Creek. 
 





The location has its disadvantages. The land on the west bank of the Cape Fear River 
opposite Wilmington is an extensive marsh, and a ferry was the only means of crossing 
the Cape Fear to the town until after the Civil War when a iron Bollman Truss bridge 

























THE STAGECOACH LINE OF THE  
WILMINGTON & RALEIGH RAIL ROAD 
 
 
The stagecoach line of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road existed briefly 
between 1837 and 1840 as the railroad was being constructed. As it advanced from the 
north and south, the length of stage route decreased. The southern route from Wilmington 
to Waynesborough followed roads that paralleled the projected railroad. The northern 
route, however, traversed areas of Edgecombe County, Wilson County (formed later), 
and Wayne County that were bypassed by the railroad – particularly, the towns of 
Tarboro and Stantonsburg.  
 The history of the stage route was documented in several period North Carolina 
newspapers. The acquisition of stagecoaches and horses was mentioned at a meeting of 
the stockholders of the company held on 1 May 1837 at Wilmington. The following 
month, an article in the Wilmington Advertiser notes that double teams of horses had been 
stationed along the stagecoach route in advance of the arrival of the coaches. The 
stagecoach line had proven to be successful after its first month of service. An 
announcement in the 3 January 1838 issue of the Raleigh Register in early January stated 
that the winter route for the southbound stages of the railroad started at Halifax and 
included a stopover at South Washington. The 18 May 1838 issue of the Wilmington 
Advertiser and the 9 June 1838 issue of the Tarboro Press reported the proceeding of the 
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second annual meeting of the stockholders of the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road held 
earlier that month. The director considered and rejected a plan to change the stagecoach 
route from “Enfield, by Tarboro, to Stantonsburg, to the route by Rockymount” at this 
meeting. An article in the 27 October 1838 issue of the Tarboro Press, reprinted from the 
Wilmington Advertiser, announced the opening of section of the railroad from Halifax to 
Enfield in the north and a section to Faison’s Depot in the south. After the last spike of 
the railroad was driven on 7 March 1840, the stagecoach line was phased out. The 
stagecoaches were sold to C.W. Hause of Leechville in Beaufort County, North Carolina 
(Wilmington Advertiser, 5 May 1837, 9 June 1837, 18 January 1838, 18 May 1838, 28 
July 1841; Raleigh Register, 3 January 1838; Tarborough Press, 9 June 1838, 27 October 
1838).  
At least three of these pieces of information found in newspaper articles are 
necessary for this study because they help establish locations along the route that can be 
associated with the narrative of traveling on the stagecoach line provided by Frances 
Anne Kemble. A notice from the office of the Petersburg Rail Road Company dated 27 
October 1838 announced to planters and farmers sending produce north consigned loads 
to their agent (Major B.F. Halsey) or the agent for the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
Company at Enfield. The Wilmington Advertiser, two days before Mrs. Kemble’s 
stagecoach ride, names the southern termination of the stagecoach line in an article. Mrs. 
Kemble substantiates what the newspaper reports on the southern extent of the railroad. 
She notes that the stagecoach had traveled about ten miles after a stop in 
Waynesborough, and that a group of locals had gathered at the place where the stage 
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stops to meet the train from Wilmington to see the locomotive “come up for only the 
third time into the midst of their savage solitude.” An article reporting an example of fish 
being purchased in Wilmington and arriving in Tarboro the next day by way of the 
railroad’s stagecoaches indicates that the stagecoach line was still servicing Tarboro in 
late 1838 (Tarborough Press, 17 November 1838, 22 December 1838; Kemble, 27-28). 
The two sections of the railroad that are in operation and towns located on the stagecoach 
route can be mapped out using the information provided in these articles for Mrs. 
Kemble’s trip on 23 December 1838 (Figure E1). 
 Mrs. Kemble, after departing Weldon by train between eight and nine o’clock in 
the evening, arrives four hours later at the end of the northern section of the railroad. 
 
Between twelve and one o’clock [in the early morning of Sunday, December 23, 
1838], the engine stopped, and it was announced to us that we had traveled as far 
upon the railroad as it was yet completed, and that we must transfer ourselves to 
the stagecoaches; so in the dead middle of the night we crept out of the train, and 
taking our children in our arms, walked a few yards into an open space in the 
woods, where three four-horse coaches stood waiting to receive us. 
 
– (Kemble, 22) – 
 
 
Mrs. Kemble’s description of a group of men warming themselves by a fire at the end of 
the railroad most likely was a work crew, and the opening in the woods suggests that 
railroad construction had advanced a short distance south of Enfield. The log road that 
her stagecoach traveled that night went through swampland. The stage arrived at 
Stantonsburg shortly after sunrise. Though Kemble writes a single paragraph about the 











Figure E1. Map of the progress of construction on the Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road   
during 1838, as reported in the area newspapers. The railroad was finished in 
March 1840. The total length of the railroad from Wilmington to Weldon was 
161.5 miles. The stagecoach line of the railroad operated during construction. 
By May 1838, the stage line ran from Halifax to South Washington. A section 
from Halifax to Enfield was completed in October 1838, and the southern 
section was completed to Faison’s Depot. By the last week of December, the 
railroad was within nine miles of Waynesborough.  
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There had been only a four-hour respite at Weldon from the time she left Portsmouth, 
Virginia the previous morning. In addition, she was nursing a baby (Kemble, 19-23). It is 
evident from her account that both the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road and the 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road had subjected their passengers to an unimaginable 
ordeal to meet the scheduled connections. Mrs. Kemble and her family arrived at 
Wilmington at 5 AM on 24 December 1838 deprived of sleep and adequate nourishment 
after nearly two days of travel. 
 Other sources are available for determining the duration of the stage ride from 
Enfield to Stantonsburg, and the approximate speed of the stage. The US Naval 
Observatory in Washington, DC, calculates that sunrise at Stantonsburg (W 077° 49’, N 
35° 36’) on 23 December 1838 occurred at 7:18 AM (United States Navy, 2007). Given 
Mrs. Kemble’s observation that her stage trip began around 12:30 AM, the stage ride 
lasted approximately seven hours. Frederick Law Olmsted  recounted a similar journey 
by stagecoach through southeastern North Carolina while traveling on the yet to be 
completed Wilmington & Manchester Rail Road in A Journey in the Seaboard Slave 
States with Remarks on their Economy. His stagecoach also traveled during the winter 
over log roads through swampland. The driver and teams changed out about every ten 
miles (Olmsted, 380). 
 Applications of the Time Geography proposed by Torsten Hagerstrand are most 
closely associated with transportation planning in the urban context and the concepts of 
space-time autonomy in describing the mobility of individuals and classes of individuals 
(Hanson, 2004).  The aspects of Time Geography that are applicable to the problem 
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addressed in this study involve determining what route through the road network of 
1830s Edgecombe County would allow a trip by stagecoach that would begin in the 
neighborhood of Enfield, pass near Tarboro, and terminate at Stantonsburg within the 
span of approximately seven hours. The distance “as the crow flies” between Enfield (N 
36° 10.858’, W 77° 40.000’) to Stantonsburg (N 35° 36.408’, W 77° 49.401’) is 40.64 
miles; the distance between Enfield and Tarboro (N 35° 53.808’, W 77° 32.150’) is 20.96 
miles; and the direct distance between Tarboro and Stantonsburg is 25.72 miles. Thus, the 
ideal road network for a route between Enfield and Stantonsburg via Tarboro would be 
46.68 miles long. If a stagecoach traveling at an average speed of 7 mph were to take this 
ideal route, it would take 6.668 hours. At an average speed of 8 mph, the trip would last 
5.838 hours. If it the historic route between Enfield and Stantonsburg took seven hours 
(by Mrs. Kemble’s account), the distance traveled at 7 mph would be 49 miles, and for 8 
mph would be 56 miles. The direct distance between Stantonsburg and Waynesborough 
(Goldsboro) is 20.61 miles. The distance by rail to Faison’s Depot to the end of the 
completed railroad in December of 1838 is ten miles (Figure E2).  
 The mileage of stagecoach travel appears in the Wilmington Advertiser several 
times between 1838 and 1840. In October of 1838, the stage trip between Faison and 













Figure E2. This map illustrates the direct distances between Enfield, Tarborough, 
Stantonsburg, Waynesborough, and the southern end of the railroad as of 21 
December 1838. The stagecoach route during this period time included stops 
at Tarborough and Stantonsburg. As the railroad progressed beyond 
Waynesborough and Enfield, the route excluded these stops. The antebellum 
road network of these counties should approach the direct distances. 
 Sources: Kemble, F. (1984). Journal of A Residence on a Georgian Plantation 
in 1838-1839. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 22-33; 
Tarborough Press, 22 December 1838; Wilmington Advertiser, 19 October 
1838, 17 November 1838,  21 December 1838, 23 August 1839 
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The modern highway equivalent from Faison to Enfield via Goldsboro, 
Stantonsburg, and Tarboro, US 117, NC 111, NC 222, NC 33, and NC 44, to SR 1103, is 
90.75 miles. However, in August of 1839 the southern division of the railroad had 
advanced to the ninety-three mile mark (in the neighborhood of Pikeville) and the 
northern division had advanced to Battle’s Depot (Battleboro). The stage route was forty-
two miles (Wilmington Advertiser, 23 August 1839). The direct distance between these 
locations is 40.32 miles and the route by modern highways is 42.70 (US 177 and US 
301). Stantonsburg and/or Tarborough could not be on the stage route at this point. By 
October, the southern division added twelve miles (near the site of present-day 
Contentnea Junction) and the train still stopped at Battle’s Depot in the north. The stage 
route was thirty miles (Wilmington Advertiser, 4 October 1839). The direct distance 
between these locations is twenty-nine miles. On modern roads, US 177 and US 301, the 
distance is 30.43 miles. The obvious empirical conclusion, with some variation, is that 
the antebellum roads are the foundation of the modern roads. An examination of historic 
maps can determine whether the road network of the 1830s through 1860s in Edgecombe 
(Wilson) and Wayne counties contained roads that would allow a route that satisfies these 
time/distance conditions. 
In 1863, Jeremy Francis Gilmer, a Confederate Army engineer, prepared the Field 
Map of Lieut. Koener’s Military Survey Between Neuse and Tar Rivers North Carolina. 
This map, though more than twenty-year years later than the completion of the railroad, 
illustrates the road network and topography of several counties from the Neuse River to 
the Virginia in fine detail (Gilmer, 1863). What is immediately obvious is that many of 
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the roads depicted in this map approximate modern roads in the same counties. The 
Stantonsburg-Tarborough Road follows the route of modern NC 222/111, and the 
distance between the centers of both towns is 27.23 miles (Figure E3). However, there 
are several possible routes from Enfield to Tarborough on the Gilmer map that 
approximate modern roads. These are even apparent on the earlier 1833 MacRae-Brazier 
A New Map of the State of North Carolina and the 1865 U.S. Coast Survey (Cumming, 
1966, Plate X, Plate XII). Three bridges crossing Fishing Creek are depicted in all the 
historic maps thus mentioned. These are Daniel’s Bridge (or Wyatt’s Bridge), Spear’s 
Bridge, and Cofield’s Bridge (Field’s Bridge), with the most direct route between Enfield 
and Tarborough passing over Spear’s Bridge. On a modern map, the approximate 
location of Spear’s Bridge is the crossing of Fishing Creek on SR 1109 (W 77º 37’ 
38.97”, N 36º 06’ 50.83”) and the approximate location of Cofield’s Bridge is the 
crossing of Fishing Creek on SR 1429 (W 77º 33’ 5.54”, N 36º 05’ 55.22”). The routes 
crossing these points on Fishing Creek converge near the town of Leggett (W 77º 34’ 
53.03”, N 35º 59’ 28.88”). The crossing at the former location of Daniel’s Bridge follows 
the modern roads US 301, Speight’s Chapel Road, and NC 33 that eventually passes 
through Leggett. The route crossing Fishing Creek at the site of Spear’s Bridge is 22.49 
miles. The road from Enfield to Tarboro via Bell’s Bridge, and the Tarboro-Stantonsburg 
Rd. were on post routes: these routes were twenty-four miles from Enfield to Tarboro, 
and forty-six miles from Tarboro to Waynesboro via Pitts Cross Roads, Oak Grove, and 










Figure E3. The red line denotes the most direct route from Enfield to Stantonsburg via 
Tarborough (Tarboro). The road is referred to as the Stantonsburg-Tarborough 
Road on historic maps, and NC 222/111 on modern maps. On historic maps, 
this road crossed the Tar River at Bell’s Bridge and Fishing Creek at Spear’s 








The old Stantonsburg-Tarborough Road follows the present-day NC 111/ NC 222, and 
remains the most direct route to Stantonsburg. This road also passes through Pitt’s 
Crossroads. That fact that the railroad was able to deliver fish from Wilmington to 
Tarboro by their stagecoaches in late December of 1838 suggests that a Tarboro stop was 
on the route. It follows that the best route of the stages would match the post route. The 
route from Enfield to Tarborough via the supposed Cofield’s Bridge site on SR 1429 is 
24.60 miles, the distance by US 301 to NC 33 by the supposed site of Daniel’s Bridge is 
24.70 miles, and by SR 1109 to NC 33 the distance is 22.49 miles. Given the selection of 
the three, the direct route of 22.49 falls under twenty-four miles with 1.51 miles to spare. 
The other two routes are above twenty-four miles. It is not likely that the railroad would 
have selected the most direct route.  
 NC 111/NC 222 (called the Good News Church Road, Saratoga Road and 
Pinetops-Tarboro Road at various points between Tarboro and Stantonsburg) is the most 
direct route. However, it is still necessary to prove that the modern roads are built on the 
path of the nineteen-century roads. The MacRae-Brazier map shows the intersection of 
two important roads near Toisnot Swamp. One of the roads connected Tarboro to 
Smithfield, with the other connecting Stantonsburg to Nashville (NC). These roads 
remain in the United States Coast Survey map three decades later. In this map, the 
intersection now has the name of Wilson. In the modern city of Wilson, the intersection 
of Tarboro and Nash Streets preserve the place where the two earlier roads crossed. If 
Tarboro Street is traced east from Wilson, it becomes NC 42. After this highway enters 
Edgecombe County, NC 42 divides into NC 124 and NC 42. NC 124 intersects NC 111 at 
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Pitt’s Crossroads. If Nash Street is traced east from Wilson, it becomes NC 58/US 264 
and passes through Stantonsburg on NC 58. The town of Saratoga, appearing on the 
United States Coast Survey map, also connects to Wilson. The modern NC 91 retains the 
curves of the road depicted on the historic map. The relationships between the modern 
roads and their earlier manifestations suggest that NC-111/NC-222 retains much the same 
path as it followed in the 1830s. The total distance of the route between Enfield and 
Stantonsburg using the modern road network is 49.77 miles. This route is remarkably 
close to the 46.69 miles of direct distance between Enfield to Stantonsburg via Tarboro. 
The distance for the post route from Tarborough to Waynesborough was forty-six 
miles. There are two sets of modern roads approximating this road on the Gilmer map 
between western Goldsboro, the former site of Waynesborough, and present-day Tarboro. 
The first includes NC 581, US 117, SR 1537, NC 222/ NC 111, NC 111, SR 1006, SR 
1205, US 64A, and SR 1289. The total distance is 46.96 miles. The other set of roads 
includes NC 581 to NC 111, SR 1543, SR 1537, NC 222/ NC 111, NC 111, SR 1006, SR 
1205, US 64A, and SR 1289. Both roads are slightly over forty-eight miles, but the 
increase in distance is associated with the less direct modern urban block network of 
Goldsboro. The latter route, passing through Stony Creek and Patetown, follow the 
“County Road” depicted by Gilmer. In this map, he included the bridge across Nahunta 
Swamp, and on the modern maps, this road is still known as the Seven Bridges Road. 
This is the only factor that recommends that set of roads as the stage route leading from 
Stantonsburg to Waynesborough. 
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This stage route distances mentioned in issues of the Wilmington Advertiser from 
23 August 1839 to 3 January 1840 do not fit with the existing road network on the Gilmer 
map or any early map. The equivalent of present-day US 117 did exist between beyond 
the northern outskirts of Waynesboro. The modern roads follow the paths of the earlier 
roads but none run directly north. Only the railroad formed a continuous path between 
Waynesborough and the Tar River. The shorter distance given in the Wilmington 
newspaper suggest that some of the graded sections of railroad might have been used, or 
the writer was merely referring to the distance of the railroad that was not open. It is 
unclear. However, the section of railroad between Enfield at Battle’s Depot (Battleboro) 
traverses the marshland of Swift Creek. This is the type of topography where the early 
builders of railroad would have driven pilings (Ruffin, 1833). These structures would not 
have been suitable for stagecoaches or any other vehicle other that locomotives and 
railroad cars. On a modern topographic quadrangle map, US 301 crossed the Swift Creek 
marshes. All other roads go around it. For this reason, it is highly unlikely the stagecoach 
followed the route of the railroad on departing from Enfield. There were two roads 
leading from Rocky Mount to Tarborough. Both paralleled the Tar River. The road on the 
north bank of the river proceeded east to a crossing of the river at Teat’s Bridge or Bell’s 
Bridge. After crossing the river, it joined the road on the south bank that entered 
Tarborough on the north side of town (Gilmer, 1862; Cumming, 1866, Plate X). The 
present-day roads that follow their paths are Alt US 64 and NC 97. Dunbar Road, SR 
1252, crosses the Tar River near the site of Teat’s Bridge. Mrs. Kemble’s journal entries 
become problematic because she is unaware of the established (Kemble, 25).  
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Mrs. Kemble, by her own admission, “endeavored in vain to guess at the nature of 
the country through which we were traveling” (Kemble, 22). Can this be attributed to the 
fact that most of the journey was undertaken in the dead of night? The railroad was, and 
still is, located to the west of Halifax. The town of Enfield was not originally oriented on 
the line of the railroad; rather it was centered along the old road to Halifax that crosses 
the railroad above the town and continues at an angle to the west (Gilmer, 1862). That 
Mrs. Kemble boarded the stagecoach from here rather than a mile or so further down the 
track is possible. In this instance, the stagecoach could have followed the road from 
Enfield to Tarboro that crosses Daniel’s Bridge. There are two possibilities on this leg of 
the journey that would conform to both the Time Geography constraints and the ground 
control points. The first route would proceed from south of Enfield to a crossing of the 
Tar River at Teat’s Bridge that would skirt Tarboro to the west (Figure E4).  The second 
route would commence at Enfield and Tarboro via Bell’s Bridge over the Tar River. 
Because the rate of travel is ten miles per hour or less, time constraints do not permit a 
route that both crosses the Tar at Teat’s Bridge and enters Tarboro. That fact that railroad 
was able to deliver fish from Wilmington to Tarboro by their stagecoaches in late 
December of 1838 suggests that a Tarboro stop was on the route. It follows that the best 
route of the stages would match the post route. Mrs. Kemble’s failure to realize that she 
traveled through Halifax, Enfield, Tarboro, and Stantonsburg can be attributed to the 
darkness, her fatigue, and her metropolitan mindset. The stage route from Enfield to 
Waynesborough was likely the most direct route that falls within the mileage of staging 








Figure E4. Mrs. Kemble’s Journal makes no mention of passing any towns on the night 
stagecoach ride to Stantonsburg. This map of present-day Edgecombe County 
illustrates a route that conforms to the distance requirements of forty-nine 
miles established earlier in this study without entering Tarborough. The 
crossing of streams illustrated in the 1833 MacRae-Brazier map and the 1865 
U.S. Coast Survey map were compared to the modern road network in the 
county to approximate the earlier route. 
Source: Cumming, W.P. (1966). North Carolina In Maps. Raleigh, NC: State 

















Figure E5. This map illustrates the most probable route of the stagecoach line of the 










The author has selected Mrs. Butler’s (Kemble’s) 1842 article in Bentley’s 
Miscellany to deconstruct not only because it is an earlier version of the same account 
published in her 1863 Journal, but also because it is contemporary with the response. In 
like fashion, the response from “The Boors of Carolina” in Niles’ National Register also 
will be examined. The only elements of both documents that can be assumed to be true 
without proof is that the writers had submitted the work of their own hands, their 
observation came from personal experience, and they were not writing fiction. 
 The most basic question in the Kemble texts center around what railroad in North 
Carolina she was traveling. There were two railroads under construction in the state in 
1838, the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road and the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. The 
Raleigh & Gaston, as the name suggests, was constructed from the town of Gaston on the 
Roanoke River to Raleigh. It connected to the Petersburg Rail Road via the Greensville & 
Roanoke Rail Road. The other railroad, the Wilmington & Raleigh, extended from the 
town of Weldon on the Roanoke to the port of Wilmington. The name of the company is 
deceptive, because its incorporators originally intended to build a railroad between 
Raleigh & Wilmington, but the route was changed to Weldon and the name of the 
company was not changed to the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad until much later. This 
railroad provided a steamboat connection from Wilmington to Charleston. It connected to 
the Portsmouth & Roanoke Rail Road and the Petersburg Rail Road at its northern 
terminus. Details contained in the “A Winter’s Journey to Georgia U.S.” exclude all but 
the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road.  
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Mrs. Kemble traveled from Suffolk to Wilmington; she waited for the train at 
Weldon; it took her to a stagecoach that passed through Stantonsburg and 
Waynesborough; when she resumed rail travel, the train took her to Wilmington; and she 
took the steamboat from Wilmington to Charleston (Kemble-Butler, 1842, 12:6, 8-10, 
113, 115). The Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road operated in a different part of the state, and 
none of the places mentioned are located on its route.  
 The next task is to determine how far the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road 
Company had advanced in construction, and what sections were in operation in 
December of 1838. The answer is in several articles published in the Wilmington 
Advertiser. The remaining nine (miles) of track to Waynesborough (Goldsboro) lacked 
only the iron to make it complete (Wilmington Advertiser, 21 December 1838). Does this 
agree with Mrs. Kemble’s narrative? Remarkably, she records that the distance of the 
stagecoach ride from the bridge over the Neuse River at Waynesborough to the place 
where they were to meet the train from Wilmington was ten miles (Kemble-Butler, 11). 
The distance between the modern town of Dudley and Goldsboro is approximately nine 
miles. Mrs. Kemble gives the distance as ten miles, and she reports that the distance from 
where the stagecoach stopped and the home of the Colonel was one mile along the course 
of the track, so the area to be examined should include the land fronting the railroad two 
miles north and two miles south of Dudley. The texts are examined for geographic 
references. From this point, these references will appear underscored in block quotes 
through this study. An examination of the Kemble narrative begins after her stagecoach 




The ten miles which followed were over heavy sandy roads, and it was near 
sunset when we reached the place where we were to take the railroad. The train, 
however, had not arrived, and we sat still in the coaches, there being neither town, 
village, nor even road-side inn at hand, where we might take shelter from the 
bitter blast which swept through the pine-woods by which we were surrounded; 
and so we waited patiently, the day gradually drooping, the evening air becoming 
colder … 
 
– (Kemble-Butler, 11) – 
  
 
What does this mean in geographic (also climatic) terms? The sandy soil and pine-
woods are characteristics found in the coastal plain region of North Carolina. The road 
intersects or parallels the railroad, and the section of railroad completed is between 
towns. The rapid temperature drop at sunset is indicative of low humidity, and the bitter 
blast is likely a cold air mass moving in from the north. Two questions should be asked 
about this location. Why is this section of the railroad open to this point, and how long 
has it been in use? The answer to the first question is found in “Section Twenty-six” of 
an Act to Incorporate the Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road Company passed by the 




Be it further enacted, That so soon as ten miles of said rail road shall be 
completed, and as often thereafter as any other section of like length shall be 
completed, the said company, or the president and directors, may transport all 
produce or other commodities, that shall be deposited convenient to the said road 
for that purpose, and which they may be required to convey to any point on said 
road … 
 





This section of the act puts a legal limit on the minimum length the company can open 
for traffic: it had to be at least ten (miles) of track. Thus, if the railroad was abiding by 
their charter, they had opened a section of track at least ten miles in length. The article in 
the Wilmington Advertiser is dated two days before Mrs. Kemble was there.  
 
The section of the Wilmington and Raleigh Rail Road between Faison’s and 
Martin’s, 12 miles long, was traveled over yesterday for the first time by the 
passenger’s train.  The remaining section—nine miles—between Wilmington and 
Waynesboro’ is finished, except the iron, which will be nailed down as speedily 
as possible.   
 
– (Wilmington Advertiser, 21 December 1838) – 
 
 
It follows that the total number of miles between Faison’s Depot and Waynesborough by 
rail is twenty-one miles. Thus, this section was first used on 20 December 1838. The 
actual distance between Faison’s and these other places mentioned needs to be measured 
on an accurate map – both direct distances and distances by rail – since that depot site 
still exists. The newspaper article provides a new location to consider: Martin’s. The train 
stops at this undefined place; it may have been located twelve (miles) from Faison’s 
Depot, and the Slocomb plantation is in the neighborhood. Continuing the analysis of the 
Kemble text, she makes note that a group of local people had gathered at the site where 
the stagecoach was waiting “to see the hot-water carriages come up for only the third 
time into the midst of their savage solitude” (Kemble-Butler, 11). This appears likely 
since the newspaper account suggests that the first passenger train arrived here on 20 
December 1838. The title of the article, “Staging reduced and the comfort of travelers 
advanced,” suggests the stages were also at this point for the first time on the same date 
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(Wilmington Advertiser, ibid). The Kemble text also makes mention of the gentlemen of 
her party seeking a meal at “a miserable farm-house across the fields” (Kemble-Butler, 
11). An inventory of the geographic references that have been gleaned from the texts so 
far would include these elements: the stages had stopped at a location called Martin’s that 
is twelve (miles) north from Faison, and approximately nine miles south of 
Waynesborough Depot by rail. There is a stand of pines on one or the other side of the 
railroad, and a farmhouse separated by a field on the other side of the track. If a road is 
paralleling the track, the house could be facing the road. If it is actual an intersection, it 
could also be facing the other road. Whatever direction the house is facing, it is likely that 
the house was built with the front of the house facing an established road. This 
consideration may be insignificant, but should be noted if additional archival and map 
research exposes references to Martin’s Crossroads, Martin’s Farm, or anything similar. 
The gentlemen travelers agreed that they would seek shelter at the farm of “a man 
of some standing in the neighborhood” who lived about one mile away on the railroad. 
The luggage, women, and children were loaded on to an “empty baggage-car, or rather a 
mere platform on wheels,” and utilized the Black laborers that were there to push it along 
the railroad. It took nearly a half an hour to reach the Colonel’s plantation. She and a 
companion sheltered the babies in their arms to shield them from “the bleak north wind 
that whistled over us” (Kemble-Butler, 11-12). With a baby in her arms, it is likely she 
had her back to the wind.  
 
The last embers of daylight were dying out in dusky red streaks along the horizon, 
and the dreary waste around us looked like the very shaggy edge of all creation. 
The men who pushed us along encouraged each other with wild shouts and yells, 
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and every now and then their labour was one of no little danger, as well as 
difficulty – for the road crossed one or two deep ravines and morasses at a 
considerable height, and nothing but the iron rails were laid across piles driven 
into these places, it became a service of considerable risk to run along these 
narrow ledges, at the same time urging our car along … we presently beheld, with 
no satisfaction, a cluster of houses in the fields at some little distance from the 
road.   
 
– (Kemble-Butler, 12) – 
  
 
The Sun and Moon data for the coordinates of this area of Wayne County, North 
Carolina, for Sunday 23 December 1838 as calculated by the US Naval Observatory are 
as follows: sunset was at 5:05 PM, with evening civil twilight ending at 5:33. The Moon 
transit was at 6:02 PM, and it was a first quarter Moon (United States Navy, 2007). That 
Mrs. Kemble could distinguish the houses in the field at the site of the Colonel’s 
plantation suggests that civil twilight had not yet ended. The first quarter Moon would 
not have provided enough light for that extremely dangerous trip there on the flat car if it 
were later. Her narrative does not indicate the direction they are traveling, but the 
“ravines and morasses” she describes suggest unique landscape features that might 
appear on topographic maps and these could be observed on a site visit. 
 Several problems in Mrs. Kemble’s narrative need to be addressed before 
continuing with her description of the interior of the Colonel’s home. It was getting dark, 
and the train from Wilmington was overdue. If they started at the end of the newly 
opened twelve miles of track, the Black laborers are pushing the women and children on 
a flat car south, are pushing them in the direction the train will be coming. Not only that, 
the car is being pushed over trestlework. No mention is made of the stagecoach leaving, 
and if it had left, there was a group of laborers at hand to help them carry their luggage an 
393 
 
extra mile down the road. That is, if there is a road parallel to the railroad. If not, the 
railroad is the only direct means to get to the plantation. What happens with the flat car 
when they arrive at the Colonel’s plantation? It cannot be left there because the engineer 
would not expect it, and probably would not be able to avoid it the dark. Would the Black 
laborers, already familiar with the locomotive, have taken a big risk pushing the car along 
at twilight more than double the risk by pushing it back at dusk? Now, if the flat car was 
being pushed north, there must be a reason why the railroad is not using the remaining 
miles of track. This is a return to the ten miles/twelve miles puzzle presented earlier. The 
charter of the company required ten miles of track to be put down before the section was 
open, but what if the ten-mile mark places the train on trestlework over a ravine or in a 
swamp? The train needed a place to take on freight and passengers that was accessible by 
an existing road, and it had to be where there was enough space to construct an 
arrangement of track and switches to get the locomotive and tender pointed in the right 
direction for the return trip. If such a place were at the eight-mile mark, it could not be 
used until the company built ten miles of new track. The text has presented so many 
questions about this short length of track, there needs to be proof that such a landscape 
exists here. 
  In 1836, Ruffin’s Farmer’s Register published “Extracts from the Report of 
Walter Gwynn, Esq., Engineer, to the President and Directors of the Wilmington and 
Raleigh Rail Road Company.” The Western Route is the one that was selected, and the 
block quote below concerns the section of track between Faison’s Depot and the Neuse 
River. Gwynn refers to Goshen in his text. Goshen Swamp begins just north of Faison 
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Depot, and covers a large area, but it is outside the study area. The relevant streams and 
landscape features will appear underscored. 
 
Immediately on ascending from the valley of Goshen, the route reaches a dry, 
level, open woods through which it passes to Brook’s Branch. The formation of 
the rail road on this portion of the route will consist, chiefly, in cutting down large 
trees which overspread the track, and hewing and preparing them for the reception 
of the iron rails. After making a slight undulation in crossing Brook’s Branch, 
which is a very inconsiderable stream, it arrives at the same level ground, on 
which it continues to the head of Yellow Marsh; along the margin of which, it 
descends to the valley of the Neuse River … 
 
– (Ruffin, 1836, 348) – 
 
 
 “Revolutionary Reminiscences. Fanny Kemble in North Carolina” was first 
published in the Charleston Courier, and then republished in Niles’ National Register on 
1 October 1842. The writer, referring to Mrs. Kemble’s denigrating remark about the 
country people that had come to see the train from Wilmington, signs his response “The 
Boors of Carolina.”  
 
Mrs. B. gives a very correct account of the colonel and of his mansion as it 
appeared by night. It is a common two story frame house, very ancient – and so 
was its master, for I regret to say the venerable Colonel died on the 4th day of July 
1840, in the 89th year of his age … The house fronts the east, and an avenue of 
half a mile in length, and almost 150 feet in breadth, stretches to the easternmost 
side of the plantation, where was a highway, and beyond that, open grounds partly 
dry meadow and partly sand barren. This avenue was lined on the south side by a 
high fence and a thick hedge row of forest trees now removed and replaced by the 
pride of India and other ornamental trees; on the north the common rail fence of 
seven or eight feet high, such as is seen on all plantations of good farmers in the 
low country where the necessary timber is convenient …  
 






The writer includes additional details of the plantation when he describes an event that 
occurred during the American Revolution. Col. Slocomb and members of the local militia 
narrowly escaped when they unknowingly came upon the British encamped on the 
plantation grounds.     
 
 
Quick as thought they again wheeled their horses and dashed down the avenue 
directly toward the house, where stood the quarter guard to receive them. On 
reaching the garden fence, a rude structure, which we call a wattled fence, they 
leapt that, the next, amid a shower of balls from the guard, cleared the canal, a 
tremendous leap, and scouring across the open field to the northwest, were 
sheltered in the wood before their pursuers could clear the fences of the enclosure. 
This description should excite the curiosity of any traveling reader, he may see the 
whole ground as he passes over the Wilmington rail road, 1½ miles south of 
Dudley depot.   
 
– (The Boors of Carolina, 1842) – 
     
   
  From the details provided by the writer, the plantation was located south of 
Dudley. Brogden and Yellow Marsh Branch can be excluded from the examination. The 
trestlework traversing “one or two deep ravines and morasses at a considerable height” 
must have been located where the railroad crosses the two tributaries of Brook’s Swamp. 
The two-story frame house faced east at least one half mile from the highway. There is a 
road on the topographic map located between the two streams at Brook’s Swamp, almost 
two miles south of Dudley, which is one half mile in length and intersects with a road 
east of the railroad. This may be the relic of the “avenue.” The combination of roads that 
joins both the suspected half-mile avenue and the railroad appears on modern road maps 
as Kelly Springs Road SE and Everette Road SE. The distance between the point where 
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Everette Road SE intersects the railroad and the western end of Parker Road SE is 1.3 
miles north by the railroad.  
 The geometry of the modern arrangement of roads suggests two hypotheses that 
maybe verified, in part, with additional examination. The first is that the stagecoach 
stopped at a point that is now the intersection of Everette Road SE and Old Mt. Olive 
Road (3.1 miles) from Dudley). For lack of a road, the passengers followed the railroad 
1.3 miles to the site of the modern Parker Road SE, the suspected “avenue” on the 
Slocomb plantation. The second possibility is that the stage arrived at the site of what 
would be Dudley Depot, and they followed the railroad 1.8 miles to the same point. The 
first hypothesis has the advantages of being the shorter distance and utilizing a direction 
away from the expected train. In addition, we can also hypothesize that the Black laborers 
were not merely “loitering about” as Mrs. Kemble put it; that they were connected to the 
construction and/or operation of the railroad, and the flat “baggage” car had been left 
there to be loaded with the passengers’ luggage. The latter may be difficult to prove, but 
seems odd that luggage would be unloaded from the stage onto a car used by the 
construction crew for hauling iron, wood, or dirt; or that the stage would deposit the 
passengers and their luggage without receiving those coming up the road from 
Wilmington. 
 The last fragment of text to be examined in Mrs. Kemble’s article is her 
description of the interior of the Colonel’s home. 
 
To the principal one I made my way, followed by the rest of the poor womankind, 
and, entering the house without further ceremony, ushered them into a large 
species of wooden room, where blazed a huge pine-wood fire. By this welcome 
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light we descried, sitting in the corner of the vast chimney, an old ruddy-faced 
man … His residence (considering his rank) was quite the most primitive 
imaginable, – a rough brick-and-plank chamber, of considerable dimensions, not 
even whitewashed, with great beams and rafters by which it was supported 
displaying the skeleton of the building, to the complete satisfaction of any who 
might be curious in architecture. The windows could close neither at the top, 
bottom, sides, nor middle, and were, besides, broken so as to admit several 
delightful currents of air, which might be received as purely accidental. 
 
– (Kemble-Butler, 12) – 
 
 
Kemble states that the same room contained a clock, a bed, and a number of rush-bottom 
chairs of many sizes. Turkey-feather fans, dried herbs, medicine bottles, and one or two 
firearms were hung from the wall. Sometime past eight o’clock, they were informed that 
the train from Wilmington had arrived (Kemble-Butler, 12).  
 The article written by “The Boors of Carolina” refers to the house having a 
“piazza,” meaning a covered arcade or a verandah; and during the British occupation of 
the plantation during the Revolution, that Mrs. Slocomb “withdrew to her room” after 
being assured by the British commander, Tarleton, that his soldiers would not loot her 
home. He also mentions a skirmish between a “platoon” of troops under the direction of a 
Tory captain and the militiamen of Col. Slocomb and Major Williams in the woods and 
field near the canal. At the time the article was written, the local residents still called this 
“dead man’s field.” The writer corrects Mrs. Kemble’s remark that the Colonel served 
homemade wine. It was actually peach brandy prepared under Col. Slocomb’s 
supervision from the fruit of his own orchard, “the orchard and field to the right” (The 
Boors of Carolina). The article contains many details such as the names of British and 
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American officers and their outfits, the locations of encampments, and the type of food 
that would have been served in the region.  
 Now, the elements of the text must be reassembled into statements that describe 
the whole spatial event in concise, disinterested terms: 
1) On the afternoon of 23 December 1838, the British actress Frances Anne Kemble-
Butler traveling with her husband and infant children on the yet to be completed 
Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, arrived at a location in the neighborhood of the 
present-day town of Dudley in Wayne County, North Carolina. They had traveled 
approximately ten miles from the crossing of the Neuse River at Waynesborough 
(now a part of Goldsboro) by stagecoach to a point where the existing road 
intersected the open section of railroad. The text does not provide enough 
information to determine the exact point; yet Mrs. Kemble records that the 
distance between this point and the home of the Colonel is one mile by rail. At the 
point where the stage had stopped, there were a field and farmhouse on one side 
of the road and pine forest on the other. Colonel Ezekiel Slocomb is the only 
possible candidate for Kemble’s unnamed Colonel: he was a veteran of the 
American Revolution, his wife died in 1836, and his home was located on the 
railroad near the section of the railroad that had been open on 20 December 1838. 
His acquaintances recognized his thinly cloaked identity when Mrs. Butler (Mrs. 
Kemble) published her article in 1842. The descriptions of the interior of the 
Colonel’s house in the Kemble text can be connected with the exterior 
descriptions provided by “The Boors of Carolina.”  
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2) Colonel Slocomb owned a plantation near Dudley. The half-mile, one-hundred 
fifty foot wide road leading to the Colonel’s house fronted an old highway on the 
east. There was once a seven or eight-foot high fence and a hedgerow that ran 
along the south side of the “avenue” leading to the plantation house. There were 
“sand barrens,” or sandy patches that would not support vegetation, near the 
highway. On the northwest corner of the plantation, visible from the railroad, 
being one and a half miles south of Dudley Depot, was an open field with woods 
on the north side and a canal on the south side. The plantation house, surrounded 
by outbuildings, was a short distance from the railroad track, and its front faced 
the east. It was a two-story frame structure of brick and plank construction. It had 
a verandah, and/or cover walkway. The framework was exposed in the interior, it 
was not painted, and the windows were set in unmovable frames. There was at 
least one large fireplace, and the room that contained it was large. The plantation 
had a peach orchard, and the “Pride of India,” that term being applied to both the 
crape myrtle and the chinaberry tree, would have been used later as ornamental 
plants along the “avenue.”    
3) Sunset occurred at 5:05 PM that day. The wind was blowing from the north. Mrs. 
Kemble, her children, and the other women passengers boarded the available flat 
car that was used to haul baggage, and were pushed by Black laborers one mile 
along the railroad through Brook’s Swamp to the rear of Colonel Slocomb’s 





 Testing of the two hypotheses presented in the previous section involves 
identifying the “one or two deep ravines and morasses” within a three mile distance south 
of the site of Dudley Depot on the line of the railroad. This is the only landscape element 
linking the two documents analyzed. It can also be defined in a specific set of X, Y 
coordinates representing movement from one location to another along a fixed route: 
Mrs. Kemble was pushed a distance of approximately one mile on a railroad car from the 
site where the stagecoaches were to meet the train from Wilmington to the home of the 
Colonel. The sand barrens, the canal, “dead man’s field,” the site of the peach orchard, 
and the plantation house are all unknowns on a parcel of undetermined dimensions; and 
though they were observable in 1842, there is no reason to assume any of them remain. 
 As stated earlier, the purpose of this study is to glean enough information from 
the historic texts to recommend a site for further inquiry. Taking this recommendation as 
a starting point, the historic preservation profession and/or archaeologist must determine 
the significance of the site and make the appropriate arrangements with the property 
owners. The professional must then first examine the life and career of Colonel Ezekiel 
Slocomb to establish his place in North Carolina’s antebellum history, or else establish 
the significance of the plantation and whatever opportunities it may present in expanding 
what is known about antebellum material culture. Otherwise, several purely historical 
topics arise from the questions posed by the examination of the text. Knowing the 
identity of the “Colonel” and details about his place of residence enhances the 
interpretation of Frances Anne Kemble’s Journal of a Residence on a Georgian 
Plantation in 1838-1838. The text illustrates how the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road, 
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an example of early railroad construction in the United States, employed a trestlework of 
pilings for crossing some stretches of uneven ground rather than earth embankments. In 
addition, the Southern antebellum railroads used slave labor in the construction of their 
railroads, and in some aspects of operating these railroads. The Kemble narrative contains 
two accounts of groups of Black laborers encamped at the end of both divisions of 
construction. This is one of the few written accounts of the working and living conditions 
of this type of work force. Finally, the two documents provide insight into the life of a 
veteran of the American Revolution. 
 The methods selected for testing the two hypotheses involve map analysis and a 
site examination of the section of railroad running through Brook’s Swamp. The author 
downloaded a 1/3 ArcSecond NE CONUS Elevation map from The National Map 
website, hosted by the USGS, for the map extent of 35º 12’35” N to 35º 16’30” N and 77º 
59’9” W to 78º 5’43” W – Geographic Coordinate System WGS84 (USGS, 2007, The 
Nation Map, http://nationalmap.gov/; last accessed on 18 December 2007). At this point, 
the only quality of landscape that needs to be examined is elevation. The heavy black line 
marks the route of the railroad. The second layer of this map consists of sections of the 
modern road network east of the railroad taken from US Census TIGER/Line Files 
(Figure E6). These roads appear as thin black lines. The road network west of the road 
has been excluded because there are no roads in this section intersecting the railroad 
through Brook’s Swamp below Dudley. Point A marks the intersection of Everette Road 
with the railroad; Point B marks the intersection of Parker Road with Kelly Springs Road; 









Figure E6. Point A marks the intersection of Everette Road with the railroad; Point B 
marks the intersection of Parker Road with Kelly Springs Road; Point D 
marks the intersection of Brewinton Road with the railroad; and Point E is the 
intersection of Sleepy Creek Road/Dudley Road with the railroad – the 
approximate site of the old Dudley Depot. The elliptical, crater-like, 
formations like the one marked by Letter E are Carolina Bays. The Letter C is 
the location marked by the double circle is the probable place where the 
“avenue” leading through Colonel Slocomb’s plantation intersected with the 
railroad.  
Source: 1/3 ArcSecond NE CONUS Elevation map from The National Map 
website, hosted by the USGS, for the map extent of 35º 12’35” N to 35º 
16’30” N and 77º 59’9” W to 78º 5’43” W – Geographic Coordinate System 
WGS84; from US Census TIGER/Line Files (US Census Bureau, 2000, North 






intersection of Sleepy Creek Road/Dudley Road with the railroad – the approximate site 
of the old Dudley Depot. For those unfamiliar with the geomorphology of the Coastal 
Plain of North Carolina, the elliptical, crater-like, formations like the one marked by 
Letter F are Carolina Bays. The Letter C is the location marked by the double circle is the 
probable place where the “avenue” leading through Colonel Slocomb’s plantation 
intersected with the railroad (Figure E9). The distance by the railroad between Everette 
Road (Point A) and Parker Road (at Letter C) is 1.3 miles. The distance between the 
railroad and Kelly Springs Road (Point B) by Parker Road is 0.5 miles. The distance by 
railroad between Parker Road and Brewinton Road (Point D) is 1.2 miles; and the 
distance between Parker Road and Sleepy Creek Road/Dudley Road (Point E) is 1.8 
miles. The distance between Everette Road and Sleepy Creek Road/Dudley Road is 3.1 
miles; and the distance between Everette Road and Brewinton Road by the railroad is 2.5 
miles. By querying the elevation data on the 1/3 ArcSecond NE CONUS Elevation map, 
there is about a foot gained in elevation between Point A and Point D; however, the 
streams running through the two branches of Brook’s under the railroad are over forty 
feet lower than Point A and Point D.  At this point, it seems likely Mrs. Kemble could 
have traveled on high trestlework over “ravines and morasses” for about a mile from 
either direction. This is not necessarily so, however. The railroad could have chosen to 
descend gradually from the higher elevation to the south by trestlework to some safe level 
over the bank full level of the streams. From this point, the railroad could have followed 
the terrain on its ascent.  
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By 1858, all the original trestlework below the Neuse River had been filled as 
embankments (Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, 1858, 7). Since it is more likely that the 
company would have smoothed out the descent and ascent rather than cut it more deeply, 
the height of the present embankment on the railroad should reflect, to a degree, the 
construction on the height of the original trestle. Since trains have run over this section of 
track regularly since 1838, it is not likely the line has been shut down to elevate the track 
too much higher or lower than it was originally. 
 The geographic statements the period documents match a common location, 
Colonel Ezekiel Slocomb’s plantation. An examination of the physical landscape along 
the railroad track within 3.1 miles of the former Dudley depot site affirms the hypothesis 
that Mrs. Kemble was pushing north in the “baggage car” from the approximate location 
that can be represented on a map with the coordinates N35.223938º, W78.042719º to 
N35.24236, W78.04032. The northward direction of travel would carry the car over the 
“ravine and morasses” at a dangerous height, if the present day embankments are a good 
indication of the height of the original trestlework. The second set of coordinates can 
with associated with the approximate location of the “avenue” passing through the 
Slocomb plantation. These conclusions are the best that can be obtained with the 
available sources, and are subject to slight revisions if additional research should prove 
the need to do so. The author suggests that a further inquiry into the life, military career, 
and plantation of Colonel Ezekiel Slocomb would enhance the available body of research 










LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK 
 
 
The 14 locomotives that ran the line in 1840 were the best of English and 
American technology at the time. The first two engines delivered, built by the English 
Stephenson firm, arrived in late 1837. Illustrations accompanying the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road’s advertisements in the Wilmington newspaper and the impression of 
the company seal on early documents in the North Carolina State Archives suggest the 
Stephenson “Planet” class locomotive (North Carolina, 1840b, 10; Wilmington 
Advertiser, 10 November 1837; Konkle, 1922, 171). The Smithsonian Institute preserved 
Stephenson locomotive the John Bull used on the Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road is a 
modified “Planet” class locomotive, as is the reproduction of the Raleigh & Gaston’s 
locomotive Raleigh housed at the North Carolina Transportation Museum in Spencer. 
Three Norris engines and one Baldwin engine, both made in Philadelphia, are 
mentioned in the Wilmington Advertiser, along with three passenger cars and four 
baggage cars built by the firm of Betts, Pusey & Harlan, whose shops were located in 
Wilmington, Delaware. Eight wheels supported these passenger cars, and the engine 
tenders for passenger trains were also fitted with eight wheels. This arrangement was 
adopted for reasons of safety, and to reduce the need for “frequent stoppages for water 
and fuel” (Wilmington Advertiser, 11 January 1839, 24 May 1839). Another Norris 
engine was ordered for the northern end of the line.  
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The company also owned locomotives built by D. J. Burr and Company. The 
1838 report given by Alexander Anderson, President pro tem of the Wilmington & 
Raleigh Rail Road, before the North Carolina Legislature’s Board of Internal 
Improvements, provides a detailed account of the company’s resources, equipment, and 
the cost of purchase. Included in the report are the following items: 12 locomotives with 
tenders, $90,000; 8 coaches capable of carrying 56 passengers each ($2,250 each), 
$18,000; and 80 burthen cars ($300 each), $24,000 (Wilmington Advertiser, 11 October 
1839; North Carolina, 1838, 17-18). 
The paint scheme for the locomotives and car is a matter of speculation. However, 
the paint shop inventory of the company included in the 1856 annual stockholders report 
includes large quantities of the Brandon paint, also called ochre, a clay base containing 
iron used in preparing paint, including Venetian red, vermillion, chrome green and 
chrome yellow. Other pigments listed in the 1858 report include India red, vermillion red, 
chrome green, chrome yellow, and black (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road Company, 
1856, 20; 1858, 16) suggesting a similar selection of colors to that of the Raleigh, but 
perhaps used in a different way. Assuming the paint scheme was selected early in the 
history of the company, the locomotive and cars were likely decorated with some 
arrangement of these cheerful colors. 
James Sprunt, in Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, provides more details about 
these first locomotives. 
 
Twelve locomotives, which were named, Nash, Wayne (built by R. Stephenson & 
Co., Newcastle-on-Tyne, England), New Hanover, Edgecombe, Brunswick, and 
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Bladen (built by William Norris, Philadelphia, Pa.), Greene, Halifax, and 
Sampson (built by Burr & Sampson, Richmond, Va.), etc. 
 
– (Sprunt, 1916, 150) – 
 
 
The Brunswick was the first engine to run over the entire railroad when it was completed 
from Wilmington to Weldon, and it was still in service as a supply train in 1858 
(Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road, 1858, 8). Another engine that survived into the 1850s 
was the Edgecombe. After 1840, other locomotives were added periodically over the 
decade. During the Great Fire of 1843, five of the locomotives were damaged.  
 
All the Rail Road Depot, buildings, of every description, including five 
Locomotives, some cars, the bridge over the ravine, and two or three yards of the 
road where there were several tracks … 
 
– (Carolina Observer, 3 May 1843) – 
 
 
Shortly thereafter, the Wilmington Chronicle reports that some of the locomotives could 
possibly be repaired. At the annual meeting of the stockholders held on 9 November 
1843, $8000 was determined to be the cost of replacing “provisions, fixtures, &c.” due to 
the fire . This amount seems small compared to the original cost of the $90,000 it took to 
purchase the original 12 locomotives. However, by that December a powerful new engine 
was added to the road, and another like it is had been ordered, to compensate for the loss 
of locomotives due to the fire (Wilmington Chronicle, 17 May 1843, 15 November 1843, 
North Carolina, 1838, 17). 
 
In consequence of the loss of several locomotives by the fire last spring, there has 
since been a lack of motive power on the Wilmington Rail Road, especially felt in 
the heavy freight transportation. The deficiency is now however partly supplied, 
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and will be entirely very soon. An engine capable of hauling a train of 6 or 700 
bbls. Turpentine, weighing alone 100 to 120 tons, has just been put upon the 
Road, and another which it is supposed will be able to take along a train of a 
thousand bbls., or about 170 tons, is expected shortly. 
 
– (Wilmington Chronicle, 6 December 1843) – 
 
 
The available surviving record does not provide enough information to determine what 
happened to the all the damaged engines. It might be safe to speculate that they were 
eventually restored or their salvageable components could have been used in engines 
made in the company shops.  
Mention of four new locomotives, two new coaches, and a large number of 
“trucks” having been purchased appears in a report of the annual meeting of the 
stockholders of 1846 (Wilmington Journal, 20 November 1846). During the 1840s, the 
company acquired a number of new locomotives. The J. C. Calhoun, an M. W. Baldwin 
locomotive, was put into service in 1841. The James K. Polk, also by M. W. Baldwin, 
followed in 1842. The William A. Graham, by M. W. Baldwin, and two Burr, Pea & 
Sampson locomotives, E. B. Dudley and Wm. H. Haywood, were purchased in 1846; 
followed in 1847 by the Perseverance, by M. W. Baldwin locomotive. During 1850, the 
company shops built the  J. M. Morehead and the Saxapahaw. Mechanic, a Norris 
Brothers locomotive was also added in 1850. This first generation of passenger 
locomotives were lightweight and managed an average speed of 22 miles per hour 
(Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road, 1955, 22). In 1891, Albert Johnson, engineer whose 
career had started with the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad in the 1830s, gives a 
description of the early locomotives on the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road. 
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They had no pilot, no headlight and no cab. English fashion, the driver or 
engineer stood out in the weather. The first engines on the Wilmington and 
Weldon railway weighed ten tons each. They were the Dudley, the Haywood, the 
Green and the Sampson. 
 
– (Wilmington Messenger, 3 September 1891) – 
 
 
These early locomotives, as with all locomotives built prior to the Elijah McCoy’s 
invention of the “Lubricator Cup” in the late 19th century, had to be oiled frequently 
during its run. The average oil consumption for these early locomotives was one pint 
every 10 miles. Other organic lubrications available at time also included animal fats that 
were used as grease, and cottonseed oil. That the railroad became a heavy consumer of 
tallow and cotton waste is not surprising.  
Some of these first generation engines were rebuilt and used for varying tasks 
until the 1860s. The Brunswick, Edgecombe, E. B. Dudley, W. A. Graham, J. C. Calhoun, 
and W. H. Haywood – all put into service between 1838 and 1846 – were rebuilt during 
the 1850s. Even when they were worn out, the company shops were able to rebuild them. 
The Edgecombe, along with the Cumberland and J. C. Calhoun, are listed as worn out 
and irreparable in the 1856 “Consolidated Report of Locomotives.” Other older engines 
listed in this report are the W. A. Graham, valued at $1000 and considered not worth 
rebuilding. The Saxapahaw (a shifting engine built by the company shops in 1850) was 
valued at $500 and considered worn out; the W. H. Haywood, at $3000 and the E. B. 
Dudley at $800 were considered worth rebuilding. Surprisingly, by 1860, the J. C. 
Calhoun was being repaired and the E. B. Dudley had been rebuilt (Wilmington & 
Weldon Rail Road, 1856, 23; 1860, 37).  
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Between 1851 and 1855, eleven new locomotives were in use. These new 
locomotives, the second generation to be put into service on the Wilmington & Raleigh 
Rail Road, were truly American machines. They were almost evenly divided between the 
M. W. Baldwin and Norris Brothers (See Table F1.) Norris and Baldwin had developed 
locomotives that were dependable, durable, and could perform well on less than perfect 
rail arrangements. American railroads at that time had been built in a quick economic 
fashion, and many railroads during the 1850s, particularly in the South, were still using 
strap iron on wooden rail. Others were using an assortment of different iron rail sizes and 
designs. Even when the “T” rail became the standard, it was manufactured in many 
weights and sizes. There was not a universal track gauge at that time. The American 
railroads were longer than most of their European counterparts and covered diverse 
terrain. The design had to be such that a railroad could repair a locomotive in their shops. 
The American locomotive of the 1850s was twice the weight of its predecessors, 
weighing 20 to 25 tons, and weight was distributed over a greater area. The 4-4-0 
configuration with its four large driver wheels was the standard American locomotive of 
the 19th century, and many builders used this design well into the early 20th century. It is 
worth noting that the durability of Norris locomotives was such that the Seaboard Air 
Line was using one for instructing engineers in the late nineteenth century - the company 
made its last locomotive in 1867 (Sinclair and White, 1970, 643).  Likewise, the Baldwin 
locomotives were equally durable. Following the Civil War, the Goldsboro and Industry 
were rebuilt, and another engine, the Guilford, had been recovered from the Roanoke 














Name of Locomotive Builder Put into service  Usage 
J. M. Morehead Company Shops 1850 Timber 
Saxapahaw Company Shops 1850 Dirt 
Mechanic Norris Brothers Co. October, 1850 Passenger
Farmer Norris Brothers Co. May, 1851 Passenger
Merchant M. W. Baldwin June, 1851 Freight 
Industry M. W. Baldwin February, 1852 Freight 
Director Norris Brothers February, 1852 Passenger
Quickstep Norris Brothers March, 1852 Passenger
Engineer Norris Brother April, 1852 Passenger
President R. Norris & Son February, 1853 Passenger
Express R. Norris & Son March, 1854 Passenger
Treasurer M. W. Baldwin May, 1855 Passenger
Guilford M. W. Baldwin August, 1855 Freight 
Orange Manchester Locomotive Works September, 1855 Passenger
 
Table F1. Locomotives put into service on the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road between 

















M. W. Baldwin built all three locomotives. The Orange, built by Manchester Locomotive 
Works in New Hampshire and put into service in 1855, was still in service after the war 
(Wilmington Journal, 19 November 1869). The arrival of one of the Norris engines in 
1851 is mentioned in The Wilmington Herald.  
 
We take the liberty in connection with this subject of stating that A New 
Locomotive, from the manufactory of Norris & Bros., has received by the 
Company. It is called “The Farmer,” a good name, and it looks like a splendid 
engine. 
 
– (Wilmington Herald, 21 May 1851) – 
 
 
Angus Sinclair provides a description of several Norris locomotives, quoted from 
an 1853 article in the “American Railway Journal”, in his book Development of the 
Locomotive Engine. Several Norris locomotives are listed in this article. It is probable 
that the reporter for The Herald saw a locomotive with similar features. 
 
No 10, by Norris, outside cylinders 12⅜ inch by 26 inch; 4 drivers 5 feet diameter 
on truck; heating surface, 708 square feet in tubes, 54 in firebox, and 10 square 
feet grate area; weight 43,920, of which 26,880 are on drivers. 
 
– (Sinclair and White, 1970, 266) – 
 
 
While the available documentation does not reveal the actual specifications of the 
Farmer, the 1856 report to the stockholders indicates that for the year ending on 30 
September that the engine ran 11, 853 miles, hauled 341 cars, consumed 201 cords of 
wood, and was in service 79 days (Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road, 1856, 21). It 
appears the Farmer averaged 59 miles to the cord of wood while hauling 4.3 cars.     
413 
 
By 1856, the Wilmington & Weldon (changed from the Wilmington & Raleigh) 
Rail Road had ten passenger locomotives, seven of which were built by Norris. The 
names of these locomotives were Mechanic, Director, President, Engineer, Express, 
Farmer, and Quickstep. Manchester Locomotive works had built the Orange, and M. W. 
Baldwin had built the Treasurer. One new passenger locomotive, the Alexander McRae, 
had been built in the company shops. M. W. Baldwin built all seven of the regular freight 
locomotives. The names of these locomotives were Guilford, North Carolina, Merchant, 
Industry, Perseverance, James K. Polk, and J. M. Morehead. The inventory of 
locomotives given in the annual report to the stockholder in 1860 indicates a total of 26 
(See Table F2). On the eve of the Civil War, the Wilmington & Weldon Rail Road was 
outfitted with an exceptional number of first-rate locomotives, and had managed to keep 
some of the older locomotives in service for maintaining the line. Paul T. Warner’s 
Motive Power Development on the Pennsylvania Railroad System, 1831-1924, published 
in 1924 by Baldwin Locomotives, contains a number of illustrations of locomotives of 
the antebellum period along with their specifications (Warner, 1924, 4-7). In general, the 
American railroad tended towards purchasing the locomotives with the classic 4-4-0 
configuration since the four-wheeled leading truck proved it usefulness in negotiating the 
grades, curves, and other defects in the rails. The pace of construction for American 
railroads was primary, and the quality of the road was secondary to placing it in operation 
expediently. By contrast, the English placed an emphasis on extensive excavations, 
embankments, and quality construction of the rail superstructure to produce the well 







Number  Name of 
Locomotive  
Names of Builder Condition Usage 
22 Orange Manchester Locomotive 
Works 
Running Passenger
23 Wilmington Manchester Locomotive 
Works 
Running Passenger
24 Gov. Bragg Manchester Locomotive 
Works 
Running Passenger
17 President R. Norris & Son Running Passenger
18 Express R. Norris & Son Running Passenger
21 Alex. McRae Company’s Shops Running Passenger
9 Weldon Norris Brothers Running Passenger
25 P. K. Dickinson M. W. Baldwin & Company Running Passenger
26 Gov. Ellis M. W. Baldwin & Company Running Passenger
19 Goldsboro M. W. Baldwin Running Passenger
14 Director Norris Brothers Running Freight 
15 Quickstep Norris Brothers Running Freight 
20 Guilford M. W. Baldwin Running Freight 
12 Merchant M. W. Baldwin Running Freight 
13 Industry M. W. Baldwin Running Freight 
4 W. H. Haywood Burr, Pea & Sampson Running Freight 
27 Gilbert Potter M. W. Baldwin & Company Running Freight 
28 E. P. Hall Rogers Running Freight 
6 J. K. Polk M. W. Baldwin Running - 
7 Perseverance M. W. Baldwin Running - 
10 North Carolina M. W. Baldwin Running - 
1 Brunswick William Norris Running - 
8 J. M. Morehead Company’s Shops Running - 
11 Farmer Norris & Brothers Laid up - 
3 J. C. Calhoun M. W. Baldwin Laid up - 
5 E. B. Dudley Burr, Pea & Sampson Rebuilding - 
 














THE LETTERS OF P.Q. AND G.L.C. 
 
 
Edmund Ruffin’s Farmers’ Register became the arena for a debate when two 
writers that identified themselves only as P.Q. and G.L.C. began a discussion of railroad 
routes in February 1836. Their literary joust, replete with classical references, antiquated 
wit, and chivalrous concessions, is both amusing and somewhat annoying to the current 
reader; yet, when all the gentlemanly conceit is set aside, the letters detail the merits and 
defects of the planned rail routes that were being discussed in North Carolina. Writer 
P.Q. signs his letters from Raleigh, and favors the Raleigh to Gaston route as well as its 
extension to the Pee Dee and beyond. G.L.C., signing his initial letter from Camden, 
South Carolina, prefers a route from Weldon to Waynesborough, and defends the 
Wilmington to Halifax route. 
G.L.C. began the contest with a critique that expressed regret that the Petersburg 
Rail Road had constructed two branch lines to the Roanoke rather than applying the funds 
to building a railroad from Raleigh to Fayetteville. The writer saw Petersburg’s redundant 
routes to the Roanoke as a waste. He was critical of the opinions of writer “Raleigh” in 
the Raleigh Register who had proclaimed that the Raleigh & Gaston would attract the 
produce of the western portion of the state, while the east would continue to ship produce 
from its coast (Ruffin, 1836d). P.Q. responded from Raleigh with an accusation that his 
rival was trying to envision the whole system of internal improvements for much of the 
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Union – as it existed – without full consideration of the landscapes of these different 
states, or desires of communities that have long supported a “favorite scheme.” He 
asserted that “every rail road is an invention, so far that one was never tried before, under 
the same circumstance,” and he did not believe the Wilmington to Halifax route would 
work. In general, he believed the state should carefully consider when granting charters 
whether a new railroad would weaken one that already existed. He was also sure that the 
west would support the Raleigh & Gaston, and that Wilmington would have been better 
off had they built their railroad to Raleigh (Ruffin, 1836c, 766). 
 In his response, writer G.L.C. expressed his doubts about the effectiveness of 
legislatures to manage railroads and noted that the North Carolina Legislature refused to 
grant funds to build the experimental railroad to Swift Creek that was recommended by 
Hamilton Fulton. He did not think legislatures should be entrusted with the authority to 
protect railroads from competition, and he lectured P.Q. on “odious” monopolies. He also 
referred to a report by Lt. Col. S.H. Long of the United States Topographical Engineers 
titled “Railroads – Atlantic to the Mississippi” that supported a Darlington to Halifax 
route. The report had been transmitted by Lewis Cass, the Secretary of War (Ruffin, 
1836e). The text of this document describes a central trunk line. 
 
Among the numerous opportunities presented for connecting the contemplated 
railroad with important points on the Atlantic seaboard, by means of lateral 
branches, there is one of no less moment than that relating to the main stem, as 
already described. We allude to a route which is to be regarded as a part or 
prolongation of the main road itself rather than a branch leading from it, and 
which is as follows: Commencing at the crossing of the Oconee at the point 
designated, the route may be extended in a northeasterly direction, through the 
broad and flat diluvial region bordering upon the Atlantic coast of Georgia, South 
Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, and passing the vicinity of 
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Swainsborough, in Georgia; Barnwell, Sumterville, Darlington, Harleesville, 
South Carolina; Fayetteville, Waynesborough, Tarboro’, and Halifax, North 
Carolina; and then by the Portsmouth and Roanoke railroad, to Norfolk, in 
Virginia, or by the Petersburg railroad to Richmond, and thence, by the Richmond 
and Fredericksburg railroad, to Fredericksburg; and thence, by some route 
situated more or less remote from the Potomac river, passing perhaps through 
Falmouth and Stafford, and in rear of Dumfries and Alexandria, in a direction to 
meet the Washington and Baltimore railroad at Washington City … 
 
– (United States, 1835a, 51-52) – 
 
  
P.Q. responded again on 25 May 1836. After lengthy formalities, he asserted that 
the Halifax to Fayetteville via Waynesborough route would not secure travel unless it 
were to be connected through Raleigh; and if both the other coastal route and in inland 
route from Raleigh south were completed, the Raleigh route would prove superior. He 
supposed, since the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road was on its way to being realized, that 
Col. Long’s opinion could be adapted to the new situation; and disagreed that Weldon 
should be the only place on the Roanoke to terminate a railroad from Raleigh. The last 
letter written by G.L.C on the subject appeared in the October 1836 issue of the Farmers’ 
Register. He reiterated his support for the Halifax to Darlington line, and added that it 
could be constructed more cheaply than the interior route. Also, he pointed out the 
military advantages of this route. Briefly, he mentioned the dangers of monopolies and 
joint stock companies, and recommended a two-fifths investment on the part of the 
federal government in exchange for the mails and the transport of troops. The editor of 
the Farmers’ Register recommended in a closing note that should P.Q. and G.L.C. wish 
to continue their discussion that they should begin a new series that sets forth their view 
418 
 

















































THE POTENTIAL OF A RAILROAD FROM FAYETTEVILLE TO THE WEST 
 
 
The principal advantage to the development of industry that such a railroad could 
offer is the integration of these mineral rich counties into an existing rail network both to 
the east and to the west. The direct distance between the Egypt coalfields and Salisbury is 
approximately seventy miles. It might be appropriate to dismiss the construction of a 
railroad from Fayetteville to the Yadkin, or Wilmington to Morganton as financial and 
technically impractical for the early 1830s; but it seems incomprehensible two decades 
later when Wilmington had commenced work on the Wilmington, Charlotte, & 
Rutherford Railroad – a railroad that would pass due south of Fayetteville at Lumberton 
with a branch line to that town and its railroad. In the late nineteenth century, North 
Carolina historian James Sprunt briefly described the early efforts to build a railroad from 
Fayetteville to the west. On the eve of the Civil War, the Western Railroad (chartered in 
1852) extended from Fayetteville to the Chatham County coal fields at Egypt (near Gulf, 
North Carolina) and was isolated from the state’s other railroads. Fayetteville’s 
connection to the west was by way of plank roads. Sprunt expressed his puzzlement as to 
why it took so long to build a railroad to the Yadkin Valley when its vast resources had 
been widely known, and considered vital to the state’s interests (Sprunt, 1896, XLVI-LI).  
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Throughout the antebellum period, Fayetteville was a receiving point for the 
produce of the southwestern counties, and its plank road system extended west to 
Charlotte, south to Cheraw, and north to Winston-Salem (Cumming, 1966, 28-29). The 
town had been a commercial center since the colonial era and had enjoyed the advantages 
of its location: it was situated at the head of the navigation of the Cape Fear, and also 
well positioned on an evolving road network extending in a direct line along the Atlantic 
States north to south (today, it is the I-95 corridor). Yet, it had no other option but to rely 
on river transport for its exports, for north to south rail traffic was deflected from the 
direct line a considerable distance to Wilmington. Was this sufficient? 
Frederick Law Olmsted’s A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States; With Remarks 
on Their Economy is a valuable resource in understanding the conditions of transportation 
and the agricultural economy of North Carolina during the early 1850s. For example, 
Olmsted describes the transition between the coastal plain soils and the Piedmont soils, 
and the crops associated with each, between Weldon and (Old) Gaston on the roads 
following the south bank of the Roanoke. His experience with the poor operation of the 
stagecoach between Weldon and Gaston, the inadequate upkeep of the roads, and 
inaccurate scheduling of the train from Raleigh to Gaston belie serious organizational 
problems between the different railroads providing a “through ticket” south. In addition, 
Olmsted notes that the Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road had new “U” iron rails, but its cars 
were “old, dirty, and with dilapidated and moth-eaten furniture”; and the intervening 
agricultural land between Gaston and Raleigh appear “unproductive”  (Olmsted, 1856, 
315, 208-318).  
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His observations on the road from Raleigh to Fayetteville are of particular 
interest. Olmsted mentions two places along the route that help identify his route – 
Bank’s Plantations and Mrs. Barley’s – and notes that the last ten miles of the journey 
were on a plank road (Olmsted, 322-332). These locations appear on the Mac Rae – 
Brazier Map of 1833 and the United States Coast Survey Map of North Carolina of 1865 
(Cumming, 1955, Plate X; Plate XIII). Banks and Barkclaysville are located on the 
modern North Carolina roads SSR 1006 followed by SSR 1769 – together named the 
“Old State Road.” The Old Stage Road begins outside Raleigh on US 401, and continues 
to Erwin where it joins SR 217. The text does not contain enough details to trace the 
remaining miles from the crossing of the Cape Fear River at Erwin to Fayetteville, but it 
is likely that the ten miles of plank road was that which approximates US 401.  
Outside Raleigh, Olmsted examined cornfields and spoke with a farmer who 
considered twenty-five bushels (per acre) of corn a large crop, but the average crop was 
about fifteen bushels. The farmer stated that it cost too much to take the corn to market. 
Olmsted had been on foot ahead of the stage, and had not yet walked ten miles south of 
Raleigh. At Mrs. Barkley’s, he observed turpentine and rosin production (Olmsted, 320-
321, 328). It is likely, owing to fact that the Cape Fear River was about half the distance 
from the Barkley farm than Raleigh, the output of these works would have eventually 
found their market at Fayetteville (then downriver to Wilmington), rather than the 
Petersburg market.  
Olmsted witnessed the arrival of wagons of produce from the western counties 
during his visit at Fayetteville, and notes that some had come from as far away as the 
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Blue Ridge. These wagons, drawn by as many as six horses, could hold a load of about 
seventy-five bushels of grain. The wagons also carried cotton. He notes that the plank 
roads are a significant improvement in safety and efficiency in the transport of produce, 
and suggests that the region’s farmers might prefer this mode to railroads. However, he 
cites a story he heard from a farmer near Raleigh who sold his grain for a higher price by 
sending it to Petersburg by train rather than selling it locally; and he mentions both the 
efforts to build a railroad from Fayetteville to the coal field in Chatham County, and the 
town’s somewhat wasteful investment of $100,000 in 1820 to make the upper Cape Fear 
fit for navigation (361-363). When he departs Fayetteville by steamboat for Wilmington, 
he observes that the greater portion of the freight that was taken downriver to the port 
was turpentine (Olmsted, 358-359, 363-365, 369). 
It might be safe to conjecture that Fayetteville’s far-flung network of plank roads 
sufficed to bring in produce from the western regions, but it was merely an improvement 
upon what had existed before. The railroads being built in the regions around it during the 
late antebellum period, such as the North Carolina Railroad in the Piedmont, and the 
Wilmington, Charlotte, and Rutherford Railroad to the south, threaten to enclose this of 
south central North Carolina. Thus, the produce from the mountains would be closer to 
railheads at Charlotte, Salisbury, and Greensboro; and the produce of the Yadkin and 
upper Pee Dee would be intercepted south of Fayetteville. The travelers going south from 
Raleigh would have to make their way by Charlotte or Wilmington, or endure the painful, 
inefficient stagecoach ride such as Olmsted experienced. The most serious drawback to 
Fayetteville’s plank road network was its limiting effect upon industrial development.  
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During the Civil War, and for a period starting during the 1870s, the Endor Iron 
Works operated a successful smelting operation. It was ideally located near the Egypt 
coalfields (Cumnock). The Fayetteville & Western Railroad serviced the coalfields at this 
time. The coal and iron industry could have been established in the region earlier – its 
potential had been recognized earlier – had the railroad connections existed. While the 
navigation of the Cape Fear River from Fayetteville to Wilmington appears to have been 
both adequate and appropriate for transporting bulk such as iron and coal, a rail 
connection been the two towns was reconsidered during the early 1850s. 
 
We had an opportunity recently of hearing from one of the most liberal and 
intelligent merchants which that or any other community can boast of, that he 
favors a rail road from Wilmington to Fayetteville to connect with our Western 
Road to the Deep River Coal Mines, and thence to the N.C. Road at the Eastern 
terminus of the Western extension.  And we learn that a correspondence has been 
going on between himself and a gentleman here on the subject.  And further, we 
understand from the paragraph which we quoted in our last from the Wilmington 
Journal, that some such views were presented to the late meeting in that town to 
consider of the proposed road to Charlotte.  These facts induce us to say a few 
words, which in their absence we should consider wasted, in support of the 
connection via Fayetteville. There was a time when we thought the idea of a rail 
road from Wilmington to Fayetteville was supremely ridiculous.  That was when 
no successful rail road existed in the State, and when the experiment of running a 
rail road on the banks of a navigable stream had not even been made, much less 
shown to be eminently successful; and when our means could be better employed 
than opening a channel where Nature had already placed one which answered the 
purpose tolerable well, to say the least.  But that time is past. 
   
– (Wilmington Journal, 16 June 1854) – 
 
Unlike the Cape Fear River, with its course set by nature, a railroad from Chatham 
County through Fayetteville to Wilmington would offer the possibility of additional 
connections.   
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It seems to me that there are two important sections of North Carolina to be 
tapped by local Roads, in the first instance; but one of these local Roads will 
become a great line from East to West.  That is, the region of the country from 
Fayetteville, West, through the coal and iron counties of Moore and Chatham, to 
Salisbury, requires at this moment a local Road to Wilmington, through 
Fayetteville. 
 
– (Wilmington Journal, 3 July 1854) – 
 
The author of this article recognizes the potential of carrying the railroad to Salisbury, 
where it would intersect the North Carolina Railroad, and recommends branch lines into 
Robeson, Anson, Richmond, Union and Mecklenburg counties.  
The Report of the Committee on Int. Improvements on the Cape Fear and Deep 
River Navigation Company which was presented to the North Carolina General Assembly 
during their 1845-55 Session, discouraged the further use of railroads to exploit the coal 
and iron resources of the Deep River while continuing the support funding of the ongoing 
navigational improvements to the Cape Fear and Deep River drainage network. River 
transport, unfortunately, was linked to the existing operations at the coalfields. 
 
We cannot omit to mention, that from testimony before us, that a fatal blow will 
be given to these vast resources, should the Bill now before us, or some other 
suitable measure of relief, be rejected by the present General Assembly, for we 
are assured by Mr. McLane, that he is under express orders from his employers, to 
remove the force and machinery of every kind, under his charge, now on Deep 
River, and to abandon the coal field, if the Legislature refuse to grant the 
necessary relief, inasmuch as water transportation is so much cheaper and more 
desirable for coal than Railroads, and because no one Railroad, nor any number 
that are likely to be built, will be competent to carry off the coal that is expected 
to be taken out, and further, that another company, now ready to commence 
shipping coal, has suspended operations, until further aid is granted to the River. 
 




 The report indicates that seventeen of twenty-two locks and fourteen of seventeen 
dams, planned by an engineer named Douglass who had worked on the Lehigh Canal in 
Pennsylvania, had been completed. The works at Jones’ Falls, eight mile above 
Fayetteville, Smiley’s Falls, near Erwin, are mentioned favorably in allowing free 
navigation from Fayetteville to Haywood in Chatham County. A canal, one mile in 
length, needed to be cut around Pullen’s Falls, and the canal at Buckhorn Falls required 
additional excavation to make it wider and deeper. The existing locks and dams needed 
improvements as well. The committee presented some information on the coal and iron 
deposits of the Deep River, noting that the quality of the iron ore was suitable for the 
manufacturing of rails; and two companies manufacturing iron – one in Petersburg, 
Virginia and the other in Pottsville, Pennsylvania – had subscribed to $10,000 of stock in 
a proposed company that would be set up to smelt iron in the area (North Carolina, 1855, 
1, 6-7). A correspondence to the New York Times dated 10 December 1860 described the 
activities and facilities of the Deep River Coal and Iron Company and the Cape Fear Coal 
and Iron Company. In addition to smelting iron, the Deep River company had the 
capacity of producing 10,000 barrels of coal oil daily (New York Times, 22 January 
1861).  
 The history of the effort to improve navigation on the upper Cape Fear had always 
been problematic. The duration of construction for the multiple canals around the several 
falls appears to have been protracted. Hamilton Fulton, in his 1821 report to the Board of 
Public Improvements, noted that the dams above Branson’s Mill were so low that the 
canal needed to be excavated a foot from Buckhorn Falls to Haywood; however, he 
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recommended that the dams be raised in spite of Mr. Branson’s objections – Fulton refers 
the board to Branson for an explanation of these objections. His estimates for cutting and 
lockage for the new canal is $3,348, and $3,554 for improving Parker’s Creek (North 
Carolina, 1821, 30-32). In a letter to Governor Edward B. Dudley dated 16 February 
1837, George McNeill, agent for the Cape Fear Navigation Company, reports that the 
company had achieved, in part, a bateau navigation from Haywood to Buckhorn Falls. 
However, Mr. Wyche of the Board of Internal Improvements, under the direction of Mr. 
Kerr, determined without consulting that company that Buckhorn Falls could be 
circumvented by sluicing, and that the locks should be abandoned. The company had by 
that time, spent $40,000 on the canal and locks (Dudley, 1837-1840, 41-45).  
 The plank roads and canals, in spite of the confidence expressed by antebellum 
officials, were less efficient forms of transportation for developing an iron industry in 
North Carolina. That they were cheaper in the end is questionable. They certainly were 
not permanent. The Cape Fear and Deep rivers were are rich with the raw materials of 
iron production, and this was known since the early nineteenth century; and so the 
building of a railroad west from Fayetteville offered the potential for early industrial 
development. A connection between Wilmington and Salisbury during the 1850s would 
have provided a distribution network for iron product, and allowed for the emergence of 
manufacturing of finished iron products such as iron rails, boilers, hardware, and 
consumer products such as stoves at the commercial towns along the way.  
 Olmsted’s description of the arrival of wagons in Fayetteville and the subsequent 
intercourse between the merchants of that town and the drivers on the purchase of the 
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goods was a far different economic culture than the relentless flow of arrivals that had to 
be contracted for in advance. The turnpike and river were open to all at their pleasure, 
whereas the railroad operated on a schedule. A train of cars functioned as a mobile 
warehouse – a natural domain of agents and brokers – that could receive goods from all 
places on the route. Thus, the merchants of a town such as Fayetteville could have been 
relieved of bargaining in the street with their suppliers; rather the task would be reserved 
to a network of agents working in concert over a large area. They could keep the price of 
commodities uniform, and the warehouses of the commercial town would be adequately 
stocked to support permanent local industry. That the merchant could make the transition 
to industrialist is possible, but it is perhaps a vision too far removed from an economy 
based on agriculture and wood products to project a coherent system of production and 
consumption where tasks are fragmented over space with the whole process dependant on 
the timely delivery of raw materals. The ideology underpinning work culture of the south 
was Jeffersonian Democracy, with its emphasis on individual self-reliance and local 
autonomy. It follows that the means and the mode of transportation – if sufficient – 
should favor an ad hoc relationship between  suppliers of raw materals or crops, 
artificers, middlemen, and brokers. At the time, it was the accepted practice almost 
everywhere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
